• Philosophim
    2.6k
    I wrote a post called the Methodology of Induction that largely went unread. I find this a shame, because I feel I’ve constructed a system of knowledge that can serve as a new base of discussion in epistemology. I have used this system of knowledge to solve all of the problems and paradoxes that I know of in current day epistemology. And yet, the low engagement has told me its not written or presented very clearly, so I’m trying again!

    I’ve cut the paper in half to narrow the topic down to establishing what knowledge is within our own world view. Hopefully I will get some clever people on here to read it and give it a good analysis.

    Summary: Knowledge does not capture the truth, but is a tool to arrive at the most reasonable assessment of reality for survival and desired goals. Once we can establish what knowledge is, we can then attempt to rationally assess what to do upon reaching its limitations. The paper attempts to do the following.

    Demonstrate that knowledge within a solo context can be subdivided into two separate approaches: Distinctive knowledge, and applied knowledge.

    Demonstrate how Induction is a rational approach to situations in which the limits of deduction are reached. 4 subdivisions of induction will be analyzed to determine a hierarchy of inductions allowing a reasoned comparison between the cogency of types of inductions.

    How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

    The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire.

    Any outside reference to other theories cannot assume that theory is sound without first proving it is sound. Saying, “Well X says this,” is fine as long as you understand why X said that, that what X said can be shown to be sound, and its a valid point to bring against the theory.

    Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasn’t read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper.

    If this new attempt gets more traction I will post the second part that addresses knowledge in between more than one person, but for now this will remain in the context of a single person, or in your case, you, the reader.




    Belief and Knowledge

    Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs. A belief is a will, or a sureness reality exists in a particular state. There are beliefs which are co-existent with reality, and there are beliefs which are contrary to reality. For example, I believe I can pick up a baseball with my hand from a table in front of me. If I act to reach over to the baseball, I can pick the ball up with my hand. My belief and my acting upon that belief is co-existent with reality. However, if I believe I can levitate the baseball with my mind alone, the baseball remains inert despite my will to do so. In this instance, my belief and the results of my acting upon that belief are contradictory.

    Reality can therefore be defined as what results despite a belief being applied. It is better for one to apply a belief that one is certain will be co-existent with reality, and not contradicted by reality. This ensures that one’s will and actions result in the expected outcome. The assessment of beliefs to ascertain that one’s beliefs and actions will be contradicted by reality is what I would consider an attempt at gaining “knowledge”.

    A contradiction from reality may be direct or indirect. A “direct contradiction” to a belief is a “contrary existence”. For example, I believe that eating this apple will be healthy, but the apple ends up being rotten and harmful. An indirect contradiction is an inability to experience one’s belief in reality. For example, if I believe in an invisible and unsensible unicorn, there is nothing in reality with which I may apply this belief. There must be the potential for the belief to be applied and contradicted. Therefore such a belief could also not be knowledge.

    There are two ways to reason whether a belief is not contradicted by reality. The first is induction. Generally I call this a “belief” that a belief is sound. The second is deduction. A deductive belief is that which cannot be contradicted from the information and experience available to oneself. Can a belief be deduced that cannot be contradicted by reality?

    Such a belief was famously sought by Descartes in Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes begins to question all of his assumptions about the world. Is he dreaming? Are math and science real representations of the truth? Of what can anyone be certain? At the end of Descartes' journey of self-doubt, he arrives at a belief which appears he cannot doubt and requires no further justification in his mind, “I think therefore I am.” Of course, I can be doubted because what is “I am”?

    I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, “I” would be different from “everything else”. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.

    Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”.

    The beginning of knowledge Discrete Experiences

    A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.

    Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience.

    Thus, my first deductive belief that is not contradicted by reality, or bit of knowledge is not, “I think therefore I am,” but simply, “I am a discrete experiencer.” With my base established, I can now build more knowledge. I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses? Closing off my senses reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call “thoughts.” If I “think” on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of “thoughts” I again run into a contradiction. As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.

    It may seem odd that I am calling these things “thoughts”, as we all know what thoughts mean in English. At this time it is not that we can know things in English that I am trying to demonstrate, it is that I can know things. And if you can read and comprehend the ideas here, you can know things as well. English is necessary only as a medium to communicate to “an other”, something not yet known. There is only you, and you now know what “thoughts” are. You are the "I" of this paper.

    I now combine my thoughts and my senses. This is another discrete experience, something I know I do, and so do. I look at a table in front of me. I close my eyes and think about the table. I open my eyes and I think, “The table is still there.” I am claiming two points. First, I am claiming I have memory, a thought which recalls itself as a prior experience. Second, I am attempting to apply this memory to the reality of my other current discrete experiences, that of the “table” before me.

    Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. I find at this time, I cannot deductively justify that memories of a past discrete experience are accurate or inaccurate representations of that original discrete experience. I may believe they represent past experiences without contradiction, but this belief is indirectly contradicted by reality. I can never go back in “time”. Believing that a memory is not contradicted by past experience is currently something I cannot deductively believe, therefore it is an inductive belief. What I can deductively believe, is that I have the discrete experience of memories. Without memories, how could I remember my claim to what a memory is and deny its reality? The denial of experiencing the discrete experience of a memory is again a contradiction by reality, and I deductively believe, and thus know I have memories.

    Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge

    Since I know I have memories, I wish to find a way to match a memory deductively to a current discrete experience without contradiction by reality. I will need some new vocabulary. A discrete experience could easily be called a “distinction” in philosophy. I know that I discretely experience. I will now claim that what I discretely experience is also known. This type of knowledge will be called distinctive knowledge. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.

    What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge. The two types of knowledge summarized will not be explored in depth below.

    The Formation of Distinctions

    The first thing is to explore distinctions in depth. I travel down a road in the country and spy a strange thing which seems to interact differently from the existence I distinctly know. In English we this creature would be called a “sheep”, but I have never encountered the word, or the experience before now. To help me manage these many distinctions, I start to identify this new discrete experience and commit it to memory. There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. “‘This’ is separate from ‘that’”. Because I am capable of language, I will use a word as a symbol of this memory. I will make up a word and call it a “shep”.

    There is no outside force that necessitates how I must discretely experience. Whatever I claim the distinction to be at the time of distinction, is what the distinction is. I decide to notice the shep as its own entity, (instead of part of the field for example). In that first moment of awareness, I observe the shep as an indistinct whole without detail. However, just like I can discretely experience words, then letters, then the ink which makes up a part of a letter, I find I can subdivide more discrete experiences within this initial discrete experience of the sheep. There are distinctions which may be made within distinctions. I notice that its curly fur and feet seem strange. If I wished, I could label these further discrete experiences as wool and hooves. As these separate discrete experiences are part of the larger discrete experience of the sheep, the subdivisions of the full discrete identity will be called properties of the shep.

