Interesting response. I will think about it.

As I explained, "the builder building", and "the house being built" are just two different ways of describing the exact same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you are claiming that builders are houses.

Yes, "building" is "being built". Why can't you comprehend this? The two are the very same, identical activity, described in two different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, that is the point. Actions are identically passions from a different perspective. That does not make causes (builders building) the same as effects (houses being built).

There is no separation of cause and effect because there is only one activity being described. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, exactly the point. There can be no separation, and so there is necessity. Still, the cause is not the effect, it is just inseparable from the effect.

Further, since "the house", as subject does not yet have any existence, it cannot suffer any passion, or have any properties at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

The house has some existence = a partial existence as a work in progress. Once building has begun, the house has a partial existence. If you do not like the term "house," substitute "house in progress." The logic works as well as it depends on the facts.

If the cause is inseparable from the effect, then how do you know that "being built" is not the cause, and "building" is not the effect? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because the first is the action that makes a potential house (the materials) into an actual house. Doing is causing and being done to is being effected.

Yet you also claim that the two are concurrent and the cause is inseparable from the effect. Therefore whenever you describe the scenario, there is no way to know whether the description is of the builder building, or the house being built. — Metaphysician Undercover

All the rest of us are able to distinguish builders building from houses being built even though they are inseparable. Distinction is mental, not physical, separation. You have already admitted the inseparability. Are you now denying the difference between builders building and houses being built?

you've devised this elaborate way to say that it is two distinct activities, one cause and the other effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have never said there are "two activities". There is one action/passion that has two inseparable aspects: a cause (the builder building) and an effect (the house being built).

you admit that the cause cannot be distinguished from the effect, "they are inseparable". — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing separation, which is dynamical, from distinction which is mental. The matter and form of a body are inseparable, but still distinct.

So you try to hide it behind a strange use of "passion". — Metaphysician Undercover

I am tired of your lame excuses. Both Tim and I had no problem finding the definition of "passion" I am using. Tim also pointed you to its use in Categories. We all make mistakes. It is not a character fault unless you are unwilling to admit it.

Do you agree that to talk about causation here, we need to include "final cause"? — Metaphysician Undercover

If we were discussing causation completely, yes. However, you asked about efficient causes and that is what I am explaining here.

To actualize a potential here and now requires an agent operating here and now. No potential can actualize itself, because what is potential is not yet operational. So potentials are incapable of the operation of self-actualization.

The house does not exist — Metaphysician Undercover

"House" is being analogically predicated. It does not mean the completed house, but the work in progress, which does exist.

Aristotle did not distinguish accidental efficient causation from essential efficient causation in the way you describe. Nor did the scholastics. — Metaphysician Undercover

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26170042

Now you are claiming that builders are houses. — Dfpolis

You continue to be ridiculous. In the hypothesized scenario there is a builder building a house and there is a house being built. A proper description refers to both, but this obviously does not imply that builders are houses. In that hypothesized scenario, the description of a builder building refers to the very same situation as the description of a house being built.

Again, that is the point. Actions are identically passions from a different perspective. That does not make causes (builders building) the same as effects (houses being built). — Dfpolis

The effect of the builder building is a house, and the house is posterior in time to the builder building. The effect of the builder building is not a house being built, as these are one and the same thing. The effect is the house.

You are stipulating a separation between the "builder building" and the "house being built", in order to claim that there are causes and effects which are simultaneous and not chronologically ordered. I disagree, and so I am demonstrating that your argument is simple sophistry. Your argument amounts to employing two distinct descriptive styles to describe the very same activity, and then claim that one description is of the cause, and the other is of the effect, when both descriptions are really descriptions of the very same thing.

The house has some existence = a partial existence as a work in progress. Once building has begun, the house has a partial existence. If you do not like the term "house," substitute "house in progress." The logic works as well as it depends on the facts. — Dfpolis

Perhaps we can make some progress here, by breaking down the coming into being of the house, into parts. Do you agree, that when each part comes into existence, it does so as an effect, from the prior activity of the builder which is a cause of it, and the activity of the builder is always prior in time to the existence of the part? So, for instance, the foundation comes into existence, and it only exists after specific activities of the builder. There is no simultaneity of cause and effect here, the effect, which is the existence of the part, is always posterior in time to the cause, which is the activity of the builder. Can you agree to this simple principle?

Doing is causing and being done to is being effected. — Dfpolis

Right, but "being done" implies finished, complete, the end. And "being built" implies unfinished, and this is completely incompatible with "being done". Further the concept of, "being done to", "being effected", as is your claimed meaning of "passion", which is really "passive", requires an object which the action is being done to. In the hypothesize scenario, this object is supposed to be the house. But the house does not exist, and this is why your proposal is nonsensical and impossible to understand. If you would propose a passive object which the action is being done to, then we'd have a place to start. However, you insist that the passive object which supposedly suffers the passion, is the activity of "being built", and this is nonsense.

All the rest of us are able to distinguish builders building from houses being built even though they are inseparable. — Dfpolis

That's unabashed bullshit. Provide for me an accurate description of a house being built which does not involve builders building. The only difference is as I explained earlier. Since "builders building" is more general, there is no necessity that the builders building are building houses, yet there is necessity that houses being built involves builders building. This, as I explained to you, is the nature of final cause, the free willing agent has choice, which is most general, and decision moves toward the more specific without necessity. So there is no necessity between cause and effect in this direction. But when we look from the direction of the more specific, "houses being built", there is the necessity of builders building.

If we were discussing causation completely, yes. However, you asked about efficient causes and that is what I am explaining here. — Dfpolis

There is no such thing as efficient causation in which the cause and effect are simultaneous, concurrent. You simply use a sophistic trick of description in an attempt to prove that there is.

"House" is being analogically predicated. It does not mean the completed house, but the work in progress, which does exist. — Dfpolis

So the object which suffers the passion is a predicted object? How can it suffer the effects of the activity it doesn't even exist, and is only predicted to exist?

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26170042 — Dfpolis

If you believe that this text is consistent with your claims, then provide some references from it. I think you and Duns Scotus are talking about two different things, but using the same terms. You have an odd way with terms, as is evident from your use of "passion".

Are you guys arguing whether there is something like simultaneous causation in Aristotle? Of course there is. Substantial form actualizes its prime matter here and now. And there is a causal relation between the two. The relation of formal causality. And of course the distinction between per se and per accidens causality is a different one. Some thomists nowadays portray essential causality as necessarily simultanoues but this is clearly not the case. Essential causality is per se. But it's not necessarily simultaneous and there are clear examples in Aristotle and the scholastics. And as far as I recall there's no distinction between a per se and an essentially caused thing., they are translated interchangeably.

The effect of the builder building is a house, and the house is posterior in time to the builder building. The effect of the builder building is not a house being built, as these are one and the same thing. The effect is the house. — Metaphysician Undercover

The completed house is a cumulative effect. The immediate effect is progress toward completion = the house being built. If there were no immediate effect, the house would never come to be.

You are stipulating a separation between the "builder building" and the "house being built" — Metaphysician Undercover

I never made such a stipulation and I deny any such separation. They are not physically separate, but logically distinct. The builder cannot build unless something is being built, and nothing can be built unless there is an agent building it.

Your argument amounts to employing two distinct descriptive styles to describe the very same activity, and then claim that one description is of the cause, and the other is of the effect, when both descriptions are really descriptions of the very same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is one event which can be described as a action or a passion. The two descriptions describe one and the same process (= the identity of action and passion). What is different is that the builder (not the house) builds and so is the cause of building, and the house (not the builder) is being built and so is the effect of building.

I am not claiming that either description is the cause or the effect. Both describe a process. In that process, one element (the boulder building) is source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house and so the cause, and the other element (the house being built) is the result of the actualization, and so the effect.

Do you agree, that when each part comes into existence, it does so as an effect, from the prior activity of the builder which is a cause of it, and the activity of the builder is always prior in time to the existence of the part? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but that is thinking in terms of the other kind of efficient causality (accidental causality = time sequence by rule). Its effect (the existence of new part of the house) is the result of a building process. Essential causality looks at the process, not the end result, and sees that that process (building) involves two concurrent aspects (the builder building as cause, and the house being build as effect).

Right, but "being done" implies finished, complete, the end. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Being done" means finished, but that is not what I said. "Being done to" means an on-going activity.

this object is supposed to be the house. But the house does not exist — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already addressed this. When my houses were being built, my wife and I went to see our "house," and spoke of it. No one was confused by the term, because they knew it could refer to a house under construction. Please do not quibble about this again. It is unbecoming.

That's unabashed bullshit. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have spent enough time explaining this to you. As with our previous discussions, you either cannot, or refuse to, see what is clear to most.

The passion is in the builder, — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you now deliberately fail to understand a word?

The words in question are ποιεῖν poiein and πάσχειν paskein. Boiled down, the first means to make or to do - active/action, and the second, "to be affected by anything whether good or bad, opposite to acting of oneself," (A Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 1977, p. 536) - passive/passion.

2300+ years on this and you don't get it?

And this, Metaphysics, 1066a:
"That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar." italics added.

Some thomists nowadays portray essential causality as necessarily simultanoues but this is clearly not the case. — Johnnie

How can an agent actualize a potential without the potential being simultaneously actualized?

Perhaps there are cases in which "essential causality" is being used equivocally, but that does not mean that, defined as an agent actualizing a potential, it can other than simultaneous with the effect of actualizing that potential.

So, I wonder if real numbers are either subjective or objective. I mean, they're not to be found anywhere in the world, as such. Nor are they products of the mind, as they are the same for all who can count. That is the sense in which 'intelligible objects' are transcendent - they transcend the subject/object division. And not seeing that is part of the consequences of the decline of realism. The culture doesn't have a way of thinking about transcendentals. From an article on What is Math that I frequently cite in this context: — Wayfarer

Disclaimer : not erudite on Aristotle, Plato, or Kant. But I think they were onto something, even when I can't say exactly what it is.

I suppose the issue you raise here is what prompted Kant to develop the tricky concept of Transcendental Idealism. Plato's Ideal Forms seem to be implicitly supernatural, so how do we natural beings know anything about them? Kant placed such imaginary things off-limits to human experience, in the heavenly realm of ding an sich. So, we cannot "know" them via empirical experience, but only "imagine" them as abstract concepts. From that perspective, Numbers are not "real" in any natural sense, but "ideal" in the sense that we abstract those bare bones (ding an sich) from fleshly experience with multiple objects. Numbers are transcendental place-holders for abstract values. Those ideal tokens are not "products of any one mind", but are universal truths that logical minds have access to.

Therefore, "transcendentals" are "intelligible objects" that are not perceptible to the senses. Hence, their questionable status of "reality". Yet, like verbal viral Memes, such unreal abstractions can be exchanged from one mind to another carrying some non-monetary value. In math, transcendental numbers (like PI) are defined as non-algebraic. Which means they can only be written down with symbols, qualifiers & modifiers to indicate their abstraction, infinitude & unreality*1. As a judge once said about Pornography : "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it". When we encounter an abstract bare-bones concept like "Beauty", we can't define it in a few words, but we can mentally put imaginary flesh on the metaphorical bones.

Some animals, such as crows*2, seem to be able to extract numbers from their concrete experience. So the ability is natural, even if the dings are somehow super-natural, or transcendental. I suspect that the general universal concepts that philosophers create in their minds are representations of the dings that Aristotle discussed in his Meta-Physics (lit. beyond physical) addendum to his book on Physics. However, as I disclaimed above, I don't know what I'm talking about, but I know it's not pornography. Maybe it's above & beyond vulgar Physics*3. :smile:


*1. Transcendental Numbers :
More formally, a transcendental function is a function that cannot be constructed in a finite number of steps from the elementary functions and their inverses.
https://www.mathsisfun.com › numbers › transcendental-...
Note --- A Function is an abstract relationship between two or more objects or quantities. We can't see it, but we can infer it.

*2. Can crows recognize numbers? :
Crows can use and even make tools, reason via analogies, and have been said to rival monkeys in cognitive capacity. They also seem to have a remarkable ability to understand numeric values.
https://www.audubon.org/news/crows-can-count-aloud-much-toddlers-new-study-finds

*3. Aristotle's Transcendent Reality :
In Plato's theory, material objects are changeable and not real in themselves; rather, they correspond to an ideal, eternal, and immutable Form by a common name, and this Form can be perceived only by the intellect. . . . .
The relationship between form and matter is another central problem for Aristotle. He argues that both are substances, but matter is potential, while form is actual. . . .
Thus Aristotle's conception is full of paradoxes.
https://www.sparknotes.com/biography/aristotlebio/section7/
Note --- Did Ari really (actually) know what he was talking about?

Substantial form actualizes its prime matter here and now. — Johnnie

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument.

The immediate effect is progress toward completion = the house being built. If there were no immediate effect, the house would never come to be. — Dfpolis

"Progress" is a judgement in relation to the final cause. So you continue to conflate final cause with efficient cause.

I never made such a stipulation and I deny any such separation. They are not physically separate, but logically distinct. — Dfpolis

If "the builder building", and "the house being built" are not physically separate, then they are one and the same, as I've been saying. So we agree here. You say they are logically distinct, and I've said that the distinction is that "the builder building" is more general than "the house being built". This is because the builder building is not necessarily building a house. Would you agree with this logical distinction?

Suppose we say "the builder is building a house", and "a house is being built". Would you agree that the logical distinction is that in one case, "the builder" is the subject, and in the other case, "the house" is the subject. But now there is a problem, the house, as the subject does not yet exist, it's existence is, as you say, predicted. Do you agree, that "the house" as the goal or end, is the final cause, just like in Aristotle's example, the goal of health is the final cause of the man walking? So when we say "a house is being built", we are talking about final causation, because what indicates that "a house" is being built, is reference to the intended goal of the project, the end.

Therefore the logical difference between "the builder building", and "a house being built", is that the former is a description of efficient causation, and the latter is a description of final causation. "The builder building" refers only to the physical activities of the person putting things together, while " a house being built" refers to the goal, end, or intention of the person putting things together.

What is different is that the builder (not the house) builds and so is the cause of building, and the house (not the builder) is being built and so is the effect of building. — Dfpolis

I would disagree with this because the house is not yet built. Therefore it cannot be the effect described as "a house being built". It is only the effect after the house is built. Only after the house has been built can we say that the house is the effect.

Prior to the project being completed, the house is an idea, a plan, or goal, and as the goal or end, it is the cause of the builder building, in the sense of final cause. So, to explain what I am saying, consider that the material house comes from potentially existing, to actually existing, through the the activity of building (the means to the end). When the material house potentially exists, it is actually an idea, or goal in the builders mind, and therefore acts to inspire the builder to build, as final cause.

Therefore the builder is the cause of building, as you say, but only as final cause, not efficient cause. Building, itself, is an efficient cause, but if we say the builder is the cause of building, we are referring to the freely willed choice of the builder, to build, and this is final cause.

In that process, one element (the boulder building) is source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house and so the cause, and the other element (the house being built) is the result of the actualization, and so the effect. — Dfpolis

I completely agree with this, and I believe that you and I both have a good understanding of Aristotle on this point. However, where we seem to disagree is that I think that under Aristotelian principles, what you describe as "source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house" is final cause, while you seem to argue that it is a type of efficient cause.

Essential causality looks at the process, not the end result, and sees that that process (building) involves two concurrent aspects (the builder building as cause, and the house being build as effect). — Dfpolis

This still makes no sense to me. All you are saying is that there is two different ways to describe the same physical activity, There is no logical reason given to conclude that one is cause and the other effect. In fact, the affirmation that they are concurrent seems to negate the possibility of a cause/effect relation.

"Being done to" means an on-going activity. — Dfpolis

Sure, but the point is that there is no house in existence to be having anything done to it. And if we look at the raw material as having something done to them. there is no "effect" in this description, just something being done.

I have already addressed this. When my houses were being built, my wife and I went to see our "house," and spoke of it. No one was confused by the term, because they knew it could refer to a house under construction. Please do not quibble about this again. It is unbecoming. — Dfpolis

Of course no one is confused when we speak of the things which only exist as goals, because final causation is an integral part of our lives, and influences all sorts of conversations.

You ask me not to quibble about this, but it is key to understanding Aristotle's thesis on causation. To understand the reality of change we must recognize the difference between "the house" as a goal in people's minds, and "the house" as a completed material object. Do you agree that "the house as a goal in the minds of people, is a cause of action, and "the house" as a completed material object is the effect of that same action?

The words in question are ποιεῖν poiein and πάσχειν paskein. Boiled down, the first means to make or to do - active/action, and the second, "to be affected by anything whether good or bad, opposite to acting of oneself," (A Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 1977, p. 536) - passive/passion. — tim wood

I know what passive means, it's Df's usage which makes no sense. If you think it does make sense, then explain how Df's expression "the passion of being built" makes any sense to you.

And this, Metaphysics, 1066a:
"That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar." italics added. — tim wood

As I said, the two are one and the same, "identical", when it is the actualization which is being discussed. It is Df who wants to cast one part of the actualization as cause, and another part of the actualization as effect, and say that these two, the causal part and effectual part of the actualization are concurrent. But that is not Aristotle at all.

Numbers are not "real" in any natural sense, but "ideal" in the sense that we abstract those bare bones (ding an sich) from fleshly experience with multiple objects. Numbers are transcendental place-holders for abstract values. Those ideal tokens are not "products of any one mind", but are universal truths that logical minds have access to. — Gnomon

I would agree with that description, although not with the equivocation with ‘ding an sich’. That is owed to Kant’s confusing equivocation of ‘thing in itself’ with ‘noumenal’ which actually have two different meanings.

There is an expression in classical philosophy ’the eye of reason’, which refers to that kind of insight - things which can only be grasped by a rational mind. (There’s also ‘the eye of the heart’ which is ‘higher’ again but this is more associated with esoteric philosophy.)

The common error with understanding these principles, is to try and imagine their objects as ‘existing somewhere’. They don’t exist in the sense that sensible objects exist. And as today’s culture is overwhelmingly oriented to sense-experience (‘empiricism’), then they don’t exist at all. This is why empiricist philosophers reject Platonic realism - their metaphysical framework has no conceptual space to allow for the reality of anything other than sense-objects or mathematical abstractions that are grounded in them. They have a ‘flat ontology’ which can’t deal with levels of being. (This is what Vervaeke refers to by ‘levelling up’.)

There’s a book called Thinking Being: Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, Eric D. Perl. It’s expensive and out-of-print but there’s an online copy posted here.. See Chapter 2: Plato, Section 3 The Meaning of Separation which succinctly explains the meaning of ‘forms’ and why they must not be understood as inhabiting a separate realm (as distinct from a separate level of being, which is completely different. Again, it is a problem of trying to transpose an hierarchical to a flat ontology.)

Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by thought. If, taking any of these examples—say, justice, health, or strength—we ask, “How big is it? What color is it?How much does it weigh?”we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense.’ — Eric D Perl, op cit

Did Ariistotle really (actually) know what he was talking about? — Gnomon

Do you know what he was talking about? Actually as far as a synopsis of his metaphysics of form and matter, the above title provides quite a good synoptic overview.

