Which debate — Banno

Indirect vs direct

I say "The tree has three branches" is about the tree, and not about anyone's perceptions, direct or otherwise. — Banno

It is about the commonly perceived tree and is either true or false, as can be confirmed inter-subjectively. If I say, "the tree I perceive has three branches" and no one else sees it as having three branches, then it would be considered to be false, because the usual conclusion would be that I am hallucinating or lying. If I say, "I perceive the tree to have three branches, that could be true about what I perceive, but not about the tree, if others do not perceive it to have three branches.

The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches". Idealism is the conflation of the two. — Banno


That is conflating various forms of Idealism. Kantian Idealism is not going to conflate that. Perhaps Berkeleyianism. In fact, Kantianism would insist on that division. — schopenhauer1

If the tree is an idea in God's mind (pace Berkeley) then it either has three branches or it doesn't. I could still misperceive the tree in that scenario. The Kantian version of its having three branches or not is down to inter-subjectivity.

Wittgenstein in PI is more an Indirect Realist than a Direct Realist — RussellA

I think later Wittgenstein resist being labeled an Idealist or Realist, or anything in-between. May be difficult to argue this sufficiently in a posting, but I will give it try.

From Philosophical Investigations(PI)

P. 402, he says the following, "For this is what disputes between Idealist, Solipsists and Realist look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the other defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being." Definitely not defending any particular position here, but suggesting all parties are mis-using are ordinary language.

From On Certainty(OC)

P. 24, he says, "The idealist's question would be something like: 'What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?' (And to that the answer can't be" I know that they exist.). But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like? and don't understand this straight off." Here he is not supporting the skeptical idealist nor the realism of G.E. Moore. Throughout the OC, Wittgenstein is arguing against philosophical skepticism, as well as Moore's Realism, who takes these objective certainties as if they are absolutely unconditional.

So, is Wittgenstein an Idealist or Realist? He is resisting this label because of how he views the purpose of philosophy. Consider the following from PI:

P. 116 "When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"- and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

and

P. 124 "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is."

It is about the commonly perceived tree and is either true or false, as can be confirmed inter-subjectively. — Janus

This is about what we know about the tree, not about the tree. It's like saying something like "The tree has three branches if and only if it is observed, by some statistically significant number of people, to have three branches"

But that's not right. "The tree has three branches" is true IFF the tree has three branches, regardless of who and how it is observed.

But we've had this discussion previously.

Yep. There's some suggestion he would take an anti-realist stance, but I suspect that's anti-realism trying to take him on board. See IEP.

Do you think we confuse the act of perceiving with the object of perception? — NOS4A2

I don't know where does this question refer to ... :chin:

But as an independent question --e.g. a new topic :smile:-- my answer is maybe. It depends who is "we", esp. because you used the word "confuse". Some people might and others not. I don't. Perception is a process and objects are ... well, objects. The one is you, the observer, and the other is outside, independent of you. Even if it is part of your body. Because you are not your body.

If we didn't perceive the tree we wouldn't know it has three branches. So, the statement about the tree in question cannot be informedly made absent having seen it.

If we didn't perceive the tree we wouldn't know it has three branches — Janus

Sure - I agree.

But our knowing or not knowing has no impact on the number of branches on the tree. It either has three branches, or not. That is, the better approach used here is realist, not anti-realist, so we can proceed with a bivalent logic. If you instead wish to drop the law of excluded middle and use a nonstandard logic, then go ahead, but I, and I guess most others, will not be joining you.

We've been here before. I'm not too keen on repeating an old tit for tat, so unless you have a new way to approach this, I might let it go.

I just read something and thought it was vaguely relevant.

Ever since puberty, when it is customary to get excited about such ques­tions, I have never again really understood the so-called problem of rela­tivism. My experience was that whoever gave himself over in earnest to the discipline of a particular subject learned to distinguish very precisely be­tween true and false, and that in contrast to such experience the assertion of general insecurity as to what is known had something abstract and un­convincing about it. Let it be that confronted with the ideal of the absolute, everything human stands under the shadow of the conditional and temporary - what happens when the boundary is reached at which thought must recognize that it is not identical to being, not only allows the most convincing insights, but forces them. — Adorno

I’m thinking that indirect realism, though popularly often expressed in modern scientific language, is a hangover from theology and speculative metaphysics. Compared with the view of God, “everything human stands under the shadow of the conditional and temporary,”—in this case, everything we experience is removed from the world and uncertain.

Ditch the ideal of the absolute, and experience is no longer a barrier, but just the way we interact with the rest of the world.