    There are also properties within the shep that I may currently or later discretely experience in my examination, but do not find important for my identity and memories. For example, smell, color, size, or any other properties besides the ones I use for my definition/memory, are irrelevant to me. Perhaps I am colorblind or deaf. As such, the colors and the noise of the shep do not matter. Perhaps I find it unimportant that a shep has a tail, as all creatures I have seen besides humans at this point in my life have had tails I could ignore the tail completely. I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I don’t believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.

    The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep, I call accidental properties. Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties. If I wish to refer to those accidental properties, I may use them as addendums to “shep”. Thus, I could note a black shep, white shep, tall shep or short shep. What I ultimately define as a shep are the essential properties that I set, even if these essential properties are mere memories of experiences and beyond language.

    Applying Those Distinctions to Reality

    While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. To continue the example, later in the day I walk past another field and spy an experience that strikes me as familiar. I look at the discrete experience of the thing and further discretely experience two properties within the full discrete experience of the entity. I believe these two properties match what previously identified as curly fur and hooves. Can I apply these known memories to the current experience in front of me without contradiction from reality?

    First, within my distinctive knowledge, I have no notion of any other memory of a discrete experience with the essential properties of both curly fur and hooves. Second, I choose not to identify this new thing as a newly defined memory. As such, I attempt to match this new discrete experience of the thing in the field, to a memory I know. Unlike the other forms of knowledge, I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience.

    Can I have knowledge of, “That experience over there matches the identity of a shep by simply having the experience itself?” I know that I’m having the experience of believing this, but can my belief about a thing that is outside of my immediate experience be deductively shown without contradiction from reality? This is one step higher than the distinctive knowledge of the experience itself. I am matching, or applying an identity beyond simply having the experience itself. If I can deductively do so without contradiction from reality, I will have successfully performed the seconds subdivision of knowledge, applicable knowledge.

    To do so, I start with my current remembered identities. I have no other memory of anything with curly fur and hooves that is not a shep, but I still need to deductively confirm that what I observe are curly fur and hooves, if I am to know that the thing is a shep. I note that both my discrete experience of curly fur and hooves fit my images of curly fur and hooves in memory without contradiction from within myself. I could ask myself, “But is the current image I have of curly fur the image that I had yesterday?” That is a question of applicable knowledge that cannot be known with the information I have. The only thing I distinctively know is the memory I experience today. I find that I have no other memories that could match to my discrete experience of the creature before me. Since I do not wish to create new distinctive knowledge, and there is nothing within experienced reality which directly or indirectly contradicts my deduction that these memories match, I have obtained applicable knowledge that I am observing wool and hooves.

    1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
    2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
    3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
    4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.

    Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep.

    Considering Issues with Knowledge

    What if I have two conflicting memories? Imagine I have a distinctive knowledge conflict with two separate memories of hooves. I will call them memory A and B respectively. I must decide which memory I want to use before applying it to reality. Perhaps in memory A, it is essential that a hoof is curved at the top, while in memory B, it is essential that a hoof is pointed at the top. I can decide to use either memory A or B without contradiction, but not apply both memory A and B at the same time. I can, however, decide to apply memory A for one second, then apply believe memory B one second later. Such a state is called “confusion” or “thinking.' at the symbolic distinctive level. Once I decide to applicably believe either memory A or B, I can then attempt to deductively apply that belief. My distinct experience of the hoof will either deny memory A, memory B, or both. If I have a memory of A and B for “hoof” that both retains validity when applied, then they are either synonyms or one subsumes the other.

    What if I experience a “shep” which seems to be different from the initial identity I created? What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the “hologram” as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make.

    However, if I touch both the solid and hologram sheep and find a difference, I now have a distinctive choice. I could decide the lack of physical solidness of one sheep is an accidental property and simply state, “Some sheep I can pass my hands through; others, I can't.” If I decide the physical properties of a sheep are essential, I can create a new distinctive identity called a “hologram” with its separate and unique combination of essential properties. The distinctive decision determines what I then applicably know. If I distinctively know touch as an accidental property, then by sight alone, I will applicably know both a hologram and a solid sheep as a “sheep.” I must discretely experience an entity with touch before I could applicably know whether the creature is a perfectly convincing hologram or a sheep. The more essential properties I introduce within my distinctions, the more I have to apply them to reality to determine if this application is a deductive belief.

    The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. Instead of a hologram, imagine a more real world scenario. I continue walking down the field and spy another creature I have never heard or experienced before which society calls a goat. I look at the “goat” and notice some distinctions I will call horns and a beard. I continue to make further distinctions and note that I can deductively believe and apply that the animal has hooves and curly hair. Here, I have a choice.

    Like the hologram, if I find the horns and beard are non-essential distinctions, then matching my memory of a shep to this goat, I would applicably know it to be a shep. Perhaps I did not notice the beard or horns. If I do, I may still only label them as accidental properties, and state, “That is a shep with a beard and horns”.

    If instead I find the horns and beard as essential properties. In my mind, this sets it as something different enough from a sheep to see it as a more distinct identity. In this case, I have an identity with essential properties that a shep does not have. Once I have this identity to compare to in my memory, any future creatures with the essential properties of a goat can no longer be applicably known as a shep. While the shep and goat may share some essential properties, they do not share all of them.

    Knowledge of Applicable Limits

    Understanding the distinctive and applicable subdivisions of knowledge allows us also grasp the limits of when something is outside of these subtypes of knowledge. As an example I walk further down a field and spy a thing with wool and hooves walking away from me. Because it is walking away, I am unable to see its head. As I am unable to observe the creature’s face and see if it has a beard or not, I am unable to claim a deductive belief, or knowledge that the entity is definitively a sheep or a goat. Any such assertive claim that the creature is definitively one or the other, would be contradicted indirectly by my inability to observe the face of the entity. Such a belief would be inductive.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Induction

    While a method of evaluating beliefs through a deductive methodology has been proposed, there are times when a belief cannot be deduced. In these cases the only type of belief available is an inductive belief. So far, an inductive belief has been classified as merely a belief. Intuitively however, people have regarded certain inductions as more cogent than others. Understanding how beliefs can be deduced into knowledge also allows insight that not all inductive beliefs are the same.

    In evaluating inductions I looked at them from the standpoint of their relations to distinctive and applicable knowledge. In looking at the interplay between distinctive and applicable knowledge, I noticed that certain inductions strayed more or less further from the knowledge process. This allowed me to definitely demonstrate why one induction is more reasonable than another. From this, I propose 4 baseline inductions: probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction.

