I don't see the utility. Even if we were to take "it seems that X" as prima facie evidence that X, we'd almost immediately encounter someone for whom it does not seem that X, and thereby immediately have equally good reason to think that not X.

If we didn't ever encounter someone who didn't think that not X, we'd unlikely doubt X anyway, and so have no need for a justification.

It seems that the only situation in which we might want to justify a belief that X would be in the case that we encounter someone who does not believe that X.

I do think that it has some use. for example in defending the belief in free will. free will skeptics still have an experience like "it seems that I have free will". Also, in defending objective moral values, since the moral skeptics still (in my experience) have an experience like "it seems to me that I shouldn't murder people for fun" though they interpret it to instead be a personal feeling.

it's important to note that "seems" and "seeming" here does not mean belief, and does not mean an inclination toward, or a feeling, it's an experience one has when one thinks of a statement. someone experiences that a statement seems true to them, just like someone experiences that an apple seems to be in front of them. — aminima

You say seeming does not mean belief, but it does. It's just a belief for which you don't have very good justification. Things seem plausible. Seem possible. Seem likely. Don't seem unlikely. That's just intuition - knowledge for which you have uncertain justification.

As with all justification, it all comes down to the consequences of being wrong. Is your justification adequate for the risk involved? Should I lend Aminima $5? Sure, they seem honest. Should I lend Aminima $10,000? I'll have to think about that.

You say seeming does not mean belief, but it does. It's just a belief for which you don't have a very good justification. — T Clark

I'm having a hard time seeing how "seeming" equals belief. can you explain more?

I see belief and seeming are separate things. for example, in the The Ponzo Illusion it seems to me like the lines are different lengths, but I believe the lines are the same length. in this case, seeming and belief are two completely different things.

I don't see the utility. Even if we were to take "it seems that X" as prima facie evidence that X, we'd almost immediately encounter someone for whom it does not seem that X, and thereby immediately have equally good reason to think that not X. — Isaac

Yes!
It seems to Bob that P, absent defeaters.
It seems to Alice that not-P, absent defeaters.

Aren't in contradiction. If Bob and Alice were brought into the same context - "immediately encounter" - then that would introduce a defeater. The principle as stated removes such scenarios - if it seemed to Bob that P, but it was also the case that It seems to Alice that not-P, and those are both known, it works like a defeater. Just as you used it to undermine justification that P and justification that not-P.

Though I don't know if only seemings can count as defeaters for seemings. Like if I see a black blur moving quickly past my window in a Y-ish shape, I could infer that was a black bird. If I see a bird fly at the same speed across the window again, with the same shape, and it's white, I'd have a defeater for the first claim as a seeming, but only if it simultaneously seemed like the same bird.

Perhaps you could clarify if you see judgements as being part of seemings @aminima? Is the principle neutral on the question? Furthermore:

thereby has at least some justification for believing that P — aminima

Where does this "at least some justification" come from when applied to a judgement/experience like seeming? Interested in how the inference works.

I'm having a hard time seeing how "seeming" equals belief. can you explain more?

I see belief and seeming are separate things. for example, in the The Ponzo Illusion it seems to me like the lines are different lengths, but I believe the lines are the same length. in this case, seeming and belief are two completely different things. — aminima

That doesn't make sense to me. If something seems like it's true, but we know based on evidence, or at least believe strongly, that it's not, do you really propose that we have "at least some justification for believing that P."

is this principle a good one? I think so because it's a simple response to skepticism. — aminima

I've been called and called myself a pragmatist. The pragmatic approach to skepticism is to do the best you can with an understanding of the uncertainties of your knowledge and the risks of being wrong. What more is needed?

Innocent until proven guilty! If it seems that P, then P is (only provisionally) true, to be swapped with Q, when P is proven false, such that one can only say Q seems to be true, so on and so forth, ad nauseum. The point is to having ad interim beliefs while the search for truth is in full gear. As you can see there are 2 components to PC - one is to go by appearances and the other is to seek the hidden truth. Skepticism differs in that skepticism can sometimes mean that the quest for truth is futile (re Agrippa's trilemma). Unlike PC, skepticism recommends epoché; it's a form of mental paralysis, brought on by adiaphora cum aporia.

free will skeptics still have an experience like "it seems that I have free will". — aminima

They don't. Otherwise they wouldn't be free will sceptics. They clearly have an experience like "it seems that I'm not sure if I have free will". If you're simply going to insist that other people's experience must be like yours really, despite what they say, then you're not using your own principle. It clearly seems prima facie that other people seem to experience doubt about free will because that's what they say.

in defending objective moral values, since the moral skeptics still (in my experience) have an experience like "it seems to me that I shouldn't murder people for fun" — aminima

Again, if they don't find it likely that there are moral universals, then they clearly don't have an experience like "it seems to me that I shouldn't murder people for fun". Once more you're denying the prima facie evidence that other people experience things differently to you and replacing it with your rational analysis that they probably deep down have such an experience.

