I wrote a post called the Methodology of Induction that largely went unread. I find this a shame, because I feel I’ve constructed a system of knowledge that can serve as a new base of discussion in epistemology. I have used this system of knowledge to solve all of the problems and paradoxes that I know of in current day epistemology. And yet, the low engagement has told me its not written or presented very clearly, so I’m trying again!

I’ve cut the paper in half to narrow the topic down to establishing what knowledge is within our own world view. Hopefully I will get some clever people on here to read it and give it a good analysis.

Summary: Knowledge does not capture the truth, but is a tool to arrive at the most reasonable assessment of reality for survival and desired goals. Once we can establish what knowledge is, we can then attempt to rationally assess what to do upon reaching its limitations. The paper attempts to do the following.

Demonstrate that knowledge within a solo context can be subdivided into two separate approaches: Distinctive knowledge, and applied knowledge.

Demonstrate how Induction is a rational approach to situations in which the limits of deduction are reached. 4 subdivisions of induction will be analyzed to determine a hierarchy of inductions allowing a reasoned comparison between the cogency of types of inductions.

How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire.

Any outside reference to other theories cannot assume that theory is sound without first proving it is sound. Saying, “Well X says this,” is fine as long as you understand why X said that, that what X said can be shown to be sound, and its a valid point to bring against the theory.

Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasn’t read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper.

If this new attempt gets more traction I will post the second part that addresses knowledge in between more than one person, but for now this will remain in the context of a single person, or in your case, you, the reader.




Belief and Knowledge

Any discussion of knowledge must begin with beliefs. A belief is a will, or a sureness reality exists in a particular state. There are beliefs which are co-existent with reality, and there are beliefs which are contrary to reality. For example, I believe I can pick up a baseball with my hand from a table in front of me. If I act to reach over to the baseball, I can pick the ball up with my hand. My belief and my acting upon that belief is co-existent with reality. However, if I believe I can levitate the baseball with my mind alone, the baseball remains inert despite my will to do so. In this instance, my belief and the results of my acting upon that belief are contradictory.

Reality can therefore be defined as what results despite a belief being applied. It is better for one to apply a belief that one is certain will be co-existent with reality, and not contradicted by reality. This ensures that one’s will and actions result in the expected outcome. The assessment of beliefs to ascertain that one’s beliefs and actions will be contradicted by reality is what I would consider an attempt at gaining “knowledge”.

A contradiction from reality may be direct or indirect. A “direct contradiction” to a belief is a “contrary existence”. For example, I believe that eating this apple will be healthy, but the apple ends up being rotten and harmful. An indirect contradiction is an inability to experience one’s belief in reality. For example, if I believe in an invisible and unsensible unicorn, there is nothing in reality with which I may apply this belief. There must be the potential for the belief to be applied and contradicted. Therefore such a belief could also not be knowledge.

There are two ways to reason whether a belief is not contradicted by reality. The first is induction. Generally I call this a “belief” that a belief is sound. The second is deduction. A deductive belief is that which cannot be contradicted from the information and experience available to oneself. Can a belief be deduced that cannot be contradicted by reality?

Such a belief was famously sought by Descartes in Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes begins to question all of his assumptions about the world. Is he dreaming? Are math and science real representations of the truth? Of what can anyone be certain? At the end of Descartes' journey of self-doubt, he arrives at a belief which appears he cannot doubt and requires no further justification in his mind, “I think therefore I am.” Of course, I can be doubted because what is “I am”?

I see, hear, smell, taste and touch. And yet this is still not basic enough. I sense. But even if I did not sense, “I” would be different from “everything else”. In recognizing a self, I am able to create two “experiences”. That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.

Why should I have this capability? I cannot answer this. What I can realize is I may sense, but I find I can focus on different parts of that sensation. I can see a field of grass. Now I create the identity of a blade of grass. Now a piece of that blade of grass. I part and parcel my sensations as I wish. I do not know what “I am”, or “everything else” is, but I do know that reality cannot contradict my ability to focus, create identities where I wish, and essentially “discretely experience”.

The beginning of knowledge Discrete Experiences

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.

Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience.

Thus, my first deductive belief that is not contradicted by reality, or bit of knowledge is not, “I think therefore I am,” but simply, “I am a discrete experiencer.” With my base established, I can now build more knowledge. I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses? Closing off my senses reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call “thoughts.” If I “think” on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of “thoughts” I again run into a contradiction. As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.

It may seem odd that I am calling these things “thoughts”, as we all know what thoughts mean in English. At this time it is not that we can know things in English that I am trying to demonstrate, it is that I can know things. And if you can read and comprehend the ideas here, you can know things as well. English is necessary only as a medium to communicate to “an other”, something not yet known. There is only you, and you now know what “thoughts” are. You are the "I" of this paper.

