It seems clear enough to me that meaningful thought and belief(experience or consciousness, if you like) are reducible to neither physical events nor physics, similar to Davidson's anomalous monism(without 'mental' events).
How does one reduce meaningful correlations drawn between different things to physics? — creativesoul
Nagel’s major (and perhaps most controversial) contribution was the introduction of bridge principles. The notion of bridge principles, (also: ‘bridge laws’ and ‘coordinating definitions’) can be spelled out in several different ways. The most common way in accord with Nagel (1961: chap. 11, Sec. II.3) is to describe them syntactically as bi-conditionals linking terms in the vocabularies of the two theories. In the same context, however, Nagel describes them in terms of the ‘nature of the linkages postulated’ (Nagel 1961: 354). He distinguishes three such linkages:
The links mimicked by the bridge laws are ‘logical connections’ (1961: 354), which are understood as meaning connections.
The links postulated by bridge laws are conventions or stipulations (‘deliberate fiat’; 1961: 354).
The links postulated by bridge laws are ‘factual or material’ (1961: 354); that is, bridge laws state empirical facts (these truths are then described as empirical hypotheses).
Finally, it is worth noticing that Nagel introduces a distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary reductions: These criteria are “non-formal” (1961: chap. 11, Sec. III). The first criterion Nagel mentions is that the premises of a reduction—the bridge laws and the reducing theory—should be well established rather than arbitrarily chosen (1961: 358). Second, Nagel alludes to the fact that the reducing theory should be better established than the reduced one. The third criterion states that reduction is concerned with unification. The fourth criterion states that the reducing theory corrects and augments the reduced theory.
But what I do not see is a reduction of the functions of the cell to the physical level. The functions of the cell are still an important part of understanding the phenomena of life, even if understanding the molecular interpretation of life further elucidates and deepens our understanding of why life is behaving in accord with such and such a function.
But the way biologists use "function" -- you won't find an extension for that in the physics textbook, nor will you find anything but metaphoric talk in the chemistry textbooks about function. So on page 109 of the above pdf biology book: "Organelles are cell structures with specialized functions that will be discussed in section 4.4" -- this is my intended meaning of "function" — Moliere
I think it can go too far. For instance the amount of time spent peering into dust, and smashing bits of it together to see what falls from them, has been time wasted, in my opinion. — NOS4A2
Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP. — frank
It's true that once we start explaining function in this way (that it's stuff that happens accidently), the line between life and non-life fades. But I think that's the point of reduction? — frank
And I'm not sure what the point of reduction is :D -- maybe, as Fooloso4 mentioned, I'm getting stuck on "reduction" too much. — Moliere
Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP.
— frank
Right! So this is a statement which seems to link a name and two biological concepts (Name,concept,concept: Mitochondria,functions,producing) with one chemical name (which, sure, I'll count that as a concept).
Is this now a bridge law? Is it enough to find a harmonious example between two disciplines? — Moliere
I would say the sciences are independent of one another, and their harmony is something sought after by us because we like it. And sometimes we find it, which is nice! But that's not the same thing as to say everything will, or could be, reduced to physics. — Moliere
We would start with chemistry and bridge up to the biological function as a category of processes required for the endurance of the system. All chemistry has to do is explain cell respiration, digestion, metabolism, etc. We enter the bridge when we collect those explanations and serve them up as to how the organism endures? — frank
My intent in using the metabolism example is to say, hey, yes, we can already map the chemical pathways of these things. But that chemical map doesn't explain why the animal eats. Why does an animal make decisions at all? In what way are even single-celled organism's decisions to respond to sugar gradients predicated upon any physical law? (or is the observation that they respond to sugar gradients a physical law? are all observations observations of physical laws?) — Moliere
One of the things I want to mention, though it could throw us too far off course so I'm separating it off -- something that threw me off of thinking reductionism could take place is the fact that we cannot analytically solve any Schrödinger equation other than the one which represents the system of one proton and one electron -- the hydrogen system.
