It seems clear enough to me that meaningful thought and belief(experience or consciousness, if you like) are reducible to neither physical events nor physics, similar to Davidson's anomalous monism(without 'mental' events).

How does one reduce meaningful correlations drawn between different things to physics? — creativesoul

I don't know the answer to your question. Could it be it's as if you're asking a person from 50 CE: "how does one get to the moon?"

"One day" is the answer I think a reductionist would give.

Would you argue that it isn't possible to reduce our theories of consciousness to physics?

The base of the problem is found in Zeno's paradoxes, and manifests in the way that calculus resolves the issue with the concept of approaching the limit, or approaching zero. When this concept is applied to the temporal existence of waves, the uncertainty principle rears its ugly head.

To determine the features of waves requires a period of time because waves are activities. As the period of time utilized becomes shorter and shorter, the capacity to determine the wave features is debilitated, and the result is an increase in uncertainty. As the zero point in time is approached, uncertainty approaches infinity. In classical mechanics this was the problem of infinite acceleration required for a change in motion . Any body at rest, if it began to move, would require a time of infinite acceleration at the point when it was caused to move. The problem transposes to relativity theory when a body at rest is replaced with a body with uniform motion, and we consider changes to that motion.

So we have a fundamental incompatibility between "position" which refers to a object's rest spot, and "velocity" (or any wave features) which implies no rest spot. What is demonstrated by the need to employ the concept of "infinite" in the calculus which relates these two, is that our way of plotting an object's position, and our way of plotting an object's movement, are fundamentally incommensurable. This basic incommensurability demonstrates that our mathematics of "space" is fundamentally inadequate. Zeno demonstrated this very well with the tortoise and the hare. And the issue remains as the uncertainty principle.

I'm thinking that my mechanics example is a good one to work through, along with the mechanics to biology contrast.

So let us define a theory, first. I would say theory is understood by coming to understand particular theories, which we find in science textbooks and learn through training. By coming to learn particular theories we can get a sense of what we generally mean by "theory". It is this usage of "theory" that I intend.


Physics textbook
Biology textbook

Mostly providing the links to coordinate our conversation, not to delimit the set of possible examples. Just "here's a ballpark estimate of the sorts of theories I believe we're talking about"

It seems to me, from reading your article, that as long as the terms being used by scientists have the same extensions then they are considered reduced to one another, while also admitting in bridge principles.

Nagel’s major (and perhaps most controversial) contribution was the introduction of bridge principles. The notion of bridge principles, (also: ‘bridge laws’ and ‘coordinating definitions’) can be spelled out in several different ways. The most common way in accord with Nagel (1961: chap. 11, Sec. II.3) is to describe them syntactically as bi-conditionals linking terms in the vocabularies of the two theories. In the same context, however, Nagel describes them in terms of the ‘nature of the linkages postulated’ (Nagel 1961: 354). He distinguishes three such linkages:

The links mimicked by the bridge laws are ‘logical connections’ (1961: 354), which are understood as meaning connections.
The links postulated by bridge laws are conventions or stipulations (‘deliberate fiat’; 1961: 354).
The links postulated by bridge laws are ‘factual or material’ (1961: 354); that is, bridge laws state empirical facts (these truths are then described as empirical hypotheses).

So, one thing I'd like to note here is that insofar that we are able to introduce auxiliary propositions to a theory then, naturally, we can always save the belief that the sciences reduce to physics. If we find something inconvenient, we can use link type 2 in the above -- I'm guessing "fiat" is any consistent set of logical functions which are chosen to ensure the extensions between terms being compared are the same -- and bridge two principles together.

But then later the SEP article notes an informal distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary reductions.

Finally, it is worth noticing that Nagel introduces a distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary reductions: These criteria are “non-formal” (1961: chap. 11, Sec. III). The first criterion Nagel mentions is that the premises of a reduction—the bridge laws and the reducing theory—should be well established rather than arbitrarily chosen (1961: 358). Second, Nagel alludes to the fact that the reducing theory should be better established than the reduced one. The third criterion states that reduction is concerned with unification. The fourth criterion states that the reducing theory corrects and augments the reduced theory.

