Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is ‘collective’ in the sense that we’re all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. — Wayfarer

But here you refute exactly the same argument in your support of mathematical platonism. You are derisive of the attempts to see number as unreal and your opposition derives entirely from the fact that our mathematical models , assuming number is real, have been extremely successful in predicting previously unknown facts about the world.

Firstly, if number ought be considered real on the grounds of the success of models which treat it as if it were, then our models which treat the external world as equally real have had even more success and so should count even more as evidence of a real external world.

Secondly, your argument for mathematical platonism itself relies on the reality of an external world described by physics because without it, the success of mathematical theories in predicting physical constants is not at all surprising and is evidence only of internal consistency.

Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is ‘collective’ in the sense that we’re all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. Hegel made a lot out of that, didn’t he? — Wayfarer

So,are those "conditions" mind independent? We know they are independent of any individual mind, and if there is no collective mind, then how would they not be mind-independent?

if individual minds "parse experience in the same way" that explains how we experience things in similar ways generally, but it cannot explain how we all see the same things at each corner of the table. Nor does it explain how my dog sees the ball landing where I see it, since the dog is not a member "of the same language group, culture, and so on".

your opposition derives entirely from the fact that our mathematical models , assuming number is real, have been extremely successful in predicting previously unknown facts about the world. — Isaac

Not 'entirely'. The fact that mathematics can make predictions that can then be confirmed or refuted by experience is mainly an argument against fictionalism or conventionalism. My argument for mathematical platonism more generally is simply that number (etc) is real, but not materially existent. Numbers, and many other 'intelligible objects', are real, in that they are the same for anyone who can grasp them, but they're only able to be grasped by a rational intelligence. So they're independent of your mind or mine, but are only real as objects of the intelligence.

I think the conventional physicalist view is that ideas, as such, are a product of the mind, which in turn is a product of brain, which in turn is a product of evolution, and so on. That is the ontology of mainstream physicalism, as I understand it. Whereas this attitude is that these intelligibles are not a product of the mind, but can only be grasped by a mind. It is close to what is called objective idealism.

For Kant and Hegel, the only reality we know is constructed by the activities of the intellect. Hegel’s idealism differed in that Hegel believed that ideas are social, which is to say that the ideas that we possess individually are shaped by the ideas of the culture of which we're a part. Our minds have been shaped by the thoughts of other people through the language we speak, the traditions and mores of our society, and the cultural and religious institutions of which we are a part. We're embedded in that matrix of language, thought and convention.

Again I'm not saying, and I don't think any mature idealism is saying that the world is 'all in the mind' or that objects per se don't exist. It's just that they don't possess the mind-independent status that physicalism wants to imbue them with. It does not seek to orient itself with respect to experience of objects, in the way that empirical philosophy seeks to do (even if it fully respects empirical philosophy in respect of that vast domain within which it is authoritative).

My argument for mathematical platonism more generally is simply that number (etc) is real, but not materially existent. Numbers, and many other 'intelligible objects', are real, in that they are the same for anyone who can grasp them, but they're only able to be grasped by a rational intelligence. So they're independent of your mind or mine, but are only real as objects of the intelligence. — Wayfarer

For the second time in this thread you seem to be confusing an argument for a statement. There's no argument there, no series of logical steps from a common foundation. You've just said "numbers are real". A sentence of the form "X is y" is a proposition, not an argument.

So...

these intelligibles [numbers, which are real] are not a product of the mind — Wayfarer

...but...

the only reality we know is constructed by the activities of the intellect — Wayfarer

How do you square those two? If the only reality is "constructed by the activities of the intellect", then how can real numbers (which you claim are a part of reality), be "not a product of the mind"?

Either reality (part of which you claim includes numbers), is a product of the mind or it isn't.

It still remains that if whatever it is that appears as the world and its objects is not a collective mind then, since it is independent of individual minds, it follows that it is mind-independent,

As you should know, I think the world and its objects are a collective, that is an inter-subjective, representation, so of course I am going to agree that the empirical world is in that sense mind dependent. But whatever it is that appears as the empirical world cannot be said to be mind-dependent unless God or some universal or collective mind is posited.

