when intelligence and mindedness are at issue, what leads us to be puzzled by the phenomena is our tendency to subsume them under theoretical categories that just aren't apt at making sense of them. — Pierre-Normand

Such norms are appealed to in order to instigate their modification. That's what philosophers do. — plaque flag

But Wittgenstein, and also Ryle, Strawson and Austin, were insistent that, when intelligence and mindedness are at issue, what leads us to be puzzled by the phenomena is our tendency to subsume them under theoretical categories that just aren't apt at making sense of them. They weren't targeting science but rather scientism. — Pierre-Normand

As I also am inclined to do. Perhaps what I meant is, even though nothing is hidden, this is also not something that everyone can understand. Philosophy is an antidote to the lack of wisdom, but that lack is the want of something. Maybe that is lack is one of perspective but that perspective not something that we all have. — Wayfarer

But I take Wittgenstein to be saying something more like: theoretical categories as such are inapt in some cases. — Jamal

But, except for the bit about scientism, couldn’t this describe any philosopher who wants to overturn the thought of their predecessors? — Jamal

We are given a blur and try to make it less blurry. — plaque flag

When WA says, "Maybe that lack is one of perspective but that perspective not something that we all have," he seems to be suggesting that the ability to adopt the right perspective or framework to understand these phenomena is not something that everyone possesses. He might be implying that while philosophy serves as an antidote to the lack of wisdom, it is not always easily accessible or comprehensible to everyone. In this sense, even if nothing is hidden, not everyone may be able to see or understand what is in plain sight due to their inability to adopt the correct perspective or framework for understanding. — GPT4

Immanence, meaning residing or becoming within, generally offers a relative opposition to transcendence, that which extends beyond or outside. Deleuze "refuses to see deviations, redundancies, destructions, cruelties or contingency as accidents that befall or lie outside life; life and death [are] aspects of desire or the plane of immanence."[1] This plane is a pure immanence which is an unqualified immersion or embeddedness, an immanence which denies transcendence as a real distinction, Cartesian or otherwise. Pure immanence is thus often referred to as a pure plane, an infinite field or smooth space without substantial or constitutive division. In his final essay entitled Immanence: A Life, Deleuze wrote: "It is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence."
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Pure immanence therefore will have consequences not only for the validity of a philosophical reliance on transcendence, but simultaneously for dualism and idealism. Mind may no longer be conceived as a self-contained field, substantially differentiated from body (dualism), nor as the primary condition of unilateral subjective mediation of external objects or events (idealism).
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The plane of immanence thus is often called a plane of consistency accordingly. As a geometric plane, it is in no way bound to a mental design but rather an abstract or virtual design; which for Deleuze, is the metaphysical or ontological itself: a formless, univocal, self-organizing process which always qualitatively differentiates from itself.

In this sense, even if nothing is hidden, not everyone may be able to see or understand what is in plain sight due to their inability to adopt the correct perspective or framework for understanding. — GPT4

But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light.

It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were aiming at a particular state, a state of complete exactness, and as if this were the real goal of our investigation.

This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the nature of language its function, its structure yet this is not what that question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth.

‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience.

Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us.

The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

Peirce is not misled by the dualistic idea that thought language is unreal. — plaque flag

Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last.

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Nothing is hidden, in this context, is the denial of dualism. The ontology here is flat and holist in the sense that all entities are linked inferentially and practically in a single 'nexus.' No finite thing has genuine being, in this context, means that no isolated or disconnected entity makes sense. What is called 'consciousness' is just the world for a discursive self. Instead of consciousness, we just have [the being of ] the world --- seen, of course, with many pairs of eyes, and smelled with many noses, ... — plaque flag

The world is all that is the case, in this context, means the embrace of rationalism. The world is described or articulated or disclosed by our true claims. In different words, the world is that minimal something that a self can be wrong about. This underspecification is not an oversight. What is the case is endlessly revisable. We fix Descartes by socializing him. Philosophers plural are given. This means, however, that a minimally specified world and a shared language are also given. This language includes the 'liquid logic' of evolving semantic and inferential norms. Such norms are appealed to in order to instigate their modification. That's what philosophers do. What cannot be sensibly disputed --- by the truth-intending philosopher as such --is the 'primordial situation' of philosophers-in-the-world-with-language. This is because any denial presupposes what it denies. — plaque flag

That's awesome ! Any overall thoughts about Sellars and Brandom ? ( I haven't looked into McDowell yet.) — plaque flag

Wittgenstein argues that our ordinary, everyday language already contains everything we need to understand the nature of our mental lives. He believes that philosophical problems arise when we try to look for hidden, underlying structures or entities that explain our experiences. In other words, he opposes the idea that there is a hidden realm of mental phenomena that exists beyond the ordinary use of language. — GPT4~ Pierre-Normand

We join spokes together in a wheel,
but it is the center hole
that makes the wagon move.

We shape clay into a pot,
but it is the emptiness inside
that holds whatever we want.

We hammer wood for a house,
but it is the inner space
that makes it livable.

We work with being,
but non-being is what we use. — Lao Tzu

Wittgenstein was opposing "Blank person with blank idea" — schopenhauer1