That is to say panpsychists have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness, however minute. — schopenhauer1
The appeal of panpsychism is that, while preserving the physicalist notions that (a) matter has standalone existence and (b) material arrangements are responsible for human-level consciousness, it avoids the famous ‘hard problem’ by making lower-level consciousness fundamental. Notice, however, that instead of enhancing the explanatory power of physicalism, this merely avoids the need for an explanation by throwing one more element—namely, low-level consciousness—into the reduction base, while removing nothing from it. It can thus be argued that panpsychism is as arbitrary as it is unhelpful, for it would be trivial to ‘solve’ every metaphysical problem simply by declaring every aspect of nature to be fundamental. — Kastrup
It's the way empiricism and naturalism developed. History of ideas 101. — Wayfarer
I question whether there is or should be 'a scientific worldview'. Science is first and foremost a methodology. It has philosophical entailments, but often its practitioners are not aware of those entailments - which is part of what I'm saying. I'm saying that science deals mainly with contingencies and discoverable principles ('laws'), so as such doesn't really extend to Aristotle's 'unprovable first principles', but it is often taken as a metaphysic by 'scientism' (which you yourself have criticized on many an occasion.) — Wayfarer
So if that's the wrong view, what's the right view. Rewind to what I've said a number of times already - 'the world' is, for us, you and me, Tom Storm and Wayfarer, generated or constructed by our fantastically elaborated hominid forebrain, which evolved at a breakneck pace over the last few million years. — Wayfarer
So I'm arguing that methodological naturalism, which is a perfectly sound in principle, doesn't support metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to extend empirical evidence to metaphysical propositions. It's often confused because our culture is on the whole not educated in metaphysics and has abandoned the conceptual space for metaphysics due to its rejection of religion.
Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer.
I have a sneaking suspicion that often "realists" and "idealists" of a certain variety, start to converge on some form of panpsychism. — schopenhauer1
So what I'm arguing is that methodological naturalism - the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken, if we believe that the world really is that way, that it can be real with no perspective. Perspective is essential to reality and it can only be provided by a point of view, by an observer. And again this validates Kant's contention that time and space have no intrinsic objective reality, but are furnished by the mind, and again by a passage from a cosmologist I've already quoted before in this thread. So I'm arguing that human being is intrinsic to reality, we're not an 'epiphenomenon' or a 'product'. So does that mean, in the absence of h. sapiens, the universes ceases to exist? Have to be very careful answering, but I'm arguing, it's not as if it literally goes out of existence, but that any kind of existence it might have is completely meaningless and unintelligible. The kind of existence it might have is very close, again, to what Kant describes as the unknowable thing-in-itself. — Wayfarer
The whole idea of being educated in metaphysics is absurd, because there is no settled metaphysics and never has been. — Janus
This does not constitute not an argument. — Janus
Since you are a Buddhist, you should listen to your greatest philosopher Nagarjuna, who argues for the rejection of all metaphysical "views". — Janus
How could we possibly know anything about anything outside the context of human experience and judgement? — Janus
You keep arguing that science has a "blind spot", as though at some point in history there had been a clear choice between two equally viable methodlogies and methodological naturalism was mistakenly or blindly adopted. — Janus
What if it were meaningful and intelligible to God, for example? Can you rule that out? — Janus
The claim didn't warrant one. — Wayfarer
The principle of dependent origination and the Buddhist śūnyatā is a metaphysic. (I don't claim to be a Buddhist, although I did undertake an MA in the subject in order to understand it better.) — Wayfarer
One of the principle subjects of philosophy. — Wayfarer
Methodological naturalism was in no way blindly adopted. — Wayfarer
On the one hand, you assert that all metaphysical speculation is a contrivance, then you turn around and ask me to engage in it. — Wayfarer
This statement is what is absurd. If there is a multitude of distinct attitudes toward metaphysics, then education in metaphysics is even more important in order that we get exposed to all the different possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
Much more elegantly expressed than my attempt at pretty much the same point. — Tom Storm
You need more? I tend to get stuck at the Incredulous Stare. — Banno
But moving past that there is the problem of how little minds come together to make bigger minds, and of how seperate small minds come together to make the unified mind had by you and I. — Banno
Most importantly here, to Whitehead, actual entities have a degree of sentience – of awareness, feeling and purpose – as do systems, or ‘societies’ as he names them, that are organically constructed from actual entities. Consciousness as we humans have it is therefore a complex nested system of subordinate sentiences: the redefined ‘organisms’ we traced in the path from Homo sapiens to subatomic particles, each of them being self-organising systems, are also sentient to degrees, according to the integrated complexity involved. Each cell in our body is such an instrument of sentience – instruments which focus their effects in the hall of the skull. Such consciousness requires a human brain because the brain channels together the awarenesses of the subordinate entities. Where actual entities have formed into non-self-organising aggregates – such as doors and windows – there is no unified sentience associated with the aggregate itself – only the myriad lesser sentiences of which the aggregate is composed: the sentiences of the molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. Note the implication that although a brain is required for high-level animal-type consciousness, a brain is not required for mere sentience. Analogously, although an orchestra is required for a symphony, an orchestra is not required for a violin solo. Sentience, or experience, already exists as part of reality. — The Philosophy of Organism
As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality — Janus
There's an expression that captures what I was getting at: Cartesian anxiety….. — Wayfarer
I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense…. — Wayfarer
I think metaphysics is a valuable study, for its imaginative and creative interest, I am only rejecting the idea that truth may be found there. — Janus
Nagarjuna, if I recall correctly, rejects the principle of dependent origination and the śūnyatā is an apophatic rejection of any metaphysic, as I understand it. — Janus
Then why did you disagree with me without providing a counter-argument when I said just that, and then go on to say that it didn't warrant a counter-argument. — Janus
methodological naturalism is the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer.