Which is good because it blocks against the argument I was thinking of making :D

So as the biology textbook highlights, chemistry could serve as a non-arbitrary set of bridge laws between biology and physics.

But then the second condition of non-arbitrary reduction "the reducing theory should be better established than the reduced one" -- that is an odd notion. But just going along with the words and seeing where it takes me: I tend to think biology is better established than chemistry! :D

But we can overlook that. The biology textbook utilizes chemical concepts to talk about how cells and life work. But what I do not see is a reduction of the functions of the cell to the physical level. The functions of the cell are still an important part of understanding the phenomena of life, even if understanding the molecular interpretation of life further elucidates and deepens our understanding of why life is behaving in accord with such and such a function.

But the way biologists use "function" -- you won't find an extension for that in the physics textbook, nor will you find anything but metaphoric talk in the chemistry textbooks about function. So on page 109 of the above pdf biology book: "Organelles are cell structures with specialized functions that will be discussed in section 4.4" -- this is my intended meaning of "function".

Now if we can ignore the intension then that would take away the argument from meaning that I'm making. Though that'd also strike out one of the kinds of links proposed as bridge laws, leaving fiat, and empirical fact. Fiat is ruled out by arbitrary/non-arbitrary distinction, but that's how I got here in the first place. Which leaves link 3, an empirical fact, and that much we can say is true of chemistry. However, it's also true that Mars is the 4 planet from the sun. Why not propose that as a bridge law, if all we need is an empirical fact? (comes back to arbitrary/non-arbitrary...)

... I'm not sure. I'm coming back to "what's the point of these bridge laws again?" It seems to me that, sure, we'll be able to come up with sentences that fill in the gaps to make up a totality, but then as science changes we'll have to continue to update that picture.

I think it can go too far. For instance the amount of time spent peering into dust, and smashing bits of it together to see what falls from them, has been time wasted, in my opinion.

But what I do not see is a reduction of the functions of the cell to the physical level. The functions of the cell are still an important part of understanding the phenomena of life, even if understanding the molecular interpretation of life further elucidates and deepens our understanding of why life is behaving in accord with such and such a function.

But the way biologists use "function" -- you won't find an extension for that in the physics textbook, nor will you find anything but metaphoric talk in the chemistry textbooks about function. So on page 109 of the above pdf biology book: "Organelles are cell structures with specialized functions that will be discussed in section 4.4" -- this is my intended meaning of "function" — Moliere

Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP. Obviously this is a cherrypicked example because we know mitochondria were originally independent critters which were eaten by bigger cells who then started using them as metabolic regulators. It's not too hard to see functionality in this case as the result of a happy accident (happy for us, since we're the result of those ancient events).

It's true that once we start explaining function in this way (that it's stuff that happens accidently), the line between life and non-life fades. But I think that's the point of reduction?

I think it can go too far. For instance the amount of time spent peering into dust, and smashing bits of it together to see what falls from them, has been time wasted, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

If you're talking about the Hadron collider, I kind of lean in that direction as well. That was a lot of money spent, for what exactly?

I tend to think of functionality as a result of happy accidents, and then natural history. And there's nothing wrong with cherrypicked examples, because this is philosophy -- we're not doing statistical analysis to determine the likely best guess! :D

Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP. — frank

Right! So this is a statement which seems to link a name and two biological concepts (Name,concept,concept: Mitochondria,functions,producing) with one chemical name (which, sure, I'll count that as a concept).

Is this now a bridge law? Is it enough to find a harmonious example between two disciplines?

It's true that once we start explaining function in this way (that it's stuff that happens accidently), the line between life and non-life fades. But I think that's the point of reduction? — frank

I'm not so sure that the distinction fades, at least not for me. But I hasten to add I don't mind it fading. And I'm not sure what the point of reduction is :D -- maybe, as @Fooloso4 mentioned, I'm getting stuck on "reduction" too much.

Perhaps the belief is just that, someday, the sciences will form a coherent whole of some kind?


