Case in point? — Galuchat

Science is the latin name for knowledge. What makes a belief possible as knowledge is whether it is justified (as in testable) and true. There can be no other kinds of possible knowledge than the justifiable and true kind.

But there are many ideologies that exploit current unknowns of the world, or attack scientific method for whatever insufficiencies it may have, as the means to market alternative unjustifiable beliefs.

Turning it around - the problem Dennett has to explain away is the reality of first-person experience. If he can't explain it away, then materialism is false. — Wayfarer

Why do people keep repeating the same mistakes here? Not all materialism is eliminative materialism. Some materialism doesn't at all reject subjective experience. It just claims that subjective experience is what particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes, is like--that is, it's simply the properties of that material in those relations undergoing those processes, from the reference frame of being the material in question.

Why do people keep repeating the same mistakes here? — Terrapin Station

Materialism is an interpretive paradigm - a model. It is quite consistent with the overall tradition of Western philosophy insofar as it is a tyoe of 'appearance vs reality' model: that what we take to be intentions, minds, and ideas are appearance only and that the reality is material organisms, atoms and forces. Mind is a product or output of matter that, in Dennett's model, is essentially self-organising, first due to physical laws and due to what he describes in terms of 'the genetic algorithm' (in Darwin's Dangerous Idea.)

There are different schools of materialism, or tendencies - Darwinian, Marxist, scientific, historical - but it's a recognizable trend throughout history. And for many people it is a natural and obvious attitude to take.

It just claims that subjective experience is what particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes, is like-- — Terrapin Station

So what about that particular matter, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes? Even if we assume that this is the cause of subjective experience, rather than caused by subjective experience, we still need to explain the existence of all these peculiar particulars. Of course it cannot be random chance which causes all this, so now we must assume a cause of all these particulars, and the effect is subjective experience. That multitude of particulars, therefore, is just a distraction.

Materialism is an interpretive paradigm - a model. It is quite consistent with the overall tradition of Western philosophy insofar as it is a tyoe of 'appearance vs reality' model: — Wayfarer

This is incorrect. Some materialists may very well see it as an appearance versus reality issue, but that's not necessary for it to be materialism, and certainly not all materialists see it that way.

So what about that particular matter, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes? Even if we assume that this is the cause of subjective experience, rather than caused by subjective experience, — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not an issue of causality, but identity.

This is incorrect. — Terrapin Station

And that is an unsupported assertion. What are examples of materialism that are not interpretive paradigms?

And that is an unsupported assertion. What are examples of materialism that are not interpretive paradigms? — Wayfarer

How could you have read my response above and thought that what I was disagreeing with was the phrase "interpretive paradigm"?

I think that Dennett's own philosophical works might be entering into an area of post-intelligent design. — Colin B

LOL. I'd say that ship has already sailed.

It's not an issue of causality, but identity. — Terrapin Station

To identify subjective experience as material is false identity.

Obviously I don't agree with that.

Is having complete knowledge important? — JupiterJess

Well, to the extent I know, we are in the dark or is it that I'm not fully abreast of mankind's ''progress''? Whatever the case may be the question is moot precisely because we don't know whether all this knowledge is good for us (or not). For example take knowledge of nuclear energy - it is now possible to end ALL of civilization in say 30 minutes?? Perhaps we need the ever elusive *wisdom* that philosophers so energetically speak. But that's getting ahead of ourselves - the first question is ''are humans even capable of finding such wisdom?"

Or could humanity survive by existing within the dark without having to know the behind the scenes extras? — JupiterJess

Well, what of the rest of the living world? They seem to be doing fine without the kind of knowledge humans are in possession of. Why should we be any different?

Obviously I don't agree with that. — Terrapin Station

You may not agree, but it's still obviously a case of mistaken identity. So you were wrong whether you admit to it or not. No matter how many particular materials you can identify, in whatever particular relations, involved in whatever particular processes, you have not identified subjective experience, so this is a false identity. "Subjective experience" refers to something which is common to many different individuals, therefore it cannot be identified by referring to particulars.

This is a classic example of category error, and such error indicates mistaken identity. Here's another example. Suppose someone asks you "what is 'red'?". No matter how many particular instance of red you produce, to demonstrate "what is red", you do not answer the question "what is 'red'?" with such demonstrations. Likewise, no matter how many particular instances in which you demonstrate material involved in particular relations, and particular processes, your producing these instances of subjective experience as examples, does not answer the question of what is subjective experience.

You may not agree, but it's still obviously a case of mistaken identity. So you were wrong whether you admit to it or not. No matter how many particular materials you can identify, in whatever particular relations, involved in whatever particular processes, you have not identified subjective experience, so this is a false identity. "Subjective experience" refers to something which is common to many different individuals, therefore it cannot be identified by referring to particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whereas in my view, it's obviously a case of mistaken cleavage on your part.

The identity also has nothing to do with our abilities to name anything, pick anything out, etc.

I also disagree with "subjective experience referes to something which is common (as in identical) to many different individuals." Nothing is common to many different individuals on my view. I'm a nominalist. Only particulars exist.

