Of course this view raises many questions. There are many disanalogies between the universe and a DID subject, and it is not at all clear how to find analogous within-subject fragmentation at the level of cognitive processes in the universe. The view is also massively revisionary about our minds and our relations to one another. It makes our ordinary mode of existence pathological, since in this mode we are unaware of the vast majority of experiences we are having.18 This entails a massive failure of introspection, where our ordinary beliefs reflect a near-complete lack of knowledge about our own consciousness. This failure is at least uncomfortable for people who are realists about consciousness, though analogous phenomena on a more limited scale are familiar. — p.24
↪Michael's schema does not quite capture the full depth and breadth of idealist thinking... — Banno
I will understand idealism broadly, as the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts. As such it is meant as a global metaphysical thesis analogous to physicalism, the thesis that the universe is fundamentally physical, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in physical facts. The only difference is that “physical” is replaced by “mental”.
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As for concreteness: this excludes truths about abstract domains, such as mathematics. In practice most physicalists and idealists are not committed to the strong claim that mathematical truths are grounded in physical or mental truths, and the restriction to concrete domains helps to avoid the issue.
Do you take 'transcendental' to mean beyond experience, unknowable? — Janus
All we know is that we think there must be such a reality, a transcendental (because unknowable-as-it-is-in-itself reality), but a reality nonetheless — Janus
that is why I say transcendental realism seems to logically follow. But again that is not an empirically established conclusion (…) It is, rather, an inference to the best explanation. — Janus
I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is plausible. Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. But the probabilities of all of these views get a boost from the fact that one of them must be true. Idealism is not greatly less plausible than its main competitors. So even though idealism is implausible, there is a non-negligible probability that it is true.
To illustrate these various doctrines for various targets and units, let the target t1 = concrete objects, and let the unit u1 = highest type. To be a monist for t1 counted by u1 is to hold that concrete objects fall under one highest type. The materialist, idealist, and neutral monist are all monists of this sort (substance monism). They all agree that concrete objects fall under one highest type, disagreeing only over whether the one highest type is material, mental, or something deeper.
To be a pluralist for t1 counted by u1 is to hold that concrete objects fall under more than one highest type. The Cartesian dualist is a pluralist of this sort (substance dualism). She holds that concrete objects fall under two highest types: the material (with the primary attribute of extension), and the mental (with the primary attribute of thought).
Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? — Mww
I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is? — Mww
So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all. — Mww
What do you think?
By transcendental realism I understand 'the inquiry of how reality must be in order for scientific models to be possible'. — 180 Proof
Same for the direction this thread has taken, I say.Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me. — Mww
The quoted conclusion is useful. It is worth pointing out that none of the supposed solutions is tenable. This line of discussion was by way of making some sense ofI’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. — Mww
I voted "The question is too unclear to answer". — Michael
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