How do I know a person is depressed? If he tells me, and is honest about it, then I can assume he is depressed. He could be lying. I cannot enter his head. — Manuel

The conception of depression as a hidden mental state is itself the incorrect presupposition here. Wittgenstein's beetlebox thoughtexperiment shows this. Words cannot get/have their meaning from secret/private experience.

↪Gnomon
I think you need to infinitely nest your Cartesian theatre image. The mini-me needs his own control-room in the skull, with its own screen that shows the first screen. And then mini-mini-me needs... — green flag

Yes. That's why the homunculus theory doesn't explain Sentience. It's a same-thing-all-the-way-down theory. But, what's missing is Transformation from sensory data to meaning in the mind. My Enformationism thesis begins with a Quantum science concept : that Matter & Energy are different functional forms of Generic Information (power to enform ; to cause change ; to transform). Hence, I have inferred that Matter, Energy and Mind are all various instances of Information (relationships ; mathematical ratios ; meanings). So, Cosmos (reality + ideality) is indeed the same-thing-all-the-way-down. But the essential thing is Mind-stuff (information) instead of Material-stuff (atoms in void). Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. And that notion opens up a Pandora's Box of infinite possibilities, including mis-interpretations of the Mind-Matter relationship. :smile:

I haven't looked that deeply into Hoffman's claims. I will admit that. I saw some of his interview with Lex and recognized something akin to a self-subverting psychologism.

if one doesn't trust in our ability to use logic, or that the world is rational and that this rationality is comprehensible to us... Down that road lies true, radical skepticism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, though I'd call it inarticulate madness. As long as still makes earnest claims as a philosopher, one must assume, explicitly or not, a share language in a shared world that one can be wrong about. Norms of rationality are also presupposed in the notion of philosopher as opposed to an emitted of random words or careless conjectures which are not modified in response to criticism. Something like Sellars' space of reasons makes worldly objects intelligible in the first place.

Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. — Gnomon

My objection to approaches that want to call everything 'mind' is that only make sense in a world where we see animals with nervous systems and speculate about what it's like to be them or about their umwelt. This applied to us encouraged philosophers to think of themselves as trapped behind a wall of sensory experience, within a mere image of the world on a screen and not the world itself.


As if the eyes create the very world in which eyes are seen in the first place.

Eyes are self-creating like that old god we used to sing about.

Agree. However, Hoffman is trying to model reality in terms of "conscious agents." So, while I don't think he specifically denies material reality, he is working on an alternative based on consciousness. He says the hard problem of consciousness was one of the things that motivated his search for an alternative to materialism. — Art48

Yes. As noted, I suspect that Hoffman is leaning toward some form of Idealism. But, I try to cover both bases -- material Realism and mental Idealism -- in one thesis : Enformationism. It's based on the Quantum implication that both Energy (causation) and Matter (malleable substance) are functional forms of Generic Information (power to enform). :smile:

Ah, you are a follower or fan of Wittgenstein. Then we will probably disagree. Words get meanings in several ways- it’s context dependent. I don’t see any problem with the idea of a private mental state.

We sure can say quite a bit about idealized states- no doubt. It’s pointing out that this knowlege too is representational. So I don’t think we have substantive disagreement that I can see.

Do you have a robust refutation to Wittgenstein's private language argument?

If someone can tell me what it is, maybe I could reply. But if it has to with, say, marginalizing sensations and mental states, then I don’t even see what there’s to argue.

Interesting. There must be a thread on it.

Our perceptions of the world need not resemble the world in any way, in order for us to develop some sort of understanding. All that is required is consistency in usage. For example, the words we use, and mathematical symbols we use, do not resemble in any way the things they refer to, yet the usage of words and symbols develops into an understanding. This is the nature of "meaning", it is based in consistency of usage, not in resemblance. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are jumping from perception to the symbols we use for communication. Of course symbols, unless they are icons or pictographs, don't resemble what they symbolize, but that fact has nothing to do with the point that, since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. For example if when standing on the edge of a cliff you saw instead a beach with a very inviting lake before you, leading you to decide to take a swim you would not live long.

