Hello Janus,

The categories of understanding are identifiable simply by reflecting on the ways we experience and judge things; nothing at all to do with the thing-in-itself.

All I was asking Mww in the quote you made of me was to expound briefly the argument for the twelve categories that he hold and not that he is trying to prove that they are things-in-themselves nor a part of a thing-in-itself.

Now, you correct that I do think that the 12 categories, if they existed, would be a part of a mind which, in turn, would be a thing-in-itself; but that is irrelevant to what I was asking Mww for.

The problem is, Bob, I don't think you are listening to anyone else.

I hope that is not the case: I do my absolute best to hear everyone’s perspectives; but I just think it is wrong to think that we can claim there are 12 categories of the understanding and not admit to ourselves that the understanding is either an (1) illusion or (2) a part of a thing-in-itself.

I appreciate your chiming in and please continue to do so as you deem fit!

Bob

Hello Mww,

If you would like to not give a proof, then that is perfectly fine. But, to clarify, I am saying I would like to hear your proof (or argument) for what convinced you of it.

My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant. I’m sufficiently persuaded by the affirmative argument to think he’s come up with a perfectly fascinating metaphysical theory. That’s it

It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. I’m curious what convinced you, as you clearly interpreted the text differently than me.

On your “Of The Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception” quote, the very next line after what you posted, shoots your argument in the foot.

I don’t think it did. Here’s the whole snippet:

The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think”, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But the representation, “I think” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive aperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations...the unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it

He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self; and that the transcendental self is the necessary precondition (i.e., subject: mind) for the former.

Bob

He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self….. — Bob Ross

“…. because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results….”

The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.
—————-

“…. This relation**, then, does not exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity. The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious….”
** “this relation” is between me and my representations.

This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different. When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;
That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;
That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.
————-

”My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant….”
-Mww

It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. — Bob Ross

The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.
———-

I must agree with when he says you’re not listening. I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless. Same with requests for proofs. There is no damn proof, fercrissakes. It’s a fargin’ THEORY, grounded in abstractions for which there never can be a proof. And that a mind must be a thing-in-itself, when in accordance with the consistency of the presently concerned dialectic, it cannot.

(Sigh)

Hello Mww,

The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.

How can a self “think transcendentally” but not be a transcendental self? Those sound like the same thing to me.

This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different.

True.

When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;

Included in what act? I didn’t quite follow this part. The “I think” would be the act itself and different from the explication (to ourselves) of the act—but that, to me, is still a concession that the “I think” is transcendental and, thusly, not the mere aggregate of appearances of a self.

That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;

I didn’t follow this part either: what do you mean?

That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.

Correct.

The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.

I honestly don’t think his works (especially CPR) are well written, so, yeah, I mean he tend to presuppose a lot of things slash say things that can be interpreted three or four different ways without clarification.

I must agree with
↪Janus
when he says you’re not listening.

Well, I apologize, but I feel as though I have been. For example:

I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless.

This is not evidence that I am not listening: I have said many times that I understand that you find whatever convinced you insignificant but that I would like to hear it anyways (if you don’t mind). And:

Same with requests for proofs

This is just semantics. By ‘proof’, I think I have been clearly asking for ‘whatever pursuaded you’ which is not equivalent to whatever you are using the term for with respect to theories. Bottom line is that something convinced you and if you don’t want to share it (for whatever reason) then that is fine. I was just curious.

Also, theories have proofs; but I would reckon you are referring to something wholly different by ‘proof’ than me.

Bob

By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). — Bob Ross

Just a note. I doubt that this is BK's view, although his language is sometimes imprecise on this point.

He has come around, I believe, perhaps partly due to his friendship with Rupert Spira, to a view sometimes called transcendental or absolute idealism.for which mind is emergent and not fundamental. For this view the extended universe may be explained as mind but not reality To think of 'The One' as mind, Plotinus tells us, is to think of it 'too meanly'.

I've discussed this with Bernardo and we seemed to agree on this point.