I know what passive means, it's Df's usage which makes no sense. If you think it does make sense, then explain how Df's expression "the passion of being built" makes any sense to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I leave your discussion with Df to you. The question is whether the expression. "the passion of being built," makes sense (to me). I'll note that I jumped in only because it appeared you did not understand "passion" in this context and that seemed odd. Now twice you have said you do understand it - yet if you do, I don't see why there is still a question.

Let's start with two sentences, 1). "Bob hit the ball." 2) "The ball was hit by Bob." 2 is simply a passive construction and I'm very surprised if it presents a problem for you. And while it would be peculiar usage now, still one could reasonably talk about the action of hitting the ball and the passion of the ball being hit. The passive voice useful in news articles because often the doer is not the main story, but rather the thing that was done. Is it perhaps the use of the word "passion" itself in this way that is the problem? Anyway, so much for the grammar.

In my opinion - and in this case not even my opinions are entirely my own - what Aristotle has to work with is what he sees, his own logic, common language, and common sense. That is, he doesn't have a science. He's pretty much constrained to description, and whatever sense he can make of things. He sees his friend Kevin and asks him what he's doing. The answer is he's building a house. And Aristotle makes explicit an observation that most folks wouldn't bother with: if someone is building, then something is being built. If someone or something is acting, something is being acted on. And he calls that πάσχειν, translated as passion, or being-affected.

And this point explicitly made in his Categories 1b25, this being one version.
"1b25. Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or
qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or havingor doing or being affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the
Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning;of being-affected:
being-cut, being-burned," bold-italics added.

It is just that simple, so yes, it makes sense to me, and I believe that was all the point that Aristotle was making.

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so. Aristotle did not rule out the concept of “prime matter” as incoherent with his cosmological argument. In fact, “prime matter” is a fundamental concept in his metaphysics.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. It is pure potentiality, capable of becoming any form. This is crucial to his hylomorphic theory, where everything in the natural world is a composite of form (morphē) and matter (hylē).

In his cosmological argument, particularly in the “Physics” and “Metaphysics,” Aristotle posits the existence of an unmoved mover, a necessary being that causes motion* without itself being moved. This unmoved mover is pure actuality**, having no potentiality. The concept of prime matter, in contrast, is pure potentiality and plays a different role in his metaphysical framework.

Thus, far from ruling out prime matter as incoherent, Aristotle integrates it as a core component of his explanation of change and substance. The cosmological argument addresses the existence of a first cause, which is separate from the notion of prime matter but does not negate it.

——

*’Motion’ in Aristotle means something different than modern physics ‘velocity’. Aristotle’s notion of motion is broader and more encompassing, dealing with the transition from potentiality to actuality in various aspects, not limited to spatial movement. This understanding of motion as a change of state is a fundamental difference from the modern physics definition, which typically focuses on the change in an object’s position over time (velocity).

** ‘Pure actuality’ can be traced back to Parmenides vision of ‘what is’ as being above or beyond the change and decay of concrete particulars. As modified first by Plato and then Aristotle, ideas are eternal and changeless, in which particulars ‘participate’. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not posit a separate realm of Forms but argued that the form and matter coexist in the same substance. However, he maintained that the highest forms of being, such as the unmoved mover, are pure actuality, embodying eternal and changeless existence.

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, you know much less about Aristotle than you would like to believe. Further, you are not open to learning. So, once again, I leave you to your own beliefs.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. — Wayfarer

You might be interested in my "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle" Modern Schoolman 68 (3):225-244 (1991)

Thank you, I shall have a look.

The answer is he's building a house. And Aristotle makes explicit an observation that most folks wouldn't bother with: if someone is building, then something is being built. If someone or something is acting, something is being acted on. And he calls that πάσχειν, translated as passion, or being-affected. — tim wood

Yes, something is being acted on, and that is the raw materials. The form of the materials changes due to the activity called "building". That is how Aristotle described change. The problem with Df's representation is that he portrays the house as that which suffers the passion, by saying "the passion of being built". And this is incoherent because there is no house in existence, to undergo a change of form, only the raw materials undergo that change, as described above. But the raw materials are not "being built", the house is. But the house does not yet exist. It exists only as a goal or end, and as such it is the final cause of the builders activity. So in this way, Df represents what Aristotle would name as the final cause, as some sort of "necessary efficient cause".

Not so. Aristotle did not rule out the concept of “prime matter” as incoherent with his cosmological argument. In fact, “prime matter” is a fundamental concept in his metaphysics. — Wayfarer

This has been a subject of debate for some. But a thorough reading of the "Metaphysics" ought to display to you that he actually does rule out prime matter. He discusses it thoroughly, treating it as if it might possibly be a viable concept, because it was accepted by many, only to reveal in the end, that such a thing is impossible. To put it simply, prime matter would be pure, absolute potential. And any potential requires an actuality to act as cause to bring about anything actual from it. The concept of pure, absolute potential, does not allow for any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. So if there ever was pure absolute potential (prime matter), this would always be the case, and there would never be anything actual. But observational information reveals to us that there is something actual. Therefore "prime matter" is ruled out.