But the physical systems which comprise life are much more complicated than that system. We don't have analytic, logical access to that at this point in time in terms of scientific knowledge. So I think this thought is also causing some of my doubts. — Moliere
The problem though, is that mathematics really does not give a "clear-cut account of what is going on". — Metaphysician Undercover
That itself is a matter in need of interpretation. What quantum mechanics predicts is probabilities, not what is actually the case. That's exactly the problem I discussed above. What is actually the case, is what is, right now, the zero point in time. And that's when uncertainty is maximum. So quantum mechanics can accurately predict the probabilities of what could happen if..., the odds of X, the odds of Y, etc.. But it's absolutely uncertain about what is happening right now, and that's why it needs the "if", because those are the temporal conditions which introduce degrees of certainty.Quantum mechanics is the most accurate physical theory ever devised. What is at issue in all the interpretations is the meaning of the theory, not what it actually predicts will happen. — Wayfarer
Would you argue that it isn't possible to reduce our theories of consciousness to physics? — frank
Consciousness is meaningful experience. — creativesoul
Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc. — creativesoul
I mean that the most basic "stuff" of the world is physical — Fooloso4
As I am using the term in the sense that nothing else is posited as fundamental. All that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them. — Fooloso4
I'd say we cannot know that the most basic stuff of the world is physical — Moliere
One reason I doubt any assertion about what reality fundamentally is is because people smarter than I have disagreed upon the subject. — Moliere
... attaining extreme tenuousness (chapter 16).
.I assert that what is serious (to spoudaion) must be treated seriously (spoudazein), and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete blessed seriousness, but that
what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything (paignion) of god, and that
this is really the best thing about it. Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing
(paizonta) the most beautiful games (paidias)” (803c)
Rather than cannot know I would say we do not know. But methodologically reduction has been enormously successful. I take a pragmatic approach. We should not abandon reductionism, but we should be aware of its limits. — Fooloso4
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos
I don't think it's that we observe physical laws. We use physics to explain what we observe. Do we really observe acts of volition? Or is volition a theory to explain observations? In other words, is there a clash of explanations when we try to reconcile decision making with physics? I would be one who says there's no bridge between the two. — frank
Physics, especially when viewed as an all-encompassing body of explanations, is essentially a deterministic domain, right? — frank
The area of decision making is about identity (who makes the ATP? who shot down the balloon?) Decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural (per the literal meaning of that word.) And ultimately, it's the engine of emotion we call morality. I suspect that reduction is never going to happen here. Any attempt to reduce is going to give way to eliminativism.
Do you agree with that?
Yes. It's a bad time in history to be reductive because the foundation of physics is unfinished. We could make bridge laws to what we've got, only to find out tomorrow that it's all completely different from what we thought. — frank
I sometimes wonder about the beautiful. — Moliere
I think, at times, the beautiful can seduce us away from the just. — Moliere
Those "shoulds" imply a moral obligation to the "truth" of Physics, as opposed to the "falsehoods" of Religion. The assertion of final authority for Empirical Physics was indeed the underlying ideology of Classical Physics since the 17th century. But the 20th century threw a monkey wrench of doubt (Quantum Uncertainty) into the works of that non-religious belief system .The second meaning of reductionism is the assertion that all sciences should reduce to physics (just as Apollo did). The argument for this hinges mainly on the success of physics up to this point. At least methodologically, scientists should continue to stick to what's been working for thousands of years. We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank
Consciousness is meaningful experience.
— creativesoul
Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc.
— creativesoul
Consciousness is neither physical nor nonphysical? Are you saying ontology doesn't apply to consciousness? — frank
In an attempt to bring this back to the thread topic, we should consider whether the beauty of nature is biologically significant. If we conclude it is, and I think we should, we have good reason to think reductionism does not tell us the whole story. — Fooloso4
How does the conclusion that the beauty of nature is biologically significant lead to a belief in the limits of reductionism? — Moliere
I think a good case can be made for biological teleology at the level of organisms. Cell differentiation allows for one kind of stuff, a totipotent cell, to become other kinds of stuff, all the other cells that make up the organism. It is purposeful in the sense that it functions toward an end, the living organism. — Fooloso4
The beauty of nature is manifest in appearance. The appearance is no longer present in reduction to something else. — Fooloso4
Thus, if I'm to be taken as saying anything at all about ontology, I'm saying that the historical and conventional ontological frameworks are fatally flawed in that they are inherently inadequate as a result of being incapable of taking meaningful experience into account. — creativesoul
but in smaller scales we prefer other tools like Complexity Science and Emergence. — Nickolasgaspar
The second meaning of the term is more of a failed philosophical attempt to oversimplify the above "success story of science" but that has nothing to do with the goals of science or the emergent characteristics found in Nature. — Nickolasgaspar
think identity is a rich concept. I'm not following how decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural. — Moliere
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.