I watched a Quinn's Ideas YT video about blindsight a few months ago. — Marchesk

I enjoyed the video, especially the graphics, and even more the narrator's shirt. They made a five minute film out of the book. I don't know if you saw it. Very good.

Let me explain: an idea cannot be a cause already because an idea is a representation, an imagination or a fiction. — Jacques

That is not the kind of idea that is being discussed. Notice the example given was one of the laws of motion. We are able to discern constraints and causes that act on the physical level, such as laws of nature, but are those laws themselves physical in nature? There is a distinction made in Talbott's example between the because of reason and the because of physical causation. To equate the two kinds is to deny the efficacy of reason, as your argument is then already determined by the disposition of your neurons.

personal experience/consciousness is instrinsically dependent on judgement and the discernment of meaning
— Wayfarer

I'm not sure, but I don't think this is true. — T Clark

That itself is a judgement.

I don't see that as reductionism. — T Clark

And not seeing it, doesn't mean that it isn't so.

personal experience/consciousness is instrinsically dependent on judgement and the discernment of meaning
— Wayfarer

I'm not sure, but I don't think this is true.
— T Clark

That itself is a judgement. — Wayfarer

So. Language games, as if you don't know what I mean. I didn't say I don't make judgements, I said consciousness is not intrinsically dependent on judgement.

I don't see that as reductionism.
— T Clark
And not seeing it, doesn't mean that it isn't so. — Wayfarer

And yet another language game, again as if you don't know what I mean.

It's not that *I* don't know what you mean, it's that I think *you* don't know what you mean. You say:

Meaning and thought can be seen as manifestations of mental processes, which can be seen as manifestations of biological, neurological processes. I don't see that as reductionism. — T Clark

But that is the textbook definition of reductionism, to wit:

Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.

So I'm suggesting that if you don't see it as reductionism, then maybe that's because you don't understand what 'reductionism' means, or what the criticisms of it are.

:cool: I've replied in the other thread

Meaning and thought can be seen as manifestations of mental processes, which can be seen as manifestations of biological, neurological processes. I don't see that as reductionism.
— T Clark

But that is the textbook definition of reductionism, to wit:

Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind. — Wayfarer

I was trying to use language carefully so that my meaning would be clear. I guess I failed, although I put part of the blame on you for not even trying. "Manifesting as" is not the same as "equivalent to." Broadcast TV signals manifest as images on your TV set. Are the signals equivalent to the images? Are they the same thing? Of course not. DNA manifests itself as an organism through reproduction and development. Are DNA and the organism the same thing?

Manifest (verb) 'to make evident or certain by showing or displaying.' It is still reductionist, and if it's not, then what does it actually say?

To try and be clear, what I'm arguing is that such mental acts as reasoned inference comprise the relationship between ideas, between premisses and conclusions (and not only formal reason, but judgements of meaning, generally, as per this citation). The reductionist wants to say of such mental acts that they are actually neural processes, and that they are real via this grounding in their material constituents; that they exist as physical constituents in the brain, to which we assign meaning. But I'm arguing that it is the assigning of meaning that is fundamental. Even what we regard as a physical explanation has to be grounded in meaningful claims regarding what reasoning or thought is or is not.

It is still reductionist, and if it's not, then what does it actually say? — Wayfarer

I gave examples, which you didn't respond to.

The reductionist wants to say of such mental acts that they are actually neural processes, and that they are real via this grounding in their material constituents; that they exist as physical constituents in the brain, to which we assign meaning. — Wayfarer

That's not what I said and it's not what I meant. I don't deny that mental acts exist as mental acts. Trees exist as biological organisms. They are also manifestations of chemical processes. They are not equivalent to those chemical processes. They are something different.

The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

I would not speak of a different level of explanation, but rather of a different kind of communication: a metaphorical one that should not be confused with reality.

There is a distinction made in Talbott's example between the because of reason and the because of physical causation. To equate the two kinds is to deny the efficacy of reason, as your argument is then already determined by the disposition of your neurons. — Wayfarer

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons.

To claim that our reasons are determined by the disposition of our neurons is not to deny the efficacy of reason - this would only be the case if neurons were not working efficiently.

Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.

"Reduced" does not mean "made equivalent to" but rather "explained by" and it does not mean that the brain is seen as identical to its thoughts and feelings but rather that the thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity.

I am also a panpsychist but to say that everything has mentality is to say nothing. Where do you draw the line? A rock is an arbitrary collection of atoms. you can say the left side of the rock is sentient and the right is also? what set of atoms is the rock? the rock would have an infinite number of minds. But the world is already divided into "natural individuals" that appear to be self movers. elementary particles fit the bill as do eukaryotic cells and animals with nervous systems.

It's a good question. I'm a very extreme form of panpsychist at the moment, and I do think there are practically an infinite number of arbitrarily defined conscious individuals. I think the question of consciousness is in some ways far less interesting than the question of individuation. I don't agree that saying everything is conscious is saying nothing. It still means something.

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons. — Jacques

I think, as explained in my post, that you have this backward Jacques. All causation is causation by reason, and any other form of "causation" is fundamentally wrong, for the reasons explained.

A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"):

And though [one] should be convinced, that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nonetheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. — David Hume EHU 5.4-5

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. — David Hume EHU 7.28

thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity. — Jacques

However

causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit — Jacques

At 22 pages of this of thread, I'm way too late to contribute productively as I cannot read all of what's already been said. That said, I'm interested in the following points. But I won't answer them as I believe some responses have already done it:

I'll ask you the same as I ask everyone who asks this question...

Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?" — bert1


... What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you. — Isaac

The potential problem here is that if there is such a thing as first person consciousness, and if first person consciousness is essentially private, then by necessity there can’t be any sort of public, scientific evidence of or explanation for it. — Michael

So, why can't brains do all their stuff without consciousness? — bert1

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"): — Jacques

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. "Real cause" here referring to what a proper analysis and understanding of the situation would uncover. These words are just used to facilitate communication, when a deeper philosophical understanding of the situation is not required. So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, but there is some reason there, for the action, which we do not properly understand. So "Custom" and "Habit" here are terms that stand for something which is not well understood, but understanding those things is not necessary to the conversation, so the use of them allows use to breeze over those not-understood aspects of reality. We use many words like this.

Hume alludes to this in the quoted passage with the statement "By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity". But of course this really is not a pretense, and the quoted passages gives us no reason why we should assume that it is a pretense, just an assertion that we should think of some actions as the custom of pretense.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. It is our custom to believe that we do not give the complete reason when we say that custom is the cause. But if custom really is the cause, then we would have to accept that custom is the cause of us believing this. Therefore he could not truthfully say that this is a pretense, he must say it is a custom. Pretense is a cause other than custom, because it runs contrary to custom by causing one to express the opposite of what that person would customarily express, in order to "pretend". To be customary is to be consistent with the acts of others, but to pretend is to make your act (which is consistent with others) inconsistent with your mind. So it's self-refuting for Hume to say that we pretend otherwise, when he says that custom or habit is the real cause, because pretense implies a cause which is inconsistent with custom. If custom was the real cause it would be impossible for us to pretend anything, because to pretend is to do something contrary to what custom inclines us to do.

@Wayfarer

thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity. — Jacques

causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit — Jacques

These two statements do not contradict each other, as you may imply. The first one only says that thoughts are always preceded by a specific brain activity and that no thought has ever been observed that was not preceded by such a brain activity (provided of course that one observes the brain from which the thought originates by means of fMRI). This is consistent with Hume's statement about causality:

... our knowledge [about the relation of cause and effect] is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.19)

If you continue to find a contradiction between my two statements, you are welcome to point it out.

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — David Hume (EHU 4.18)

So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly what Hume wants to say: that we do not properly understand why the same cause is always followed by the same effect.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all.

If you continue to find a contradiction between my two statements, you are welcome to point it out. — Jacques

The self-evident conflict stands despite your attempt to deny it. First you say that

The first one only says that thoughts are always preceded by a specific brain activity — Jacques

By which you are asserting a causal relation between the brain and thought. But the very next quote undermines causal relations, quoting Hume saying they are 'only a matter of custom'. Besides, the assertion that specific brain activities can be correlated with specific thoughts is also false. The brain, as I'm sure you know, is the most complex phenomenon known to science, with more neural connections than stars in the sky. So to demonstrate a 1:1 mapping between those activities and even very simple ideas and sensations, I don't think is tenable. You're advocating what is known as 'brain-mind identity theory' which has very few advocates in today's philosophy.

Another thing you might consider when quoting Hume is Kant's 'answer to Hume'. He said, very briefly, that causality is not an empirical concept but a necessary condition of experience. It is a category of the understanding that we use to organize our sense experience. In other words, we do not derive our knowledge of causality from experience; rather, we bring our concept of causality to experience, which allows us to understand and interpret it. And for that reason, Hume's point is something which is betrayed by the use of the word 'because' in any argument - even those of that he employed.

A scientific research field that increases knowledge of biology, moreso brain / body duality is helpful to refine a knowledge of the limits human free will and the physical processes that may be innate to the human organism. It gives an idea of what orientation the biological animal might be orientated to in terms of mental process in cognition, sociability, language and dexterity. It has some crossover with other observed theories in personality theory how the environment is processed in a type of individual. The observations of brain activity in different individuals who have been measured in other ways first for certain dominant traits and abilities have formed a map of brain activity suggesting distinct physical parts of the brain are designed biologically for behaviour and certain functions. It has not necessarily solved the matter of unified consciousness as a model but we can see from AI that sentient meanings and operations on them are drawn from a vast repository of mental states and dispositions that in theory are suggested from depth psychology. The brain in its electrical activity can be observed accessing certain physical regions when the subject is engaged in or reacting to specific information, tasks and stimuli which has gone someway to validate theory about the dispositions of the mind from biology and conditions of its being that have preexisted in medical science and psychoanalysis in depth psychology, helping to form a greater understanding of ourselves as human beings. With the emphasis in philosophy on what is the 'being'?

You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand

I don't know Jaegwon Kim, but if he holds that there are higher levels above the physical realm, then I certainly don't think like him.

Hey guys, let's get back to the topic. Let's put aside Hume's opinion on causality and instead focus on mental experiences, or qualia. Although neuroscientists do not know how qualia arise from brain activity, they have observed that those qualia (perceptions, emotions and thoughts) are caused by brain activity and never the other way around. That means, they have observed that mental experiences always occur after the corresponding brain activities and never without such a lead-up.

That means, they have observed that mental experiences always occur after the corresponding brain activities and never without such a lead-up. — Jacques

How do you get to that conclusion? It's come up lots of times on the forum before, but I don't see this strong connection.

@bert1
It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. The reverse order has not been observed a single time.

It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. — Jacques

Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. It's totally consistent with the view that consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity.

Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. — bert1

If it's not interesting, it's still quite controversial, especially among philosophers. :smile:

... consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity — bert1

How can you prove your claim that consciousness occurs in rocks?

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past.
— David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — Jacques

OK, but "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past" is a principle derived from inductive reason. Therefore Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. So why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Clearly, "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform..." is an inductive principle, so causality is based on reason according to Hume.

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all. — Jacques

Judging by the problem stated above, I think it might be you who does not understand Hume very well. It appears like you have created an argument which is not consistent with what Hume actually said, and you have presented it as Hume's argument.

why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". — Metaphysician Undercover

Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work according to Hume.