    Probability

    The induction considered mathematically the most cogent is probability. An example of probability is the statement, “The random chance of pulling a jack out of a normal deck of 52 playing cards is 4/52. If it is applicably known there are four jacks in a deck of 52 playing cards, the cards have been randomly shuffled, and the person who draws the card is unable to discern which card is which, deductively a 4/52 chance is the only possibility. Any prediction about the future is innately inductive, but a probability is the most rational type of prediction about the future because its justification the applicably known limits of what can occur given the situation.

    Probability will also reveal how I can evaluate other inductions cogency. If applicable knowledge is a deduction that cannot be contradicted by reality, then the possible outcome when considering all of the evidence leading to that knowledge is 100%. There is only one conclusion that can be reached, no other possibilities. If I then make another claim of applicable knowledge using a prior claim of knowledge as justification, as justification, the second justification is a 1*1=100% probability of being applicable knowledge.

    If I make a pure induction, its probability is less than 100% of being logically sound. The definition of an induction is that the premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusion. This means that the probability of an induction’s result being a belief that does not contradict reality is 1 out of an unknown other possibilities. To simplify this concept, imagine an induction’s probability of not being contradicted by reality is 50%, as in the shep/goat example when I could not see its face. I arrive at 50% because there are only two distinctively known possible outcomes. (Note: I am ignoring the possibility of a person forming new distinctive knowledge to simplify the example).

    If more than one probable induction is combined, the likelihood of its occurrence can be reasoned out. For example, I guess that it’s a shep instead of a goat, then I guess that the shep is male. Since I distinctly only know of two possible sexes, the probability of both of them being sounds is .5*.5 or a 25% chance. Any probability of less than one multiplied by any probability of less than one will always result in an overall lower chance of being correct. The more inductions one uses as justification for new inductions, the less likely their conclusion will be a rationally concluded belief.

    Possibility

    From this understanding, the next cogent induction down from probability that can be defined is possibility. A possibility is a belief that something applicably known at least once, can be applicably known again without consideration of its likelihood. For example, I applicably know people can put a jack in a deck of cards, shuffle it randomly, and draw a jack on the first draw. Therefore, it is possible that when a deck of shuffled cards has a jack in it, it can be randomly drawn on the first draw again. However, I am not evaluating the probability that it will happen, only that it is possible.

    A possibility is cogent because it relies on previous applicable knowledge. It is not inventing a belief about reality which has never been applicably known. Like probability, a possibility is an applicably known outcome. We applicably known there is a Jack in the deck of cards, and thus if someone randomly pulls a card, it is a possible outcome that it is a jack. A possibility is less cogent than a probability because while both rely on applicable knowledge as a justification for their inductions, a possibility does not examine all of the facts to conclude a deduced chance of its likelihood. For example, it is possible that I could win the lottery, but highly improbable. I would be more rational in my belief that I will likely not win if I buy a ticket based on probability, then ignoring probability and simply believing it is possible that I will win if I buy a ticket today.

    What I cannot do while comparing inductions is state the specific likelihood that one is more possible than another. I can claim that it is unlikely that I will win the lottery, and also believe it is possible. But what I can do is base my decisions on what is most applicably known. If I examine the possibility of winning the lottery, I can realize it is incredibly unlikely that I will win in a particular place, lets say 1 out of 1 million. If however I examine another lottery elsewhere, I find the chances of winning are 1 out of 100,000. If both pay out equally, I can take the more rational probability and bet on the one that has the greater chance of winning.

    Without probability, if I know it is possible to win the lottery in both states, but do not know the odds, there is no way to determine which possibility is more likely to occur. Thus if there are two possibilities, I cannot deductively conclude which one has the greater chance of occurring. If I only examine the possibility that I can win without analyzing the probability, my belief has less applicable knowledge involved, and thus I cannot know the likelihood of winning.

    While I cannot compare possibilities alone and determine which one is more cogent, I can compare probabilities to possibilities and determine that probabilities are more cogent to make decisions on. Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. Still, both probability and possibility rely on the belief, “What has been applicably known once could be applicably experienced again.” This brings up the problem of induction by Hume. What reason compels us to believe that what has happened once can happen again? If one has applicable knowledge of moments in which one applicably experienced something, and moments in which one did not applicably experience that same thing, one cannot applicably know that the applicable knowledge will, or will not be experienced again. The only way to applicably know one will or will not experience what one applicably knew again, is if one either does experience, or does not experience what one applicably knows again. Thus the decision to make an induction is something outside of applicable knowledge.

    Relying on Hume’s base criticism of induction is not a rational decision,, but an ingrained thing that I simply do. I in fact, must do it, just like I create discrete experiences. Making inductions is something that is necessitated by our very existence. Forming applicable knowledge takes time and careful reason, something the world does not always afford an individual before a decision must be made. With the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge, just like I can shape our discrete experiences into better expressions and tools for greater success, I can manage and shape my inductions as well.

    Plausibility

    Continuing on, this leaves the remaining two classifications of induction: plausibility, and irrational. While probability and possibilities rely on applicable knowledge, these two new inductions rely only on distinctions. A plausibility is the belief that an applicable belief will be applicably known before an application has been made. This breaks down even further into two subgroups. There are applicable and inapplicable plausibilities. An applicable plausibility is a plausibility which has not been applicably tested, but can be. An inapplicable plausibility is a belief which is unable to be applicably tested.

    Imagine I open a brand new deck of 52 cards and have looked at them. I know that its a 4/52 probability that the first card I draw will be a jack. I know that its possible for the first card drawn to be a jack. However, my mind whirls and I think to myself, “What if its possible that all the cards are actually magical cards that grant me a wish when I pull one?” I've never experienced this before in opening a new deck of cards, so using the word “possible” is incorrect. I don’t applicably know if its actually possible that all the cards could grant wishes. The correct term is “plausible" when I have formed a new distinctive idea that has not yet been tested in application.

    Without the understanding that knowledge has the two subdivisions of distinctive and applicable, the distinction of plausible can be difficult to identify. However, there is a clear difference between the possible, and the plausible. What is possible must have been applicably known at least one time. What is plausible is a distinctively known concept that has yet to be applicably tested.

    An applicable plausibility is previously unapplied distinctive knowledge that can be applied. In this case, an easy way to test the idea that all cards are magical wish granting cards, is to pull the cards and see if my wish is granted. If at least one of the cards does not, then my plausible belief is now applicably known as incorrect. An inapplicable plausibility would be when I had no means of applicably testing My claim. For example, I are unable to, or refuse to open up the deck of cards and pull one.

    Another example of an inapplicable plausibility is Descartes’ “Evil Demon,” argument. In his meditations, Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. There must be essential properties of this Evil Demon that I could apply. As the Evil Demon cannot be sensed in any way, there is no criteria of application. The plausibility is inapplicable.

    What is common to both plausibilities is that they are distinctive ideas without application. In the hierarchy, plausibilities are less cogent than possibilities. The simple reason is that possibilities and possibilities are based on something which has been applicably known. A plausibility has not yet reached this level. It is more cogent to base my reason on what has been confirmed to exist in reality, then what has not. Myths and conspiracy theories are good examples.

