• A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

    Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason/explanation/ground for its existence or occurrence.

    The reasons that fulfill the PSR are divided into 3 types as listed below. By laws of logic, the list is exhaustive.
    • Type 1: External necessary reason: The existence of a thing is explained by causal necessity. E.g. a rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry.
    • Type 2: External contingent reason: The existence of a thing is explained by a free choice or by design, and for a specific purpose. E.g. a paper-cutter exists because man designed it, for the purpose of cutting paper.
    • Type 3: Internal reason: This applies to all tautologies. The existence of a thing is explained inherently or by its own objective definition. E.g. the formula "2+2=4" exists necessarily because II and II are inherently found in IIII. Or, should there be a certain being who has existence inherently, then the statement "this being-that-inherently-exists exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.

    A full description and defense of the PSR can be found in this post.


    APPLICATION OF THE PSR IN HISTORY:

    In the pre-modern period, before the 1600's:
    People did not know about atoms and laws of nature (e.g. laws of physics, biology, chemistry, and evolution), and thus did not explain the existence of things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). They also understood that they did not inherently exist (type 3) because things would come and go out of existence by transforming into other things. E.g. water transforms into vapour and vice versa. Therefore, they concluded that all things in the world were designed (type 2).

    With that, the existence and behaviour of things were described using Aristotle's four causes:
    1. Efficient cause: what we now simply call "cause" as in cause and effect.
    2. Material cause: what it is made of.
    3. Formal cause: the identity or design of a thing.
    4. Final cause: the purpose or function of designed things.

    For example, the existence of water is caused by vapour or clouds (efficient cause), is made of a certain amount of matter because it has a certain mass (material cause), is a substance designed to be fluid and fall to the ground (formal cause), and must have a purpose because all designed things have a purpose even if we don't always know what that purpose is (final cause).


    Since the modern period, starting in the 1600's:
    Aided by the rise of scientific instruments, we now know about atoms and laws of nature. Thus, we explain the existence of most things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). With that, we no longer need four causes to describe the existence and behaviour of things but only two:
    1. Efficient cause: what caused it.
    2. Material cause: what it is made of.

    For example, both water and vapour are composed of the same molecules H2O and energy (material cause), and their existence and behaviour are explained by the laws of physics and chemistry (efficient cause).


    THINGS MADE BY INTELLIGENT DESIGN:

    Despite our understanding of modern physics, are there still things in the world that fit the old Aristotelian model of having a formal cause and final cause, i.e. of being designed with a purpose? I can think of three groups of things:

    1. The fundamental laws of nature: Most things in the world are explained by causal necessity because they obey the laws of nature. But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). They also do not exist inherently (type 3) because they are not tautologies. E.g. Law of Inertia: "An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion" can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction. Furthermore, if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose.

    The next two groups of things are true only if we presuppose that we have free will. If you don't want to accept that presupposition, then they can be dropped.

    2. Man-made things: This presupposes that free will exists, because if not, then we fall back into causal necessity. Whatever is man-made is designed, and designed with a purpose in mind. E.g. a paper-cutter is a man-made device designed to cut paper. A house is a man-made structure designed for humans to reside in. A painting is a man-made thing designed to be appealing to our sense of sight. Etc. There is no man-made thing that is not designed for a purpose.

    3. Man itself: A process that is fully determined cannot give rise to a non-determined thing (and quantum should not be used as an objection because even physicists claim they do not fully understand it). Thus, the existence of humans with free will cannot be explained by causal necessity with laws of nature alone (type 1). It is also not explained inherently (type 3) because humans did not always exist. Thus, the existence of humans is designed (type 2). And if so, they have a purpose. Man's purpose is what is usually called the meaning of life.
  • Shawn
    13.3k
    Intense. Good thread opening post. :clap:
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    thank you! Let me know if anything is unclear or if you have any objections.
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason/explanation/ground for its existence or occurrence.A Christian Philosophy
    Of course, the divine Hippopotamus made it so. This isn't as silly as it sounds. What is needed to estop such nonsense - if possible, and I think it is not possible in principle - are rigorous definitions of "sufficient," "reason/explanation/ground," and even "existence/occurrence."

    Lacking these, I'm afraid it must be the River-horse. Or prove it isn't.
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k


    - Sufficient means that the explanation accounts for or covers all the things that are inquired about.
    - Reason/explanation/ground do not need to be defined because they mean exactly what is understood when using them in the common language. An example will be enough: the reason/explanation/ground for why I exist is because of my parents.
    - Existence and occurrence, again, do not need to be defined for the same reasons. Here are examples instead: horses exist; unicorns do not. Caesar crossing the Rubicon is a real occurrence; Caesar surviving the Ides of March is not.

    If you want a full defense of the PSR, you can see this post.
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    You miss the point. E.g., the divine Hippopotamus satisfies all requirements. It - she - explains everything. Her reasonings are lapidary clarity. If she says something is, or is not, or happened or did not happen, then that is conclusive. Obviously you're free to disagree, after all, you have your own horse that you back. The problem, that you seem to not yet have grasped, is that you want yours to be more than just your opinion or belief. And that is not easy to establish - I think it is impossible.

    What you're left with is contingency, probability, and a tendency among folks to think they know because they do not know.

    But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1).A Christian Philosophy
    Why do fundamental laws need an accounting or reason? Do you even know what such a law in general is? Ans.: it isn't anything. At best it's a set of observations with predictive power: it seems to work.

    There is no man-made thing that is not designed for a purpose.A Christian Philosophy
    This is extravagant. I invite you to rethink it/qualify it. Drop a bomb on a building and the result is a thing that no one planned or designed. So much for the thing.

    Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose.A Christian Philosophy
    Forgive me if I plod here, but there seems a lot wrong here. Kindly make explicit the steps in your argument and their justification. And as I concede you can believe whatever you like, let not appeal to belief of any kind be a basis or justification for any part of your argument.

    Bottom line, I think you're subject to a fallacious reification of your beliefs through deceptive use of language. "Subject to" because while I think you buy it, at the same time I do not think you know what you're buying or have bought.
  • Banno
    26.7k
    I don't see anything here resembling an argument for sufficient reason. Perhaps some things just are the case, unexplained and unexplainable. The supposed principle is then no more than wishful thinking.

    Similarly, the supposed "laws of nature" might simply be arbitrary. There is no need at all to suppose them to be necessarily true, and so invoking modal collapse is muddled.

    Perhaps the supposed laws are simply descriptions of the consistency we find around us.

    There are good reasons to think physics is not "determinate".

    Basic theistic bullshit. Confirmation bias dressed as philosophy.
  • Quk
    57
    In the original post I'm missing this:

    Type 4: Random.
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    the divine Hippopotamus satisfies all requirements.tim wood
    The divine hippopotamus explanation does not fulfill the PSR because it is superfluous. The PSR, on the epistemology side, is also called Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. Simpler explanations exist (at least by dropping the hippopotamus part of it), and therefore it is not the most reasonable one.

    Do you even know what such a law in general is? Ans.: it isn't anything. At best it's a set of observations with predictive power: it seems to work.tim wood
    Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the general behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or general behaviours.

    Drop a bomb on a building and the result is a thing that no one planned or designed.tim wood
    This is a minor point but I don't understand it. Bombs are man-made things designed to explode and destroy things; and that's what they do.

    [Re: the fundamental laws of nature being designed] Kindly make explicit the steps in your argument and their justification.tim wood
    As per the PSR, every thing that exists demands an explanation. There are only 3 types of explanations: types 1, 2, and 3 as described in the OP.

    The fundamental laws of nature (whether these are compelling or descriptive) need a reason to exist. The OP shows that they cannot exist out of causal necessity (type 1), or inherently (type 3). Therefore, by process of elimination, they exist by design (type 2).
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    I don't see anything here resembling an argument for sufficient reason.Banno
    It is not defended in the OP and only presupposed. But you can find a defense of the PSR in this post. (I also added the link in the OP for clarity).

    The supposed principle is then no more than wishful thinking.Banno
    You can check the link above, or else we can simply suppose the PSR to be true for the sake of this discussion, to see what conclusions can be drawn from it.