This is basically the argument against being coming from nothing. Pure potential, prime matter, is actually nothing. It is assumed as an original chaos or some absolute disorder, what some called apeiron. From this complete and absolute randomness, organized actual existence (form), is supposed to come into being by some chance occurrence. Apokrisis presents this as symmetry-breaking. You can see how this is illogical, to assume that formed being springs spontaneously from absolute potential, prime matter.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. — Wayfarer

Actually, what Aristotle reveals in his Metaphysics, is that the true underlying substratum is actually formal. That it is material is just an illusion produced from the assumptions of empirical sciences. This is why Aristotle is truly idealist rather than materialist, as "form", being what is actual, becomes the first principle. You'll see this principle taken up by Christian theologists like Aquinas, choosing actuality as the first principle over the "pure potential" of the Neo-Platonists.

In his cosmological argument, particularly in the “Physics” and “Metaphysics,” Aristotle posits the existence of an unmoved mover, a necessary being that causes motion* without itself being moved. This unmoved mover is pure actuality**, having no potentiality. The concept of prime matter, in contrast, is pure potentiality and plays a different role in his metaphysical framework. — Wayfarer

This is good, but if you look closely you'll see that the concept of "pure actuality" excludes the possibility of "pure potentiality", and vise versa, because "pure" excludes the other category. So, when you see that the assumed unmoved mover is pure actuality, you know that pure potentiality is ruled out. Therefore, "pure potentiality" is the ontology which he is refuting. This is the position of the Pythagoreans, and those that Aristotle refers to as "some Platonists", those who adopt pure potentiality as a first principle.

*’Motion’ in Aristotle means something different than modern physics ‘velocity’. Aristotle’s notion of motion is broader and more encompassing, dealing with the transition from potentiality to actuality in various aspects, not limited to spatial movement. This understanding of motion as a change of state is a fundamental difference from the modern physics definition, which typically focuses on the change in an object’s position over time (velocity). — Wayfarer

Yes, Aristotle distinguish two types of change, change of place (locomotion), and internal change, which is change of a thing's form. Modern science, with its propensity toward dividing objects into smaller parts, reduces all change to change of place. What was internal change, or change of form, is now change of place of the parts. However, as we get to smaller and smaller parts, we reapproach the problem of the ancient atomists, which Aristotle had to deal with.

We cannot assume infinite divisibility of the parts, because this leaves us with nothing, no substratum at the base of things. So the atomists proposed fundamental parts, and these fundamental parts must be unchangeable or else they'd be divisible into further parts. The fundamental parts would be prime matter, that which all things are composed of. However, this creates the need for a completely different perspective. There is a requirement for a 'force' of actuality which organizes the fundamental parts, and this 'force' must be internal to the objects we know. The 'force' becomes the principle for actual existence, organized being. Then by Aristotle's refutation, the cosmological argument, the fundamental parts (atoms) as prime matter, get ruled out, and we are left with this 'force' as the fundamental substratum of all being. Aristotle's primitive representation is the divine activity, the thinking, thinking on thinking.

Clearly, you know much less about Aristotle than you would like to believe. Further, you are not open to learning. So, once again, I leave you to your own beliefs. — Dfpolis

You, Dfpolis, are unable, or simply unwilling to engage with teleology, the foundational aspect of Aristotle's ontology. Instead you incessantly attempt to represent the intentional activity of final causation as some sort of necessary efficient cause, refusing to engage with the true Aristotelian principles.

Yes, something is being acted on, and that is the raw materials. The form of the materials changes due to the activity called "building". That is how Aristotle described change. The problem with Df's representation is that he portrays the house as that which suffers the passion, by saying "the passion of being built". And this is incoherent because there is no house in existence, — Metaphysician Undercover

And with this you parse meaning out of language. Nothing can be built. And nothing can be worked with and nothing changed. And your idea of "suffers the passion" makes clear that notwithstanding your claims, you simply do not understand "passion" in this usage and context. Or "suffer" for that matter: in A's time it meant "let" as in permit or allow.

Let's set aside translation. Question to you: is it possible to build a house? Yes? No?

You, Dfpolis, are unable, or simply unwilling to engage with teleology, the foundational aspect of Aristotle's ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you spout nonsense. See my "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010)

I ran across these references just now.

Posterior Analytics II, 12, 95a14-35 discusses simultaneous and time ordered causality.

Cf. “In an essentially ordered series of causes, both the existence and causal function of the effect are caused and preserved by the simultaneous coexistence of the cause.” Juan Carlos Flores, “Accidental and essential causality in John Duns Scotus’ treatise ‘On the first principle,’” Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévale 67, no. 1 (2000): 97f.

Leaving aside my (or other people's) objections to Gerson's idea of Ur-Platonism, Gerson certainly seems to group the 'naturalists' as unified in their opposition to what he supports:

[...]

But I take your point that a collection of five "anti's" has problems asserting a clear thesis. That highlights a difference with other critiques of the modern era. — Paine

Yes, that's a fair point. The five points converge on anti-naturalism.