    Irrational

    Finally, an irrational belief is a belief that distinctive knowledge which is applicably known to be contradictory to reality, still may somehow be real. An example would be a person watches a deck of 52 cards being shuffled, a jack is randomly pulled, and it actually grants a wish. There are no tricks, and this is applicably confirmed. Despite the applicable knowledge that a jack was randomly pulled, the person irrationally insists on believing it is impossible for card to grant wishes.

    Justification for irrational beliefs cannot rely on applicable knowledge, irrational beliefs are a contradiction to applicable knowledge. Irrational beliefs are either justified by reliance on other inductions, or simply have no justification at all beyond one’s personal desire. This does not mean irrational inductions cannot be eventually found to be an applicable outcome. Perhaps in the future new experiences demonstrate that the card wasn’t actually magical, despite the idea that it granted wishes being the only deduced outcome that could be ascertained at the time. Irrational inductions are at the bottom of the hierarchy of inductions, as they go against rationality itself.

    Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
    Induction examined from the applicable knowledge of deductive justification provides a rational way to evaluate competing inductive beliefs. This is important, for while one cannot rationally argue which possibility is more rational to believe in, one can argue a probability makes the claim of a possibility irrelevant. Thus I can now take different inductions and determine which is most rational to make decisions on.

    To summarize:


    In an applicably known deck of 52 playing cards with four jacks,
    It is a 4/52 probability that a jack will be drawn the first pull.
    It is possible that a jack will be drawn.
    It is plausible that drawn card will grant me a wish.
    It is irrational that if I draw an applicably known Jack, I believe it is not a Jack.

    Here I can see how each progressive induction is lower in the hierarchy. To be clear, when comparing inductions within the same hierarchy (besides probability), there isn’t an easy way to determine which induction is more cogent. It is possible that a jack could be drawn, but also possible that a jack could not be drawn. Looking at possibilities alone cannot tell us which is more rational to believe in for the first card draw. It is equally plausible that the drawn card could grant myself a wish, but also plausible that it sings a tune for me. It is equally irrational to believe the Jack I draw is not a Jack, and that despite my drawing the card, I did not actually draw it.

    At this point, this theory of knowledge has been distinctively known and applied within a single individual’s context. This does not yet address knowledge between more than one individual, but I will definitely post the continuation if this gets enough traction and discussion. Thank you for reading all the way! Feel free to post questions and criticisms at this point. I honestly have so much more to say, but I understand the length is already quite long for these forums. I will be reserving the next post for optional reading focused on questions and comments that are repeated below.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Advanced portion: Only read this once you understand the first section and if you have more questions on how knowledge works within social contexts.

    So far, deductive beliefs have been made from the self. But what of other people? Can I deductively believe other people exist? I will define other people as other “I’s”. Recall “I” is “a discrete experiencer”. Distinctly, I know a language and have written ideas expressed in this language on this paper. To comprehend this language, a thing must be able to discretely experience and be an “I”. I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”. Therefore, if you are reading this, then you exist as an “I.” If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself. For my current purposes in applicably knowing other people exist, this is enough.

    If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a “subject” and their ability to deduce is their “subjective deduction”. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called “distinctive context”.

    To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, “Nice sheep!” The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, “Actually, that’s a goat.”

    I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition,, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.

    I reply,, “I didn’t know that, thanks!” If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the rancher’s. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.

    Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state “The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard.” There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of “I”s, and not laws of reality.

    As there are potentially as many distinctive contexts as there are combinations of people in the world, societies invented languages as distinctive contextual standards. A language is a societal construct of distinctive knowledge one may reference when communicating with another person. If someone decided to define a goat as a “sheep,” they could not do so within the established prescripts of the English language. A language gives a standard of distinctive knowledge to encourage a common ground for communication. As such, we will go forward with more confidence that we are using English in this paper’s communication, with a few of my own distinctive words that we are agreeing to for this topic.

    Even within a language, people’s ways of discretely experiencing the world can change the distinctive context.. A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus. A colorblind person will discretely experience a green and red apple differently than a person who sees color. A weak person's experience of what is heavy will differ from a very strong person. One person may look at a sheep for the first time and marvel at its wool while another thinks nothing of the wool and marvels at its tail. As such, a language is usually only a baseline, and a contextual context of essential properties must be agreed upon within each new group of communicating people.

    For example, one way to establish a discrete context is to agree to forgo discussing any discrete experiences two people are unable to share. For example, when speaking with a blind person, both people may decide to forgo any communication regarding sight. Such an applicable context does not negate the distinctive knowledge of a sheep having visual properties, those properties are simply not important or useful in this particular contextual communication. Thus I could file away in my head, “Sheep that is in the English language for people with sight, sheep for people without sight, and sheep between me and a group of friends,” and these would all be valid distinctive contexts.

    Imagine two friends are lifting weights in the gym. One lifts 100 pounds with every ounce of their strength while the other lifts 100 pounds with ease. When communicating, the stronger weight lifter praises their friend for lifting such a “heavy weight.” The intention of this context is to enter into the weaker weight lifters distinctive experience, and is not addressing the stronger weight lifters personal context of “heavy” that he uses for only his self-context.

    In some cases, there may be a distinctive disagreement two people can never agree on. One person might like the color blue more than any other, while another person likes the color green more than any other. In this case, we cannot enter into the same distinctive context regarding the appeal of colors. Our understanding of this and acceptance of another’s self-subjective distinction is called an opinion.

    Just like a language is a standard baseline to share a contextual discrete set of beliefs, there are often standards set to deal with the differences within perceptions and measurements. One such standard in society is math. Math does not consider the specifics of what a person is discretely experiencing. Instead, math considers the logic of discrete experiencing itself. A discrete experience is “one”. The act of discretely experiencing two discrete experiences as a group is “two”, therefore, 1+1=2. These standards are translated into tools of application. As the distinctive knowledge of math is consistently applied and deductively confirmed as a representative of the logic of discrete experiences itself, it is one of the standardized languages of discrete experience.

    Yet even with math as a baseline, its application is still within a context as well. For example, we can measure a large group of people together and say, “X height is higher than average, so we’ll call that ‘tall’”. Tall of course can change, even with math, based on the group of people one is measuring. If I’m only measuring Americans, what is tall might differ greatly when comparing to Chinese people. And of course, the context of tall may change once again when I apply it to both countries.

    Once contextual agreements are established, the deductive steps needed for an applicable conclusion are the same as within a self-context.. If those contextual beliefs are applied to reality without contradiction, they are applicably known within that context.