    Perhaps the supposed laws are simply descriptions of the consistency we find around us.Banno
    That's fine. Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the consistent behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or behaviours.

    There are good reasons to think physics is not "determinate".Banno
    Physics seems to me to be pretty determinate; otherwise, planes would not fly.
    However, this would not change the conclusions, as there would still only be 3 types of explanations for things existing in the world: causal necessity, design, or inherent existence.
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k

    Randomness is not a valid type of reason under the PSR. A behaviour is random if it occurs without reason, and this runs in direct contradiction with the principle that demands sufficient reasons.

    Now, some people claim that quantum mechanics has some randomness to it. But as per the OP, quantum should not be used as an objection because even physicists claim they do not fully understand it.
  • Quk
    57
    Of course, randomness -- Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle -- contradicts with the PSR dogma. But there's no reason (!) to solve that contradiction by ignoring the randomness. Randomness is empirically observable with eyes and ears. Another way of solving the contradiction is this: Discard that PSR dogma. It's outdated.
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    The divine hippopotamus explanation does not fulfill the PSR because it is superfluous.A Christian Philosophy
    Is that a belief of yours, or can you prove it? As you deal in categorical claims, live or die by them. Prove the DH is superfluous.

    ...they require an explanation.A Christian Philosophy
    Nothing requires an explanation. You seem to be very confused about these matters. "The principal of reason reads nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason." (The Principal of Reason, Heidegger, p. 3). He qualifies reason as, "that [which] one can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way instead of that" (p. 119). I submit the DH as the reason. You don't have to like it - liking it is not the issue. You would like to disqualify it. And ultimately, you cannot.

    What I'm driving at is that you have beliefs based on things - ideas - that you cannot prove but take for granted, being foundational for your beliefs. We all do; it's the way the world works. But the idea is not to confuse those beliefs with any external reality. You're free to be and to remain confused if you choose. But if you represent them as real you're dealing in error, and a person might wonder why you do so.

    Therefore, by process of elimination, they exist by design (type 2).A Christian Philosophy
    Which presupposes a designer, yes? You do realize you're on the first step of an infinite regress, yes? No?

    Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one.A Christian Philosophy
    Small point: this a modern adoption and reinterpretation of Occam's thinking, he actually meant something different about the status of universals. He thought them both unreal and obstacles to understanding and their use not to be multiplied unnecessarily.
  • Richard B
    450
    Thus, the existence of humans is designedA Christian Philosophy

    Yep, this seems to be making a come back. When we all thought Hume buried the design argument, philosophers are starting to defend it again, see Chalmers, Reality+: virtual worlds and problems of philosophy. Since virtual reality is simulated to resemble our reality maybe we are just simulation ourselves. But now this demands a simulator. While this concept does not resemble the Christian concept of God, it opens the door yet again.
  • Banno
    26.7k
    But you can find a defense of the PSR in this post. (I also added the link in the OP for clarity).A Christian Philosophy
    There's too much confusion in that OP and the subsequent thread to make much of interest. That you think of "defending" the PSR is curious. At the very least, the idea is controversial, certainly not generally accepted. It simply will not do to take it as granted.

    That someone wants there to be an explanation simply does not imply that there must be one. It remains that there might well just be stuff, without explanation.

    Might leave it there.
  • Wayfarer
    23.9k
    Aided by the rise of scientific instruments, we now know about atoms and laws of nature. Thus, we explain the existence of most things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). With that, we no longer need four causes to describe the existence and behaviour of things but only two:
    1. Efficient cause: what caused it.
    2. Material cause: what it is made of.
    A Christian Philosophy


    @Banno - in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we find:

    6.371 At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.

    Why do you think Wittgenstein describes this as an ‘illusion’?
  • Banno
    26.7k
    An electron passes through a double slit. It moves to the right. It might have moved to the left. There is no sufficient reason that explains it having moved to the right. Therefore the PSR does not hold.

    The usual response is denial, as .

    But I want to be clear about the reply I'm giving: it is not that there are counter-instances to the PSR; although I think there are. Rather the argument is that there is nothing impossible, inconceivable, or irrational involved in denying the PSR. The PSR supposes that there must in every case be a sufficient reason, that there is no alternative. And yet, we have a case in which the explanation given is possible, indeed actual, and hence conceivable, and rational.

