The experts will correct me if I am wrong, but this is a recapitulation of 'the beginning' of philosophy. It aligns with what we know of the prehistory of ideas, though it may seem odd to the modern ear. Perhaps you will understand easily enough that I see your post on a screen and naturally infer a person behind it expressing thoughts in the same way that I am expressing thoughts. And it is just as natural to me to see the cat creeping up on the bird and the bird looking around, and infer an internal life for each with intentions and understandings. And why not also for trees and rocks and thunderstorms and volcanos?

The alternative is to think one is oh so special, to have an internal being. The modern depopulation of the world of all the myriad sprites and gods and other spirits and agencies, right up to the Great Sky God himself, is actually the bizarre and unnatural position that stands in need of explanation and justification.

I agree with what you say here. I think you are referring to the "problem of other minds", right?
But, i still cannot see how "the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)?"

The idea of "no object, without a subject"-- that comes from Berkeley, right?
I assume according to the author, In order to qualify as an object, they must have an internal side... but I cannot see exactly how?
Schopenhauer/Kant experts help?!

@andrewk I think this is right up your alley based on how you answered some of my Kantian questions years ago?

I'll put this here by way of waving a little flag at one of the experts, and linking to a related thread:

To me, the absolutely crucial thing about Kant is his recognition that 'things conform to thoughts' rather than vice versa. I still think very few people really get the significance of that. If you understand it, it completely undercuts 'scientism'. — Wayfarer

I can't help you unfortunately as I'm not familiar with the original texts and I'm not sure I'm understanding your opening post correctly.

The only way I can make sense of it that my experience/representation of a tree is personal and unique to me, even if you and I were to perceive the same tree from exactly the same spot at the same time and assuming identical perception (eye sight, smell etc.). I fell from a tree once and I'm reminded of it, you might not have been. Eg., there's a relational and contextual aspect to all our observations but I'm pretty sure this is not what he meant.

I am actually pulling out my Schop books now....!! it is certainly not a straightforward argument

Thanks!
more context: (although i am still trying to work out the "PSR part" too...)

"Suppose then, I (or anyone) am experiencing a field of representations. Within this field, I notice that a section of it, namely, my body, has a subjective aspect that is congruent with the very mind (that is, my mind) that contains the entire field of representations in which that body is located. Since my body is a representation, it is in my mind, but my mind also permeates and enlivens that very body from the inside. It does not, however, permeate and enliven the remaining representations in my perceptual field. Within this knotted context, Schopenhauer is struck by how incomprehensible it would be if the remaining representations in my perceptual field – the chair, table, knives, forks, etc. – were not also backed by a mentality similar to what I apprehend directly as underlying the representation of my body. Here is the same argument, formulated from a slightly different angle. From the subjective standpoint, every representation in my experience is “my” representation and is a mental entity. The representations are identical in this respect. From the objective standpoint, the representation of my body has a subjective backing, but since the other representations in my perceptual field do not display one, it is difficult to know whether they have one or not. The subjective backing to my body is my consciousness, and if – and this is the crucial point – there is to be a perfect parallel and consistency between the subjective and objective standpoints in general, as the root of the PSR would dictate, then the remaining representations in my perceptual field must have a subjective backing as well."

From §19:

The double knowledge which we have of the nature and action of our own body, and which is given in two completely different ways, has now been clearly brought out. Accordingly, we shall use it further as a key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature. We shall judge all objects which are not our own body, and therefore are given to our consciousness not in the double way, but only as representations, according to the analogy of this body. We shall therefore assume that as, on the one hand, they are representation, just like our body, and are in this respect homogeneous with it, so on the other hand, if we set aside their existence as the subject's representation, what still remains over must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in ourselves we call will. For what other kind of existence or reality could we attribute to the rest of the material world? From what source could we take the elements out of which we construct such a world? Besides the will and the representation, there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable for us. If we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world, which immediately exists only in our representation, then we give it that reality which our own body has for each of us, for to each of us this is the most real of things. But if now we analyse the reality of this body and its actions, then, beyond the fact that it is our representation, we find nothing in it but the will; with this even its reality is exhausted. Therefore we can nowhere find another kind of reality to attribute to the material world. If, therefore, the material world is to be something more than our mere representation, we must say that, besides being the representation, and hence in itself and of its inmost nature, it is what we find immediately in ourselves as will. I say 'of its inmost nature,' but we have first of all to get to know more intimately this inner nature of the will, so that we may know how to distinguish from it what belongs not to it itself, but to its phenomenon, which has many grades. Such, for example, is the circumstance of its being accompanied by knowledge, and the determination by motives which is conditioned by this knowledge. As we proceed, we shall see that this belongs not to the inner nature of the will, but merely to its most distinct phenomenon as animal and human being. Therefore, if I say that the force which attracts a stone to the earth is of its nature, in itself, and apart from all representation, will, then no one will attach to this proposition the absurd meaning that the stone moves itself according to a known motive, because it is thus that the will appears in man.