And further "whatever it is" cannot be anything for us other than the empirical world, which means we cannot rightly say it is mind-dependent or material.

How do you square those two? If the only reality is "constructed by the activities of the intellect", then how can real numbers (which you claim are a part of reality), be "not a product of the mind"?

Either reality (part of which you claim includes numbers), is a product of the mind or it isn't. — Isaac

When materialist theories of mind say that something is a product of the mind, then it is positing an identity or equivalence between brain and mind. That is 'brain-mind identity theory', isn't it? That is a reductive explanation, i.e. it seeks to reduce ideas to a lower-level explanation i.e. the neurobiological.

So I'm attempting to argue for the generally Kantian view that knowledge comprises a synthesis of experience and intellect. Within that context what I'm arguing is that some fundamental ideas (what Kant calls the categories, and also logical and arithmetical primitives) are apprehended or discovered by the mind - that they're not a product of the brain, in terms of being understandable as a configuration of grey matter (i.e. 'discovered not invented'.) They are real on a different level of explanation or abstraction than that which materialism proposes (pretty much as per the last paragraph in the Schopenhauer quote I provided in this post.)

But whatever it is that appears as the empirical world cannot be said to be mind-dependent unless God or some universal or collective mind is posited. — Janus

I agree that it's a delicate philosophical position. I drafted a piece on that on Medium about it, from which:

Consider this. All of the vast amounts of data being nowadays collected about the universe by our incredibly powerful space telescopes and particle colliders is still synthesised and converted into conceptual information by scientists. And that conceptual activity remains conditioned by, and subject to, our sensory and intellectual capabilities — determined by the kinds of sensory beings we are, and shaped by the attitudes and theories we hold. And we’re never outside of that web of conceptual activities — at least, not as long as we’re conscious beings. That is the sense in which the Universe exists ‘in the mind’ — not as a figment of someone’s imagination, but as a combination or synthesis of perception, conception and theory in the human mind (which is more than simply your mind or mine). That synthesis constitutes our experience-of-the-world.

Another example from Western philosophy is provided in an account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy:

“The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied [by idealism] than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room [or the reality of Johnson’s rock]. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper” ~ Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, p105.

What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of the rock, or the pen, or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. That’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. After all, the definition of ‘empirical’ is ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience.’ So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question.

So there is no need to posit a ‘supermind’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for. — Mind at Large

I note in the essay that this is in line with the Buddhist view - refer to it for further details.

I'm attempting to argue ... that knowledge comprises a synthesis of experience and intellect. ... that some fundamental ideas ... are apprehended or discovered by the mind - that they're not a product of the brain — Wayfarer

We're still waiting for the argument. So far, all you've done is claim it.

Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything. — Jamal

This is very consistent with the Christian (theological) view of the temporal continuity of objects, commonly represented as inertia. Newton stated that his first law of motion is dependent on the Will of God. If God pulls out His Will (which is His choice to do at any moment as time passes), then the temporal continuity of objects, which constitutes the material existence of an object, represented as mass, disintegrates, and we have no more material objects.

I don't disagree with your point that all knowledge is in a form conditioned by the nature of human perception, intelligence and judgement: I think that is indisputably obvious.

But this: "What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of the rock, or the pen, or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species"

I think goes too far. All our knowledge is in a form conditioned by our world-making intelligence, but the content is a function of something beyond that intelligence.

And this:" So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question.

So there is no need to posit a ‘supermind’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for."

is just another dualistic position, the converse of which would be that it could be, for all we know, an answerable question. And we do come up with different mutually exclusive answers, but we cannot ascertain which answer is the more correct or even if the notion of any answer couched in dualistic terms (as all our answers inevitably are) could have any bearing at all on a non-dual reality.

The element of truth in the idea that there is nothing to account for because the question is unanswerable is contextual and a matter of interpretation. like the element of truth in its negation. All discursive truths are dualistic, and thus inadequate to a non-dual reality, but then dualistic truths are all we have that can be stated.