I now combine my thoughts and my senses. This is another discrete experience, something I know I do, and so do. I look at a table in front of me. I close my eyes and think about the table. I open my eyes and I think, “The table is still there.” I am claiming two points. First, I am claiming I have memory, a thought which recalls itself as a prior experience. Second, I am attempting to apply this memory to the reality of my other current discrete experiences, that of the “table” before me.

Can I deductively believe I have memories without contradiction? A memory is a thought of a prior discrete experience. I find at this time, I cannot deductively justify that memories of a past discrete experience are accurate or inaccurate representations of that original discrete experience. I may believe they represent past experiences without contradiction, but this belief is indirectly contradicted by reality. I can never go back in “time”. Believing that a memory is not contradicted by past experience is currently something I cannot deductively believe, therefore it is an inductive belief. What I can deductively believe, is that I have the discrete experience of memories. Without memories, how could I remember my claim to what a memory is and deny its reality? The denial of experiencing the discrete experience of a memory is again a contradiction by reality, and I deductively believe, and thus know I have memories.

Distinctive Knowledge and Applicable Knowledge

Since I know I have memories, I wish to find a way to match a memory deductively to a current discrete experience without contradiction by reality. I will need some new vocabulary. A discrete experience could easily be called a “distinction” in philosophy. I know that I discretely experience. I will now claim that what I discretely experience is also known. This type of knowledge will be called distinctive knowledge. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.

What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge. The two types of knowledge summarized will not be explored in depth below.

The Formation of Distinctions

The first thing is to explore distinctions in depth. I travel down a road in the country and spy a strange thing which seems to interact differently from the existence I distinctly know. In English we this creature would be called a “sheep”, but I have never encountered the word, or the experience before now. To help me manage these many distinctions, I start to identify this new discrete experience and commit it to memory. There does not need to be a word, only a recognition of a distinction separate from another distinction. “‘This’ is separate from ‘that’”. Because I am capable of language, I will use a word as a symbol of this memory. I will make up a word and call it a “shep”.

There is no outside force that necessitates how I must discretely experience. Whatever I claim the distinction to be at the time of distinction, is what the distinction is. I decide to notice the shep as its own entity, (instead of part of the field for example). In that first moment of awareness, I observe the shep as an indistinct whole without detail. However, just like I can discretely experience words, then letters, then the ink which makes up a part of a letter, I find I can subdivide more discrete experiences within this initial discrete experience of the sheep. There are distinctions which may be made within distinctions. I notice that its curly fur and feet seem strange. If I wished, I could label these further discrete experiences as wool and hooves. As these separate discrete experiences are part of the larger discrete experience of the sheep, the subdivisions of the full discrete identity will be called properties of the shep.

There are also properties within the shep that I may currently or later discretely experience in my examination, but do not find important for my identity and memories. For example, smell, color, size, or any other properties besides the ones I use for my definition/memory, are irrelevant to me. Perhaps I am colorblind or deaf. As such, the colors and the noise of the shep do not matter. Perhaps I find it unimportant that a shep has a tail, as all creatures I have seen besides humans at this point in my life have had tails I could ignore the tail completely. I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I don’t believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.

The properties which I find are important to me for my memory, the curly fur and hooves, are identities of the sheep I call essential properties. Properties I observe which are irrelevant to my identity of the sheep, I call accidental properties. Accidental properties allow me to remark on how the identity is affected beyond its number of essential properties. If I wish to refer to those accidental properties, I may use them as addendums to “shep”. Thus, I could note a black shep, white shep, tall shep or short shep. What I ultimately define as a shep are the essential properties that I set, even if these essential properties are mere memories of experiences and beyond language.

Applying Those Distinctions to Reality

While these distinctions are known at their time of creation, I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality. To continue the example, later in the day I walk past another field and spy an experience that strikes me as familiar. I look at the discrete experience of the thing and further discretely experience two properties within the full discrete experience of the entity. I believe these two properties match what previously identified as curly fur and hooves. Can I apply these known memories to the current experience in front of me without contradiction from reality?

First, within my distinctive knowledge, I have no notion of any other memory of a discrete experience with the essential properties of both curly fur and hooves. Second, I choose not to identify this new thing as a newly defined memory. As such, I attempt to match this new discrete experience of the thing in the field, to a memory I know. Unlike the other forms of knowledge, I am not merely claiming the knowledge of the identities, memories, and experience I have. I am stating that these identities, memories, and experiences I have represent something apart from the experience itself. So I can distinctly know that I am attempting to match identities to an experience.