    While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, deduction takes time and energy, and is not always practical. When a well-designed context runs into limits, there is no recourse but induction. Fortunately, we have the hierarchy of induction once again. As long as we agree on the definitions involved, we can practice contextual applicable knowledge.
  • Caerulea-Lawrence
    26
    Hello Philosophim,

    This is my first real post, when leaving my introduction. I am not well versed in philosophy, so it took me a couple of hours to read and understand this, and I am still far from actively grasping it, but I am also eager to respond as well. It was very captivating, and I have enjoyed it so far, as I believe I will further when I delve more into it.

    Since you welcome all background levels, I assumed that includes me. I have read the paper, and have tried to keep a correct mindset. When I strayed into my own ideas or patterns, I went back to understanding and ‘deduction’ ;)

    It was a challenge to understand, and it felt like starting to grapple with puzzles in Riven (Myst games)… Like how does this work, what is all this information etc., but as I am starting to get it, I must say I am honestly positively surprised at how well I liked this, even though I have a very different approach.

    I decided to show you my summary. It is very short compared to what was written there originally, but written more in my own words. I thought it would be helpful to get a grasp on how I structure things. But I do not want any comments on the summary, except for with regard to what I wrote under Plausibility. I am curious about your view on what I wrote there.

    After the summary, I will write some of my thoughts. In line with your intent for this thread, I will try to keep it focused.

    Hope you like it.

    Forming applicable knowledge takes time and careful reason, something the world does not always afford an individual before a decision must be made. With the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge, just like I can shape our discrete experiences into better expressions and tools for greater success, I can manage and shape my inductions as well.Philosophim


    Belief and Knowledge

    Beliefs are intentions that are congruous with reality.

    Gaining knowledge is finding out if beliefs are contradicted by reality.

    Belief, without the potential to be contradicted, cannot increase knowledge.

    The deductive axiom - The self-recognized thinker and everything else. My ability to focus, create identities and to discretely experience.


    The beginning of knowledge - Discrete Experiences

    “I am a discrete experiencer.”
    Discretely experience is to give form meaning in one’s inner world. Since it actually happens, it is a congruous belief, and becomes ‘knowledge’.

    Memories are true in that they are form given to experiences.


    Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge

    Distinctive Knowledge is that which you are aware of in one’s inner world.

    Applicable Knowledge is beliefs that are compared with reality.


    The Formation of Distinctions

    Distinctions are individually made, and means to create a form in the mind different from another. Some factors are defining of the form, essential properties, others are optional, accidental properties.

    Since these are still experience, it doesn’t necessitate that what I find essential, is what differentiates an object in reality from another.


    Applying Those Distinctions to Reality

    Applicable knowledge is when a form I have created in my mind, fits reality. The simpler the properties in the distinctive knowledge, the simpler the applicable knowledge accrued. If the essential properties of sheep are curly fur and hooves, this would be indistinguishably from for example a goat.


    Considering Issues with Knowledge

    Memories can both apply, or neither can, or one of them.

    I choose if new properties are added as essential or accidental. But as I add more, I would also need to check more to be certain of the applicable knowledge.

    Properties can create a new form separate from another, depending on how the properties are understood, or even noticed.

    Knowledge of Applicable Limits

    Deductible beliefs need direct affirmations to become applicable knowledge.

    Induction

    Induction, seen parallel to the process of deduction - as a mean to differentiate different inductive beliefs and their closeness to ‘the knowledge process’.


    Probability

    Predictions about the future are inherently inductive, and probability means to limit error by knowing all available options that could occur, to increase the likelihood of said induction being applicable.

    So, when the factors are known, induction is used mathematically to improve the chance of the induction being applicable.

    It is also possible to circumvent this reasoning by simplifying the distinctive knowledge.

    Possibility

    Possible induction refers to situations that have happened, which we have applicable knowledge about, but where the probability is unknown. The similarity lies in the belief that the knowledge could happen again.


    Plausibility

    Plausibilities are untested distinctive knowledge, that has not happened to the I before, and furthermore classified as either applicable or inapplicable. The difference between the subgroups is in if it possible to test it, which also means an inapplicable belief can become an applicable if you find a way to test it?

    Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. I find this example interesting. Even though it makes sense that the undetectable Evil Demon is in itself an inapplicable plausibility example, I see something else as well.

    This sentence speaks to me differently. If we break it down into parts:
    Is it possible that his entire view of reality is flawed? Yes, if at one point he changed his view of reality, and he viewed the former view as limited or flawed. Then it would be possible.
    Is it possible he was tricked? I do not know Descartes very well, but I assume that is something he would have had experience with. Moreover, he could have applicable knowledge with tricking someone without them knowing, and therefore it is possible that he has been tricked without his knowledge as well.
    Believing something false should be something he has ample experience with as well, which makes it something possible.

    So if we remove the Evil Demon, I see the statement more as an assertion. He believes it is possible that he could view his current worldview as flawed and based on a false reality.


    Irrational

    Irrational beliefs do not rely on applicable knowledge. They are in direct opposition to applicable knowledge, but there is still the possibility that it might be true.
    Irrational beliefs are contrary to the surmiseable options available.


    Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
    The hierarchy makes comparing beliefs possible, and where there is direct competition between a possibility and a probability, to apply the knowledge of induction hierarchy to heighten the relative success these inductions will have in relation to reality.

    With regard to different beliefs on the same hierarchy level, it is not possible to argue for one over the other.
    Summary ends here.

    Ok, that finishes my summary, and some of my thoughts whilst reading this. I still find it curious how well I enjoyed reading this, even though it took a lot of conscious effort. Again, thank you for writing this, and thank you more for opening up to feedback from everyone. I wanted to post this, and I will think more on it over time, but I wanted to get out something. I will have to let it sink in, at it might be some time till I circle back, but I will read your response.

    Maybe I am missing some obvious point, but I was wondering if it is also possible to include the subconscious with regard to the discrete experiencer, or see it as a parallel axis or something? As I am very much more fluent in intuition, emotions and feelings, I am trying hard to focus on the task at hand and not dive into that. Still, I thought this feedback could fit the bill without digressing.

    Kindly,
    Caerulea-Lawrence
  • Philosophim
    2.6k


    Hello Caerulea! I'm so sorry that I never saw your notification that you had replied. I'm pretty upset about it as you spent such a nice amount of time in your reply. Hopefully you're still around to see my response.

    First of all, this is a fantastic summary. You nailed the message all the way through. I may use your summary at a future date, so your reply is most welcome. I wrote this so that it would be able to be understood by even someone without a background in philosophy. The fact you nailed it so well, makes me extremely happy. :D

    Onto your questions now!

    Your summary of the Evil Demon, your point, and your conclusion, are all correct. It is the evil demon itself which is plausible, as no one has ever applicably known an evil demon before. But if we do remove the Evil Demon and use Descartes applicable knowledge of being flawed and misunderstanding reality, your statement:

    He believes it is possible that he could view his current worldview as flawed and based on a false (view of) reality.Caerulea-Lawrence

    you are correct.

