I just don't see how nonduality prioritizes "mind" "subject" "experience" over above "world" "object" "thing" as transcendental idealism does, Wayf, so maybe you can explain to me. — 180 Proof

As mentioned earlier, the point about Buddhist idealism is not that it claims 'the world is mind-created' but that we normally misconstrue the nature of experience and cling to the impermanent as a source of the satisfaction that it cannot provide. It is different to Western metaphysical idealism in that sense, but neither does it support any form of materialism (as you know, materialists were represented by 'carvakas' in the Buddhist texts and always presented as philosophical opponents of the Buddha. See What Is and Isn't Yogācāra Dan Lusthaus. )

As regards Advaita, here is an abridged passage from the Upaniṣad comprising a dialogue with a Vedantic sage, about the nature of the ātman:

"Yājñavalkya, answer this. There is an eternal Being which is immediately presented into experience and directly observed; which is the Self of all beings and internal to everything. Explain it to me. What is that which is innermost to all beings, which is internal to everything, which is non-immediate experience – not immediately experienced as through the senses when they perceive objects, and which is direct, not indirect experience? Explain that to me." ....

Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman.

"Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self.

"Everything other than the ātman is stupid; it is useless; it is good for nothing; it has no value; it is lifeless. Everything assumes a meaning because of the operation of this ātman in everything. Minus that, nothing has any sense." Then Uṣasta Cākrāyana, the questioner kept quiet. He understood the point and did not speak further. — Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad

Clearly it articulates the supremacy of ātman above the phenomenal domain. I don't think it's too long a bow to draw a comparison between this and Kant's 'transcendental apperception' . I've always believed that point about the inability to 'see the seer of seeing' is significant, and has not been made explicit in the Western canon, as far as I know. It is picked up in contemporary philosophy in the idea of 'the blind spot' as an inherent limitation of objective science.

You've lost me.

Asked and answered as far as I’m concerned

So, we can interpret that the vote comes from him. :eyes: — javi2541997

Right, judge for yourself. Am I an honest voter, or a troll?

I've often heard the view I subscribe to called model-dependant realism, but I don't know if that's the right term. — Isaac

Why didn't you vote idealist then? Model-dependent realism, as a manifestation of Platonist mathematics in conjunction with idealist physics, is the epitome of idealism.

I think this site Is full of closet idealist. Even Banno displays idealist tendencies when discussing mathematics and bivalent logic. There's a special form of hypocrisy which Wittgenstein demonstrates well, and it seems to have caught on with many philosophers, and that is to use idealist premises to produce idealist arguments while all the time asserting that idealism is unacceptable. Hmmm.

Right, judge for yourself. Am I an honest voter, or a troll? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are a metaphysician honest troll.

if you equate enlightenment and data-harvesting then there is probably no enlightenment to be had. — Wayfarer

Intriguing. So does enlightenment give no information at all? If 'the world' is more than just the sensible objects, then any form of 'revelation' takes to form of data about the way the world is. Religious prophets are saying something about what is the case, so they must, by some means, have gathered that data.

You can't have it both ways, you can't claim that the world (all that is the case) encompasses more than just material sense data, but then say that knowledge obtained by revelation isn't data-harvesting.

Why didn't you vote idealist then? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know, it's a complete mystery. It couldn't possibly be because I disagree with you about the definition, because the notion of anyone disagreeing with you is obviously absurd, so... I'm at a loss I'm afraid.

Good question, I suppose I'd currently say I'm a "skeptical realist". There are many flavors of skepticism, from Pyrrhonian to "mitigated skepticism", found in Gassendi or Hume.

I just am not certain what part is completely external and what isn't. Quite hard to tease apart.

Is mind ontologically separate from / independent of (the) world? — 180 Proof

I don't think so no.

Does mind correspond to Being and ideas to Beings (well isn't Being / mind also an "idea" – the one we're discussing)?

Yes, perhaps, depending on exactly what you mean. And yes there is an idea of mind or Being.

I don't really like using a capitalised 'Being' though, it's unclear and a bit wanky.

I just am not certain what part is completely external and what isn't. Quite hard to tease apart. — Manuel

:up:

It's fun to give the psyche it's own location, like it's in another dimension or something, but that dividing line isn't present in the content of experience.

Is idealism here the love that dare not speak its name? Are the idealists in their cupboard, hiding their true feelings behind excuses and lack of commitment? Or do these forums disproportionately attract contrarians? — Banno

Aren't you committing a bandwagon fallacy? Your claims must be true because a majority of X believe them? The very idea of empirical is at the root of the question you are asking, and so you can't so easily say, "Well, the 'experts' of philosophy are X, therefore anyone who is not X is a crazy kook". This isn't science or medicine where all they are using is a sort of verification/falsification from experimental evidence built up over time. So what are you trying to say by this survey?

Clearly you think your positions are realist. Clearly you think there are people who disagree with you here and are idealists. But what are you trying to imply here other than the actual survey? Why even post it?

Are you uncomfortable or irritated by the disagreement you are getting here? I mean, I deal with that all the time here being a philosophical pessimist! If I was in a nice cocoon of a fellowship of philosophical pessimists, indeed things might be different, but this forum is not that.

But you will say those are "outliers" and that you represent some respectable position that others do not, and that you are somehow presenting them as the weirdos they are (by not being the popular position of academic philosophers that took part in the linked survey). So again, what are you trying to imply?

Non-skeptical realism, here.

I answered the question from the perspective of what I believe in my heart of hearts, rather than what I argue. Where my thinking at, now, is that the real is absurd. This could be read in a skeptical, idealist, or realist sense, and I'd prefer to emphasize the realist sense: somewhere in the observation that reality is absurd, beyond meaning, yet impinges upon meaning there's a phenomenological argument I've yet to tease out for realism.

Aren't you committing a bandwagon fallacy? — schopenhauer1

Not at all. The issue here is the difference in frequency of certain esoteric metaphysical views in the population of this forum compared to other communities of philosophers.

As I said elsewhere,

The strange constituency of this forum might have you think there is a great philosophical debate between direct realism and idealism. It ain't so. Overwhelmingly, philosophers, like the general population, will if asked say that they are realists (80% in the PhilPapers survey, with idealism garnering less than 6%. Yes, we don't do philosophy via polls and it's a survey of English-speaking philosophers and so on, but that's a level of agreement which is for philosophers pretty much unheard of.) — Banno

And as I pointed out above, of greater significance is the fifty percent who would not commit to one of skepticism, idealism or realism.

So does enlightenment give no information at all? — Isaac

I would put it like this: that it's more like a change in perspective.

When you have an insight, have you 'acquired information'? You may have no new information at all, but you might realise the information you already have means something very different to what you previously thought.

A good example are the processes involved in a gestalt shift - you see what you've already seen but something but suddenly it takes on a different significance.

And as I pointed out above, of greater significance is the fifty percent who would not commit to one of skepticism, idealism or realism. — Banno

In the article the majority voted for "accept or lean toward ". Lack of commitment is perfectly acceptable in a good philosopher.

In the PhilPapers survey, one might choose more than one option. That was not possible with the Forum survey tool.

What the percentages mean: "Accept or lean toward P: 50% (40%)" means that 50% of respondents endorsed this answer inclusively (including multiple-answer endorsements) and 40% endorsed this answer exclusively (excluding multiple-answer endorsements).

Setting the filters to all responses and all regions the percentage of respondents who endorsed realism exclusively was 76.37, hence only 1.5% endorsed realism and some other option.

Lack of commitment is perfectly acceptable in two percent of good philosophers? Sure.

There were still twice as many explicit realists in the PhilPapers survey as in the Forum survey.

Setting the filters to all responses and all regions the percentage of respondents who endorsed realism exclusively was 76.37, hence only 1.5% endorsed realism and some other option. — Banno

Are you sure you're reading that correctly? Some chose "accept or lean toward" exclusively, some chose it inclusive of something else.

Damn filters.

76.37% for all regions and all respondents, "endorsed this answer exclusively (excluding multiple-answer endorsements)"

77.92% chose realism or something else, inclusive.

The difference is 1.55%, being those who chose realism and some other option.

Check that for me, see if I have it right.

You're right. I was just taking the "lean toward" as being less than committed.

Thanks.

There's very little difference across the filters. Even Continental Europe scores 75% realist, 7% idealist.

There's very little difference across the filters. Even Continental Europe scores 75% realist, 7% idealist. — Banno

Since the alternative appears to be some sort of solipsism, I think you'd get the same answer if you had a time machine and could go back through the history of the human race.

The survey is amusing. It is like trying on different shoes at a Target store.

The criteria presume all the different possible opinions can be mapped out in relation to each other. But is that the case? The method may be helpful toward generating encyclopedias but runs the risk of turning everything into a Cliff note version of themselves on the way.