Your thoughts don't have labels on them. You cannot crack open your brain and this one labelled "seemings", and this other one labelled "rational analysis", this third one labelled "interpretation" and a fourth, "gut instinct"...

All you have is a post hoc story about how you come to act the way you do, and the characters in that story are "seemings", "rational thought", "peer pressure", "feelings"...etc.

We tell ourselves things like "I feel like X is the case, but on rational analysis I come to believe Y, I still doubt it though, because my gut tells me it's wrong"...but none of this is given to us empirically, we can't detect these thought types with any mechanism outside of the same story-telling post hoc process of answering 'what just happened?'

Though I don't know if only seemings can count as defeaters for seemings. Like if I see a black blur moving quickly past my window in a Y-ish shape, I could infer that was a black bird. If I see a bird fly at the same speed across the window again, with the same shape, and it's white, I'd have a defeater for the first claim as a seeming, but only if it simultaneously seemed like the same bird. — fdrake

The statistician I used to work with had this story (I'm sure it's not hers though, but I can't now recall the original source...)...

You're at a magic show, the magician asks you to pick a card and place it back in the deck anywhere, then shuffle the deck. This you do. He than takes the deck from you, taps it with his magic wand and asks you to look at the top card. What's the probability that this is your card?

Answers vary, but quite high among them is 1 in 52. Of course, the probability isn't 1 in 52. It would be a pretty crap magic show if the magician was just relying on luck! The probability that it's your card is almost 100% (barring error). Yet - and this is the interesting bit for the discussion here - we're still surprised when it is. Answering the question of why we're still surprised gives us an interesting set of possibilities for what goes on when we have contradictory expectations.

Is the surprise genuine? Do we 'go through the motions' of surprise because we can't just accept that magic exists (or that we can so little trust our judgement as to be so easily defeated)? Personally, I'm of the view that the surprise is part of the story, we are 'surprised' to re-affirm to ourselves that this is a rare event, that the world is a good deal more predictable in general than it is during a magic show, in much the same way as we laugh when a friend pokes fun at us to re-affirm that this is not an attack, it's a joke.

I think this post hoc talk of seemings and judgements is much like the 'surprise' at the magic show. It's a good story to re-affirm that we can trust our senses, the world is as it is given to us, but sometimes it's nature requires this additional step 'judgement' to discern.

Nice.

They don't. Otherwise they wouldn't be free will sceptics. They clearly have an experience like "it seems that I'm not sure if I have free will". — Isaac

I guess I'll have to talk to more free-will skeptics about it. of course, I'll never reject anyone's experiences, they are the expert of their own experiences. However, I will say that I had a professor in learning and behavior say that he doesn't accept free will, but never-the-less he said it feels like we are making choices for ourselves. I'll also like to say that belief does not equal experience. I may experience something to be true, but just believe it's an Illusion for example the Ponzo Illusion and other Illusions. Ultimately though I'll have to consult the skeptics, and I agree that if they don't have an experience like I said, then my principal is in trouble.

Once more you're denying the prima facie evidence that other people experience things differently to you and replacing it with your rational analysis that they probably deep down have such an experience. — Isaac

again, I'll never claim someone's mental life is different than what they report it to be. they are the masters of their own mental life. however, every single person that is a subjectist I have talked to says they think murdering people for fun is bad, even though they believe that's just their opinion.

let me be clear: I someone reports that they don't have any feeling of free will and if they report that they don't have a feeling that "murdering people for fun is bad". I'll have to change the way I view things.

that being said, I'll like to ask you what your experiences with free will and values are. do you experience a sense of free will? do you experience something like "It seems to me that I shouldn't murder people just for fun"? if you don't experience them, then my principal is in trouble.