    Maybe I am missing some obvious point, but I was wondering if it is also possible to include the subconscious with regard to the discrete experiencer, or see it as a parallel axis or something? As I am very much more fluent in intuition, emotions and feelings, I am trying hard to focus on the task at hand and not dive into that. Still, I thought this feedback could fit the bill without digressing.Caerulea-Lawrence

    Great question, and I'll need to think about it. You've waited long enough for a reply for now however, so I'll come back when I've had time to think about it and answer.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Read Husserl.I like sushi

    I have. Anything in particular you wanted me to consider?
  • Caerulea-Lawrence
    26


    Yes, I got the notification, and I am glad I heard from you, as there was this little part of me that thought that my answer was totally off the mark.

    Congratulations on achieving your goal of more accessibility, and yes, I am also thoroughly pleased that I got this, and that even the summary is on point. That makes me happy, and I share your enthusiasm and happiness too.
    I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end).

    To be fair, I haven't come back to this yet, but at least I reread my summary now. Still, I must admit that your post is still a bit daunting, as I did have to focus very extensively and intensively, and follow your guide to the tee. I did manage to not get lost, and consequently I am still in a state of Relief after achieving something that looked to be too steep a climb, than I am quite ready to take a look at how the **** I did it :)
    I mean, the reason isn't only because it was 'difficult' to do, of course. I tend to do this with regard to new knowledge or ideas, that even when I am very satisfied with them, and like them very much, and I even start to apply them a little bit in my cognitive space, I ease things in, slowly.

    In due time, I will circle back, and if you do talk more about this, I would be very pleased if you would notify me somehow.

    If there is a small nit-pick I can mention,
    Reveal
    I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it.


    God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure.


    The growth from reading this:
    I remember reading a post here.
    And just noticing that I wasn't very bothered with claims, and could just look at it more relaxed. They write about the experiences NDE survivors have, and I noticed I could add it to a long list of "Possible human experiences/abilities". I also noticed, that I can start formulating why, that it became quite clear that there isn't really any evidence for the Consciousness surviving the body there, and there are quite numerous reasons for that being the case.

    But I also found that I could say that it seems quite plausible that we humans might have abilities and can have experiences that most of us are unaware of. For example, the ability to see others from a distance, is something argued in a documentary about Anna Breitenbach, where they link it to some kind of tracking-skill.
    That doesn't mean that we literally see from a distance, but that we are underestimating the amount of information our brain can process, and what kinds of conclusions it can draw. And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all.

    If you find an answer to the question of subconsciousness, I'll be back for that. It will be a while before I circle back for a round 2, but I'll let you know more then.

    KIndly,
    Caerulea-Lawrence
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    How anything you are saying is different from what he was outlining with phenomenology.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end).Caerulea-Lawrence

    Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.

    To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.

    If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it.Caerulea-Lawrence

    I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?

    God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure.Caerulea-Lawrence

    It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.

    The growth from reading thisCaerulea-Lawrence

    That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.

    And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all.Caerulea-Lawrence

    Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.

    Thank you again for reading and contributing!
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    How anything you are saying is different from what he was outlining with phenomenology.I like sushi

    How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

    The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire.
    Philosophim

    Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasn’t read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper.Philosophim
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    So I just wasted my time reading your post? Thanks. Bye.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    ↪Philosophim So I just wasted my time reading your post? Thanks. Bye.I like sushi

    No, you wasted my time with that question. Obviously phenomenology does not have a hierarchy of inductions. I'm looking for serious discussion and contribution from your end, not troll posts.
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    Any such assertive claim that the creature is definitively one or the other, would be contradicted indirectly by my inability to observe the face of the entity. Such a belief would be inductive.Philosophim

    https://www.britannica.com/topic/eidetic-reduction
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    How is it different?
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    How is it different?I like sushi

    No, that's not the right way to approach this. Spend some time going over the argument, then explain why you believe the entirety of it and its conclusions is simply identical to eidetic reduction and nothing new.

    This proves two things to me:

    1. I know you've read the OP and actively tried to understand it.
    2. You've read and understand what you've linked.

    Do that, and I'll know you're serious about discussing. If you can't be bothered, neither will I.
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    I did not say that. I asked a question and you went ultra defensive. I read the OP a second time to see if I missed anything - after you accused me of not reading it - so ball is in your court. Either respond to my question or do not.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    I did not say that.I like sushi

    You didn't say the thing you said that I quoted? You're saying my answer that the hierarchy of inductions does not exist in Husserlian philosophy didn't answer your question? I spend my free time here with serious people. Attempt to make an actual point of discussion and I will engage. Otherwise I will be ignoring your posts going forward.
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    I have used this system of knowledge to solve all of the problems and paradoxes that I know of in current day epistemology.Philosophim

    If you are going to make bold claims like above and then snap at people you are on your own.

    What you have done looks pointless. I was trying to direct you to compare and contrast what you say with Husserl because there are obvious parallels.

    I’ll leave you to it. Enjoy.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    What you have done looks pointless.I like sushi

    And what you've done IS pointless.

    I answered your initial question by informing you that Husserl does not have inductive hierarchies. That's a key point of the OP, and anyone who read it and Husserl would, looking at them in parallel, know what I said was true. Or at least try to show why I was wrong.

    That was your test. You clearly didn't read the OP. Hierarchy of inductions is in the summary of the paper, as well as has its own underlined section. You were lazy sushi, and you got caught. Instead of owning up to it and actually trying, you dug in. A first time forum poster nailed the OP flawlessly, while you, a long time poster, mucked about wasting my time. You bet I'm disappointed in you.
  • I like sushi
    4.8k
    You clearly didn't read the OP.Philosophim

    Read it twice. I told you that. Why would I lie? Never mind … not interested anymore. Enjoy.
  • RogueAI
    2.8k

    What does your proposal have to say about the probability of Last Thursdayism?
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    ↪Philosophim
    What does your proposal have to say about the probability of Last Thursdayism?
    RogueAI

    Good question!

    For those who don't know what that is, last Thursdayism is the idea that the universe was created last Thursday, but with the physical appearance of being billions of years old.

    This proposal wouldn't be a probability, it would be an inapplicable plausibility. The outcome is designed in such a way that no one could ever find out if it were applicable, so fits the definition. That's lower down in the hierarchy of induction, so any probability or possibility would be a more cogent belief.

    I would love to see more of these types of questions.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Hello Philosophim,

    First of all, as I have stated before, I think that this methodological approach is severely underrated and underappreciated (especially in this forum): it is a deceivingly simple but yet an incredibly effective pragmatic approach!