It also makes me think of Wittgenstein:

215. Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application. — Wittgenstein, On Certainty

I’m thinking that indirect realism, though popularly often expressed in modern scientific language, is a hangover from theology and speculative metaphysics. — Jamal

Nice Adorno quote. I've been looking for quotes expressing precisely this sentiment.

Ditch the ideal of the absolute, and experience is no longer a barrier, but just the way we interact with the rest of the world. — Jamal

In a somewhat cruder form, this kind of thinking informs my atheism. The idea of God, or some 'really real reality' which cannot be perceived has, for me, no clear application. It can in no way change my experience of what it is to be human in the world and can offer little but distraction and futility. Or some shit...

Indeed. However, I’m currently finding it difficult to stitch all these ideas together.

At some level we might say this positon is also a kind of philosophical shoulder shrug.

I can see that but I don’t really like that way of putting it. A refusal to play the game can be substantial, in that you’re questioning the starting point. I’d guess that most developments in philosophy have been of that form.

I like to think it’s more than boredom or pragmatism that makes me question the veil of perception.

I can see that but I don’t really like that way of putting it. — Jamal

Fair enough, but I like my swords double edged...

:cool:

I wasn't intending to push Wittgenstein as taking any sides in this rather silly debate — Banno

It cannot be such a silly debate without philosophic substance if some modern philosophers believe that the great genius philosophers of the past were mistaken.

In Searle's words: "I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive...........The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world."

It is interesting that Searle in his article The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument doesn't logically justify his belief in Direct Realism.

You have an image of a causal chain with you at one end and the tree at the other, and have convinced yourself that you cannot see the tree at the other end of the causal chain. — Banno

From the IEP article Objects of Perception, both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree with "the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers". However, "Direct realists also claim that it is with such objects that we directly engage." and for the Indirect Realist, "through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me."

The IEP also notes "There are, however, two versions of direct realism: naïve direct realism and scientific direct realism."

The article Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them by Pierre Le Morvan addresses the "causal argument".

He suggests that the Direct Realist should accept that perception is indirect, in that it involves a long, complex causal series of events. However, he argues that accepting causal indirectness does not require rejecting cognitive directness, in that the perceiver is still cognitively directly aware of the external object.

However, this doesn't answer my two fundamental problems with Direct Realism:
1) When we perceive the world, how can we directly know the cause of what we have perceived when our only knowledge of any external world has come from the perceptions themselves.
2) How is it possible to know from knowing an effect the cause of that effect, when every effect is overdetermined by more than one sufficient causes.

Let me repeat, this is an absurdity derived from a grammatical fiction. What is the fiction? Directly perceived sense data. — Richard B

I agree that, in a sense, "sense data" is a linguistic fiction, in that, for me, the term is metaphorical rather than literal.

As @NOS4A2 wrote: "For the direct realist, the man directly perceives a tree. For the indirect realist, though, something within the man (the mind, the brain, a little man) directly perceives something else within the man (sense data, representation, idea)."

As Searle wrote: "But the something is not a material object. Give it a name, call it a “sense
datum”."

My conscious mind does perceive something, and there is a long causal chain between this conscious perception and an object in the external world. Exactly what happens in the brain is still mysterious, but the mind does perceive something. The term "sense data" may be a metaphor, but it is still useful, as are the metaphors Evolution by Natural Selection, Laws of Nature, Gravity, General Relativity, etc.

I think later Wittgenstein resist being labeled an Idealist or Realist, or anything in-between — Richard B

We can label Wittgenstein, even if he wouldn't have done so himself

I agree that Wittgenstein would resist being labelled, as that does not seem to be in his character. Although I definately disagree with your position that "Indirect Realism is incoherent", I appreciate your reasoned arguments.

However, I do think we can label Wittgenstein's position, even if he himself would object to being so labelled, not that he can do anything about it. As Wikipedia's article about The Death of the Author writes: "Barthes's essay argues against traditional literary criticism's practice of relying on the intentions and biography of an author to definitively explain the "ultimate meaning" of a text. Instead, the essay emphasizes the primacy of each individual reader's interpretation of the work over any "definitive" meaning intended by the author, a process in which subtle or unnoticed characteristics may be drawn out for new insight"

For example, I am sure it could strongly be argued that Wittgenstein was definitely not an Idealist, in that he argued that a language understandable by only a single individual was incoherent. He wrote in para 256 of PI:
"Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations?—As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as 1.—But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions."

As regarding paras 116, 124 and 402 from PI and para 24 from On Certainty, I agree that there is the tendency to attack the words being used rather than what the words mean, but that doesn't mean, as Wittgenstein is seeming to suggest, that words should be taken at their common sense face value, ie, as used by the pedestrian in the street. This is clearly impractical. If a physicist at CERN could only use the word accelerator as understood in everyday language, I doubt future scientific breakthroughs would be possible. Similarly, if we could only use the words direct and indirect as commonly used in everyday situations, such as shopping, our understanding of the true nature of reality would be very much diminished.