What I've always felt about science is that it provides several ways of looking that enrich understanding rather than limit it. We could restate everything in terms of some physical laws, especially once we allow logical functions and fiat such that any set of sentences can count as bridge laws as long as their extensions are the same and they are true (so I imagine at least, it wasn't exactly spelled out I'm just giving an interpretation). But that restatement wouldn't be as rich as knowing both it and what it is a restatement of -- propositions which utilize the locution "function" stated by scientists writing textbooks, at least (this is a valid avenue of attack, I'd say -- textbooks are pedagogic, rather than literal. They are written to catch people up rather than state, here is the true scientific analysis).

I would say the sciences are independent of one another, and their harmony is something sought after by us because we like it. And sometimes we find it, which is nice! But that's not the same thing as to say everything will, or could be, reduced to physics. But I'm questioning "reduced" now...

And I'm not sure what the point of reduction is :D -- maybe, as Fooloso4 mentioned, I'm getting stuck on "reduction" too much. — Moliere

I think reductionism needs to be looked at from both ends - more complex things can be broken down into simpler components, but in order to understand complexes, attempting to reconstruct them from their components is not necessarily or always the best approach.

Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP.
— frank

Right! So this is a statement which seems to link a name and two biological concepts (Name,concept,concept: Mitochondria,functions,producing) with one chemical name (which, sure, I'll count that as a concept).

Is this now a bridge law? Is it enough to find a harmonious example between two disciplines? — Moliere

We would start with chemistry and bridge up to the biological function as a category of processes required for the endurance of the system. All chemistry has to do is explain cell respiration, digestion, metabolism, etc. We enter the bridge when we collect those explanations and serve them up as to how the organism endures?

I would say the sciences are independent of one another, and their harmony is something sought after by us because we like it. And sometimes we find it, which is nice! But that's not the same thing as to say everything will, or could be, reduced to physics. — Moliere

Gotcha.

We would start with chemistry and bridge up to the biological function as a category of processes required for the endurance of the system. All chemistry has to do is explain cell respiration, digestion, metabolism, etc. We enter the bridge when we collect those explanations and serve them up as to how the organism endures? — frank

I'm wondering if @apokrisis has an opinion on this they'd be willing to share.

My intent in using the metabolism example is to say, hey, yes, we can already map the chemical pathways of these things. But that chemical map doesn't explain why the animal eats. Why does an animal make decisions at all? In what way are even single-celled organism's decisions to respond to sugar gradients predicated upon any physical law? (or is the observation that they respond to sugar gradients a physical law? are all observations observations of physical laws?)

**

One of the things I want to mention, though it could throw us too far off course so I'm separating it off -- something that threw me off of thinking reductionism could take place is the fact that we cannot analytically solve any Schrödinger equation other than the one which represents the system of one proton and one electron -- the hydrogen system.

But the physical systems which comprise life are much more complicated than that system. We don't have analytic, logical access to that at this point in time in terms of scientific knowledge. So I think this thought is also causing some of my doubts.

My intent in using the metabolism example is to say, hey, yes, we can already map the chemical pathways of these things. But that chemical map doesn't explain why the animal eats. Why does an animal make decisions at all? In what way are even single-celled organism's decisions to respond to sugar gradients predicated upon any physical law? (or is the observation that they respond to sugar gradients a physical law? are all observations observations of physical laws?) — Moliere

I don't think it's that we observe physical laws. We use physics to explain what we observe. Do we really observe acts of volition? Or is volition a theory to explain observations? In other words, is there a clash of explanations when we try to reconcile decision making with physics? I would be one who says there's no bridge between the two.

Physics, especially when viewed as an all-encompassing body of explanations, is essentially a deterministic domain, right? The area of decision making is about identity (who makes the ATP? who shot down the balloon?) Decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural (per the literal meaning of that word.) And ultimately, it's the engine of emotion we call morality. I suspect that reduction is never going to happen here. Any attempt to reduce is going to give way to eliminativism. Do you agree with that?