Here he seems to admit that it's an assumption and an analogy. However, he does want the conclusion to be taken seriously, that the world in itself is will. It's a long time since I read it but I remember finding it too much of a leap.

I can't recall specifically how the argument here is related to fourfold root, other than that this leads to the two-aspect view of self as object and self as consciousness or will, which when applied to objects leads to the characterization of their own inner aspect as will-like too. On the basis that the thing-in-itself is a unity, whatever is inmost in us is what is also inmost in objects, though taking different forms.

Nice, thanks!
Here, but, the above is not really an argument for will as being Kant's thing-in-itself....it seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations (he doesn't even mention thing-in-itself" in the above)... So he still needs to get from "will as inner side of representation" to thing-in-itself. How does he do that??
he later relates will and thing-in-itself? I would assume it would be soon thereafter (one would think).

seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations — KantDane21

Yes, but it does at least help answer the question in the OP. I’m not going to attempt to set out the overarching argument that the thing in itself is will, mainly because I can’t remember it and I don’t want to read Schopenhauer again. :smile:

Will give longer response, but I like to think of Schop as a sort of Kantian Neo-Platonist. Will is the Unified One, but somehow it immediately has an objectified aspect of lower gradations. He doesn’t explain why there needs to be this double-aspect as Will has no purpose. A poster long ago, mentioned the idea that the World of Phenonmenon is really a sort of playground for the Noumenal Will to reach teleology, but not realizing that it simply ends in strife for each manifestation. Anyways, that’s all speculation of Schop. All you need to know is that Will has a phenomenal aspect whereby there is a subject for an object. The animal is he place whereby appearances play out. This is the root of his PSR and thus the world of appearance of an object for a subject. He thinks all objects, including forces, have a will aspect to it, but it is unclear to me if all objects create appearance as animals do. To my understanding, his construct needs the animal subject to have always been in the equation. Time is a flat circle then. It appears to start billions of years earlier but really always stars with the first subjective being which oddly can never be prior to itself. It’s like the hand drawing itself Escher painting.

This is a really good discussion with a good opening post, even though I don't understand much of it. You're trying to trick me into learning about Schopenhauer.

How does the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)? — KantDane21

I dont think that PSR , in and of itself, establishes Schopenhauer’s conclusions. If it did, then generations of philosophers who accept PSR would have to accept Schop’s metaphysics, which most don’t. It is the original insights he supplements PSR with that allows him to see it as leading to the idea that all objects have a subjective side.

If everybody agrees the nature of human intelligence is representational, what would be used to examine the “inner nature” of representations?

What sense does it make to ask if representations have a nature, if to find out what it is, if the only possible way to understand what it is, is by means of the very thing being asked about?

Nice of you to say so, but I consider myself more 'casual reader' than 'expert' :yikes:

The aspect of this argument that most perplexes me is the suggestion that all objects possess subjectivity - for that is panpsychicm, which to my knowledge is not associated with Schopenhauer (where it can plausibly be with Spinoza and Liebniz). I think the passage quoted by @Jamal really nails it - that the sole real existent is will: 'Besides the will and the representation, there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable for us.' But, as he then mentions, and several others agree, it's hard to see how the argument from the principle of sufficient reason supports this contention.

. . . and internally as will. — KantDane21

Interesting. In my experiences in the Art of Dreaming (lucid dreaming) I become pure will.

If everybody agrees the nature of human intelligence is representational, what would be used to examine the “inner nature” of representations? — Mww

Wouldn't that correspond to the real nature of the knowing subject? If the domain of representations corresponds to 'the phenomenal realm', then the nature of the knowing subject corresponds to 'being in itself' (to coin a phrase. This is the subject of an interesting blog post.)

That blog was a nice clear read. Appearances and reality and the demarcation between them - 'through the Kantian wall of mystery' are a bit of a mind fuck...

Yes, a good blog.

But again the argument invents a thing-in-itself about which nothing can be said, then proceeds to tell us all about it. Again, it splits the world into subject and object and pretends surprise when it finds it can only talk from a subjective position.

As with any dichotomy, presuming a split between object and subject leads to an irreparable fissure.

And again, the subject/object dichotomy is the private/public dichotomy dismantled by the private language argument. The stuff we talk about is always, already public.

Hence Wittgenstein moves past Schopenhauer. Of course, you already know this. I'm just marking it out.

, my apologies for the digression.

If the domain of representations corresponds to 'the phenomenal realm', then the nature of the knowing subject corresponds to 'being in itself' — Wayfarer

If that is to be the case, it arises from a non-Kantian theory, insofar as conceptions are also representations, but with respect to their origin and use in understanding, have nothing to do with the phenomenal realm of sensibility.

Sorry….I don’t know how to relate the knowing subject/being in itself to representation/phenomenal realm. I agree the self can never be a phenomenon, but we are still allowed to think that which represents the process of thinking, which, obviously, gets us into all kindsa trouble.

