That seems right to me. It really makes discussing a topic hard work. Nickolasgaspar might be a case in point, assuming we want to bring back the Gods and the ether. — bert1
How can what is intrinsic not be co-extensive with what it is intrinsic to? — Dfpolis
The problem is, the ontological status of the laws of nature is not a question of experience.
— Fooloso4
On the contrary, they are discovered via or experience of nature, and they could not be if they did not exist as an aspect of nature. — Dfpolis
If there were no laws operative in nature, anything could happen. — Dfpolis
It is metaphysically possible for a rock to become a humming bird — Dfpolis
Aristotle’s conceptual space is unburdened by dualism.
However, qualia are not subjective awareness, but contingent forms of sensory experience. — Dfpolis
However, consciousness of abstract truths, such as ‘the square root of 2 is a surd,’ have no quale. Only sensations have qualia, and not even all of them. Blindsight and proprioception have none. — Dfpolis
I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it.The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better. — Philosophim
This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c.This is just wrong. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/5-2-altering-consciousness-with-psychoactive-drugs/ At a very basic level humanity has been using drugs for centuries to alter our state of consciousness. Drugs are a physical thing. We can measure how the physical introduction of drugs changes the brain. — Philosophim
This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility.The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it. — Philosophim
You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires.There are plenty of commonly known emergent properties that are not impossible to deduce from fundamental principles. — Philosophim
Then, why did you raise it?Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve. — Philosophim
I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility.We can know that a being has all of the mechanical aspects of what we would identify with a conscious being. However, we can't know what that actual personal experience of being a conscious plant is. So of course the definition of a reductive consciousness cannot describe the personal subjective experience of the plant. It doesn't even try to. — Philosophim
I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon.If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against. — Philosophim
I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book.And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention. — Philosophim
Chalmers's why questions are pseudo philosophical questions (Sneaks in Intention and purpose in to nature). — Nickolasgaspar
There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation: — Wayfarer
Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers. — Philosophim
"Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions. — Philosophim
A reasonable point. I would say that "otherness" depends on how you conceptualize things. If you think of a rock as a unity, you can say it is attracted to the earth as a unity -- and that would be true. In a different conceptual space, you can think of the rock and the earth as masses subject to the very real law of gravity -- and that would also be true -- be adequate to reality.What is "co-extensive" is other than what it is coextensive with. — Fooloso4
Experience also tells us that phenomena have causes. So, if there are regularities, they must have a cause.All that experience tells us is that there are regularities. — Fooloso4
It is not an assumption, but a conclusion. Possibility, per se, is only limited by the impossibility of instantiating contradictions. In order to limit possibility to what is physically possible, more constraints are needed. These are the laws of nature.That is a questionable assumption without evidence. — Fooloso4
But, a rock can become sand or lava or a plasma. So, being a rock is not sufficient to preclude change, and it alone cannot prevent it from becoming a humming bird. That it can become some things, but not others, is a consequence of the laws operating in nature.A rock does not become a hummingbird because it's a fucking rock. — Fooloso4
Aristotle is well aware of the possibility of death due to external causes, and of the need for nutrients. So, living things are not self-maintaining, by exhibit immanent activity -- i.e. self-directed activity to maintain themselves and their species -- something we continue to see today.living beings that are, according to Aristotle, self-maintaining — Fooloso4
I read a lot of history of philosophy -- Copleston's and others as well as articles in various dictionaries, compendia and companions. German philosophy seemed to be largely misguided from Kant on, so it did not interest me until Brentano.Where did you hear of it, if you don't mind my asking? — frank
I would say that "otherness" depends on how you conceptualize things. — Dfpolis
So, if there are regularities, they must have a cause. — Dfpolis
It is not an assumption, but a conclusion. Possibility, per se, is only limited by the impossibility of instantiating contradictions. — Dfpolis
But, a rock can become sand or lava or a plasma. So, being a rock is not sufficient to preclude change, and it alone cannot prevent it from becoming a humming bird. — Dfpolis
Aristotle is well aware of the possibility of death due to external causes, and of the need for nutrients. So, living things are not self-maintaining — Dfpolis
The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better.
— Philosophim
I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it. — Dfpolis
This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c. — Dfpolis
The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it.
— Philosophim
This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility. — Dfpolis
You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires. — Dfpolis
Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve.
— Philosophim
Then, why did you raise it? — Dfpolis
I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility. — Dfpolis
If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against.
— Philosophim
I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon. — Dfpolis
And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention.
— Philosophim
I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book. — Dfpolis
Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career. — Wayfarer
The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.) — Wayfarer
The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point. — Wayfarer
Unfortunately, "consciousness" is an analogous term, and using this definition, when I define consciousness differently (as "awareness of intelligiblity"), is equivocation. If you want to criticize my work, then you must use technical terms as I use them. In saying this, I am not objecting to ypur definition in se, only to its equivocal use. — Dfpolis
I will agree with you that it is a Working Hypothesis since we don't already have a Theory mainly because we have to many competing frameworks at this point.Then you will have no problem in explaining how this hypothesis, which I am calling the Standard Model (SM), conforms to the facts I raised against it. — Dfpolis
-Yes a healthy functioning brain is a necessary and sufficient explanation for any property of mind known to us. We may miss many details on how specific properties correlate to specific brain functions but that's not a reason to overlook the huge body of knowledge that we've gained the last 35 years.Please note that I fully agree that rational thought requires proper brain function. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether brain function alone is adequate. — Dfpolis
-An important question that comes in mind is: " Is your problem relevant to our efforts to understand".That may well be true. I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article. As I made clear from the beginning, I am addressing the problem Chalmers defined. That does not prevent you from discussing something else, as long as you recognize that in doing so you are not discussing my article or the problem it addresses. In saying that, I am not denigrating the importance of the problems neuroscientists consider hard -- they're just not my problem. — Dfpolis
In defining the Hard Problem, you quote a reputable secondary source (Scholarpedia), but I quoted a primary source. So, I will stick with my characterization. — Dfpolis
-Agreed. But if Chalmers wanted answers to his ''why" questions with a different sense, he should have been Studying Cognitive Science. i.e. his first why question "Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?" the answer is simple. Evolutionary principles. Making meaning of your world ads an advantage for survival and flourishing(Avoiding suffering, managing pleasure etc).There are many senses of "why." Aristotle enumerates four. I suppose you mean "why" in the sense of some divine purpose. But, I did not ask or attempt to answer that question. The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis
In my opinion you fail because as you said yourself, you ignore the latest work and the hard questions tackled by Neuroscience.The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis
-I was referring to Chalmers's pseudo philosophical "why" questions. Questions like "Why there is something instead of nothing" are designed to remain unanswered.However, if you wish to call something "pseudo philosophical" or claim that it "create unsolvable questions," some justification for your claims would be courteous. Also, since I solved the problems I raised, they are hardly "unsolvable." — Dfpolis
-Sure there are many problems we haven't solved (yet). Why do you think that the SM won't manage to finally provide a solution and how are you sure that some of them aren't solved already. After all,as you stated you are not familiar with the current Science on the topic.I have never denied that the SM is able to solve a wide range of problems. It definitely is. The case is very like that of Newtonian physics, which can also solve many problems. However, I enumerated a number of problems it could not solve. Will you not address those? — Dfpolis
Well I don't know if it was a critique of your work. I only address the paragraph (Article) on Reduction and Emergence"Does the Hard Problem reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm? "Again, this does not criticize my work, because you are not saying that my analysis is wrong, or even that reduction is not involved.cogency of your objection. — Dfpolis
-As I explained if you are pointing to a different problem then you are committing a logical error. Science and every single one of us are limited within a single realm. The burden is not on Science to prove the phenomenon to be physical, but its on the side making the claim for an f an additional sub-straight. The two justified answers are "we currently don't know" Or"this mechanism is necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon".Rather, you want me to look at a different problem. Further, with respect to that different problem, you do not even claim that the named methods have made progress in explaining how awareness of contents comes to be. So, I fail to see the — Dfpolis
-My objection was with the word "prove", since in science we don't prove anything.It is a definition, specifying how I choose to use words, and not a claim that could be true or false. — bert1
-ok I think we are on the same page on that.Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. — bert1
-Because the hard problem ...is a made up problem.(Chalmers's teleological questions).I agree. I did not say that science proved frameworks, but that we use their principles to deduce predictions. That is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method. — Dfpolis
-Yes you did, but you also accept a portion of it...right? In retrospect you did stated that your questions seek the "how" and I pointed out that Science has addressed many "how" questions on Brain functions and meaning/Symbolic thinking.If you read carefully, you would see that I criticized Chalmers' philosophy, rather than basing my argument on it. — Dfpolis
-Sure you clarified that and I pointed out the problem with your "how" questions. Many "how" questions have already been addressed and if they haven't been that is not a justification to reject the whole model (the Quasi Dogmatic Principles protects the framework at all time). After all its a dynamic model in progress that yields results and the only one that can be applied,tested produce causal descriptions and Technical Applications!This is baloney. I am asking how questions. The SM offers no hint as to how these observed effects occur. In fact, it precludes them. — Dfpolis