    After thinking about it more and reading your new post here, I have some reservations (or perhaps confusions (; ) I would like to voice to you (pertaining thereto); however, I know we already had a long conversation (and I would imagine you probably moved to a new thread due to the immense number of posts between us) so I wanted to reach out preliminarily and ask you if you would like me to voice the concerns or not? This is your board, and I want to respect that. So, absolutely no worries if you were wanting to hear from other people and would like me to refrain from continuing/starting a conversation again about it.

    Just let me know either way. I look forward to hearing from you.

    Bob
  • Philosophim
    2.6k


    Thank you Bob, your input and insight is always welcome! My availability to respond is more limited this week, but as long as you don't mind a possible delay between responses, I would very much enjoy your questions and concerns!
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Hello Philosophim,

    Absolutely no worries on time! (:

    Firstly, I want to disclaim that, although I read your discussion board posts herein, I may be misremembering a thing or two (inadvertently); so please feel free to abruptly correct me here and there if I do (and I apologize in advance).

    After coming to understand your methodological approach better, I think that the hierarchy of inductions, as a hierarchy of categories (e.g., probability, possibility, plausibility, and the irrational) that definitively trump one another (e.g., probability is always more cogent than a possibility, assuming they are at the same point within the chain of reasoning), is insufficient to account for cogency of inductions.

    To provide my reasoning on this, I would like to lead you through a thought experiment and see what you think. I am going to do it sequentially so you see my full line of reasoning.

    For this thought experiment, I am going to refer to a “box-without-air” and a “box-with-air”. By both, I mean a glass box which has a trap door close to the top which has room to place objects that upon pressing a button fall through the trap door. So we can place a wooden cube in that top space, click the button, and observe it fall through the trap door and land at the bottom of the box. Now, by a “box-without-air”, I mean just that the air has been removed from the box (so it is like a vacuum sealed container). By “box-with-air” I mean a normal box that has air in it.

    You and I are sitting on the porch (of one of our houses: whichever) and we are presented with a “box” (which is a trap door box described above) that is either a “box-without-air” or a “box-with-air”: we aren’t told which it is. It has a wooden block in the upper floor area that will fall once the trap door is released.

    We are asked: “how fast will the wooden block fall once the trap door is released?”.

    You calculate an estimation of X m/s^2, which factors in air resistance. I, on the other hand, make the exact same calculations and estimations but minus the factoring in of the air resistance.

    I ask you: which of our beliefs is more cogent to hold? This is going to depend on if it is more cogent to factor in air resistance, which depends on whether it is more cogent to believe it is a box-without-air or a box-with-air. Now, at this point, I think both of our reactions is to invoke the hierarchy of inductions to decipher who is correct. Let’s narrow down this experiment to make things interesting (and explicate some worries of mine).

    Let’s say we don’t know the probability of either and we have both have experienced a wooden block fall from a trap door within a glass box before that was a “box-without-air” and a “box-with-air”.

    We can’t appeal to probabilities, so our strongest form of induction is out. Now we can both invoke the second strongest, which is possibility to defend our beliefs (which are at odds with one another). So how do we resolve it? I think the solution could be, since it is a comparison of the same category of knowledge (i.e., possibility) and the same link in the chain (i.e., first chain link), prima facie, the quantity of experiences of each could suffice. So if we have both experienced 100 times “boxes-with-air” and only 50 times “boxes-without-air”, then we could say that most cogent solution is to believe that the box has air in it.

    But, let’s make this more interesting (; . Let’s say we have both experienced the “boxes-with-air” 100 times on the moon (in special labs thereon) and the “boxes-without-air” 50 times on the earth (in normal neighborhoods in which we live). Now, although the quantity is in favor of saying the box is full of air, it is more cogent to hold that it is without air because our experiences of the “boxes-with-air” compared to “boxes-without-air” is located far away from where we are currently encountering a “box” (which is on the porch on earth). So now, location is the deciding factor. Likewise, we could say, to make things equal, that we’ve experience them the same amount (but still in those drastically different locations) and, according to your view as I understand it, we would have no means of deciphering which is more cogent even though, to me, it is clearly that it is a “box-without-air” (in this case). We can’t appeal any category within your inductive hierarchy to explain this cogency nor can we appeal to the number of instances within a category: it’s purely location this time that breaks the tie.

    But we can go even deeper: let’s say that we’ve experienced “boxes-without-air” only once and “boxes-with-air” a million times (and both within the same reasonable locale), but the box we are presented with (of which we are calculating the fall acceleration) looks identical to the one “box-without-air” we have experienced and absolutely nothing like the “boxes-with-air” we have experience (way more many times). It feels just like the “box-without-air”, has the same structure, same colors, same mechanisms are there, etc. The sheer matchability of uniqueness makes it more cogent to hold that it is a “box-without-air” even though we are comparing two possibilities and one possibility clearly has a larger quantity of experiences in its favor—yet it isn’t more cogent. It is purely the uniqueness identified in the box that is the differentiating factor.

    Now, let’s make it completely break (by my lights) the induction hierarchy: let’s prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions. Let’s say we don’t know the probability, and we’ve never experienced a “box-without-air” and we have experienced a “box-with-air” a million times. But, we inspect the box that is presented to us (which we are calculating the fall acceleration for) and see that it has “box-without-air inc.” on the bottom (engraved thereon). We google that company and find reasonably that it is a real company, they make actual “boxes-without-air”, and this box (which we are inspecting) looks exactly like the ones in the photos on their website. Now, all of that is a plausibility: we haven’t done anything about that company except for google them. We do, however, have know that it is possible that it is a “box-with-air” because we have experienced it before (many, many, and I mean many times): but, I submit to you, that that possibility is less cogent than holding, in this nuanced case, that the box is a “box-without-air”. The plausibility has outweighted the possibility in my eyes.

    Likewise, let’s say I know the probability of the box being a “box-without-air” is 90% and that the box brand says “not an airless box inc.”. Upon only googling around, the “not an airless box inc.” is adamantly against the idea of selling and using boxes that are capable of creating an airless vacuum (perhaps its against their religious beliefs). Firstly, the sheer fact that there is a probability and the other is a plausibility entails that one should go off of the former under your view, but, I submit to you, it is actually more cogent to hold that it is a “box-with-air”. Secondly, even though there is a high probability that it is a “box-without-air”, given the nuanced circumstances, it is more likely that this one is not one of them. Now, importantly, this is an example of a probability being outweighed by a plausibility.

    By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede eachother absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matter, of which are not elaborated upon in your expounding of your view. Such as, simply as examples, location and uniqueness. Likewise, I do think that plausible evidence can outweigh probable evidence (as seen above).

    I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here?