This is Hegel's perspective, as I understand it, and the reason he rejects Kant's noumena. If the noumenal cannot be anything more than literally nothing for us then it cannot be part of the discursive conversation. It cannot be the basis for any conclusions about the nature of reality.

You seem to want to have your cake and eat it: that is you say there is nothing to account for, that it is an unanswerable question, and yet you want to draw firm discursive conclusions from that idea. From our necessarily dualistic intelligence we want to account for the fact that humans (and animals) share a common world and the only two possibilities we can think of are a mind-independent actuality or an actuality produced by a collective or universal mind.

We know there can be no way of definitively choosing between those two possibilities, but one or the other might seem more plausible. What seems more plausible to individuals comes down to what their grounding assumptions are, that is it is a matter of taste; and there is no way to show that it could be anything more than a matter of taste.

We know there can be no way of definitively choosing between those two possibilities, but one or the other might seem more plausible. What seems more plausible to individuals comes down to what their grounding assumptions are, that is it is a matter of taste; and there is no way to show that it could be anything more than a matter of taste. — Janus

Your reply resonates with me. And this conclusion is one I have often suspected, as a matter of taste informed or driven by aesthetics. Some varieties of meaning making (ontology) seeming to be more aesthetically pleasing than others.

Some varieties of meaning making (ontology) seeming to be more aesthetically pleasing than others. — Tom Storm

Exactly, and as the old adage tells us: "There's no accounting for taste".

Thanks, good feedback, I'll take that on board. But I don't agree it's a matter of taste, although I will agree that it might be due to the limitations of my own understanding. But saying it's a matter of taste is again tantamount to making it a matter of opinion, which it isn't.

(Again, I found the book I read last year before taking a break from the forum, Mind and the Cosmic Order, brought a lot of these ideas into focus. It's worth just browsing the abstracts.)

But saying it's a matter of taste is again tantamount to making it a matter of opinion, which it isn't. — Wayfarer

I agree that the ultimate truth, if there is one, cannot be a matter of taste or opinion, but what humans think is the ultimate truth is inevitably so, it seems to me. Thanks for the book recommendation: I think I may have already downloaded that book, but in any case I'll take a look when time permits.

But saying it's a matter of taste is again tantamount to making it a matter of opinion, which it isn't. — Wayfarer

Not opinion. I think we are drawn to forms of reasoning and inferences which appeal to our aesthetic sense. The very fact that certain ideas become the focus of our attention is itself an expression of preferences and attractions.

One more thing. I know this is a very difficult point to articulate but appreciate the opportunity you have provided for me to try and explain it.

From our necessarily dualistic intelligence we want to account for the fact that humans (and animals) share a common world and the only two possibilities we can think of are a mind-independent actuality or an actuality produced by a collective or universal mind. — Janus

There's an idea in the early Buddhist texts (which I will probably add to the draft I linked to):

By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. — Kaccayanagotta Sutta

You can see how this 'polarity' might map against the 'only two possibilities' you posit.

That is why I say that it is 'the idea of the non-existence of the world' that gives rise to the perceived necessity of there being a 'mind-at-large' which is thought to sustain it. It is thought that in the absence of this global mind, the world would not exist if not being perceived. But, says the Buddha, that is to fall into the 'polarity' of supposing that the world either 'truly exists' or 'doesn't exist'. 'When one sees the arising of the world' means, I think, attaining insight into the unconscious process of 'world-making' which the mind is continually engaging in. It is seeing through that process which is the aim of Buddhist philosophy.

(I expect you might find some discussion of this in the book you mentioned on non-dualism by David Loy. On that note, enough out of me for the time being, as I always I write too much. I've unexpectedly gotten a full-time tech-writing role for the next six months and next week I'm diving in the deep end so I have to switch focus for a while. Not that I'll dissappear completely. Thanks for reading.)