Where does this "at least some justification" come from when applied to a judgement/experience like seeming? Interested in how the inference works. — fdrake

I would need an example of what you mean by "judgement" and "seeming"

That doesn't make sense to me. If something seems like it's true, but we know based on evidence, or at least believe strongly, that it's not, do you really propose that we have "at least some justification for believing that P." — T Clark

if we have some justification to believe that P and that justification is overridden by other evidence, then we still have some justification, it's overridden.

I've been called and called myself a pragmatist. The pragmatic approach to skepticism is to do the best you can with an understanding of the uncertainties of your knowledge and the risks of being wrong. What more is needed? — T Clark

I guess I would ask exactly how you have knowledge of our common sense beliefs. Is it because they are useful? because they are true?

seeming — aminima

Perhaps I misunderstood the terms. I interpreted seeming as an act of perception - what you see. So the thing with green leaves and a brown trunk seems like a tree.

I interpreted judgement as an inference, like "If I hear a loud ringing noise (seeming?), and my friend next to me does not (defeater), then the ringing noise could be tinnitus"

if we have some justification to believe that P and that justification is overridden by other evidence, then we still have some justification, it's overridden. — aminima

Sorry, that doesn't make sense to me. [joke] It seems wrong.[/joke] We can leave it there.

I guess I would ask exactly how you have knowledge of our common sense beliefs. Is it because they are useful? because they are true? — aminima

Are you saying that things that seem to be true as you've been discussing them are common sense beliefs? I don't think seeming and common sense are the same thing. I think common sense reflects our intuition. I don't think intuition is seeming either.

he doesn't accept free will, but never-the-less he said it feels like we are making choices for ourselves — aminima

I may experience something to be true, but just believe it's an Illusion — aminima

they think murdering people for fun is bad, even though they believe that's just their opinion — aminima

In all of these examples, you privilege one feeling over another without any justification.

Your professor feels two things - that he makes choices, and that he doesn't have free will. Unless your professor's thoughts have clear labels attached to them informing him of their origins, he just has two thoughts. He doesn't have one real thought and another rational one superficially attached. They are just two thoughts.

You don't really experience an illusion as true, but then un-really learn it isn't, you simply have two sources of data which contradict one another. Nothing privileges one over the other.

People may believe murdering is wrong (in a universal sense) and also believe it is entirely subjective. Again, one belief is not more real, or deep, or primary than the other, they are just two beliefs which are contradictory.

1) I think we all do this and 2) I think it is useful. To be at the stage of seeming, it probably has either worked ok for us or it is not worked to a harmful degree. It may have been harmful, but probably not in a blunt damaging way.

There has been some kind of natural selection process that it passed.

As with all justification, it all comes down to the consequences of being wrong. Is your justification adequate for the risk involved? Should I lend Aminima $5? Sure, they seem honest. Should I lend Aminima $10,000? I'll have to think about that. — T Clark

That probably seems like a good idea. He seems trustworthy. But once its more money it seems like there is too much risk. You have done some statistical analysis of your abilitiy to intuit trustworthyness. Or humans' abilities.

know you understood the terms correctly, I was just not understanding you.

I interpreted judgement as an inference, like "If I hear a loud ringing noise (seeming?), and my friend next to me does not (defeater), then the ringing noise could be tinnitus" — fdrake

I agree with this case

in that case, the

Where does this "at least some justification" come from when applied to a judgement/experience like seeming? Interested in how the inference works. — fdrake

the justification comes from experience. I think we agree. I don't see anything wrong with your assessment. what exactly is your question?

But once its more money it seems like there is too much risk. You have done some statistical analysis of your abilitiy to intuit trustworthyness. Or humans' abilities. — Bylaw

For the purposes of this discussion, I'm am framing this as a question of how much justification is needed. More money, more risk, more justification needed. In that regard, a judgement of @Aminima's trustworthiness is part of that justification.

The claim of Phenomenal Conservatism(PC) is: If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some justification for believing that P — aminima

While most everyone else here has been attacking this thesis, to me it seems almost - or even exactly - tautological. "Seeming" is nothing other than a judgement of prima facie plausibility. But perhaps rather than justification, which is customarily associated with epistemic standards that do not include mere seeming, you should talk of warrant - a less fraught term.

I suppose that a subjective Bayesian would connect seeming with the subjective prior probability - your starting point in evaluating a proposition, which you subsequently update by considering relevant evidence.

It would be amazing to view it from a mathematical perspective. What would the math of planetary epicycles look like? How would we modify Newton's equations of motions to Aristotle's the natural state of objects is rest? And so on.



If it looks like a spider, it is a spider. :death: :flower: