Good to see Kastrup makes it into that discussion. I'll find time to read it later.

(In relation to which, he notes that Kastrup's 'dissociated identify model' 'makes our ordinary mode of existence pathological, since in this mode we are unaware of the vast majority of experiences we are having.' with the footnote to that remark 'According to some versions of this view, we can occasionally get hints of other fragments of our experience, or become more lucidly aware of our underlying cosmic experiences. For example, some Buddhist traditions suggest that certain meditative practices (e.g., Dzogchen practice in Tibetan Buddhism) can help us experience the fundamental mode of consciousness.')

Of course this view raises many questions. There are many disanalogies between the universe and a DID subject, and it is not at all clear how to find analogous within-subject fragmentation at the level of cognitive processes in the universe. The view is also massively revisionary about our minds and our relations to one another. It makes our ordinary mode of existence pathological, since in this mode we are unaware of the vast majority of experiences we are having.18 This entails a massive failure of introspection, where our ordinary beliefs reflect a near-complete lack of knowledge about our own consciousness. This failure is at least uncomfortable for people who are realists about consciousness, though analogous phenomena on a more limited scale are familiar. — p.24

A polite way of saying Kastrup is mad.

Here's what happens: folk grab on to idealism (or realism) and then look for ways to make it appear coherent. The glory of the Chalmers article is that he displays the lack of any credible unanimity in this area.

Oh in your book, definitely, but it’s a dull read :-)

I think the bland style is a part of Charmers' joke.

Kastrup has two PhD’s, a large and growing publications list, and is very much becoming part of the global philosophical dialogue on consciousness, as the inclusion of his work in Chalmer’s paper indicates. If you read him or listen to his online debates, he’s a model of lucid analysis. So he may be a lot of things, but mad ain’t one of them.

I can see why he is your new-found friend.

The main critique may well be Chalmers' - that whatever Kastrup is talking about, it's not "consciousness" as it is understood by you and I and the psychologists; "our ordinary beliefs reflect a near-complete lack of knowledge about our own consciousness".

He's not that new-found. He was mentioned here a few years back and promptly laughed off as a crank. But since then he's published quite a bit and he's become one of members of the choir.


Kastrup at Conference in Shanghai, 2017, with David Chalmers, Galen Strawson, Howard Robinson, Daniel Stoljard, et al.

:up: :up:

What do you think?

By transcendental realism I understand 'the inquiry of how reality must be in order for scientific models to be possible'.

↪Michael's schema does not quite capture the full depth and breadth of idealist thinking... — Banno

I've only had time to read the introduction, but in general it seems to agree with my characterisation:

I will understand idealism broadly, as the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts. As such it is meant as a global metaphysical thesis analogous to physicalism, the thesis that the universe is fundamentally physical, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in physical facts. The only difference is that “physical” is replaced by “mental”.

...

As for concreteness: this excludes truths about abstract domains, such as mathematics. In practice most physicalists and idealists are not committed to the strong claim that mathematical truths are grounded in physical or mental truths, and the restriction to concrete domains helps to avoid the issue.

His subsequent breakdown of idealism into "micro", "macro", and "cosmic" doesn't seem to conflict with anything said above.

I'll comment more later today if I have the time to read the rest of the paper.

Do you take 'transcendental' to mean beyond experience, unknowable? — Janus

It is a method, a type, of reason, of thinking, by which, first and foremost, the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions are proven. Subsequently, and using such cognitions as logical ground, transcendental this or that just indicates the conditions under which this or that is thought about.

So you can cognize beyond experience and knowledge by thinking transcendentally, but transcendental doesn’t mean a reality of things beyond even possible experience and knowledge, which technically, is termed transcendent.
————

All we know is that we think there must be such a reality, a transcendental (because unknowable-as-it-is-in-itself reality), but a reality nonetheless — Janus

Hmmm…..Do we think there must be, or is it more likely we only think it is not impossible that there may be?

that is why I say transcendental realism seems to logically follow. But again that is not an empirically established conclusion (…) It is, rather, an inference to the best explanation. — Janus

Interesting. Logically follow….from what? What do you think is better explained by inferring a transcendental realism?

Even more interesting….how does the consistency of our perceptual representations suggest our senses are representing the noumenal accurately enough for practical purposes?

I’m trying to think like you, so give me more to work with, maybe?
————

You said: This from the Chalmers paper seems to support my interpretation of Kant:

Kant’s transcendental idealism is not really a version of idealism in the metaphysical sense I am concerned with here.

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with?

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with? — Mww

Substance monism.

Thanks.

As in, “…. the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental….that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts….”?

Substance monism arises from that?

Yes, or more clearly from the conclusion:

I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is plausible. Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. But the probabilities of all of these views get a boost from the fact that one of them must be true. Idealism is not greatly less plausible than its main competitors. So even though idealism is implausible, there is a non-negligible probability that it is true.

He contrasts idealism with materialism, dualism, and neutral monism. These terms are commonly understood to refer to the views of substance monism/dualism.

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism

To illustrate these various doctrines for various targets and units, let the target t₁ = concrete objects, and let the unit u₁ = highest type. To be a monist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under one highest type. The materialist, idealist, and neutral monist are all monists of this sort (substance monism). They all agree that concrete objects fall under one highest type, disagreeing only over whether the one highest type is material, mental, or something deeper.

To be a pluralist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under more than one highest type. The Cartesian dualist is a pluralist of this sort (substance dualism). She holds that concrete objects fall under two highest types: the material (with the primary attribute of extension), and the mental (with the primary attribute of thought).

Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold?

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold? — Mww

He's saying that no solution to the mind-body problem is plausible, but one of them must be true.

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? How is it not adding another implausibility on top of all the others?

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is?

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? — Mww

The point of it is that it might be true.

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is? — Mww

Not in that specific paper. That paper is just an explanation of idealism.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all. — Mww

I'm not sure what you understand "implausible" to mean. It doesn't mean "false" or "impossible". It means something like "unconvincing" or "seemingly improbable".

Yeah, my mistake. The quote says not plausible, which isn’t the same as implausible.

What do you think?

By transcendental realism I understand 'the inquiry of how reality must be in order for scientific models to be possible'. — 180 Proof

That sounds about right to me. Even if we can't know that science gives a true representation of a mind-independent reality, we have nothing else remotely serviceable for such a task. Speculations about the nature of a mind-independent reality seem to be driven by three things apart from science: imagination, that is what just seems to intuitive feel right (we can see an example in Aristotle's understanding of gravity).

Then there is the conditioning factor of well entrenched traditional beliefs.

And finally there is wishful-thinking, or attachment to the idea that things should be just as we would wish them to be.

All of these seem far more unreliable than science, which is the paradigmatic self-correcting discipline, and calls for a willingness to remain unbiased in assessing whatever theoretical speculations we might be entertaining.

So, the central problem with the idea that the in itself is completely undifferentiated and unconditioned is explaining how a diverse world that can be understood in ways common to all suitable percipients could possibly arise out of such a lack of any structure.



I have friends staying with me for the next ten days, so I will have to try to come back to this.

Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me. — Mww

Same for the direction this thread has taken, I say.

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. — Mww

The quoted conclusion is useful. It is worth pointing out that none of the supposed solutions is tenable. This line of discussion was by way of making some sense of

I voted "The question is too unclear to answer". — Michael

…..none of the supposed solutions is tenable. — Banno

Yeah, it’s pretty much established, via the historical record in general and this article by Chalmers in particular, that philosophy’s main claim-to-fame is to never leave well-enough alone.