But empirical observation doesn’t amount to metaphysical insight. That’s the crucial distinction. — Wayfarer

The hard part is working out what counts as metaphysical insight if we are locked in to a world of appearances and cognitive limitations.

Yes. And having discarded everything that used to be understood as metaphysics on account of its association with religion, then it verges on the impossible.

In my experience religions are not all that friendly towards metaphysics either.

Of course, but again, the point that I'm making is that there's an association of metaphysics with a kind of religious attitude - you see that even in neoplatonism, which at the time it was active was antagonistic to Christianity. Go back to the question- what is the unconditioned? Where in philosophical discourse do you encounter discussion of that? There's some discussion of it in German idealism but I contend that there is nothing which corresponds to it in most modern English-speaking philosophy.

Q: Where would you look in modern English-language philosophy for discussion of the concept of 'the unconditioned'?

A: In modern English-language philosophy, you might look for discussions of the concept of 'the unconditioned' in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Some specific philosophers and works that address this concept include:

Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason": In this work, Kant discusses the idea of the unconditioned in his critique of rationalism, arguing that human reason cannot reach knowledge of the unconditioned because it is beyond the realm of possible experience.

Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time": Heidegger explores the concept of the unconditioned through his analysis of human existence and the structures of being that underlie it. He argues that the unconditioned is the "groundless ground" of all that exists, and that it can be accessed through a process of "authentic" self-discovery.

Alvin Plantinga's "Warranted Christian Belief": In this work, Plantinga defends the rationality of belief in God by arguing that the concept of the unconditioned is essential to any adequate account of human knowledge and that belief in God provides a coherent explanation for the existence of the unconditioned.

David Lewis's "On the Plurality of Worlds": Lewis explores the concept of the unconditioned through his analysis of possible worlds and the idea of a "compossible" set of properties that can coexist without being dependent on each other.

Graham Harman's "Object-Oriented Ontology": Harman argues that the unconditioned can be accessed through a process of "withdrawal" in which objects reveal their hidden, inaccessible aspects. — ChatGPT

I would have nominated the first three, the second two I have heard of, but would not have thought of them.

I know a number of Catholic mystics and they would certainly agree with Plantigna ('not bad for a Protestant') on this.

You can add the Sufi tradition here too, I think - the notion Wahdat-ul-Wujood (the Unity of Being) all that that exists is held within god and all truth and the universe arises out of god (it's a kind of ground of being idea) but I am not an expert.

You claim that there is only one sort of truth, well I claim that there are two. Constant truth which never changes night or day and the variable type that changes the colour of the sky night or day. — invicta

Are you just saying that there are some sentences that are always true and some sentences that aren't?

I’m saying that there are two different sentences that can refer to truth. The difference between such sentences is that in one the truth value of it can change such as the sky is blue. In others it remains constant and never changes such as all triangles have 3 sides.

So yes!

The difference between such sentences is that in one the truth value of it can change such as the sky is blue. In others it remains constant and never changes such as all triangles have 3 sides. — invicta

Isn't that exactly what I said? Some sentences are always true and some aren't.

Yes I think I repeated myself.

It’s worth noting Banno’s view point that truth is one, (my objection is that yes it is one, but the sky changes colour so the value of truth no longer holds true) but that statements making truth claims are divided into two categories as explained above.

all water under the bridge, apparently.

The difference between such sentences is that in one the truth value of it can change such as the sky is blue. In others it remains constant and never changes such as all triangles have 3 sides. — invicta

Is there a difference between these two sentences?

1. A triangle is a 3-sided polygon
2. "Triangle" means "3-sided polygon"

Leaving the linguistics out of this for a second a referring to truth visually we can witness the color of the sky gradually change, such is the natural phenomenon presented to our visual field that this change constitutes a change in value (color) hence truth (reality)

@Michael they appear to be the same sentence arranged differently?

"The truth is true and that's the truth", that's a good argument, I hadn't thought of that, thanks for enlightening me.

Then what about a sentence such as "Joe Biden was elected the 46th President of the United States"?

Just a standard posteriori statement. Factual but would need verification. It’s a constant truth however as he will always be the 46th no matter who or what comes after himself.

So we have a number of different sentences:

1. A triangle is a 3-sided polygon
2. "Triangle" means "3-sided polygon"
3. Joe Biden was elected the 46th President of the United States
4. It is raining

Some make a distinction between a priori truths (1), and a posteriori truths (2, 3, 4), and others make a distinction between constant truths (1, 3) and non-constant truths (2, 4).

Is there some significance to these distinctions?

What if I distinguish between truths about the weather and truths about things that aren't the weather?

I wished to draw distinction and better understand the objections to the division of sentences in reference to claims that always hold true and claims that only hold true in some situations.

For lack of terminology it could be as simple as the a priori Vs posteriori division but it is not, as posteriori refers to truths verifiable and knowable via experience it does not delve into the variability of truth that some sentences reflect such as the sky is blue.

So this thread is about @invicta discovering analyticity.

Next step is to deal with Quine. Then Chomsky. Then Davidson.

What I struggle with in terms of modern philosophy is when it get’s technical and employs technical terms such as the ones you’ve mentioned, analytic, synthetic etc. It did start with Kant in his definition and distinction between such statements namely the priori posteriori split which become split further.

Yet the question in my mind always relates to truth and truth only and these complications that came afterwards with Kant and Hegel (synthetic) although a logical or even necessary step in the evolution of philosophy was a sideways development rather than upwards progression of the concept of truth.

Not a distraction either as the distinction is important however no such terminology was employed by the Greeks.

In terms of importance to overall philosophical thought I’d say it’s minor.

Yes, , philosophy is quite difficult, isn't it.

Kant went to all the trouble to develop these terms, only for others to show that they don't much work.

Most folk hereabouts seem to stop at Kant, and apart from the fashionable Nazi, not bother with stuff from last century, let alone new stuff.

Can I commend Two Dogmas of Empiricism to you.

Analyticity is a central topic, in that one's approach towards it has import for one's approach to logic, and hence to what it means to do philosophy well.

@invicta, not sure if this is what you had in mind or otherwise helps any...

The truth values of indexical propositions are context dependent. ^{SEP, W, IEP}
For example, uttering "I am the CEO of IBM" will be right for one person (or zero), false for others.
Other propositions work differently.

Here true/false are taken to be properties of propositions.

If truth is not an axiom that can be applied universally then are such truth statements as the first one in this OP useless? — invicta

You are assuming a few things, though understandably. Your measure of “useful” is based on the success science has had, which, as you say, is due to the certainty, predictability, consistency, etc. of its method (that it does not matter who does the scientific method).

Philosophy (that not peeled off historically as science) does not have this luxury of mathematical certainty, but judging whether its truths are “useful” is the desire to make philosophy be science, to require certainty, to avoid our part in our human truths. That we accept them and stand behind them, not in the sense of an opinion, but such, for example, that philosophy is not meant to explain, but to describe what you then might see for yourself, and in reaching to see and think in a way more than just certain knowledge, we change and become a better version of ourselves.

So are philosophical truths dependent on context? You won’t get far outside of the non-contextual abstract universalized pre-determined fixation philosophy has without considering how context plays a part in how we have truth-value despite not being analogous to mathematical criteria.