One of the things I want to mention, though it could throw us too far off course so I'm separating it off -- something that threw me off of thinking reductionism could take place is the fact that we cannot analytically solve any Schrödinger equation other than the one which represents the system of one proton and one electron -- the hydrogen system.

But the physical systems which comprise life are much more complicated than that system. We don't have analytic, logical access to that at this point in time in terms of scientific knowledge. So I think this thought is also causing some of my doubts. — Moliere

Yes. It's a bad time in history to be reductive because the foundation of physics is unfinished. We could make bridge laws to what we've got, only to find out tomorrow that it's all completely different from what we thought.

The problem though, is that mathematics really does not give a "clear-cut account of what is going on". — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate physical theory ever devised. What is at issue in all the interpretations is the meaning of the theory, not what it actually predicts will happen.

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate physical theory ever devised. What is at issue in all the interpretations is the meaning of the theory, not what it actually predicts will happen. — Wayfarer

That itself is a matter in need of interpretation. What quantum mechanics predicts is probabilities, not what is actually the case. That's exactly the problem I discussed above. What is actually the case, is what is, right now, the zero point in time. And that's when uncertainty is maximum. So quantum mechanics can accurately predict the probabilities of what could happen if..., the odds of X, the odds of Y, etc.. But it's absolutely uncertain about what is happening right now, and that's why it needs the "if", because those are the temporal conditions which introduce degrees of certainty.

Would you argue that it isn't possible to reduce our theories of consciousness to physics? — frank

Well, I'm not familiar enough with our theories of consciousness to say. However, I tend towards the fundamentally basic objection that meaning can be reduced to neither physics nor physical processes. Consciousness is meaningful experience. Therefore, consciousness can be reduced to neither physics nor physical processes.

My position is that all meaning is a biproduct of thought and belief formation(drawing correlations/associations/connections between different things), and that that is a process which is existentially dependent upon and/or consists of physical and non-physical things. Therefore, thought and belief cannot be reduced to merely physics or physical things. Although, I do hold that meaning emerges from physical things, and as such it is existentially dependent upon physical things. I reject many if not most commonly employed conventional dichotomies used to talk about the subject matter.

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc.

Consciousness is meaningful experience. — creativesoul

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc. — creativesoul

Consciousness is neither physical nor nonphysical? Are you saying ontology doesn't apply to consciousness?

Trying to address your post @Fooloso4

You would assert that

I mean that the most basic "stuff" of the world is physical — Fooloso4

As I am using the term in the sense that nothing else is posited as fundamental. All that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them. — Fooloso4

and that we need to look at the two-sidedness of reduction, needing to know both what we are reducing and what we are reducing to, and realizing that what we are reducing might be a better way to look at things even if it is reducible.

Would you say this is in conflict with my belief that we cannot know these statements? I'd say we cannot know that the most basic stuff of the world is physical, and we cannot know there is nothing else. But, simultaneously, I would say we don't need to know it either, and that knowledge of such things is beyond us.

Why?

I suppose it's because I don't know that it's the case, and I'm not sure what could even be a good reason to believe it. My argument would be from the multitude of beliefs about what reality fundamentally is: this sort of question has been answered in so many ways by intelligent people. Just look at philosophy! One reason I doubt any assertion about what reality fundamentally is is because people smarter than I have disagreed upon the subject. And they had their reasons, too. So why should I trust a belief just because I have a reason when they had their reasons, and yet we'd assert, today, that they were wrong?

One reason I can think of that I find persuasive is that there is some ethical justification for the belief. But, then, you can see why I'd assert that scientific knowledge does not lead to knowledge about the fundament. Instead, I'd say it's our activity which gets us closer to the fundament, but then as we interact with it the richness of being overflows our concepts. However, this is an encounter rather than a reason. I can't reason my way to the boundary of concepts -- I'd be staying within the concepts at that point. I have to grasp the world, and do so through my concepts, but in grasping it becomes a part of my projects, my desires, my way of manipulating the world: the elementality is brought under my categories of desire, converted into my hammer, my house, in which there is always a horizon, or, rather, an exteriority. But an exteriority is always exterior, and never brought under my grasp.