That is why I say that it is 'the idea of the non-existence of the world' that gives rise to the perceived necessity of there being a 'mind-at-large' which is thought to sustain it. It is thought that in the absence of this global mind, the world would not exist if not being perceived. But, says the Buddha, that is to fall into the 'polarity' of supposing that the world either 'truly exists' or 'doesn't exist'. 'When one sees the arising of the world' means, I think, attaining insight into the unconscious process of 'world-making' which the mind is continually engaging in. It is seeing through that process which is the aim of Buddhist philosophy.

(I expect you might find some discussion of this in the book you mentioned on non-dualism by David Loy — Wayfarer

Yes, existence and non-existence is just another dichotomy of dualistic thought. I'm not sure how well it maps against the idealism/ materialism polemic though, since in my understanding, , the world exists in either case, as ideas in the mind of God or actual consciousness for different forms of idealism, pace Berkeley and hegel respectively, or as an ever-changing configuration of matter/ energy in the case of materialism. Materialism takes different from too, from naive realism to ontic structural realism and others.

If we want to have a metaphysics these seem to be the only two possibilities to choose from. In Loy's book Nonduality, he points out that Nagarjuna's philosophy, the Madhyamika dialectic, abjures all and any metaphysical views on the grounds that any view, being dualistic in character, simply fails to capture the non-dual reality. Gautama is also renowned for discouraging metaphysical views of any kind.

The interesting corollary seems to be that dualistic views have only an empirical provenance, and any claim that any such view could have significance beyond the empirical context is nonsensical. Surprisingly this seems to be consonant with some aspects of logical positivism, although of course the positivist idea that empirical hypotheses and theories, which go beyond merely observational claims, can be verified, is itself nonsensical.

I find this idea of the nonsensicality of dualistic views projected into the metaphysical context most compelling, as I think you already know, since I have been flogging it for quite a while now. Of course the wrinkle in the fabric is that duality/ nonduality is also a dualistic dichotomy, so it seems that all metaphysical roads lead to aporia. This is probably why the Buddha discouraged any concern with philosophy and advocated practice designed to quieten the dualistic tendencies of the mind in order to enter nondual consciousness and see things afresh from there.

Not sure why Schopenhauer would be considered off here for positing the subject-object. The object is intrinsically tied to a subject. The object qua subject- the thing-in-itself is what, without a perceiver exactly? It's something, sure. Schopenhauer conceived of Will as this something.

HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed.

It's something, sure. Schopenhauer conceived of Will as this something. — schopenhauer1

To my way of thinking Schopenhauer was "off" for positing that this "something" we cannot help imagining without being able to have any definitive idea of what it is, is something definite, i.e. Will. It is an anthropomorphic or biomorphic projection of the idea of human unconscious or animal instinct on his part, and as far as I can tell he has no grounds for such a projection whatsoever. I would change my mind if someone could demonstrate convincingly that he did have justifiable grounds, but I am yet to encounter such a demonstrative argument, or even the whiff of one.

Spinoza had essentially the same idea with his "conatus", and I don't think his position on that fares any better; in fact I consider it the weakest aspect of his philosophy.

It was basically introspection writ large.

It was basically introspection writ large. — schopenhauer1

Probably true, but is there any warrant for postulating that what we think we find introspectively is universal?

Surprisingly this seems to be consonant with some aspects of logical positivism, although of course the positivist idea that empirical hypotheses and theories, which go beyond merely observational claims, can be verified, is itself nonsensical — Janus

Buddhists have a much broader definition of what constitutes 'experience', based on the experience arising from the jhanas. Even though Buddhists themselves wouldn't describe those states in terms of 'the supernatural', the Buddha himself is described as 'lokuttara' translated as 'world-transcending'. And the jhanas clearly exceed the boundaries of what would pass for 'empirical experience' in the modern sense.

Getting back to constructivism*. As Charles Pinter puts it,

If you lift your eyes from this [screen], what is revealed to you is a spread-out world of objects of many shapes, colors and kinds. Perhaps what you see are the familiar furnishings of your room, and if you look out a window you may see houses and trees, or a distant panorama of hills and fields. In fact, the word panorama is very apt: The root of the word is orama, the Greek word for what is seen with the eyes, and the prefix is pan, as in pantheism, meaning all. What you behold is a comprehensive display of the things before you, and this display is given to you as a single, undivided experience.