-Strawman, I never said he did. I only pointed out the main historical errors in our Philosophy. Teleology in nature(Chalmers's hard problem) and agency with properties pretty similar to the properties displayed by the phenomenon we are trying to explain.(your claim on the non physical nature of Consciousness)Obviously, you have never read Aristotle, as he proposes none of these. That you would think he does shows deep prejudice. Instead of taking the time to learn, or at least remaining quiet when you do not know, you choose to slander. It is very disappointing. A scientific mind should be open to, and thirsty for, the facts. — Dfpolis
-Abstract concepts do not help complex topics like this one. On the contrary they introduce more ambiguity in the discussion. Plus you strawmanned me again with that supernatural first person data.Nor am I suggesting that we do. I am suggesting that methodological naturalism does not restrict us to the third-person perspective of the Fundamental Abstraction. That you would think that considering first-person data is "supernatural" is alarming. — Dfpolis
Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people! — Wayfarer
that has nothing to do with logic (or knowledge). That is mostly scientific ignorance.There is the logic that biology alone fails in any explanation of consciousness. — Mark Nyquist
-....there are these things called eyes, ears and mouth which are connected to the brain. The communication of ideas use the exact same mechanism like any other environmental stimuli that ends up in our brains.We communicate ideas but no biology is transfered brain to brain in the process. — Mark Nyquist
-Again, reductionism is not the only tool science have.We use Complexity Science to study the emergent properties in complex systems.That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness — Mark Nyquist
Actually the main problems are Complexity and Observation Objectivity collapse (our ability to make observations without interacting with the system).This is the science of the problem. Observable and repeatable. — Mark Nyquist
But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today. — Philosophim
I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism" — Philosophim
One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions. — Philosophim
I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head? — Philosophim
That's an argument from false authority fallacy — Nickolasgaspar
That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness. — Mark Nyquist
I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago. — Wayfarer
...but you insist on mentioning the longevity of his carrier ?It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, — Wayfarer
It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something. — Wayfarer
Dualism does not mean that there is more than one way of thinking about reality.As you say, they are distinct. Hence, dualism. — Fooloso4
No, even "staying the same" requires a cause -- first, because physical objects are not static, composed of Greek atoma, but dynamic, constantly oscillating at the quantum level and interchanging constituents; and secondly, because they have no intrinsic necessity and so need to be sustained in being by something that has such necessity.I think you have it backwards. It is only when there is change, not when something remains the same, that there is a cause. — Fooloso4
Perhaps you would give me your definition of "possible".You are adding one assumption on top of another. — Fooloso4
These are not mutually exclusive. There needs to be a cause both for remaining the same (e.g. conservation laws) and for changing. We live in a world of constant causation.Again, you have it backwards. It is not that the laws of nature preclude a rock from becoming a hummingbird but rather there would have to be some cause in order for a rock to become a hummingbird. — Fooloso4
To see the world as filled with causal links is not to be a dualist.Self-maintenance, or entelecheia, does not mean immortality or self-sufficiency. The point again is that Aristotle's conceptual space is unburdened by dualism, yours is not. — Fooloso4
No, it only illustrates the difficulty humans have in letting go of preconceptions.The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader. — Philosophim
Non sequitur. It only shows that there is a dependence (which I affirm), not that the particular dependence explains all the known operations.Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis. — Philosophim
Asked and answered.A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here. — Philosophim
Good.We are agreeing here. — Philosophim
Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term. The only organisms we know to experience awareness of intelligibility are humans.Your paper addresses consciousness. Consciousness is something attributed to beings besides human beings. Dogs for example. — Philosophim
You persist in misrepresenting my position. That is not a sign of good faith. I have said repeatedly that conscious thought depends on neural representation and processing.If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis. — Philosophim
I have. I am growing impatient with going over the same ground with you, as it wastes my time.If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first. — Philosophim
I did not say it was not an instance of subjective awareness. Still, experiencing qualia is just one kind of such awareness. Knowing that pi is an irrational number is another, and it does not have a quale.How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness? — Philosophim
I suggest you read the section of my paper addressing information in computers.You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention. — Philosophim
1.Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?
[...]
The answer for the first question is Survival advantage(Evolutionary Principles) — Nickolasgaspar
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