For Levinas I think it was clear that this lead to God. But I'm an atheist, and so what I see is the absurd: depending upon which project a person is pursuing, how they grasp the world, so the world appears. And if you take the time oftentimes you can sort of see where a person is coming from, yet you would never have thought the things you're thinking without the human relationship with a person who told you a new perspective.

So in the place of the absurd, I'd say there is still a face-to-face, and it is this which forms a materiality beyond our own self. It's the social which creates our ability to even speak of the physical, and so it is more fundamental, and yet due to the face-to-face, the Other's exteriority, we will also never know the totality of this materiality.

I'd say we cannot know that the most basic stuff of the world is physical — Moliere

Rather than cannot know I would say we do not know. But methodologically reduction has been enormously successful. I take a pragmatic approach. We should not abandon reductionism, but we should be aware of its limits.

One reason I doubt any assertion about what reality fundamentally is is because people smarter than I have disagreed upon the subject. — Moliere

This seems sensible to me. I am suspicious of any claim about what reality fundamentally is .

I am attracted to what the Daodejing says about

... attaining extreme tenuousness (chapter 16).

When I first heard this saying I thought it was the exact opposite of what Western philosophy was about, but I eventually came to see that is may be similar to Socrates’ wisdom - knowledge of one’s ignorance. Knowing that one does not know.

In Plato's Laws the Athenian Stranger says:

I assert that what is serious (to spoudaion) must be treated seriously (spoudazein), and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete blessed seriousness, but that
what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything (paignion) of god, and that
this is really the best thing about it. Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing
(paizonta) the most beautiful games (paidias)” (803c)

.

Whatever we make of this we should keep in mind that the Athenian Stranger is being playful. He is not simply advocating fun and games but beautiful games. And, of course, this raised the question of what a beautiful game is. And this in turn requires asking the question of what the beautiful is.

I'm glad that I'm at least sensible to someone other than myself.

Definitely going out on a limb here, but responding to your ending about the beautiful more than anything. Perhaps off topic from reductionism, and should be splintered off, but I'll see what you think. (I'm loving the exchange btw):


I sometimes wonder about the beautiful. Especially its relationship to the just. Justice was a concern of Plato, yet I question his commitment on the basis of owning slaves. This is clearly an anachronism, yet I don't think it an ethically inappropriate one. It's just one of those things which humans do (still today, I might add) that clearly isn't ethical.

I think, at times, the beautiful can seduce us away from the just. Not that it's bad -- but we are easily led away from the pursuit of justice. (tho I still think the beautiful very important. I'm no aestheteascetic)

Not that I blame people. In its pursuit, justice is almost inhuman -- or, at least, implementations of justice are inhuman.

So I can see wisdom in the beautiful games. And perhaps the beautiful games will lead us to something serious.

But justice still calls -- in a way if I wiled my time pursing beautiful games, I'd be forgetting the people I know who suffer: We will always need bronze souled people, and they ought to be comfortable and happy and know that their children will be OK because we are living a stable life together. When we let go of myth, we see that there are no hierarchies of souls, only different tasks to be done from different positions within the social organism.

Rather than cannot know I would say we do not know. But methodologically reduction has been enormously successful. I take a pragmatic approach. We should not abandon reductionism, but we should be aware of its limits. — Fooloso4

I think with what I've said thus far I should say "we do not know", but I feel we cannot know. Just because of the sketch I already gave to say where my thinking is coming from. I know it needs work to establish the claim.

I agree that we should not abandon reductionism. I think we're on the same page in just trying to understand its limits, though perhaps disagree on our general assessment of where those limits are, or at least are expressing different sorts of notions on limits at the moment -- I'm sure we could come to understand one another.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos

Does this imply that an amended science could account for the mental? What could that amendment look like?

I don't think it's that we observe physical laws. We use physics to explain what we observe. Do we really observe acts of volition? Or is volition a theory to explain observations? In other words, is there a clash of explanations when we try to reconcile decision making with physics? I would be one who says there's no bridge between the two. — frank

"volition" is too squishy to count as a theory, I think, unless we mean folk-theory. But then I'd be hesitant to use "observations".

