nor the means justify the end
— Mark S
I have never heard of or considered this possibility.
It would be better of course if you supported that with some argumentation and/or examples ... (Referring to Kant cannot substitute that.)
Actions (means) in general are based on will and are done in order to accomplish something.
.... it makes no sense to talk about "the means justifying the end". Which makes this statement void of meaning and of no use.
I will be glad to "hear" about any arguments or examples that disagree with the above. : — Alkis Piskas
It’s not rare that people will be forced to do X even if it’s supposedly to be in their interest. Who decides when and what and who and all that. They may not like that. — schopenhauer1
Societies decide when “people will be forced to do X” when they advocate and enforce moral norms. For example, people will be coerced into not stealing and murdering. Will some people not like that? Sure. Will anyone else care? No. — Mark S
But morality was always on the table ...My comment that the “means do not justify the end” was about moral means and ends, so let’s restrict the discussion to morality. — Mark S
It's not a question of being convinced. A conscious act --moral or immoral-- is done on will and for a purpose. By definition. If it doesn't have a purpose --"I just did that, no reason"-- is not a wilful act.If you are convinced that moral actions necessarily have an end ... — Mark S
Yes, actions are based on a motivation, which usually constitutes a purpose. If an acrion is driven (motivated) just by desire, emotion, the subconsious, etc., it's not a wilful act. Which means that it has no purpose, an end chosen consciously by me, based on my free will. These kinds of actions do not constitute and cannot be consideres as "mans". By definition: "means" (plural) are something useful or helpful to a desired end.As Hume pointed out, people act according to their motivations which they may not understand rather than a logical consequence of their chosen ends. — Mark S
I'm not claiming and cannot claim anything regarding Kantianism. I would have first to know what does it actually mean. :smile:Are you claiming that Kantianism does not ... — Mark S
Perhaps I misunderstand you. I hear you objecting to all cultural moralities as, on balance, bad. — Mark S
No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means. — Mark S
Heiko
519
No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.
— Mark S
An "end" would be something of unquestionable value. Happiness is good and hence worthwhile. "Maximizing" it.... seems formal. This seems to give it priority over other goods. Minimizing suffering is not necessarily the same and can be made to conflict with it in thought experiments. How would we judge what to do? To me it seems there has to be another end behind those. — Heiko
"end" would be something of unquestionable value. — Heiko
That sounds merely like your preference.
We might also prefer that mind-independent moral theories be able to answer any ethical question. Again, there are no reasons I know of to believe that. — Mark S
"How is moral conscience even possible?" — Heiko
That is an easy question to answer. We have an innate moral conscience (and an innate moral sense) because it enabled our ancestors to solve cooperation problems in ways that increased their reproductive fitness.
However, I have no reason to believe that knowing the function of our moral sense - to solve cooperation problems - can answer questions about moral ends and moral values independent of cooperation strategies. — Mark S
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