    The PSR claims that for every fact or event, there must necessarily be a sufficient reason. But there are possible (indeed actual) cases—like quantum outcomes—for which we can rationally conceive of there being no sufficient reason. These cases are coherent, intelligible, and not contradictory. Therefore, the PSR is not a necessary truth of reason.
  • Banno
    26.7k
    Seems to be explained in the context. Natural laws are not logical laws.
  • Wayfarer
    23.9k
    :up: But even so, there are stochastic regularities, which serve as laws. The specifics are unpredictable but they still occur within a range of possibilities described by the wavefunction.

    I think the point I’m driving at, is that whilst phenomena can be explained in terms of natural laws, the nature of the laws themselves are not self-explanatory. That I also take to be the point of Wittgenstein’s remark (although I’ll defer on that.) But I take the OP’s point that the while the laws of nature explain phenomena, they are not themselves explained with recourse to something further. So the argument then contends that they are so ‘by design’. Perhaps they are not, but science itself doesn’t have an alternative. Science is not, as it were, self-explanatory, in that sense.

    Natural laws are not logical laws.Banno

    But isn’t the efficacy of mathematical physics and scientific method generally owed to the ability to apply logical laws to empirical observation? That was a large part of Galileo’s genius arising from his re-statement of physics in quantifiable terms. It enables the application of mathematical logic to observations and conjectures, providing a bridge between logical and natural.
  • Banno
    26.7k
    Too many issues...

    See 6.37. Looks contrary to causal determinism to me.

    Natural laws describe, rather than explain - don't you agree? Sure, there are patterns and regularities in how things happen. Bit it doesn't follow at all that every... whatever... has a sufficient reason.

    "God did it" applies to everything - it is compatible with any occurrence. And so explains nothing.

    And further, the PSR is a haunted universe doctrine, unfalsifiable and unprovable. A piece of myth.

    Can you set out your point more clearly?
  • Wayfarer
    23.9k
    Maybe later. But I would have thought that the old saw that ‘things happen for a reason’ is preferable to its negation.
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    I submit that the idea of a reason itself is left too vague, leading to confusion. An example that comes to mind is gravity, the apple falls to earth. Why? What is the reason? Reasons in this sense being nothing more nor less than descriptive templates overlaying phenomena. Do reasons have practical value? Of course they do, or the good ones anyway.

    So the challenge to those who think that a reason is a something: what exactly sort of something is it supposed to be?
  • Wayfarer
    23.9k
    So the challenge to those who think that a reason is a something: what exactly sort of something is it supposed to be?tim wood

    Understanding the nature and scope of reason is a monumental undertaking. (See for instance video on Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason.)

    The point I was pressing was in response to:

    Most things in the world are explained by causal necessity because they obey the laws of nature. But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). They also do not exist inherently (type 3) because they are not tautologies. E.g. Law of Inertia: "An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion" can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction. Furthermore, if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon.A Christian Philosophy

    They’re not logically necessary, since they can be denied without contradiction—but if they are said to exist necessarily in a metaphysical sense, that would eliminate contingency altogether (hence the risk of modal collapse). So a teleological or purposive explanation—design in the broader sense—is at least implied by the argument.

    So: I agree that the existence of the fundamental laws of nature is not something science itself can—or even needs to—explain. As Whitehead notes in Science and the Modern World, science assumes the order of nature, but it need not (and cannot) provide a reason why the laws are as they are, or why there are any laws at all. To attempt that is to cross the threshold into metaphysics—which is exactly what many poor atheist arguments fail to recognise. They try to argue from the empirical to the metaphysical without acknowledging the logical distinctions involved.
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    Understanding the nature and scope of reason is a monumental undertaking. (See for instance video on Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason.)Wayfarer
    Small points: not "reason," but a (or any) reason. And Leibniz's principal, as I have encountered it, may be abbreviated the PR. The PSR seems to be quite a different animal, or at least to me. Maybe they're the same thing with two names. In any case, the "sufficient" needs a similar breakdown, as in sufficient for whom. Don't need a reply, watching the video.
  • JuanZu
    270


