Of course there is a world of difference when you’re interacting with a human who has feelings and emotions
My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie. — Bob Ross
This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense). — Bob Ross
I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. — Bob Ross
Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): — Bob Ross
They would argue that they don’t have to be maintaining everything going on in their world just what they are aware of in that moment. — Darkneos
This point is still not true as when you realize they are a P Zombie then those things stop. It would have a bearing, especially since people can tell whether you mean something or not.
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person, considered as having qualia, but does not have conscious experience, qualia
But there is a need for that “extra” because again people can tell. There is usually evidence for it but it’s not something you can test in a lab. It has to go beyond machinery to have feelings. What you’re saying is simply false.
And you’d be wrong. The reason people mistreated those before is they took their actions to be that of a machine, in other words they didn’t really feel anything or mean it.
Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.
The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ. — Bob Ross
This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important. — Bob Ross
There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with? — Bob Ross
When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia. — Bob Ross
Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant. — Bob Ross
That’s not what it means. It’s to argue against an alleged inner life that might be occurring in the person. They don’t have qualia, hence the wording of “considered” as having it but not really.
Again you misunderstand the PZ. It acts and has all the normal actions of pain but doesn’t really feel pain.
Pain is eliminated as a PZ or rather it never truly was
You’re butchering the thought experiment to fit your narrative.
There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.
And again you’d still be wrong. One needs qualia to be concerned. I can ACT like it but it matters whether I feel it or not. Again people can tell.
Again no. If they don’t have qualia or feelings then they aren’t sincerely anything.
Again you’re not getting it. Did you even finish the math link?
You keep making up stuff like “ultra feelings” when the feeling behind an action makes all the difference. It’s just basic.
Do you agree that it is illogical for a solipsist to reference the word 'they?'What I meant is that the processing argument doesn’t hold, rather it only needs to “render” what is around you not the globe. — Darkneos
From a solipsistic standpoint, that's quite funny!Again not a real counterpoint. — Darkneos
I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention? — Bob Ross
Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. — Bob Ross
I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.
My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why? — Bob Ross
I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.
Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment? — Bob Ross
I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you. — Bob Ross
Also we can make a ton of sense of the external world, that’s how we have modern society. — Darkneos
It's pretty obvious what it is.
Again, no that is not what the PZ thought experiment is based on. A feeling cannot occur without being consciously aware of it.
The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.
You have woefully misunderstood the thought experiment not to mention your example is just wrong.
No you don't, you assume that. All that you said requires qualia.
They can perform the action but without the emotion it's not really care and concern.
People lie all the time, lead people on, so you're just wrong here.
It's not just the action they have to actually feel and have love for you, which a P-Zombie cannot, ever.
Acts of love aren't proof of love, they have to have the feeling for it to be so.
Again the fact you can't understand why the emotion behind it makes all the difference is telling.
They have to be conscious otherwise it doesn't matter. Pretty much everyone knows this.
It is entailed in the basic definition you gave me
Your whole chain shows you don't get it.
But we don't understand the external world enough to refute solipsism or skepticism, or idealism and many other ideas. If we did have a better understanding of it, these problems need not arise. — Manuel
The PZ experiment does not claim that a ‘feeling’ equates to ‘qualia’. Now, I will grant (as I already have many times) that many basic arguments for the PZ experiment are predicated on that assumption: but that is what I am questioning and arguing against. Telling me that the PZ thought experiment is not based on ‘feelings’ being disynonmous with ‘qualia’ just tells me that you are subscribing to that kind of argument: now tell me why feelings cannot be disynonymous with qualia (in the manner I already outlined it). — Bob Ross
We actually do though, but that is not why you can't refute those ideas. Rather those are ideas science cannot test, as metaphysical claims we just cannot. Solipsism cannot be tested or proven because it says only your existence is certain and everything else is either doubtful or non existent. So it can't use any metric to support it's argument. — Darkneos
How? What you are arguing doesn't at all go against what I'm saying. You say that because these views are metaphysical (which isn't clear that they are, some are epistemic, as solipsism is about our knowledge of the world, not the world itself -as would be claim made by materialists or idealists) hence science cannot test them. — Manuel
I agree science cannot not test them. If we knew more, if we had a more sophisticated and elaborate understanding, I don't see why we couldn't know enough to say for certain "solipsism or skepticism is false." We can't say they are a-priori necessarily metaphysical views.
For an advanced civilization, they may be trivial questions. — Manuel
Nevertheless for us, the issues will remain problematical, so it's not as if I'm trying to refute these ideas, we can only go by probability and likelihood here, in my opinion — Manuel
Look at it this way. You weren't born being a solipsist. Someone had to introduce you to the idea and notion so, you can be rest assured if the rest of us don't exist at least that one other person who first introduced the idea to you must be real. Otherwise, you couldn't have been real in the first place. Therefore, we all must be real and solipsism a lie. Damn. Sometimes I impress myself. I should be getting paid for this. — Outlander
Solipsist could just argue it was their mind making them aware of it. Whether you're born with it or not is irrelevant. — Darkneos
Your point about being a god also isn’t what solipsism says, that’s a strawman. — Darkneos
If you're not creator of all things and have the power to destroy all that exists (if you are destroyed) then, no, logic 101 dictates everything "the entire universe" does in fact not exist solely in your head. — Outlander
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.