At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:
1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem — PhilosophyRunner
what is morally normative to be “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” (similar to Gert’s SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ). — Mark S
First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.
Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.
The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.
Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism. — Mark S
I’m wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinz’s moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape. — Joshs
Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither side’s values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each side’s perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.
Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this? — Joshs
The OP is on the right track. Not just consequentialism, even Kantian deontological ethics is about cooperation. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." ~ I. Kant (Categorical Imperative). However, in me humble opinion, cooperation is morally ambiguous (re the Italian Mafia, the Chinese Triad, the Japanese Yakuza, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, etc.). — Agent Smith
I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.
Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?
We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems — Mark S
I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms — Mark S
Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other side’s perspective as a variation of their own. — Joshs
This leads to accusations of bad intent , immorality , stupidity and irrationality that each side constantly charges the other side with. Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. — Joshs
Claiming something like “Cooperation is moral” fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.
The recast claim “Solving cooperation problems is moral” does not suffer the same failure.
This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems – the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms. — Mark S
Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other side’s perspective as a variation of their own.
— Joshs
Is this similar to Lakoff's frames? — Tom Storm
Any quick ideas for how we break this worldview impasse? — Tom Storm
True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become). — Agent Smith
Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence. — Joshs
Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation. — PhilosophyRunner
... the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:
“Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral” and
“Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.” — Mark S
What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms – no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup). — Mark S
So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.
And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.
If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. — PhilosophyRunner
We find MACS’ ultimate source by answering “Why do cultural moral norms exist?”
As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup – the opposite of MACS’ function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start. — Mark S
I think your mistake here is saying that observing how cultural moral norms are selected is in their ability to solve universal cooperation problems for everyone. That is simply not what is observed. Rather we see many instances of cultural moral norms that are selected to strengthen cooperation in the in group, while dominating the out group. — PhilosophyRunner
Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. — PhilosophyRunner
We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell? — Tom Storm
...cis white hetro middle class males..."Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"
That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as
“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.” — Mark S
“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.” — Mark S
Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method? — Tom Storm
A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated. — Mark S
Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed. — Mark S
The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society. — Mark S
Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here. — Tom Storm
How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society? — Tom Storm
MACS’s principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better. — Mark S
Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses’ judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S
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