but I am going to finish the book first. — Wayfarer

Me, too.


Not seeing an answer here.

He seems to be an infotech Kant in some ways. — Tom Storm

yes, so it seems.

Hoffman would posit that humans have evolved a tailored and limited account of reality which assists us in survival. — Tom Storm

Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga takes this idea to show how evolutionary ideas undermine naturalism. That evolution is only selecting for survival ability and not truth finding ability, thus, our ability to determine the truth of naturalism or anything for that matter is severely questionable.

Not seeing an answer here. — Banno

Generally, trying to think how these phases are used in everyday circumstances. In my example, using "The tree has three branches", there was no perception of a tree when it was used.

Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga takes this idea to show how evolutionary ideas undermine naturalism. — Richard B

Beat me to it, I was going to say exactly that. But they draw very different conclusions as far as I can see - Hoffman doesn’t seem to read any religious implication, or even specifically philosophical conclusions, from his work, he sees himself as a cognitive scientist first and foremost. One thing Hoffman does say is that ‘reality is conscious agents all the way down’, which can’t help but remind me of Liebniz’ monads, although I don’t know if he’s ever commented on that or anyone else has noticed it.

The object in the world is not an idea but an object. — Wayfarer

We have no idea if there are objects without ideas. :lol:

We have no idea if there are objects without ideas. :lol: — praxis

Yet there are plenty of people here with no idea.

cherry-picked.

Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga takes this idea to show how evolutionary ideas undermine naturalism. — Richard B

That's true. I think Plantinga was inspired by Kant's transcendental arguments.

This, by way of formulating my objection...

What do we want in a scientific theory of consciousness? Consider the case of tasting basil versus hearing a siren. For a theory that proposes that brain activity causes conscious experiences, we want mathematical laws or principles that state precisely which brain activities cause the conscious experience of tasting basil, precisely why this activity does not cause the experience of, say, hearing a siren, and precisely how this activity must change to transform the experience from tasting basil to, say, tasting rosemary. These laws or principles must apply across species, or else explain precisely why different species require different laws. No such laws, indeed no plausible ideas, have ever been proposed. — Donald D. Hoffman

I think Davidson has shown that such an equation is both fraught and unnecessary. Anomalous monism requires no such thing, and in so doing fits in with connectionist views of neural architecture. There simple need be no particular structure that we all have that is our taste of basil.

But as you can see, I'm at p.15, so he has time to redeem himself.

(Scanned that with an iPhone. neat.)

Question about anomalous monism - it acknowledges there are no physical laws governing mental causation, but as mental causation occurs, and everything that occurs is physical, then mental events must be physical, as there is nothing else they could be.

Did I miss anything essential?

it acknowledges there are no physical laws governing mental causation — Wayfarer

Uncomfortable with that. Better to say something like that every mental even is a physical event.

I'm not at all happy with assuming the causal closure of the physical, given my scepticism about the place of causation in physical explanation. But it seems perhaps Davidson was so content.

The important insight is that it need not be the case that each and every metal event is identical to some specific physical state of a brain.

I think you are saying not only "the scientist perceives an event in their laboratory" as an inference, but "the laboratory" itself can only ever be an inference. This is an absurdity derived from a grammatical fiction. — Richard B

Two fundamental problems with Direct Realism

In my opinion, there are two fundamental problems with Direct Realism:
1) When we perceive the world, how can we directly know the cause of what we have perceived when our only knowledge of any external world has come from the perceptions themselves.
2) How is it possible to know from knowing an effect the cause of that effect, when every effect is overdetermined by more than one sufficient causes.

Item 2) suffers from the same problem as anomalous monism, that of over determination. If there was an explanation as to how the problem of over determination could be negated in anomalous monism, then perhaps the same argument could be used for item 2).

John Searle in The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument wrote
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes..............The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world."

Whether a scientist or an artist, all humans start off by perceiving the world. The question is, is the Idealist correct that the world is a mental construct, or is the Direct Realist correct that they directly perceive an external world, or is the Indirect Realist correct that they directly perceive sense data (metaphorically speaking) and only indirectly perceive the external world.

I think you will need a stronger argument against Indirect Realism than it is absurd, as, as Searle writes, Direct Realism was not supported by the great geniuses of philosophy.

"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches". Idealism is the conflation of the two. — Banno

Just elaborating:

The Idealist, Indirect Realist and Direct Realist agree that they perceive the tree to have three branches.

For the Idealist, as reality is a mental construct, both the tree and the perception of the tree exist in the mind and are therefore the same.

For both the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is something in a mind independent external world. The Direct Realist knows that this something is a tree with three branches. The Indirect Realist knows that they perceive a tree with three branches, but doesn't know what this something is in the external world.

But see 308 and 309. — Banno

Wittgenstein in PI is more an Indirect Realist than a Direct Realist

It is clear that Wittgenstein is not an Idealist treating the world as a mental construct because of the importance he places on the public language game.
Para 21. "Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?"

Para 246 suggests Indirect Realism rather than Direct Realism
"The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself."
He writes that I cannot doubt that I am in pain but I can doubt that others are in pain. Similarly, it must follow that although I cannot doubt that I perceive a tree with three branches, I can doubt that others perceive the same tree with three branches. And if that is the case, this casts doubt on there being a tree with three branches in an external world able to be perceived in the first place.