I believe the different positions cannot be mapped to one another.

But I don't think that's lost on the respondents, either.

That is one of the reasons I just decided to choose one of the three main ones on offer.

I understand that and have participated in that practice too. Better an ostensive gesture than complete silence. But maybe only a little better.

heh. Yeah. I go back and forth :D

the notion of anyone disagreeing with you is obviously absurd, — Isaac

Sure seems absurd to me, obviously.

Not at all. The issue here is the difference in frequency of certain esoteric metaphysical views in the population of this forum compared to other communities of philosophers. — Banno

How is that an issue? That is what you are not answering. You are making an observation into a normative claim, but trying to say you aren't.

As I said elsewhere,
The strange constituency of this forum might have you think there is a great philosophical debate between direct realism and idealism. It ain't so. Overwhelmingly, philosophers, like the general population, will if asked say that they are realists (80% in the PhilPapers survey, with idealism garnering less than 6%. Yes, we don't do philosophy via polls and it's a survey of English-speaking philosophers and so on, but that's a level of agreement which is for philosophers pretty much unheard of.) — Banno

Again, this to me, is committing the bandwagon fallacy, and now you are showing more evidence of (or reiterating it rather), not countering that.

And as I pointed out above, of greater significance is the fifty percent who would not commit to one of skepticism, idealism or realism. — Banno

Sure, why not be open to various interpretations in such a speculative realm? My guess is people haven't really taken a strong position more than defending various posters. This doesn't commit them to a position in any formal way.

But when you are forced to write papers to keep a position at an institution (in other words, it's your "job"), then yeah, you may be forced into defending and sticking to such claims as a matter of course, but the regular person on a philosophy forum has the luxury of exploring various avenues and trying out various hats with no real consequence. So it makes sense why the data is so disparate between here and academia. People change positions in academia too, but it seems like the stakes of doing so are much higher, especially when you are devoting loads of resources into it, and again, it's your livelihood.

However, as I stated earlier, if the implication is something like: "The consensus of the philosophy community is X and that makes it more reputable", I would hesitate to use that as evidence for anything other than the current trend of academia. Remember, idealism (like Kant's) does not deny things like empirical methods or science. It's speculative (metaphysical and/or epistemological). It's interpretations of ways of knowing and how things exist, and defending using various forms of inferencing, logic, arguments, propositions, thought experiments and the like. This is not amenable to the kind of evidence that a science might offer when that particular community coalesces on a theory or model.

I think idealism as any kind of majority view died with the 19th Century. In the 'Golden Age' of American philosophy - C.S. Peirce, Joshua Royce, William James, Borden Parker Bowne - idealism, mainly adapted from European idealism, was assumed. In England with Russell and Moore's overthrow of idealism, and later Gilbert Ryle's long reign at Oxford - idealism was regarded as superseded. But there are always a few brave souls who carry the torch - I've noticed the books of Timothy Sprigge, who published A Vindication of Absolute Idealism in 1984. There's also a current German Professor, Sebastian Rodl, who defends absolute idealism in his book Self Consciousness and Objectivity (impenetrable to the casual reader, alas.) But the popularity of idealism is irrelevant as far as I'm concerned, the fact that it's a minority view can just as easily be ascribed to a deficiency of modern culture as to any deficiency of the basic principles. After all we live in an individualist, materially-oriented, technocratic culture, and will naturally adopt philosophies that support this milieu.

I think idealism as any kind of majority view died with the 19th Century. — Wayfarer

But when did it start and what do we count as idealism - are you talking about various trends of mysticism believed in by certain groups or privileged communities? Or do you start in the West with Berkeley? When was idealism held by the average person in the West?

After all we live in an individualist, materially-oriented, technocratic culture, and will naturally adopt philosophies that support this milieu. — Wayfarer

I feel like pushing back on this a little. Can you demonstrate that idealists are less individualist or materialistic? I spent a lot of time with Buddhist and Theosophical Society community members, including serious practitioners of meditation and yoga and Hindu mysticism in the 1980's (and still know some of them) and they were as wracked by ambition and materialism as anyone else. And sometimes they just replaced owning useless consumer goods with claiming access to higher truths, which they cherished in the manner of showing off a new sports car.

But when did it start and what do we count as idealism - are you talking about various trends of mysticism believed in by certain groups or privileged communities? Or do you start in the West with Berkeley? When was idealism held by the average person in the West? — Tom Storm

It technically goes back to Plato in the West.