— Wayfarer
I think this is misleading in that it suggests the deliberate adoption of one attitude over another. On the contrary it seems much more plausible to think that it was discovered that investigating the world without concern for metaphysics or about questions regarding the subject of experience yielded the most fruitful methodology for investigating empirical phenomena. — Janus
Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views. — Mww
The empirical sciences would be nonexistent without the philosophy of science upon which they are founded, which in turn could not obtain without a philosophy of causation, and causation is in turn a metaphysical study. — javra
:100:Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views. — Mww
Doesn't make him a positivist. See the passage I quoted previously with the Buddha saying that both the views 'the world exists' and 'the world doesn't exist' are due to 'not seeing how the world really arises.' The 'ten undecided questions' of Buddhism are similar in many regards to Kant's 'antinomies of reason' (Murti, 1955.) — Wayfarer
Because your objection to what I said then went on to basically re-affirm what I said: — Wayfarer
Note the implication that although a brain is required for high-level animal-type consciousness, a brain is not required for mere sentience. — The Philosophy of Organism
My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus
I would agree that it is true that science evolved out of a context of metaphysical dogma, but I don't see any reason to believe that the continuing practice of science relies on any metaphysical beliefs. — Janus
We cannot help understanding the world in causal terms, even animals do. — Janus
My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus
If you are interested in metaphysics then learning about the history of metaphysical ideas would be a good idea. — Janus
However it's arguable that most people don't give a flying fuck about metaphysics, so it's not likely to be on the school curriculum any time soon. — Janus
I think it should be noted that Whitehead did not identify as a panpsychist, but as a panexperientialist. — Janus
From what I remember reading in Whitehead (many years ago) his notion of experience does not equate to sentience. He saw relationality and process as fundamental; things only are what they are in relation to other things and the processes that evolve out of their relations. So, an example would be that a rock experiences erosion on account of the wind, temperature differentials and the rain. — Janus
The rock has no identity apart from its dynamic ever-changing relationship with its environment. We are infinitely more complex and of course both sentient and sapient, but are we really any different, since we are really nothing apart from relations and processes within our bodies, and interacting with the environment, with culture and language? — Janus
Things are real for Whitehead insofar as they can experience being affected by other things, but this idea of experience does not entail consciousness or awareness of any kind. Even Whitehead's God is constantly evolving in response to the dynamic actuality of existence. If I am wrong about that, I am happy to be corrected by anyone more familiar with Whitehead's philosophy. — Janus
You don't have to be here. Nor are you obliged to read, let alone reply to my posts. — Banno
In my understanding, since science assumes the truth of causality, of identity and change, of time and space, etc., with certain understandings of what these signify, science then always relies upon metaphysical beliefs. — javra
Since idealism claims all things to be either directly or indirectly dependent upon psyche, wouldn't that then make idealism a non-metaphysical construct? :razz: (kidding) — javra
Learning the history of ideals is a lot different than actually learning the ideas. The former is like memorizing a list of named ideas, in chronological order, the latter requires actually understanding the ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where actual entities have formed into non-self-organising aggregates – such as doors and windows – there is no unified sentience associated with the aggregate itself – only the myriad lesser sentiences of which the aggregate is composed: the sentiences of the molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. — The Philosophy of Organism
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.