    In reality what happens is that we introduce intentions into the events. But what we introduce (an intention) is never proven, not even a posteriori. When a technological apparatus works, it does so to the extent that we have expectations, but the technological apparatus can always fail. The question is: Where is the intention and the final cause in the technological apparatus that works differently from our expectations? If everything has a reason it should also have a reason for failure too, and we would have to say that we also intended it to fail. This implies that you can introduce any final cause to objects or events as you see fit. Which makes the final cause arbitrary. Actually Ontologically there is a gap between the supposed final cause (our intention) and the caused object. No object or events possess a final cause that passes mysteriously from cause to effect.
  • Banno
    26.7k
    ‘things happen for a reason’ might be comforting, but need not be accurate.

    So the challenge to those who think that a reason is a something: what exactly sort of something is it supposed to be?tim wood
    Hence the various issues with causation, noted previously. What we have is a description of what happens, variously modified to be a better and better. The apple drops, as noted, and accelerates at a uniform velocity, except when it's not an apple but a balloon full of hot air, which instead rises, and this too can be calculated quite well. We exclude the hot air balloon from the things that fall, and don't claim it as a falsification of the Laws of Gravity. Then the predictions and observations get very accurate, and folk start to ask how it could be that the descriptions we make up turn out to be so accurate, as if it were a mystery...

    They are accurate becasue that's what we did. It's like being amazed that Philip's head screwdriver just happens to fit a Philip's head screw.

    Modal collapse occurs when a possibility is taken as a necessity. If you were to suppose that some contingent natural law was true in every possible world, you might be able to build up a case for modal collapse. As it stands, it's a simple misapplication. That is, assuming that PSR is a necessary truth might lead to modal collapse. The OP has it arse about.

    If everything has a reason it should also have a reason for failure too, and we would have to say that we also intended it to fail.JuanZu
    Interesting point. The intent is not a thing in the way that an object or event is. Again, the problem might be that overly simplistic Aristotelian approach.
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k

    A response to your objection on quantum is provided in this post (scroll down to the last paragraph). The response first shows that quantum physics cannot go against the PSR, and then shows that the phenomenon is in fact compatible with the PSR.
  • Banno
    26.7k

    5. Therefore, the behaviour of quantum particles is compatible with the PSR.A Christian Philosophy
    If every possibility is compatible with PSR, then PSR is methodologically useless. Kinda the point. WHat you are saying is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason. Bland faith.

    Further, as pointed out above, physicist do not look for, nor expect to find, any cause for such results. They are not needed; and physics does not fail as a result of this failure of PSR. PSR is not needed, and indeed not useful.
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    Prove the DH is superfluous.tim wood
    Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous.

    Nothing requires an explanation. [...] "The principal of reason reads nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason." (The Principal of Reason, Heidegger, p. 3). He qualifies reason as, "that [which] one can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way instead of that" (p. 119). I submit the DH as the reason.tim wood
    I'm unclear on your position. Do you believe that nothing requires an explanation or do you observe the principle of reason?

    Which presupposes a designer, yes? You do realize you're on the first step of an infinite regress, yes? No?tim wood
    Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3).
  • A Christian Philosophy
    1.1k
    see Chalmers, Reality+Richard B
    Interesting. I'll check it out!
  • tim wood
    9.6k
    We exclude the hot air balloon from the things that fall, and don't claim it as a falsification of the Laws of Gravity.Banno
    Just a point about where I'm coming from. The law of gravity, sure, a mighty fine and useful law, and one of some we even depend on. But a reason? And to be sure, nothing falls, ever. Things follow geodesics in a curved space-time. The reason, then, or law if you will, is nothing but an idea - some ideas better than others, but just ideas. And ideas come into fashion and go out of fashion, usually slowly. And this all goes back to hinge propositions aka absolute presuppositions.

    @Wayfarer above referred me to a video on the "PSR" according to Schopenhauer, and I listened for a while until I heard for the severaleth time that this was assumed and that presupposed, and then I stopped. Assume and presuppose, and neglect the fact that the thing thereby created is your own invention, and you can have what you want, even God.
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