The beetle in the box story is incompatible with Direct Realism

Similarly, I would argue that his story about a beetle in a box, para 293, can be used as an argument against Direct Realism, even if he didn't do so himself.

I will use your definitions of Direct Realism as the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are and Indirect Realism as the idea that we do not perceive the external world as it really is, but know only our ideas of the way the world is. Therefore, if I perceive a tree with three branches, the Direct Realist would argue that I am directly perceiving a tree with tree branches in the external world and the Indirect Realist would argue that I am directly perceiving a model or a representation of something that is in the external world.

Wittgenstein's private language argument argues that my private perception of a tree with three branches may not correspond with anyone else's private perception of a tree with three branches, in that my own beetle in a box must remain a mystery to anyone else. I can never know the private perception of another, but may only infer it from their behaviour.

Therefore, if "a tree with three branches" has a use within the language of a community, it cannot be the name of something. Either it is entirely possible that each person had a different private perception, or even that an individuals private perception continually changed or there was in fact no private perception. The private perception is irrelevant to whatever language game it is used in, as all we can discuss is what is available within a public language.

But if Direct Realism is correct, when I perceive a tree with three branches, this would mean that in the external world there is in fact a tree with three branches. Then given there is in fact a tree with three branches in the external world, someone else, assuming that Direct Realism is correct, would also directly perceive a tree with three branches.

Therefore, both myself and the other person would be having the exact same perception, that of a tree with three branches. But Wittgenstein's private language argument says that this is impossible. Therefore, Direct Realism and Wittgenstein's private language argument are incompatible.

Therefore, Wittgenstein's beetle in the box story may be used as an argument against Direct Realism.

1) When we perceive the world, how can we directly know the cause of what we have perceived when our only knowledge of any external world has come from the perceptions themselves.

If perceiving is an act of a perceiving agent, the act and the agent are one and the same. If they are one and the same, we can remove perception as some kind of intermediary between knower and the external world. If there is no intermediary, direct access to the external world is not only possible, but a brute fact. If we are able to directly access the external world, it means we are in the world, a part of the world. If we are a part of the world the knowledge is not circular, but open and relational.

2) How is it possible to know from knowing an effect the cause of that effect, when every effect is overdetermined by more than one sufficient causes.

I’m trying to grasp the question but am unsure what is cause and what is effect. Could you illustrate using our good ol’ tree?

just driven enough to reject someone's pov but not driven enough to provide a well fleshed out counterargument. Weird flex but okay you do you haha

just driven enough to reject someone's pov but not driven enough to provide a well fleshed out counterargument. — Benj96

You were? Strange for you to say.

I, on the the other hand, was referring to Searle's argument, introduced by , to which I previously gave reference:

For those interested in doing some actual thinking about the issue, a sample can be found at The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument. — Banno

and which formed the basis of much of the discussion since then. "The bad argument" is the name Searle gives to what you produced as a throw-away, but which others have taken seriously.

Sure - I agree.

But our knowing or not knowing has no impact on the number of branches on the tree. It either has three branches, or not. That is, the better approach used here is realist, not anti-realist, so we can proceed with a bivalent logic. If you instead wish to drop the law of excluded middle and use a nonstandard logic, then go ahead, but I, and I guess most others, will not be joining you. — Banno

If I were one of those who subscribe to the idea that seeing the tree collapses the wave function and determines how many branches it has, which I'm not. I would disagree, which I don't. I think that the number of branches on a tree is not determined by us at all but by an independent actuality, whatever we might think that is.

That said I think the tree, like everything else, is a (non-arbitrary) collective representation, and it is within that representation, and not outside that human context, that the notion of tree, three and branches finds its sense.

An unimportant point, perhaps, but there you go. We don't seem to be disagreeing about anything that has more than the most subtle philosophical import.

If perceiving is an act of a perceiving agent, the act and the agent are one and the same — NOS4A2

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that there is a world outside the mind. The Direct Realist would argue that we directly perceive the world outside the mind. The Indirect Realist would argue that we directly perceive a world inside the mind and only indirectly perceive the world outside the mind.

Is the discussion about direct and indirect inconsequential ? I don't think so. It is true it is not something we need to be concerned about when shopping for lamb, but then again, the lamb didn't question what was going on when approached by a friendly farmer and shepherded into a truck with the word abattoir on the side. It does make a difference to our fundamental understanding of reality whether we directly perceive the world as it is or what we perceive is an illusion that we have to pragmatically work through.

Item 3 doesn't follow from items 1 and 2.