I think what I'd say is that we're so ignorant we don't know if there is or is not a clash. So I agree with you in believing there's not a bridge between the two.

Physics, especially when viewed as an all-encompassing body of explanations, is essentially a deterministic domain, right? — frank

I could argue the case elsewise, but I'm fine with dropping it too.

The area of decision making is about identity (who makes the ATP? who shot down the balloon?) Decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural (per the literal meaning of that word.) And ultimately, it's the engine of emotion we call morality. I suspect that reduction is never going to happen here. Any attempt to reduce is going to give way to eliminativism.

Do you agree with that?

I think identity is a rich concept. I'm not following how decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural.

I'm interested in this idea of giving way to eliminativism. Not that you're wrong. However, sometimes a defense of reducitonism, as you noted, is that it does not lead to eliminativism.

So why is it that reductionism, when it comes to -- let's just say people? -- gives way to eliminativism?

Yes. It's a bad time in history to be reductive because the foundation of physics is unfinished. We could make bridge laws to what we've got, only to find out tomorrow that it's all completely different from what we thought. — frank

I think what I'd caution against is the idea that science has foundations that can be finished. At least, some very intelligent people have claimed to have found these foundations, and they don't all agree with one another.

The lense I understand science through is as a social activity. So supposing a unity between the general theory of relativity and quantum theory is widely accepted, since that's generally thought to be the foundational science, then what's stopping some smart guy in the future from pointing out a mistake or fudge or possibility -- which, given that it's a human activity, is inevitable -- just to make their mark?

I think that there will always be scientists who desire to be the foundation, and so further foundations shall be built.

Which isn't the same as to say it's false! I'm just uncertain about foundations.

I sometimes wonder about the beautiful. — Moliere

It is wonderous! The Greek terms καλός and κάλλος mean not only beautiful but fine, good, and noble.

I think, at times, the beautiful can seduce us away from the just. — Moliere

In the Symposium the love of wisdom is erotic. It can seduce us. Although Plato distinguished between the just. beautiful, and good, they are closely related.

Plato plays on descriptions of Socrates as ugly and beautiful.

In an attempt to bring this back to the thread topic, we should consider whether the beauty of nature is biologically significant. If we conclude it is, and I think we should, we have good reason to think reductionism does not tell us the whole story.

The second meaning of reductionism is the assertion that all sciences should reduce to physics (just as Apollo did). The argument for this hinges mainly on the success of physics up to this point. At least methodologically, scientists should continue to stick to what's been working for thousands of years. We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank

Those "shoulds" imply a moral obligation to the "truth" of Physics, as opposed to the "falsehoods" of Religion. The assertion of final authority for Empirical Physics was indeed the underlying ideology of Classical Physics since the 17th century. But the 20th century threw a monkey wrench of doubt (Quantum Uncertainty) into the works of that non-religious belief system .

The ancient & classical faith in an unbroken chain of causal Destiny was based on the unfounded assumption of Determinism -- by divine or physical Laws -- and "worked" for three centuries of empirical dominance. But confidence in that premise was shaken by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. In response to quantum indeterminism, AlanTuring began to look into the plausibility of Free Will within the "boundary conditions" (established by the statistical Schrodinger equation) of quantum physics. Quantum scale "laws" are fuzzy, so future states are statistical, instead of deterministic.

The Aaronson article, mentioned before, reviews Turing's reasoning in some detail (85 pages). So, what do you think? In view of Quantum Holism & Uncertainty, should we continue to bow before the Physics idols of Atomism & Destiny? :smile:


Physics and Determinism and Reductionism :
In honor of Alan Turing’s hundredth birthday, I unwisely set out some thoughts about one of
Turing’s obsessions throughout his life, the question of physics and free will. I focus relatively
narrowly on a notion that I call “Knightian freedom”: a certain kind of in-principle physical unpredictability that goes beyond probabilistic unpredictability. Other, more metaphysical aspects
of free will I regard as possibly outside the scope of science.
I examine a viewpoint, suggested independently by Carl Hoefer, Cristi Stoica, and even
Turing himself, that tries to find scope for “freedom” in the universe’s boundary conditions
rather than in the dynamical laws.
The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine ___Scott Aaronson
https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/giqtm3.pdf