The link was interesting, made some good points and some I could leave be, so thanks for that. You have a highly commendable habit of coming up with the good stuff.

To me, the absolutely crucial thing about Kant is his recognition that 'things conform to thoughts' rather than vice versa. I still think very few people really get the significance of that. If you understand it, it completely undercuts 'scientism'. — Wayfarer

Kant's idea is that phenomena – representations – "conform to" categories of reason (not "things" & "thoughts", respectively). If you understand it, it undercuts idealism.

https://epochemagazine.org/14/kant-and-the-idealists-reality-problem/

the subject/object dichotomy is the private/public dichotomy dismantled by the private language argument. — Banno

:fire:

I do not understand this argument. — KantDane21

It's not an "argument"; Schopenauer takes his extension of Kant's 'phenomena-noumena' distinction (à la Plato's 'appearances-forms' & Descartes' 'subject-object' / 'mind-body') as axiomatic and stipulates this 'idea' in the first sentence of the World As Will and Representation (vol. one): "The world is MY representation (Die Welt ist MEINE Vorstellung)."

If you understand it, it undercuts idealism. — 180 Proof

It undercuts Berkeley's form of idealism, but Kant still maintains transcendental idealism.

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance– which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing –matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are call external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us. (A370)

presuming a split between object and subject leads to an irreparable fissure. — Banno

The separateness of subject and object is undeniable. I experience myself as a subject in a domain of objects. You can't wish it out of existence.

the argument invents a thing-in-itself about which nothing can be said, then proceeds to tell us all about it. — Banno

I don't agree. I understand the assertion of the 'thing in itself' as only an observation about the limits of the understanding, i.e. we don't understand how or what things truly are, but are limited to knowing how they appear to be.

The separateness of subject and object is undeniable. I experience myself as a subject in a domain of objects. You can't wish it out of existence. — Wayfarer

Of course. Similarly, the separateness of up and down, of left and right, of in and out, is undeniable. You don't get one without the other because they are grammatically linked; the meaning (use) of the one is found in the other.

we don't understand how or what things truly are — Wayfarer

And yet we do understand how things are. There are true sentences. Drop the "truly", which does nothing but prolong the reification of the thing-in-itself.

What there is, is the stuff we talk about. This is a better way to deal with these issues than trying to make use of the grammar of object and subject that splits the word asunder, then puzzles that it cannot put the pieces back together.

And yet we do understand how things are. — Banno

said Ptolemy

Do you deny that there are true sentences?

we don't understand how or what things truly are — Wayfarer

You understand that this is a sentence in English, in a forum on philosophical issues, in reply to your post...

And so on.

And again, the subject/object dichotomy is the private/public dichotomy dismantled by the private language argument. The stuff we talk about is always, already public. — Banno

This is obfuscating what's going on. The language is public, but the experience is private. If you are making some argument that subjectivity is only had via language acquisition, I give you proof in that other animals assuredly have inner lives, and are not constructed via a publically-domained language capacity.

I can only assume that's where you are going, otherwise, it's a red herring outright, as it is a digression without context.

There must be a what it feels like to be a toothbrush? A good, imaginative writer, can easily pen a short story on that topic, oui?

I was just sitting there, in me blue cup, mindin' me own business when suddenly, a gentle hand gripped me, and lifted me up ...

The main question that is hard to answer with Schopenhauer, is how it is that there are objects when there is only Will. What is objectification of Will? He goes on about Forms as the original objects, and how artists perceive them best in their expressions in art and music. But this generates more questions..
Why does Will (unified and solo) have Forms? Why do forms have lower gradations of physical objects? It's all a bit obtuse.

He does go on about The World of Appearance being a mirror for Will, so perhaps it's something like: Will becomes objectified in order to experience itself and understand its own nature through the subject-object relationship.. But that is not explicitly stated in Schop as far as I know. It also gives a sort of story/mythos and perhaps even teleology, which really doesn't seem to be what Shop liked.

The main question that is hard to answer with Schopenhauer, is how it is that there are objects when there is only Will. What is objectification of Will? He goes on about Forms as the original objects, and how artists perceive them best in their expressions in art and music. But this generates more questions..
Why does Will (unified and solo) have Forms? Why do forms have lower gradations of physical objects? It's all a bit obtuse. — schopenhauer1

From on another forum "what exists is that we can encounter but cannot will". Was Schopenhauer part of German idealism?

As far as I can tell, Schopenhauer's will is either poorly defined or is left (deliberately?) undefined, like Robert M. Pirsig's Quality in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

I regret to inform you Herr Schopenhauer, but the conditions of my employment are as of the moment unacceptable. However, I'll be regularly monitoring your ideas in case we might be able to come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement. :lol:

It isn't defined because it is gotten at indirect means. He can only gather that it strives, and thus there needs to be a playground for striving to take place... I guess?

He at the same time seems to want Will to be a double-aspect to reality, yet seems to also think it is prior in some sense. The Will, "wills life". But that implies that the Will was there first before the "will-to-live". But then again, I don't know.