How do I know a person is depressed? If he tells me, and is honest about it, then I can assume he is depressed. He could be lying. I cannot enter his head. — Manuel
Yes. That's why the homunculus theory doesn't explain Sentience. It's a same-thing-all-the-way-down theory. But, what's missing is Transformation from sensory data to meaning in the mind. My Enformationism thesis begins with a Quantum science concept : that Matter & Energy are different functional forms of Generic Information (power to enform ; to cause change ; to transform). Hence, I have inferred that Matter, Energy and Mind are all various instances of Information (relationships ; mathematical ratios ; meanings). So, Cosmos (reality + ideality) is indeed the same-thing-all-the-way-down. But the essential thing is Mind-stuff (information) instead of Material-stuff (atoms in void). Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. And that notion opens up a Pandora's Box of infinite possibilities, including mis-interpretations of the Mind-Matter relationship. :smile:↪Gnomon
I think you need to infinitely nest your Cartesian theatre image. The mini-me needs his own control-room in the skull, with its own screen that shows the first screen. And then mini-mini-me needs... — green flag
if one doesn't trust in our ability to use logic, or that the world is rational and that this rationality is comprehensible to us... Down that road lies true, radical skepticism. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. — Gnomon
Yes. As noted, I suspect that Hoffman is leaning toward some form of Idealism. But, I try to cover both bases -- material Realism and mental Idealism -- in one thesis : Enformationism. It's based on the Quantum implication that both Energy (causation) and Matter (malleable substance) are functional forms of Generic Information (power to enform). :smile:Agree. However, Hoffman is trying to model reality in terms of "conscious agents." So, while I don't think he specifically denies material reality, he is working on an alternative based on consciousness. He says the hard problem of consciousness was one of the things that motivated his search for an alternative to materialism. — Art48
Our perceptions of the world need not resemble the world in any way, in order for us to develop some sort of understanding. All that is required is consistency in usage. For example, the words we use, and mathematical symbols we use, do not resemble in any way the things they refer to, yet the usage of words and symbols develops into an understanding. This is the nature of "meaning", it is based in consistency of usage, not in resemblance. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if it has to with, say, marginalizing sensations and mental states, then I don’t even see what there’s to argue. — Manuel
Sorry! I didn't mean to imply that there's something unreal, spooky, or fatalistic about Reality. Instead, sensory experience, including vision, is our only connection to the non-self world, by which we create Mental Maps*1 to guide us through the environment. Those ideal models are sufficiently accurate for way-finding, so they are our window-in-the-wall to the world outside. Even the blind are not "trapped" if they have other senses by which to know what's out there. You are only imprisoned behind your mind-screen if you feel trapped.Another way to express the idea is : Ontology is all Mind. — Gnomon
My objection to approaches that want to call everything 'mind' is that only make sense in a world where we see animals with nervous systems and speculate about what it's like to be them or about their umwelt. This applied to us encouraged philosophers to think of themselves as trapped behind a wall of sensory experience, within a mere image of the world on a screen and not the world itself. — green flag
But it need not be. Consciousness is direct experience. What you are reading right now, what you see when you look at the window, what you listen to when you put on music, all of that is consciousness.
It needs organs to get information inside, but without it, nothing would happen, senses would merely pass through such an organism. — Manuel
since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus
Good point.since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus
I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact. — Metaphysician Undercover
, , , about how to navigate the world fairly smoothly. But does it follow our perceptions give us accurate information about the world? Don't optical illusions, criticisms of naive realism, etc. show it does not?since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information . . . . — Janus
We have no way of knowing, according to a certain type of idealist, whether other people's consciousness is at all like ours -- or whether it is there in the first place. But this would mean the sign could have no meaning. — green flag
The purely mental is understood to be known directly by exactly one soul. But 'consciousness' is tossed around as if it's obvious that we all have the same 'internal ' 'experience.' — green flag
We don't know if other people are conscious, we infer that they are, based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances. — Manuel
While I would agree that the brain is physical, in that it is molded matter, I don't see why this denies the mental aspects of matter — Manuel
The Enformationism thesis may be "quasi-Kantian", but it is not Dualistic. It is instead Monistic, with Information being the universal Single Substance (Spinozan?) of our world, expressed in the forms of both Matter & Mind.↪Gnomon
Thanks. But you haven't addressed my criticism of this kind of quasikantian dualism.
For instance, can you clarify what a self is this theory ? — green flag
The Enformationism thesis may be "quasi-Kantian", but it is not Dualistic. — Gnomon
The human Brain is made of matter, which is organized (by natural logical processes) into a Meaning-Seeking machine. So it processes incoming information (data) into abstract concepts that are meaningful to the observer. But, in order to establish a relationship between the observer and its environment, the brain constructs a concept (the Self image) to represent its own subjective perspective*3 on the objective world. No spooky spirits required. — Gnomon
Sorry! I didn't mean to imply that there's something unreal, spooky, or fatalistic about Reality. — Gnomon
The hard problem of consciousness is that people think they know what they mean by consciousness in a metaphysical context. — green flag
The issue of an internal mental state is more of an epistemic issue than a metaphysical one. At least to me. — Manuel
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