nor the means justify the end
— Mark S
I have never heard of or considered this possibility.
It would be better of course if you supported that with some argumentation and/or examples ... (Referring to Kant cannot substitute that.)

Actions (means) in general are based on will and are done in order to accomplish something.
.... it makes no sense to talk about "the means justifying the end". Which makes this statement void of meaning and of no use.

I will be glad to "hear" about any arguments or examples that disagree with the above. : — Alkis Piskas

My comment that the “means do not justify the end” was about moral means and ends, so let’s restrict the discussion to morality.

If you are convinced that moral actions necessarily have an end, you might ask people who are acting morally at a considerable cost what their end is. They might say the end was “acting morally” but that is not a meaningful definition of “end” as I am using it. As Hume pointed out, people act according to their motivations which they may not understand rather than a logical consequence of their chosen ends.

So, no, moral actions do not necessarily have any end (beyond “acting morally”) that are understood by the actor. Behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms may have a function and ultimate cause but no conscious end. People act morally most commonly because they feel a motivation to do so, not to accomplish some goal.

Are you claiming that Kantianism does not hold that “moral means justify ends” (as per it being ‘immoral’ to lie to the murderer about where their next victim is)? My understanding of Kantianism is superficial and I would be happy to learn that is not the case.

It’s not rare that people will be forced to do X even if it’s supposedly to be in their interest. Who decides when and what and who and all that. They may not like that. — schopenhauer1

Societies decide when “people will be forced to do X” when they advocate and enforce moral norms. For example, people will be coerced into not stealing and murdering. Will some people not like that? Sure. Will anyone else care? No.

This sounds like the definition would be a means to achieve the end...
Sorry - you see the problem with this I hope. — Heiko

No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.

Societies decide when “people will be forced to do X” when they advocate and enforce moral norms. For example, people will be coerced into not stealing and murdering. Will some people not like that? Sure. Will anyone else care? No. — Mark S

So your OP was about separating means and ends. Forcing others to do things for ends seems to be a violation of autonomy in regards to the means, no?

Ultimately, you just seem to be advocating what actually happens in modern democratic societies, no? People with different values live in the same communities playing out their values, but they all agree to the value of living in the community and following it’s guidelines. I’m not sure how that’s philosophical as much as just reiterating the status quo. I guess I would default to some sort of essay like Mills on liberty or something like that because that’s essentially what you’re advocating.

Perhaps I misunderstand you. I hear you objecting to all cultural moralities as, on balance, bad.

My comment that the “means do not justify the end” was about moral means and ends, so let’s restrict the discussion to morality. — Mark S

But morality was always on the table ...

If you are convinced that moral actions necessarily have an end ... — Mark S

It's not a question of being convinced. A conscious act --moral or immoral-- is done on will and for a purpose. By definition. If it doesn't have a purpose --"I just did that, no reason"-- is not a wilful act.

As Hume pointed out, people act according to their motivations which they may not understand rather than a logical consequence of their chosen ends. — Mark S

Yes, actions are based on a motivation, which usually constitutes a purpose. If an acrion is driven (motivated) just by desire, emotion, the subconsious, etc., it's not a wilful act. Which means that it has no purpose, an end chosen consciously by me, based on my free will. These kinds of actions do not constitute and cannot be consideres as "mans". By definition: "means" (plural) are something useful or helpful to a desired end.

Are you claiming that Kantianism does not ... — Mark S

I'm not claiming and cannot claim anything regarding Kantianism. I would have first to know what does it actually mean. :smile:

Perhaps I misunderstand you. I hear you objecting to all cultural moralities as, on balance, bad. — Mark S

No just as de facto what we have. It’s like saying, it’s better to have food than no food. It’s almost too common sensical to make any impact as far as any real position. Best to have a society that has a diversity of views. Ok…

No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means. — Mark S

An "end" would be something of unquestionable value. Happiness is good and hence worthwhile. "Maximizing" it.... seems formal. This seems to give it priority over other goods. Minimizing suffering is not necessarily the same and can be made to conflict with it in thought experiments. How would we judge what to do? To me it seems there has to be another end behind those.

Heiko
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No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.
— Mark S

An "end" would be something of unquestionable value. Happiness is good and hence worthwhile. "Maximizing" it.... seems formal. This seems to give it priority over other goods. Minimizing suffering is not necessarily the same and can be made to conflict with it in thought experiments. How would we judge what to do? To me it seems there has to be another end behind those. — Heiko

Heiko, I know of no reasons we should believe that a moral theory’s, even an objectively true moral theory’s,

"end" would be something of unquestionable value. — Heiko

That sounds merely like your preference.

We might also prefer that mind-independent moral theories be able to answer any ethical question. Again, there are no reasons I know of to believe that.

For example, the Morality As Cooperation Strategies moral theory is essentially silent about moral ends and values other than values that are parts of cooperation strategies; hence this thread about judging moral ends separately from moral means.

That sounds merely like your preference.

We might also prefer that mind-independent moral theories be able to answer any ethical question. Again, there are no reasons I know of to believe that. — Mark S

The question that you should be asking then is "How is moral conscience even possible?"
Simple logic gives this: The ability to distinguish between right and wrong would imply a capability to do so.

"How is moral conscience even possible?" — Heiko

That is an easy question to answer. We have an innate moral conscience (and an innate moral sense) because it enabled our ancestors to solve cooperation problems in ways that increased their reproductive fitness.

However, I have no reason to believe that knowing the function of our moral sense - to solve cooperation problems - can answer questions about moral ends and moral values independent of cooperation strategies.

That is an easy question to answer. We have an innate moral conscience (and an innate moral sense) because it enabled our ancestors to solve cooperation problems in ways that increased their reproductive fitness.

However, I have no reason to believe that knowing the function of our moral sense - to solve cooperation problems - can answer questions about moral ends and moral values independent of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

This sounds problematic as what else could set a moral end if not that, which makes moral decisions possible in first place? What happened? Did we just put the label "moral" on arbitrary habits?