    Bob
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here? By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede each other absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matterBob Ross

    Yes, you are misremembering, but I believe its because I don't go into significant detail about context here. Upon re-evaluating the original paper, I found I could pare down explorations into context to lessen the size of the paper which seemed to be intimidating to people.

    Context and circumstances matter greatly. These determine both what distinctive and applicable knowledge you have available to you. So lets break down your examples one by one.

    First case: Air box, no air box. No probability, both are possible. No other context.

    Hierarchy results: Both are possible. Therefore one is as likely as the other.

    Second case: Air box most probable on earth, no air box most probable on moon.

    Hierarchy results: While both are possible, its more probable for an air box to be on Earth and a no air box to be on the moon.

    Third case: Air box, no air box. It is known that air boxes look like X, it is known that non-air boxes look like Y. You are provided a box that looks like Y. Is it an air or non-air box?

    Hierarchy results: Depends on how you've personally defined non-air boxes. If the look and feel is an essential property for you, then you know its a non-air box. In fact if you later found out it had air, you could easily say "Its a defective non-air box". If of course the look and feel are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is that it does, or does not have air in it, then you could say its probably an air box. Remember, your distinctive knowledge is created at your particular context. So based on how you structure that context, it would be probability or possibility comparison.

    Fourth case: Chains of sub-knowledge and beliefs about whether its an air box or not.

    Hierarchy results: Find the chains of reasoning, and compare them through the children up to the parent.

    The flaw is here:
    let’s prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions.Bob Ross

    A plausibility is never more cogent then a possibility due to the logic and reasoning involved. You have to break the actual logic and reasoning behind each induction. Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.

    First, if you've never experienced a "Box without air", then its not a probability. You simply know that people make boxes with air, and you don't yet know that people make boxes without air. The number of times this has been experienced is irrelevant.

    Now lets shorten your example down to a context in which you think of a plausibility that a box could be made without air. You're comparing applicable knowledge to a plausibility. Remove the wording that notes it is a box without air. Its more reasonable to assume its a box with air.

    Now lets add in the writing. Depending on context, this is a plausible truth, or a possible truth. Is it possible that when someone labels a box that it does not contain air, that it might not contain air? Or is it only plausible in your world? This is also inconsequential to your point. The real question is, once you've correctly established whether its knowledge or a type of induction, then you compare.

    Perhaps an underlying point to your critique is, "Do I always have to choose the most cogent answer and not attempt to explore lesser cogent inductions?" No. The cogency is about making the most efficient and rational choice when presented with two alternatives. But, one may wish to be inefficient because they believe there is a greater payoff in the long run.

    For example, its highly unlikely you will ever win the lottery. But its possible. You may be willing to forgo your time and money to buy a lottery ticket, even if you never win. In general its not the most rational or efficient use of your money, but if you DO win, it will be. Same with plausibilities. Perhaps there is a plausible challenge to something you know. It might take a week to fully explore that plausiblity to see if it is correct or not. Is that worth your time and energy? If not, it is perfectly rational and efficient to choose not to explore it. But of course, if the plausibility were correct, it very well might lead to knew knowledge which saves you two weeks of time and energy down the road. Is it worth it? That's for you to decide.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Hello Philosophim,

    Good response!

    . Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.

    Fair point. I think it may be easier for us if we stick to one specific sub-scenario of the thought experiment to really dive into this. So I am going to hit you with a more oddly specific version of this so that I am identifying the exact reasoning chain and see what you think.

    So let’s talk about this specific scenario:

    A box is selected at random from a sample size of 100 and presented to you. 51 are boxes-without-air and 50 are boxes-with-air.

    1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.
    2. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-without-air is that it is a box (i.e., a container with a flat base and sides, typically square or rectangular and having a lid) and it is not filled with air in its empty space (within it).
    3. You hold that the only essential properties of a box-with-air is that it is a box (i.e., ditto) and it is filled with air in its empty space (within in).
    4. You have experienced a billion boxes with design X and every one was a box-with-air. Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air.
    5. You have experienced a billion boxes with design Y and every one was a box-without-air. Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and not having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design Y which was not a box-without-air.
    6. The box presented to you (which was picked at random) matches the design of design X.
    7. Design X and Y look absolutely nothing alike.

    If probability is more cogent in this case, then you should hedge your bets that it is a box-without-air.
    If possibility outweighs probability in this case, then you should hedge your bets that it is a box-with-air.

    If your claim that probability is always a more cogent bet than possibility, then you are committed to saying that it is a box-without-air in this scenario.

    I think the possibility in this case is more cogent, what say you?

    Bob
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    I would like to add a 7th aspect to remove any ambiguity:

    7. Design X and Y look absolutely nothing alike.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air.Bob Ross

    If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration. As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.

    As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.

    The problem is that in your example, it is unlikely someone would consider box X to be an accidental property. We can't just say its accidental, it has to match accurately to the definition of an accidental property. Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air. If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.

    You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation. The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.
  • Bob Ross
    1.7k


    Hello Philosophim,

    If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration

    Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration?

    I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isn’t a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario).

    The definition of an accidental property is just that it is non-essential: that doesn't mean that it is irrelevant to the context of the situation.

    Since the probability that it is a box-without-air is negligible (because it is only a 1% difference) and the experiential association of the box-with-air with design X, although the design is not a part of its essential properties, so many times (viz., a billion) warrants claiming that the first random box pulled from this sample, being of design X, is a box-with-air.

    As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.

    Thank you for the clarification, but I was under that understanding as well. My point is that the accidental properties are not removed absolutely from the consideration of what is most cogent to hold. This scenario is a great example to me.

    As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.

    This is true if you are removing a large portion of the context of the scenario I gave which, arguably, isn’t the scenario anymore. Are you claiming that the scenario in which you are simply given the knowledge that there is a 49/51% chance is equivalent to the scenario I gave for epistemic purposes? I find that hard to believe that you would disregard all of the rest of that context.

    Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air.

    To clarify, this is irrelevant. The scenario outlines explicitly that they are accidental properties.

    If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.

    In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, I can say that I do not hold that the design X of the box has anything to do with its essential properties but yet it factors into what is most cogent to bet on. Resemblance and inductive association matter to me.

    The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.

    But the whole point is that I outlined it very clearly what the essential and accidental properties were. Pointing out that most people wouldn’t assign them that way is irrelevant to the thought experiment.

    You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation.

    The point here is that I think the equation is incorrect because, in this scenario, it is not more cogent to claim that the box is a box-without-air (due to there being a 51% probability) when the rest of the context is expounded. Without that context, then my claim would be different. You basically just countered a straw man of the scenario: one in which a box is handed to you and you are only given the knowledge that there is a 51% chance it is a box-without-air and a 49% chance it is a box-with-air (and there are no other options). But that wasn’t the scenario, unless you would like to claim that they are equivalent for intents of epistemic evaluation?

    Bob
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