Let me explain: an idea cannot be a cause already because an idea is a representation, an imagination or a fiction. — Jacques
personal experience/consciousness is instrinsically dependent on judgement and the discernment of meaning
— Wayfarer
I'm not sure, but I don't think this is true. — T Clark
And not seeing it, doesn't mean that it isn't so.I don't see that as reductionism. — T Clark
personal experience/consciousness is instrinsically dependent on judgement and the discernment of meaning
— Wayfarer
I'm not sure, but I don't think this is true.
— T Clark
That itself is a judgement. — Wayfarer
I don't see that as reductionism.
— T Clark
And not seeing it, doesn't mean that it isn't so. — Wayfarer
Meaning and thought can be seen as manifestations of mental processes, which can be seen as manifestations of biological, neurological processes. I don't see that as reductionism. — T Clark
Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.
Meaning and thought can be seen as manifestations of mental processes, which can be seen as manifestations of biological, neurological processes. I don't see that as reductionism.
— T Clark
But that is the textbook definition of reductionism, to wit:
Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind. — Wayfarer
It is still reductionist, and if it's not, then what does it actually say? — Wayfarer
The reductionist wants to say of such mental acts that they are actually neural processes, and that they are real via this grounding in their material constituents; that they exist as physical constituents in the brain, to which we assign meaning. — Wayfarer
I would not speak of a different level of explanation, but rather of a different kind of communication: a metaphorical one that should not be confused with reality.The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer
I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons.There is a distinction made in Talbott's example between the because of reason and the because of physical causation. To equate the two kinds is to deny the efficacy of reason, as your argument is then already determined by the disposition of your neurons. — Wayfarer
Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.
I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons. — Jacques
I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"):A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover
And though [one] should be convinced, that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nonetheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. — David Hume EHU 5.4-5
It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. — David Hume EHU 7.28
I'll ask you the same as I ask everyone who asks this question...
Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?" — bert1
... What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you. — Isaac
The potential problem here is that if there is such a thing as first person consciousness, and if first person consciousness is essentially private, then by necessity there can’t be any sort of public, scientific evidence of or explanation for it. — Michael
So, why can't brains do all their stuff without consciousness? — bert1
I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"): — Jacques
thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity. — Jacques
causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit — Jacques
... our knowledge [about the relation of cause and effect] is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.19)
To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.21)
... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — David Hume (EHU 4.18)
So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, — Metaphysician Undercover
Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you continue to find a contradiction between my two statements, you are welcome to point it out. — Jacques
The first one only says that thoughts are always preceded by a specific brain activity — Jacques
You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand
It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. — Jacques
If it's not interesting, it's still quite controversial, especially among philosophers. :smile:Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. — bert1
How can you prove your claim that consciousness occurs in rocks?... consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity — bert1
Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...
... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past.
— David Hume (EHU 4.21)
But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,
... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — Jacques
I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all. — Jacques
why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". — Metaphysician Undercover
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