But at the same time, although this scene appears 'given' to our perception, in reality it is the faculty of apperception which combines all of the stimuli arising from the inputs into a unified scene - the panorama. And the process which enables the experience of unified cognition, called the subjective unity of perception, is (according to this source) an aspect of Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness'. That reference claims, citing research, that the faculty which synthesises the various disparate elements of experience is not well understood; it says that 'The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry.'

Yet you can say that it is within this domain of the subjective unity of experience, that we 'make sense' of experience. Isn't this where the observation of cause and effect actually takes place? Isn't this the domain in which order is sought and connections are made? And where is that domain? Is it 'out there', in the world, or 'in here' in the observing mind? Or both? Or neither? Not claiming to have an answer, but I think it's an interesting question.

-------

*

Constructivism is a philosophical theory about the nature of knowledge and reality. The central idea behind constructivism is that knowledge and reality are constructed by human beings, rather than discovered. According to constructivism, our experiences and interactions with the world shape our understanding of it, and our perceptions and beliefs are constructed as a result of these experiences.

In other words, constructivists argue that there is no such thing as an objective reality that exists independently of our perception and interpretation of it. Instead, they maintain that our understanding of reality is shaped by our experiences and the mental structures we use to process and interpret those experiences. — ChatGPT

HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.

If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, the op does not make clear the relationship between the PSR and the will for Schopenhauer. It is stated as "no object without a subject" which is no consistent with my understanding of the PSR, and also the inverse "no subject without an object" is derived without any demonstration of the logic behind this inversion. So it is no wonder that you are confused. Maybe can help to explain this.

I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.

If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external. — Metaphysician Undercover

Certainly, god has no place in Schops metaphysics. Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine…

Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. But it never achieved anything. It is the illusion of satisfaction. It’s the devils playground. So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion.

The problem again is how the one becomes Forms and many.

Buddhists have a much broader definition of what constitutes 'experience', based on the experience arising from the jhanas. Even though Buddhists themselves wouldn't describe those states in terms of 'the supernatural', the Buddha himself is described as 'lokuttara' translated as 'world-transcending'. And the jhanas clearly exceed the boundaries of what would pass for 'empirical experience' in the modern sense. — Wayfarer

Would the jhanas not be states of mind or concentration, rather than experience or perception of any particular thing? Empirical experience or perception is characterized by being of publicly available objects. Dreaming is a state of mind that one might call "world-transcending', but it is a temporary state. If samadhi states are sustainable, or even may become permanent, then this would count as world-transcending in the sense that worldly experience is dualistic, or at least understood dualistically. I think our ordinary experience is non-dual and that it is the experience of duality which is a kind of illusion: "samsara is nirvana".

What you behold is a comprehensive display of the things before you, and this display is given to you as a single, undivided experience.

Everything is not seen at once; the eye flits around in ordinary waking consciousness, noticing this, then noticing that, so I'm not sure what is meant here by "single, undivided experience". There may be "gaps" where nothing is noticed in between noticing particular things, but there seems to be no breaks in the sense of being totally unconscious conscious ( except in deep sleep states or anaesthesia), no moments where there is absolutely no awareness of anything at all, whether external phenomena or bodily sensation or emotional response, so perhaps that is what is meant.

Yet you can say that it is within this domain of the subjective unity of experience, that we 'make sense' of experience. Isn't this where the observation of cause and effect actually takes place? Isn't this the domain in which order is sought and connections are made? And where is that domain? Is it 'out there', in the world, or 'in here' in the observing mind? Or both? Or neither? Not claiming to have an answer, but I think it's an interesting question. — Wayfarer

So, I can't think what "the subjective unity of experience" could mean other than that we have a sense of continuity of awareness, and in relation both to the world of objects and bodily sensations, there is a general sense that everything "fits" into an overall conceptual web of relation between the self and other things and processes, both external and internal, due to an experienced impression of familiarity. Psychedelics can break down that ordinary sense of familiarity, a sense which after all is a kind of culturally acquired illusion.