Responding to your added text, the idea of transjective constituents would count as antithetical to what Gerson required. — Paine

I don't know too much about Vervaeke, but I don't think he would see it this way. There is an interesting question about whether the overcoming of the subjective/objective division existed before modernity. I am currently reading John Deely's book on Heidegger and he would say that it did exist, albeit in a qualified and seminal way.

I would agree with that description, although not with the equivocation with ‘ding an sich’. That is owed to Kant’s confusing equivocation of ‘thing in itself’ with ‘noumenal’ which actually have two different meanings. — Wayfarer

Thanks. But, can you clarify Kant's "equivocation" for me? If the ding an sich is not Phenomenal, is it not then Noumenal by default? Is there a third category of Being : things vs dings vs (?) ? Or more than two ways of Knowing : sensation vs imagination vs (?) ?

I usually think of dings as existing in a Platonic Ideal Realm, or God's Mind, beyond the reach of the human meat-mind --- except as inferred by Reason from the inherent Logic of the Real World : Concept vs Percept. How did Kant know about dings, if not by sensory observation or rational imagination/representation? Did he know by Direct Revelation or by Inner Vision (clairvoyance)?

The Noumenal vs Phenomenal dichotomy*1 seems to be intended to avoid ambiguity. But I suppose later philosophers have analyzed that black vs white meaning into a variety of nit-picky interpretations. For example, I just noticed the definition of ding an sich below*2. Neither sensory "observation" nor mental "representation", but perhaps some spooky third category of being & knowing. :smile:


*1. What is the difference between noumenal and phenomenal?
The phenomenal world is the world we are aware of; this is the world we construct out of the sensations that are present to our consciousness. The noumenal world consists of things we seem compelled to believe in, but which we can never know (because we lack sense-evidence of it).
http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/303/kant120.htm
Note --- "Compelled to believe", by what power?

*2. Thing-in-itself
In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.
https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Thing-in-itself

That is an interesting question contrasting the ancient against the modern. I don't know how to think about Gerson's thesis in that context. My retort was to say that the "transjective"t sounded like a case of "having one's cake and eating it too" that Gerson objected to. A compromise between "materialists" and "idealist"; A position upon the history of philosophy as practiced now combined with an interpretation of ancient text.

The difference between Plotinus and Aristotle that I have argued for is not put forward with that design. The ideas seem different to me.

Thanks. But, can you clarify Kant's "equivocation" for me? — Gnomon

This is a thread about Aristotle's Metaphysics. There are two fairly recent threads on Kant which might be more suitable for discussion of that isssue:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14993/kant-and-the-unattainable-goal-of-empirical-investigation/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14616/kant-on-synthetic-a-prior-knowledge-and-experience

Perl's book, mentioned above, traces the origin of the Platonic forms or ideas with Parmenides and how it is developed first by Plato and then Aristotle. Kant is much later and belongs to the modern period.

I will say something about my understanding of 'noumenal' but within that context. According to the Wiki article on noumenon, it is derived from 'object of nous', 'nous' being that seminal word in Greek philosophy translated as 'intellect'. But like a lot of those basic terms of philosophy the connotations and implications have shifted over the centuries. 'Nous' in the Aristotelian sense has a much more active role.

From the wiki article on nous

In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For Aristotle discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. (Wayfarer: this is a reference to "universals".) Derived from this it was also sometimes argued, in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of a spiritual and divine type. By this type of account, it also came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it.

From David Bentley Hart:

In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations — for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as “causes,” but which are nothing like the uniform material “causes” of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of nature’s deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the “veil of Isis” and ever deeper into nature’s inner mysteries.

Within this context, 'noumenal' means, basically, 'grasped by reason' while sensible means 'grasped by the sense organs'. In hylomorphic dualism, this means that nous apprehends the form or essence of a particular - what is really is - and the senses perceive its material appearance. That's the interplay of 'reality and appearance'. Again from the article on Noumenon:

Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy. — Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy

According to Aristotelian philosophy (and others may correct me here if I'm wrong) animals, generally, only see the material forms of things as they lack reason, which is the ability to see the forms, principles or essence of things. (Hence Aristotle's designation of humans as 'rational animals'.) This is of course nowadays regarded as archaic and superseded. I believe there's a valid distinction being made but this is a constant source of controversy, not to mention repeated references to the cleverness of Caledonian crows.

In regard to the various ways building a house has come up, it has been presented by Aristotle as a contrast to natural causes. It is a poster child of the artificial.
Everything that can be affected demonstrates the capacity of being able to change. The components of the house are forced into a situation that "natural" products do not experience.

But what makes change possible is treated as applicable to both activities. .

Isn't there an especial significance attached to what is 'self-moving'? That applies to organisms, generally, which distinguishes them from artifacts, which exist because of an external cause i.e. the builder.