1. If perceiving is an act of a perceiving agent, the act and the agent are one and the same.
I agree with item 1. It is not as if there is a homunculus in the mind that is perceiving an act of perception, but rather, the perceiver is the act of perception. The perceiver and the act of perception are one and the same. As Searle wrote "It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain".

2. If they are one and the same, we can remove perception as some kind of intermediary between knower and the external world.
I agree with item 2 that perception is not an intermediary between the perceiving agent and the external world, as the perceiving agent and their perception are one and the same.

3. If there is no intermediary, direct access to the external world is not only possible, but a brute fact.
Item 3 doesn't follow from items 1 and 2. I agree that there is direct access by the perceiving agent to their perception of the world, as they are one and the same, which is a brute fact. However, it has not yet been shown that the world the perceiving agent is perceiving exists within the mind or outside the mind.

4. If we are able to directly access the external world, it means we are in the world, a part of the world.
It depends what one means by "world". I agree that both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe they are part of The World, where The World consists of both the world inside the mind and the world outside the mind.

5. If we are a part of the world the knowledge is not circular, but open and relational.
It depends again on what is meant by "world". I agree that the Direct Realist believes that the perceiving agent has direct knowledge of The World. However, the Indirect Realist believes that the perceiving agent has direct knowledge of the world in their mind, only indirect knowledge of the world outside their mind and therefore only indirect knowledge of The World.

It remains to be shown how direct knowledge of a world in one's mind can lead to direct knowledge of the world outside one's mind.

However, it has not yet been shown that the world the perceiving agent is perceiving exists within the mind or outside the mind.

You’ve inserted another element or space within the perceiver called “the world inside the mind”.

To avoid question begging and to test whether or not this is an area where a world could be perceived, that it contains a world, and that a perceiver can perceive it, I suggested in the original post that we ought to remove this element from the rest of the man like we can any other part of the man (like any organ), put it on a table beside a perceiver (like we’ve been doing with a perceiver and a tree) for the purpose of analysis.

What is on the table? Who perceives what? What part of the man is perceiver, what part of the man is perceived? Finally, is perception still occurring?

If perception is not occurring, one does not perceive the other, and neither element is perceiver or perceived.

You’ve inserted another element or space within the perceiver called “the world inside the mind”. — NOS4A2

The Indirect Realist believes they are perceiving a world that exists in their mind. The Direct Realist believes they are perceiving a world than exists outside their mind. Whether or not another element has been inserted within the perceiver depends on one's belief in Indirect or Direct Realism.

If one believes in Indirect Realism, then "the world inside the mind" isn't an element that is additional to the perceiver.

I suggested in the original post that we ought to remove this element from the rest of the man like we can any other part of the man (like any organ), put it on a table beside a perceiver (like we’ve been doing with a perceiver and a tree) for the purpose of analysis. — NOS4A2

I agree with what you wrote before: "If perceiving is an act of a perceiving agent, the act and the agent are one and the same". For the Indirect Realist, the act of perceiving a world and the perceiving agent are one and the same. Therefore, for the Indirect Realist, the act of perceiving a world inside their mind cannot be removed from the perceiving agent, even for the purpose of analysis.

It would be the same problem that Searle wrote about, that of removing pain from the experience of pain.

Assuming that anything “within the mind” is also within the perceiver, then one is indistinguishable from the other (so long as it is not a foreign element). The perceiver cannot stand in the way of himself and the outer world, or be his own intermediary, or placed before himself in the causal chain of perception.

Son: Dad

Dad: Yes, son

Son: Do I have sense data?

Dad: Sure, let me show you. Look at that tree. Now, press you eye like this and you will see two trees.

Son: Like this?

Dad: Yes

Son: But I don't see two trees.

Dad: You must be doing it wrong. Let me press them.

Son: Ouch! That hurts. And I still don't see two trees.

Dad: Well son, I guess you don't have sense data. I guess you are one of the few actual direct realist.

Son: Wow, that's neat. What are you?

Dad: An indirect realist. By the way, what does the tree look like?

Son: It looks like ..........

Dad: Funny, that is how it looks to me.

The perceiver cannot stand in the way of himself and the outer world, or be his own intermediary, or placed before himself in the causal chain of perception. — NOS4A2

That's how I see it. The perceiver is at one end of a causal chain of intermediaries that links the perceiver to what the perceiver is perceiving. At one end of the causal chain with intermediaries is someone who perceives a green tree with three branches. At the other end is something in the world that the perceiver perceives as a green tree with three branches.

As green, trees, branches, etc are concepts that exist only in the mind, what is being perceived can therefore only exist in the mind.

The perceiver is at one end of a causal chain of intermediaries — RussellA

And what is the nature of this chain?