Can I have knowledge of, “That experience over there matches the identity of a shep by simply having the experience itself?” I know that I’m having the experience of believing this, but can my belief about a thing that is outside of my immediate experience be deductively shown without contradiction from reality? This is one step higher than the distinctive knowledge of the experience itself. I am matching, or applying an identity beyond simply having the experience itself. If I can deductively do so without contradiction from reality, I will have successfully performed the seconds subdivision of knowledge, applicable knowledge.

To do so, I start with my current remembered identities. I have no other memory of anything with curly fur and hooves that is not a shep, but I still need to deductively confirm that what I observe are curly fur and hooves, if I am to know that the thing is a shep. I note that both my discrete experience of curly fur and hooves fit my images of curly fur and hooves in memory without contradiction from within myself. I could ask myself, “But is the current image I have of curly fur the image that I had yesterday?” That is a question of applicable knowledge that cannot be known with the information I have. The only thing I distinctively know is the memory I experience today. I find that I have no other memories that could match to my discrete experience of the creature before me. Since I do not wish to create new distinctive knowledge, and there is nothing within experienced reality which directly or indirectly contradicts my deduction that these memories match, I have obtained applicable knowledge that I am observing wool and hooves.

1. My discrete experience matches all of my created essential properties of what I consider a shep.
2. I cannot reasonably match the discrete experience to another known identity.
3. My belief that this creature is a shep is by deduction.
4. Reality does not directly or indirectly contradict the claim at the moment of conclusion.

Conclusion: Therefore I know by application this thing is a shep.

Considering Issues with Knowledge

What if I have two conflicting memories? Imagine I have a distinctive knowledge conflict with two separate memories of hooves. I will call them memory A and B respectively. I must decide which memory I want to use before applying it to reality. Perhaps in memory A, it is essential that a hoof is curved at the top, while in memory B, it is essential that a hoof is pointed at the top. I can decide to use either memory A or B without contradiction, but not apply both memory A and B at the same time. I can, however, decide to apply memory A for one second, then apply believe memory B one second later. Such a state is called “confusion” or “thinking.' at the symbolic distinctive level. Once I decide to applicably believe either memory A or B, I can then attempt to deductively apply that belief. My distinct experience of the hoof will either deny memory A, memory B, or both. If I have a memory of A and B for “hoof” that both retains validity when applied, then they are either synonyms or one subsumes the other.

What if I experience a “shep” which seems to be different from the initial identity I created? What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the “hologram” as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make.

However, if I touch both the solid and hologram sheep and find a difference, I now have a distinctive choice. I could decide the lack of physical solidness of one sheep is an accidental property and simply state, “Some sheep I can pass my hands through; others, I can't.” If I decide the physical properties of a sheep are essential, I can create a new distinctive identity called a “hologram” with its separate and unique combination of essential properties. The distinctive decision determines what I then applicably know. If I distinctively know touch as an accidental property, then by sight alone, I will applicably know both a hologram and a solid sheep as a “sheep.” I must discretely experience an entity with touch before I could applicably know whether the creature is a perfectly convincing hologram or a sheep. The more essential properties I introduce within my distinctions, the more I have to apply them to reality to determine if this application is a deductive belief.

The specifications of my essential properties determine the essential differences I can apply, and it is entirely my choice. Instead of a hologram, imagine a more real world scenario. I continue walking down the field and spy another creature I have never heard or experienced before which society calls a goat. I look at the “goat” and notice some distinctions I will call horns and a beard. I continue to make further distinctions and note that I can deductively believe and apply that the animal has hooves and curly hair. Here, I have a choice.

Like the hologram, if I find the horns and beard are non-essential distinctions, then matching my memory of a shep to this goat, I would applicably know it to be a shep. Perhaps I did not notice the beard or horns. If I do, I may still only label them as accidental properties, and state, “That is a shep with a beard and horns”.

If instead I find the horns and beard as essential properties. In my mind, this sets it as something different enough from a sheep to see it as a more distinct identity. In this case, I have an identity with essential properties that a shep does not have. Once I have this identity to compare to in my memory, any future creatures with the essential properties of a goat can no longer be applicably known as a shep. While the shep and goat may share some essential properties, they do not share all of them.

Knowledge of Applicable Limits

Understanding the distinctive and applicable subdivisions of knowledge allows us also grasp the limits of when something is outside of these subtypes of knowledge. As an example I walk further down a field and spy a thing with wool and hooves walking away from me. Because it is walking away, I am unable to see its head. As I am unable to observe the creature’s face and see if it has a beard or not, I am unable to claim a deductive belief, or knowledge that the entity is definitively a sheep or a goat. Any such assertive claim that the creature is definitively one or the other, would be contradicted indirectly by my inability to observe the face of the entity. Such a belief would be inductive.