The Aristotelian tradition draws a distinction between three basic types of living substance. These form a hierarchy in which each type incorporates the basic powers of the types below it but also adds something novel of its own to them. The most basic kind of life is vegetative life, which involves the capacities of a living thing to take in nutrients, to go through a growth cycle, and to reproduce itself. Plants are obvious examples, but other forms of life, such as fungi, are also vegetative in the relevant sense. The second kind of life is animal life, which includes the vegetative capacities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, but in addition involves the capacities of a thing to take in information through speciali]ed sense organs and to move itself around, where the sensory input and behavioral output is mediated by appetitive drives such as the desire to pursue something pleasant or to avoid something painful. These distinctively animal capacities are not only additional to and irreducible to the vegetative capacities, but also transform the latter. For example, nutrition in animals participates in their sensory, appetitive, and locomotive capacities insofar as they have to seek out food, take enMoyment in eating it, and so forth.

The third kind of life is the rational kind, which is the distinctively human form of life. This form of life incorporates both the vegetative and animal capacities, and adds to them the intellectual powers of forming abstract concepts, putting them together into propositions, and reasoning logically from one proposition to another, and also the volitional power to will or choose in light of what the intellect understands. These additional capacities are not only additional to and irreducible to the vegetative and animal capacities, but transform the latter. Given human rationality, a vegetative function like nutrition takes on the cultural significance we attach to the eating of meals; the reproductive capacity comes to be associated with romantic love and the institution of marriage; sensory experience comes to be infused with conceptual content; and so forth. — Aristotle's Revenge, Edward Feser, p 54-55

I ran across these references just now.

Posterior Analytics II, 12, 95a14-35 discusses simultaneous and time ordered causality.

Cf. “In an essentially ordered series of causes, both the existence and causal function of the effect are caused and preserved by the simultaneous coexistence of the cause.” Juan Carlos Flores, “Accidental and essential causality in John Duns Scotus’ treatise ‘On the first principle,’” Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévale 67, no. 1 (2000): 97f. — Dfpolis

Hey, thanks for the reference Dfpolis. I checked it out, and I think you are vindicated to an extent. Aristotle does discuss this simultaneity of cause and effect, but I still think this concept is misapplied by you in your example.

Aristotle gives two examples of the way in which the cause is simultaneous with the effect in this way. The first is an eclipse of the moon. The moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened. It becomes eclipsed when the earth intervenes. It is eclipsed when the earth is intervening, and it will be eclipsed when the earth will intervene. The other example is the freezing of water. Ice forms when a failure of heat is occurring, it has formed when there was a failure of heat, and it will form if a failure of heat occurs.

The reason why I still think you misapply this concept, is because "the builder building", and "the house being built" both refer to the very same activity, as you agree. In both of Aristotle's examples, there are two distinct things, one the cause of the other. The earth intervenes with the light from the sun, and the effect is the eclipse of the moon. Two distinct things. There is a lack of heat, and the effect is that the water freezes. Two distinct things. And careful scientific analysis reveals that Aristotle was wrong, there is a time difference for each of these, as the effect does not actually occur instantaneously. Your example however, is not even similar because there is not two distinct things, only one activity described in two ways.

Again, you spout nonsense. See my "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010) — Dfpolis

Well then, why don't you accept what I've been telling you, that "being built" is a predication which implies the thing being built, "the house" as its subject. And, the house exists only as a goal or intention (final cause) at this time of being built. The house is not an existing thing affected by the activity of being built, it is created intentionally by being built..

Yes, the differences between the activities of nature and artifice are clearly drawn. But how everything is capable of change or not is whatever it is regardless.

If you acknowledge intention as causal, in the sense of final cause, then you would see that "house being built", as referring to the intention of the project (the end), is the (final) cause of "builder building". Therefore you have things reversed when you say "builder building" is the cause of "being built" which is the effect.

This is very consistent with what Aristotle says in the context of your reference, Posterior Analytics 94b 7-26. "E.G. why does one take a walk after dinner? For the sake of one's health." Your example is comparable. Why is the builder building? Because there is a house being built.

Do you agree, if we adhere to Aristotelian principles (regardless of what Duns Scotus says), "house being built" is the cause, as referring to the intentional project, the end, and "builder building" is the effect?

"All causes, both proper and accidental, may be spoken of either as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either a house-builder or a house-builder building." (Physics III, 3, 195b4f).

"The difference is this much, that causes which are actually at work and particular exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g. this healing person with this being-healed person and that
housebuilding [20] man with that being-built house; but this is not always true of potential causes—the house and the housebuilder do not pass away simultaneously." (Physics III, 3, 195b16-21)

Well then, why don't you accept what I've been telling you, that "being built" is a predication which implies the thing being built, "the house" as its subject. And, the house exists only as a goal or intention (final cause) at this time of being built. The house is not an existing thing affected by the activity of being built, it is created intentionally by being built.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because "house" can be and often is analogically predicated of a house under construction.

Again, the point is that we are discussing efficient, not final, causality and digressing into final causality only leads to confusion.