But if it has to with, say, marginalizing sensations and mental states, then I don’t even see what there’s to argue. — Manuel

But that's just it. It's the 'obviousness' of the veil of ideas or veil of sensations or veil of the given in general that functions as the invisible bottle in which the fly buzzes fruitlessly. We tend to get trapped in metaphors, taking painted scenery for the real enchilada.

It's an historical contingency misinterpreted as a logical necessity. It's a false beginning, a dead metaphor in the costume of an origin.

Not at all. That fly analogy is a nice one and can sometimes be used (arguably) correctly. For instance, if someone argues that there is a "mind-body" problem, that's assuming we know what bodies are and furthermore know enough about them to conclude that bodies can't have minds.

Of course, that is debated.

But to me it looks like the opposite, trying to deny we have private experiences, or that consciousness is just a way we use a certain word, signaling "to know with", instead of an actual, concretely existing phenomenon, of which we have the most confidence in anything in the empirical world of possessing, then I think this supposed Wittgensteinian view is the one that twists itself into a pretzel, in order to avoid facing hard problems by setting them aside.

So, depending on your perspective, several flies are stuck in several bottles. But we won't easily admit that we are the ones inside. As it should be. These views take time to develop.

While some may want to deny consciousness, I think the reasonable approach is to emphasize how difficult it is to clarify what is meant by the word. Thinking should not stop with Ryle (for instance), but it should pass through the fire of Rylean critique.

It's nice even that the hard problem wants to reveal our ignorance, but it tends to miss the hard problem of the hard problem.

It can be difficult, especially trying to give a comprehensive account of everything involved, because the phenomenon in question is complex and multifaceted, involving many organs, and much mental processes of which we are not aware of.

But it need not be. Consciousness is direct experience. What you are reading right now, what you see when you look at the window, what you listen to when you put on music, all of that is consciousness.

It needs organs to get information inside, but without it, nothing would happen, senses would merely pass through such an organism.

Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. — Gnomon
My objection to approaches that want to call everything 'mind' is that only make sense in a world where we see animals with nervous systems and speculate about what it's like to be them or about their umwelt. This applied to us encouraged philosophers to think of themselves as trapped behind a wall of sensory experience, within a mere image of the world on a screen and not the world itself. — green flag

Sorry! I didn't mean to imply that there's something unreal, spooky, or fatalistic about Reality. Instead, sensory experience, including vision, is our only connection to the non-self world, by which we create Mental Maps*1 to guide us through the environment. Those ideal models are sufficiently accurate for way-finding, so they are our window-in-the-wall to the world outside. Even the blind are not "trapped" if they have other senses by which to know what's out there. You are only imprisoned behind your mind-screen if you feel trapped.

I just threw that "all is Mind" summary in there because the topic of this thread is Ontology : the nature of existence. And Quantum physics has undermined mechanical Newtonian physics, with its implicit Materialism, by discovering, at the foundations of Reality, that there are no ultimate Atoms (particles) of matter, only Fields of inter-relationships (Information). Some scientists went on to infer that a Subjective Observer is an integral part of that system of immaterial elements : John A. Wheeler's "It From Bit" theory*2. Which indicated that, not just the Mind, but the World itself is a mental construct. Yet Wheeler's Observer is just a Participant (an avatar in the model), not the creator of the Mind-world. This was a scientific speculation, not a religious assertion. A world-creating Mind is implied, but not specified, by Wheeler's quip.

"Objective" knowledge of material reality is a cultural consensus, not an absolute fact. Ironically, you would never know anything about that "quantum field world" if priest/scientists didn't reveal to you what's beyond the reach of your bodily senses. So, our worldviews are all, to some degree, acts of faith. Yet no one, especially Philosophers, should feel "trapped", merely because their physical senses cannot see the fundamental Fields all around us. The rational mind is what frees us from the solitary confinement of Solipsism. :smile:


*1. Mental Map vs Material World :
This quote comes from Alfred Korzybski, father of general semantics: “A map is not the territory it represents, but if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness”. To sum up, our perception of reality is not reality itself but our own version of it, or our own “map”.
http://intercultural-learning.eu/Portfolio-Item/the-map-is-not-the-territory/

*2. World of Appearances :
Wheeler's "it from bit" concept implies that physics, particularly quantum physics, isn't really about reality, but just our best description of what we observe. There is no "quantum world", just the best description we have of how things will appear to us.
https://plus.maths.org/content/it-bit

*3. Wheeler: It from bit.
"Otherwise put, every it — every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Archibald_Wheeler

Thanks. But you haven't addressed my criticism of this kind of quasikantian dualism.

For instance, can you clarify what a self is this theory ?

How could it ever have become plausible that there were two 'planes' in the first place ? How was such a theory engendered ?

Are fundamental fields mind or matter ? If matter, then wouldn't our image of them be maps ? Not territory ? If territory, then how can we know them ? Is the math on this side or that side ?

How do we, seemingly threatened with solipsism, manage to communicate and coestablish reliable maps ? Are words on this side or that side ? Is it pure information on one side and sounds and marks on the other ? But sensation is mental, right ? So how are marks physically instantiated ? But this is unknowable, right ? We can only map the nature of maps ?

But it need not be. Consciousness is direct experience. What you are reading right now, what you see when you look at the window, what you listen to when you put on music, all of that is consciousness.

It needs organs to get information inside, but without it, nothing would happen, senses would merely pass through such an organism. — Manuel

Of course I understand what you mean. But consciousness is very close to just being being here. 'Consciousness' gets its meaning socially. We have no way of knowing, according to a certain type of idealist, whether other people's consciousness is at all like ours -- or whether it is there in the first place. But this would mean the sign could have no meaning. And yet it does. ChapGPT can use it well enough to philosophers, at least in short conversations.

Those who believe in the purely mental (as opposed to some purely physical) are in a bind that they do not see. The purely mental is understood to be known directly by exactly one soul. But 'consciousness' is tossed around as if it's obvious that we all have the same 'internal ' 'experience.' Ryle draws out this absurdity in The Concept of Mind. In short, the mental/physical distinction is fine for everyday use but absurd when absolutized.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus

I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus

I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point.

Here's my two cents.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information . . . . — Janus

, , , about how to navigate the world fairly smoothly. But does it follow our perceptions give us accurate information about the world? Don't optical illusions, criticisms of naive realism, etc. show it does not?

We have no way of knowing, according to a certain type of idealist, whether other people's consciousness is at all like ours -- or whether it is there in the first place. But this would mean the sign could have no meaning. — green flag

But this is true independent of a belief in idealism. We don't know if other people are conscious, we infer that they are, based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances.

The purely mental is understood to be known directly by exactly one soul. But 'consciousness' is tossed around as if it's obvious that we all have the same 'internal ' 'experience.' — green flag

While I would agree that the brain is physical, in that it is molded matter, I don't see why this denies the mental aspects of matter, which are found in animals that have certain nervous systems, such as mammals, and most refined in us.

The soul is by now an outdated concept, which was quite fruitful in the classical and early-modern periods in philosophy. Yeah, there is "internal experience." You can easily remind yourself of this evident fact when, for instance, you toss around in bed before going to sleep, perhaps you are thinking of something which makes sleeping difficult.

Or when you read a book, or meditate, or remember something that happened last week or years ago, and on and on and on.

Where is the problem here? This is pretty trivial, as far as I can see.

We don't know if other people are conscious, we infer that they are, based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances. — Manuel

I think that this assumption is the wrong way to go. I'm not alone in this. See Ryle and Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Ryle's The Concept of Mind is probably the quickest and most accessibly (though W and H are greater on whole.)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/#OffDocConOff

It's cool if you aren't interested in this path. But, if you are, I will debate the details.

While I would agree that the brain is physical, in that it is molded matter, I don't see why this denies the mental aspects of matter — Manuel

I don't think we really know what we are talking about with 'physical' and 'mental.' I do not dispute that we have a practical mastery of these terms in everyday blah blah. But metaphysically we often seem to be barking and squeaking without noticing it. Mind and matter is mound and mutter.

The thing is, I wouldn't say it's an assumption (re: we infer that they are (conscious), based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances), I'd say it's a factual claim of how this actually plays out.

Sure, you can refer me to Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Ryle. I can refer you to Russell, Chomsky and Strawson...

↪Gnomon
Thanks. But you haven't addressed my criticism of this kind of quasikantian dualism.
For instance, can you clarify what a self is this theory ? — green flag

The Enformationism thesis may be "quasi-Kantian", but it is not Dualistic. It is instead Monistic, with Information being the universal Single Substance (Spinozan?) of our world, expressed in the forms of both Matter & Mind.

If you are only familiar with Shannon's narrow definition of "Information", the notion that Generic Information (EnFormAction) has universal constructive positive power -- to create all possible forms in the world -- may not make sense. The key is to think of Information as a combination of Energy & Logic. Unfortunately, the Causal power of Information was minimized by Shannon, when he associated it with dissipative Entropy. But other researchers began to label Information as "Negentropy"*1. The opposite of dissipation is en-formation (concentration, integration). Negative Entropy is better known as Energy. So, Information is the pushing power of Energy and the organizing power of Logic (mathematics)*2. If you can conceive of Information in those terms, the rest will make more sense.

Besides its Causal power, Information also has Semantic power, to associate sensory inputs into concepts & meanings. I won't try to explain that in a single post. But I will answer your question about The Self*3. The human Brain is made of matter, which is organized (by natural logical processes) into a Meaning-Seeking machine. So it processes incoming information (data) into abstract concepts that are meaningful to the observer. But, in order to establish a relationship between the observer and its environment, the brain constructs a concept (the Self image) to represent its own subjective perspective*3 on the objective world. No spooky spirits required.

The website & blog go into much more detail, with scientific references, to support the novel notion that Information is the Single Substance of reality. For example, I have coined a neologism to replace "Negentropy" with "Enformy" (opposite of Entropy). In physical terms, Entropy is the erasure of Information, while Enformy is the creation of forms (both material & mental)*4. :smile:


*1. Negentropy :
"many of Shannon's followers found it more intuitively satisfying to put a minus sign in front of the expression for information, making it the opposite of entropy".
Fire In The Mind, by George Johnson
https://www.amazon.com/Fire-Mind-Science-Faith-Search/dp/067974021X

*2. Information is :
*** Claude Shannon quantified Information not as useful ideas, but as a mathematical ratio between meaningful order (1) and meaningless disorder (0); between knowledge (1) and ignorance (0). So, that meaningful mind-stuff exists in the limbo-land of statistics, producing causal effects on reality while having no sensory physical properties. Like Energy, we know it exists ideally, only by detecting its effects in the real world.
*** For humans, Information has the semantic quality of aboutness , that we interpret as meaning. In computer science though, Information is treated as meaningless, which makes its mathe-matical value more certain. It becomes meaningful only when a sentient Self interprets it as such.
*** When spelled with an “I”, Information is a noun, referring to data & things. When spelled with an “E”, Enformation is a verb, referring to energy and processes.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

*3. Self/Soul :
The brain can create the image of a fictional person (the Self) to represent its own perspective in dealings with other things and persons.
1. This imaginary Me is a low-resolution construct abstracted from the complex web of inter-relationships that actually form the human body, brain, mind, DNA, and social networks in the context of a vast universe.
2. In the Enformationism worldview, only G*D could know yourself objectively in complete detail as the mathematical definition of You. That formula is equivalent to your subjective Self/Soul.
3. Because of the fanciful & magical connotations of the traditional definition for "Soul" (e.g. ghosts), Enformationism prefers the more practical & mundane term "Self".
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page18.html

*4. Excerpt from Fire In The Mind, by George Johnson :
"Thus, Shannon's new information theory reinforced the notion that there is something subjective about entropy and order. . . . not everyone liked the idea of introducing this slippery concept as one of the atoms of creation".
Note --- I suppose the "fire" in the mind is the creative energetic aspect of information processing. The book title may have been inspired by Joseph Campbell's writings. Johnson's book is about the development of Information Theory in the 20th century, beginning with Shannon's problem of correctly communicating ideas, to the Quantum physics of Atomic bomb development at Los Alamos, and on to the study of Information & Complexity at the Santa Fe Institute.

Just to be clear, I wasn't referring as if leaning on authority. I'm saying that a strong case in those sources is made against a particular assumption. I also don't mean to be condescending.

In the past, I've spent too much time paraphrasing this case. To me it's like watching people trying to square the circle. I ask them if they have seen the proof that it's impossible to do so. In general they either haven't or say they have and do not explain what's wrong with the proof as they keep on trying to square that circle. The hard problem of consciousness is that people think they know what they mean by consciousness in a metaphysical context in the first place. (We use it just fine in real life, let me emphasize.) They have failed to give a meaning to their sign and failed to see this failure. All of this is made clear enough, in my view, for those who are willing to see it.

The Enformationism thesis may be "quasi-Kantian", but it is not Dualistic. — Gnomon

The human Brain is made of matter, which is organized (by natural logical processes) into a Meaning-Seeking machine. So it processes incoming information (data) into abstract concepts that are meaningful to the observer. But, in order to establish a relationship between the observer and its environment, the brain constructs a concept (the Self image) to represent its own subjective perspective*3 on the objective world. No spooky spirits required. — Gnomon

I don't think you've presented a monism. Problematic quotes above.

Sorry! I didn't mean to imply that there's something unreal, spooky, or fatalistic about Reality. — Gnomon

Just to be clear, I am not at all 'afraid' of spooky fantastic theories. My criticisms are semantic. Praise Jesus. I can say it without melting. What interests me is what people can manage to mean by various metaphysical claims. I do not think such claims meaningless, but I do think they are often indeterminate, more so than their creators would like. A big problem is the loss of contrastive force. If everything is Mind, then everything might as well by Matter. It doesn't matter. If everyone is gay, then no one is. If everyone is conservative, then no is. See what I mean ? Distinctions pick things out. A true monism needs no name. But it would seem reasonable for a monist to call 'it' something like The One. Or the (selfcreating selfdiscussing ) Universe.

I didn't presuppose that you were leaning on authority nor that you were being condescending, I am only pointing out that anyone can refer to distinguished historical persons to elucidate almost any kind of argument. Another matter is if those persons referred to makes convincing arguments that are better than arguments made by opposing views.

The hard problem of consciousness is that people think they know what they mean by consciousness in a metaphysical context. — green flag

Perhaps - it can happen. There is plenty of "woo", as is popular to use here, associated with consciousness.

Nonetheless, I don't think there is a way to phrase the mind-body problem in a manner that is understandable, as these terms are commonly used in (much, but not all) contemporary philosophy. So here we may agree.

The issue of an internal mental state is more of an epistemic issue than a metaphysical one. At least to me.

Having said that, one cannot completely disentangle epistemology from metaphysics, but one can attempt to keep them apart.

The issue of an internal mental state is more of an epistemic issue than a metaphysical one. At least to me. — Manuel

Do you have any interest in Brandom ? His scorekeeping notion of rationality and the self is impressive. What is it to be self ? To be rational ? In my view, he goes a long way to making what we mostly take from granted explicit.