To me the "in here" and 'out there" dichotomy stems from the ordinary understanding of being a sensate body in a world of sensed objects. The "internal sensations belong to the body, and what are perceived as objects in the environment are perceived as external to the body, since the body is experienced as being in a world or environment, and we can feel our bodies "from the inside" so to speak, but we cannot ordinarily feel objects from the inside..

Much more beyond this basic understanding could be said about this difficult topic, and this is precisely the domain of phenomenology as I understand it. On the other hand all phenomenological analysis can give us are different perspectives from different starting points or assumptions, and all such perspectives are going to be dualistic in character and will have their own aporias. I think this is because all discursive dualistic understandings of what is intrinsically non-dual must be, in the final analysis, aporetic. It's like trying to chase or even eat your own tail; and a fitting symbol of this is the Oroubouros.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

As I understand it Schopenhauer, like Kant, posits that it is via the primal understanding that every event is caused (PSR) that we (and animals in simpler and non-self-reflective ways) are able to make any sense of experience.

Imagine if everything was completely arbitrary and disconnected, just a succession of images and impressions without any connection or continuity between them; it would be James' "buzzing, blooming confusion".

It’s a tangled knot for sure. Will is the animal desiring objects which are simply representational versions of Will trying to obtain goals that it can never truly gain satisfaction from.

That part I get. Again, the objects are then seen as beyond time and space when not mediated by PSR. That’s the Platonic element. He then goes to say art “gets at” these forms in a way that circumvents the PSR of mediated representational Will. Again all an entangled knot.

Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine… — schopenhauer1

There is no such thing as blind striving. Striving must be directed or else whatever it is that is occurring cannot be called "striving". That's what "striving" implies, directed actions.

Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. — schopenhauer1

So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means.

So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion. — schopenhauer1

Since you reversed the logical order, it is not really a never ending process. The means are determined, and carried out, the goal is achieved. That's why the goal is called "the end", when it is achieved it puts an end to the process.

If you posit a further purpose (goal) for the will itself, a purpose to the process of creating goals for itself, that purpose would itself be an end which would be achievable, by that nature of being an end. Therefore the process could not be characterized as never ending. So if this were the goal of completion, that would be an achievable goal and the process would not be never ending. But if the process whereby the will creates goals for itself is completely purposeless (contrary to the PoR), this would turn out to be a never ending process. But that perspective, of course, is to deny the PoR.

I think my earlier post you were replying to it is best seen in conjunction with the last post.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/780262

But to go further

So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I think you may have misinterpreted. I do agree with this sort of. However, I wouldn’t say that anything is prior in a causal sense. Rather, it seems to be a knot where they are all somehow one in the same. That is to say, Will manifests in the animal, desire and movement, and simply experience in space-time but that’s just the realization of Will in it’s flipside aspect of phenomenon. It is the playground.

In the playground (phenomenal aspect) Platonic form is both one’s own body (in one’s own character and manifestation of Will), played out in space/time (will-to live) and this form is directed towards other forms mediated by PSR (objects/representations) which provides the background or playground to play out its striving- towards. Space/time/causality is the necessary conditions for Will’s playground which is not prior but one and the same as Will. They are never disentangled. The Will is “dreaming itself” (maya) immediately.

Schopenhauer did not deny that goals could be met. It was just the never ending nature of the goals, and the fact that one never truly got satisfaction from obtaining the goals so I don’t think that interpretation is quite accurate in terms of completion.

The point though, is that the PSR (sorry, I said PoR in the last post, but I meant PSR) is only circumvented by assuming the reality of randomness. And that would render "will" as unintelligible, or nonsensical, as is "blind striving".

There are ways in which the artist may attempt to minimize the role of the PSR in one's creations, by employing elements of randomness, but this exclusion of the PSR cannot be complete. The artist must choose a medium of presentation, and this choice is always made with a purpose. So even if the goal is to minimize the role of the PSR, this cannot be complete, because that is in itself a goal and therefore subject to the PSR.