The identity also has nothing to do with our abilities to name anything, pick anything out, etc. — Terrapin Station

Then what is identity in your view?

I also disagree with "subjective experience referes to something which is common (as in identical) to many different individuals." — Terrapin Station

So why is it that we say that many different individuals have subjective experience if different individuals cannot have anything in common? Is subjective experience something which only I have, or only you have, or neither of us have and someone else has, or no one has? If it is something that no one has, then this supports my claim of mistaken identity.

Nothing is common to many different individuals on my view. I'm a nominalist. Only particulars exist. — Terrapin Station

So, does "subjective experience" refer to something that a particular thing has, or is it just a nonsense notion to you? If it is a nonsense notion, then I think I am correct to say that your claim to be able to identify it, is a case of mistaken identity.

Then what is identity in your view? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not like this is an idiosyncratic view. I'm referring to identity in the 2+2 is identical to 4 sense.

So why is it that we say that many different individuals have subjective experience if different individuals cannot have anything in common? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. I'm not sure that you're clear that I'm simply denying that multiple people have a single, numerically identical subjective experience. They don't literally have a single unit that they somehow share. One person's subjective experience is different than another's. It's just like one person's nose is different than another's. They don't somehow share just one nose.

I'm referring to identity in the 2+2 is identical to 4 sense. — Terrapin Station

Very funny.

Well that's a standard way to refer to it. There are other ways, but I was trying to make it as simple as possible, as it seems weird to me that there's so much apparent confusion over such a common, simple idea.

I'm referring to identity in the 2+2 is identical to 4 sense. — Terrapin Station

There is a difference between equal and identical 2+2 is equal to four, but it is far from identical to four.

Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. I'm not sure that you're clear that I'm simply denying that multiple people have a single, numerically identical subjective experience. — Terrapin Station

If "subjective experience" refers to a "type" of thing, then how can you identify it as particular material in particular relations? How can you not see this as category error?

It's just like one person's nose is different than another's. They don't somehow share just one nose. — Terrapin Station

So if a nose is a type of thing which many different animals have, how could you claim to identify a nose as particular material in particular relations? Wouldn't it be more correct to identify a nose as a part of an animal?

There is a difference between equal and identical 2+2 is equal to four, but it is far from identical to four. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no difference on the conventional usage of "identical" in philosophy. But in your view, the difference is what?

If "subjective experience" refers to a "type" of thing, t — Metaphysician Undercover

And I'm just going to stop here for the moment, because this is going to be pointless if we can't even read. Did I say that it refers to a type of thing?

Did I say that it refers to a type of thing? — Terrapin Station

You said:

Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. — Terrapin Station

Don't you think that "type" refers to something?

There's no difference on the conventional usage of "identical" in philosophy. But in your view, the difference is what? — Terrapin Station

You do philosophy without differentiating between identical and equivalent? The former is the same, unqualified, the latter is a qualified same. So one playing card is equivalent to another playing card, allowing us to count 52 cards in the deck, but no two cards are identical. I'm going to stop and wait for you to grasp this simple difference.

"Equals" and "equivalent" are identical in your view, and are both denoted by the "=" sign?

Quit the distraction, we're discussing identity, not equivalence.

You're deflecting from the fact that you just substituted "equivalence" for "equals."

Correct, "=" signifies "equals", or "is equivalent to", the two are synonymous. Do you have difficulty with the English language?

Back to my question. Do you not recognize the difference between "equals" (is equivalent to), and "is identical to"?

I don't agree with that re equals and equivalent. I agree with this: "Equal means two entities are the same entity; equivalent means that two entities have the same EFFECT, in some sense."

Your view is not a conventional view in philosophy, but I acknowledge that it's your view.

Your view is extremely bizarre. I've never heard "equal" used to signify that two entities are the same entity. That idea is simply contradictory. If they are two entities, then clearly they are not the same entity, and to say that two entities are one entity is contradictory. Your statement is contradictory.

To say that two instances of particular entities are equal is to say that they are the same in some respect. But this does not mean that they are the same in every respect, and that is what is necessary in order for us to say that two instances are instances of the same entity. So, "equal" implies distinct entities which are, according to certain criteria, the same. It does not imply that the two entities are the same entity.

Perhaps my view is not the conventional view in philosophy, but your view is not conventional in any sense, and it is simply absurd, as contradictory.

Your view is extremely bizarre. I've never heard "equal" used to signify that two entities are the same entity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The idea is that both references are to the (numerically) same entity. I agree that's worded a bit misleadingly if you don't get identity for some reason.

They do not reference the same entity though. 2+2 signifies two distinct entities each with the value of two. Those two distinct entities, with the value of two, when taken together (signified by +) have the same value as one entity with the value of four (4). 2+2 signifies two distinct entities added together, while 4 signifies one entity. 2+2 is equal to 4, it is not the same as 4. The two entities signified by 3 and 1 when added together also have the same value as 4.

Those two distinct entities, with the value of two, when taken together (signified by +) have the same value — Metaphysician Undercover

Numerically the same? Or the two distinct numerical values?