Quote : "Science is a differential equation. Religion is a boundary condition.” __Alan Turing
Differential = relationships between unknowns.
Boundary conditions = limitations on possibilites

Consciousness is meaningful experience.
— creativesoul

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc.
— creativesoul

Consciousness is neither physical nor nonphysical? Are you saying ontology doesn't apply to consciousness? — frank

Not at all. To quite the contrary, I'm saying that attempting to parse meaningful experience into either/or dichotomous language is a fatal flaw when that something consists of and is existentially dependent upon both. Thus, if I'm to be taken as saying anything at all about ontology, I'm saying that the historical and conventional ontological frameworks are fatally flawed in that they are inherently inadequate as a result of being incapable of taking meaningful experience into account.

In Methodological Naturalism (science), reductionism has a different meaning. Reductionism is just one out of many tools science has to describe systems. Its great when we attempt to establish strong correlations between elements of a system(cause/effect) but in smaller scales we prefer other tools like Complexity Science and Emergence.
In my opinion changes in theories due to the reductive approach show how epistemically efficient and useful this methodology is in describing the mechanisms of specific systems.
The second meaning of the term is more of a failed philosophical attempt to oversimplify the above "success story of science" but that has nothing to do with the goals of science or the emergent characteristics found in Nature.

In an attempt to bring this back to the thread topic, we should consider whether the beauty of nature is biologically significant. If we conclude it is, and I think we should, we have good reason to think reductionism does not tell us the whole story. — Fooloso4

I'm interested. The conflict I was attempting to bring out was roughly between mechanism and teleology, and the difficulties reduction has with this apparent conflict.

How does the conclusion that the beauty of nature is biologically significant lead to a belief in the limits of reductionism?

I prefer Kuhn, too. I'd say that my approach to the question has been heavily inspired by his approach to the philosophy of science -- treating science as a social-historical entity rather than a superior methodology which can be discovered by philosophers.

I think a good case can be made for biological teleology at the level of organisms. Cell differentiation allows for one kind of stuff, a totipotent cell, to become other kinds of stuff, all the other cells that make up the organism. It is purposeful in the sense that it functions toward an end, the living organism.

How does the conclusion that the beauty of nature is biologically significant lead to a belief in the limits of reductionism? — Moliere

The beauty of nature is manifest in appearance. The appearance is no longer present in reduction to something else.

I think a good case can be made for biological teleology at the level of organisms. Cell differentiation allows for one kind of stuff, a totipotent cell, to become other kinds of stuff, all the other cells that make up the organism. It is purposeful in the sense that it functions toward an end, the living organism. — Fooloso4

Cool, so we're pretty close in conception it seems. Just coming at it from a different angle.

The beauty of nature is manifest in appearance. The appearance is no longer present in reduction to something else. — Fooloso4

OK, that makes sense now. Thanks!

Thus, if I'm to be taken as saying anything at all about ontology, I'm saying that the historical and conventional ontological frameworks are fatally flawed in that they are inherently inadequate as a result of being incapable of taking meaningful experience into account. — creativesoul

You're probably right.

but in smaller scales we prefer other tools like Complexity Science and Emergence. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not familiar with complexity science. Do you know of a good resource?

The second meaning of the term is more of a failed philosophical attempt to oversimplify the above "success story of science" but that has nothing to do with the goals of science or the emergent characteristics found in Nature. — Nickolasgaspar

One of the things I quickly noticed about this topic is that a person would really need to be a scientist to make any pronouncements, and scientists are usually busy doing other things.

think identity is a rich concept. I'm not following how decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural. — Moliere

We know the amoeba made a decision because it's not just flowing along with the current. That's what volition is: going against wind, so to speak. Id like to do a thread on identity one day. Maybe after you're through with Marx