I think Aristotle is framing eternity as a limit that we cannot approach without seeing our condition as unable to think about it past a certain point.
All men naturally desire knowledge. (980a)
... it is through experience that men acquire science and art ... (981a)
... experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals ...
Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge);and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. (981a)
In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach, and for this reason we hold that art rather than experience is scientific knowledge; for the artists can teach, but the others cannot. (981b)
Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes. (982a)
Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom. Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man. (982a)
The same man [cannot] have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for it has been shown that a man is at the same time practically wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the incontinent man is unable to act - there is, however, nothing to prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in the way we have described in our first discussions, and are near together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in respect of their purpose - nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or drunk. — Nichomachean Ethics
You got it incorrectly. It's not "the opinion of the wise man". It is "the opinions which we hold about the wise man". Big difference. That's why you got lost there for a second.Why the detour into the opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4
Yes, Aristotle was wise, and yes he could teach us the principles and causes. The four causes are supposed to be the complete explanation of everything there is. He was a teacher after all -- educated in almost everything in the academy.Is Aristotle wise? Can he teach us these principles and causes? He will identify four causes, but this is not sufficient for making us wise regarding knowledge. — Fooloso4
You got it incorrectly. It's not "the opinion of the wise man". — L'éléphant
That's why you got lost there for a second. — L'éléphant
… the reason for our present discussion is that it is generally assumed that what is called Wisdom is concerned with the primary causes and principles … (981b)
We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually … (982a)
… for the wise man should give orders, not receive them; nor should he obey others, but the less wise should obey him. (982a)
He said,If it is through experience that men acquire science and art, then can there be knowledge of what does not come from experience? — Fooloso4
He did not consider knowledge to belong to experience (the particulars). Knowledge, as he attributed to art has the form of a universal, conceptual, or non-concrete occurrence. Similar to Platonic forms.Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience
Incidentally, I am presuming the reference to 'incontinence' is actually to celibacy or lack thereof. — Wayfarer
I think a wise person will seek wisdom. They will strive to know wisdom and to learn it. — NotAristotle
At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). — Leontiskos
Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4
Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man?
— Fooloso4
Because he is inquiring into wisdom, and rather than artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom, he looks at what we already mean by it, and who we call 'wise'. In the subsequent section he assesses these widespread opinions about the wise man. — Leontiskos
If Aristotle is wise then why artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom? — Fooloso4
I just explained to you why he doesn't do that. You seem to wish he had. — Leontiskos
(981b)In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach
If he is inquiring into wisdom does that mean he does not know what it is to be wise? If he is not wise can he determine whether others are? If others are not wise what it the value in discussing the opinions we hold about the wise man? — Fooloso4
I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. — Meno, 80e, (tr. Grube)
Your line of approach reminds me of the Meno: — Leontiskos
((982a)... the wise man should give orders, not receive them; nor should he obey others, but the less wise should obey him.
We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually … (982a)
A ruling beginning ...
This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known. — Fooloso4
We know that Aristotle was wrong, and an idea more akin to Democratus' was more right...there is serious concern regarding the method Aristotle employs to reach "metaphysical knowledge". — 013zen
Lectures, however, produce their effects in accord with people’s habits, since we expect them to be spoken in the manner we are accustomed to, and anything |995a1| beyond this appears not to have the same strength but to be something quite unknown and quite strange. For it is the customary that is familiar. Indeed, the extraordinary power of what we are accustomed to is clearly shown by our customs, where mythical and childish stories about things have greater power than our knowledge about them, because of |995a5| our habits. Now some people do not accept what someone says if it is not stated mathematically, others if it is not based on paradigm cases, while others expect to have a poet adduced as a witness. Again, some want everything expressed exactly, whereas others are annoyed by what is exact, either because they cannot string all the bits together or because they regard it as nitpicking. For exactness does have something |995a10| of this quality, and so just as in business transactions so also in arguments it seems to have something unfree or ungenerous about it. That is why we should already have been well educated in what way to accept each argument, since it is absurd to look for scientific knowledge and for the way [of inquiry] characteristic of scientific knowledge at the same time—and it is not easy to get hold of either. Accordingly, we should not demand the argumentative exactness of mathematics in all cases |995a15| but only in the case of things that include no matter. That is why the way of inquiry is not the one characteristic of natural science, since presumably every nature includes matter. That is why we must first investigate what a nature is, since that way it will also be clear what natural science is concerned with, and whether it belongs to one science or to more than one to get a theoretical grasp on causes and starting-points. |995a20| — Aristotle, Metaphysics, 995, translated by CDC Reeve, emphasis mine
This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.
— Fooloso4
But, you're right given the historical evidence. — 013zen
Democratus' was more right — 013zen
(983a)All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better.
I'm not an Aristotle expert, but I do refer to his ideas on Metaphysics whenever discussions about philosophical "hard problems" --- as contrasted with scientific empirical problems --- come up. Perhaps Ari is saying that in order to divine*1 First Principles, penetrating wisdom (insight) is more important than mere superficial observation.I decided to start a new discussion rather than continue in the thread on the hard problem. . . .
"Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes." — Fooloso4
Speculation about first things is not knowledge. The reason is simple. We have no experience of the beginning or origins. Knowledge begins with the senses, aided by memory in some animals, and by art and reasoning in the case of human beings. Knowledge and art result from experience. (981a) — Fooloso4
Speculation about first things is not knowledge. — Fooloso4
Democritus gave a more plausible account of material causes but Aristotle's inquiry extends to the good of each thing and the whole of nature. (982b) A full account should not only address the good of each thing and the whole, but it should be good, that is, beneficial to human beings. Even if the account fails to satisfy the former it can aim to satisfy the latter. — Fooloso4
All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better.
(983a)
Between these statements he questions whether such knowledge is appropriate for human beings. It is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it is knowledge of the divine as cause and knowledge that a god alone or most of all would have. Above the entryway to the temple of Apollo are inscribed the words "know thyself". One way in which this was understood is that man should know his place. He is not a god and does not possess knowledge of the gods in the double sense of knowing the gods and knowing what the gods know. Knowledge of the source and cause of the whole is not something that human beings possess. We do not even know if the divine is a cause or if the divine knows the cause.This should be kept in mind when Aristotle turns to theology. — Fooloso4
Between these statements he questions whether such knowledge is appropriate for human beings. It is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it is knowledge of the divine as cause and knowledge that a god alone or most of all would have. Above the entryway to the temple of Apollo are inscribed the words "know thyself". One way in which this was understood is that man should know his place. He is not a god and does not possess knowledge of the gods in the double sense of knowing the gods and knowing what the gods know. — Fooloso4
Since the rest of the poem is presented as the speech of the Goddess, this grasp of the whole is received as a gift, a revelation from the divine. The very first full-fledged metaphysician in the western tradition, then, experiences his understanding of being in religious terms, as an encounter with divinity. It is no surprise, therefore, that, according to the Goddess, the road Parmenides takes “is outside the tread of men” (B 1.27). Thus the Goddess draws a sharp distinction between “the untrembling heart of well-rounded truth” on the one hand, and “the opinions of mortals” on the other. The implication is that truth, as distinct from mere human seeming, is divine. We may be reminded of Heraclitus’ dictum, “Human character does not have insights, divine has”. — Eric D. Perl, Thinking Being, p13
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