Para 293 also suggests Indirect Realism rather than Direct Realism
"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

He writes that the object in my box, my pain, my beetle, may be different to everyone else's object in their box, their pain, their beetle, and therefore the object can play no part in the language game. The name "pain" or "beetle" has a use in a language game, but not as a name for a particular thing existing in the world. Similarly, the object that I perceive in my box, a tree with three branches, may be different to what everyone else perceives in their box. Therefore, the object. my perception of a tree with three branches, can play no part in the language game. The name "a tree with three branches" has a use in a language game but not as a name for a particular thing existing in the world.

This is not the position of the Direct Realist for whom there exists a tree with three branches in the world. This is more the position of the Indirect Realist, where "a tree with three branches" does not refer to something existing in the world but rather refers to a representation in the mind being used within a language game.

I think you will need a stronger argument against Indirect Realism than it is absurd, as, as Searle writes, Direct Realism was not supported by the great geniuses of philosophy. — RussellA

Let me repeat, this is an absurdity derived from a grammatical fiction. What is the fiction? Directly perceived sense data.

For both the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is something in a mind independent external world. The Direct Realist knows that this something is a tree with three branches. The Indirect Realist knows that they perceive a tree with three branches, but doesn't know what this something is in the external world. — RussellA

I believe this distinction is based on perception not knowledge.

The direct realist perceives the tree.
The indirect realist perceives the sense data of the tree.

How does the direct realist know they perceive a tree. Well, there are many actions they could do like look at it from a different angle, touch it, consult an expert, perform a DNA test and so forth.

How about an indirect realist? The same? I feel the pragmatist in me is ready to carve out the metaphysical fat.

The answer to this question seems obvious — NOS4A2

What is your answer? I have checked a few other messages/comments that follow your description of the topic but couldn't find it. Maybe you have already exposed it somewhere in this thread, but there are 17 pages in it and I cannot read all your message. Sorry. So, can you give me the link of a message in which you expose your answer?

Re "direct" and "indirect" perception: There's only direct perception. An indirect perception would be e.g. as if we are perceiving an object through the senses of some other entity. (Which I don't think is pertinent to this discussion.)

Perception has to do with being aware of things in our environment and inside us (thoughts, feelings, etc.). Even in its simplest form, it involves some degree of recognition and/or undestanding. That is, perception is not just sensing/b]. This is on the physical level and it is the task of the brain. Even simple organisms can perceive things in their environment as stimuli and react automatically or instintively to them.

Who perceives what? If we were to remove both those things from the man, both the perceiver and the perceived, place them on a table next to each other for observation, what would be there? Would there be one object or two? And could one be said to be perceiving the other? — NOS4A2

Can a perceived object also perceive you?

BTW, do you maybe refer to Krishnamurti's "the observed is the observer"?

It seems obvious to me that I perceive a tree. It doesn't seem obvious to me that I perceive perceptions, representations, sense-data, or any other such entities.

Yes, a perceived object can perceive me so long as it is capable of perceiving.

I perceive my perceptions. You perceive your perceptions. They perceive us perceiving our perceptions. We perceive them perceiving their perceptions.

The universe as a whole perceives all perceptions as it contains all perceivers and all that is perceived.

And what remains? That yet to be perceived, that which may never be percieved at all or that yet to be a perciever. Or all three.

I think if it sort of in the analogy that 0 neither perceives nor is perceived. However 0 can = - 1 + 1 (where - 1 can perceive +1 or +1 can percieve - 1), or both simultaneously.

Yes, a perceived object can perceive me so long as it is capable of perceiving. — NOS4A2

Most probably, you mean an entitity, a living organism. Which is a special case. You can't generalize it and apply it to inanimate things, can you? This is what I meant.

I'm not sure it is the case that we perceive perceptions any more than we see seeings or hear hearings or digest digestions.

Most probably, you mean an entitity, a living organism. Which is a special case. You can't generalize it and apply it to inanimate things, can you? This is what I meant.

True, that's what I meant. Anything that is incapable of perceiving would not be able to perceive us.

OK.

Do you think we confuse the act of perceiving with the object of perception? Maybe our language doesn't permit us to do otherwise. I honestly do not know.

I meant we perceive the action of them perceiving. In the sense that all we have to go on is observing them interacting with the world (perceiving) and articulating what they perceive to us, as well as the resultant beliefs/attitudes.

Because ofc we cannot perceive for them. We can only watch them doing it and hear of the results from what they say.

I wasn't intending to push Wittgenstein as taking any sides in this rather silly debate. I was attempting to show you how your picture of the process of seeing has trapped you. You have an image of a causal chain with you at one end and the tree at the other, and have convinced yourself that you cannot see the tree at the other end of the causal chain. . A better account, the one given by Austin, emphasised by Searle and implicit in Wittgenstein, is that the chain is your seeing the tree.

And that's how there is a difference between seeing a tree and hallucinating a tree; in the former, there is a tree.

I perceive my perceptions. — Benj96

There's the bad argument again.

As Searle says in his conclusion, the core of the bad argument is to "...think that somehow or other, the experiences are themselves the object of the experiences". — Banno

I think if it sort of in the analogy that 0 neither perceives nor is perceived. However 0 can = - 1 + 1 (where - 1 can perceive +1 or +1 can percieve - 1), or both simultaneously. — Benj96

I prefer my waffles with honey.

There's the bad argument again. — Banno

The homunculus surfaces again. At least they can take comfort that they can perceive directly.

I wasn't intending to push Wittgenstein as taking any sides in this rather silly debate. — Banno

I would say Wittgenstein would take neither side of debate.

Which debate? For him the idealism/realism debate is " a misfiring attempt to express what can't be expressed like that". But the direct/indirect realism debate is just an amplified grammatical ambiguity.

...and then there's realism/anti-realism... That's a harder case.