Of course, the divine Hippopotamus made it so. This isn't as silly as it sounds. What is needed to estop such nonsense - if possible, and I think it is not possible in principle - are rigorous definitions of "sufficient," "reason/explanation/ground," and even "existence/occurrence."For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason/explanation/ground for its existence or occurrence. — A Christian Philosophy
Why do fundamental laws need an accounting or reason? Do you even know what such a law in general is? Ans.: it isn't anything. At best it's a set of observations with predictive power: it seems to work.But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). — A Christian Philosophy
This is extravagant. I invite you to rethink it/qualify it. Drop a bomb on a building and the result is a thing that no one planned or designed. So much for the thing.There is no man-made thing that is not designed for a purpose. — A Christian Philosophy
Forgive me if I plod here, but there seems a lot wrong here. Kindly make explicit the steps in your argument and their justification. And as I concede you can believe whatever you like, let not appeal to belief of any kind be a basis or justification for any part of your argument.Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose. — A Christian Philosophy
The divine hippopotamus explanation does not fulfill the PSR because it is superfluous. The PSR, on the epistemology side, is also called Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. Simpler explanations exist (at least by dropping the hippopotamus part of it), and therefore it is not the most reasonable one.the divine Hippopotamus satisfies all requirements. — tim wood
Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the general behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or general behaviours.Do you even know what such a law in general is? Ans.: it isn't anything. At best it's a set of observations with predictive power: it seems to work. — tim wood
This is a minor point but I don't understand it. Bombs are man-made things designed to explode and destroy things; and that's what they do.Drop a bomb on a building and the result is a thing that no one planned or designed. — tim wood
As per the PSR, every thing that exists demands an explanation. There are only 3 types of explanations: types 1, 2, and 3 as described in the OP.[Re: the fundamental laws of nature being designed] Kindly make explicit the steps in your argument and their justification. — tim wood
It is not defended in the OP and only presupposed. But you can find a defense of the PSR in this post. (I also added the link in the OP for clarity).I don't see anything here resembling an argument for sufficient reason. — Banno
You can check the link above, or else we can simply suppose the PSR to be true for the sake of this discussion, to see what conclusions can be drawn from it.The supposed principle is then no more than wishful thinking. — Banno
That's fine. Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the consistent behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or behaviours.Perhaps the supposed laws are simply descriptions of the consistency we find around us. — Banno
Physics seems to me to be pretty determinate; otherwise, planes would not fly.There are good reasons to think physics is not "determinate". — Banno
Is that a belief of yours, or can you prove it? As you deal in categorical claims, live or die by them. Prove the DH is superfluous.The divine hippopotamus explanation does not fulfill the PSR because it is superfluous. — A Christian Philosophy
Nothing requires an explanation. You seem to be very confused about these matters. "The principal of reason reads nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason." (The Principal of Reason, Heidegger, p. 3). He qualifies reason as, "that [which] one can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way instead of that" (p. 119). I submit the DH as the reason. You don't have to like it - liking it is not the issue. You would like to disqualify it. And ultimately, you cannot....they require an explanation. — A Christian Philosophy
Which presupposes a designer, yes? You do realize you're on the first step of an infinite regress, yes? No?Therefore, by process of elimination, they exist by design (type 2). — A Christian Philosophy
Small point: this a modern adoption and reinterpretation of Occam's thinking, he actually meant something different about the status of universals. He thought them both unreal and obstacles to understanding and their use not to be multiplied unnecessarily.Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. — A Christian Philosophy
Thus, the existence of humans is designed — A Christian Philosophy
There's too much confusion in that OP and the subsequent thread to make much of interest. That you think of "defending" the PSR is curious. At the very least, the idea is controversial, certainly not generally accepted. It simply will not do to take it as granted.But you can find a defense of the PSR in this post. (I also added the link in the OP for clarity). — A Christian Philosophy
Aided by the rise of scientific instruments, we now know about atoms and laws of nature. Thus, we explain the existence of most things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). With that, we no longer need four causes to describe the existence and behaviour of things but only two:
1. Efficient cause: what caused it.
2. Material cause: what it is made of. — A Christian Philosophy
6.371 At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Natural laws are not logical laws. — Banno
So the challenge to those who think that a reason is a something: what exactly sort of something is it supposed to be? — tim wood
Most things in the world are explained by causal necessity because they obey the laws of nature. But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). They also do not exist inherently (type 3) because they are not tautologies. E.g. Law of Inertia: "An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion" can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction. Furthermore, if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. — A Christian Philosophy
Small points: not "reason," but a (or any) reason. And Leibniz's principal, as I have encountered it, may be abbreviated the PR. The PSR seems to be quite a different animal, or at least to me. Maybe they're the same thing with two names. In any case, the "sufficient" needs a similar breakdown, as in sufficient for whom. Don't need a reply, watching the video.Understanding the nature and scope of reason is a monumental undertaking. (See for instance video on Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason.) — Wayfarer
Hence the various issues with causation, noted previously. What we have is a description of what happens, variously modified to be a better and better. The apple drops, as noted, and accelerates at a uniform velocity, except when it's not an apple but a balloon full of hot air, which instead rises, and this too can be calculated quite well. We exclude the hot air balloon from the things that fall, and don't claim it as a falsification of the Laws of Gravity. Then the predictions and observations get very accurate, and folk start to ask how it could be that the descriptions we make up turn out to be so accurate, as if it were a mystery...So the challenge to those who think that a reason is a something: what exactly sort of something is it supposed to be? — tim wood
Interesting point. The intent is not a thing in the way that an object or event is. Again, the problem might be that overly simplistic Aristotelian approach.If everything has a reason it should also have a reason for failure too, and we would have to say that we also intended it to fail. — JuanZu
If every possibility is compatible with PSR, then PSR is methodologically useless. Kinda the point. WHat you are saying is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason. Bland faith.5. Therefore, the behaviour of quantum particles is compatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy
Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous.Prove the DH is superfluous. — tim wood
I'm unclear on your position. Do you believe that nothing requires an explanation or do you observe the principle of reason?Nothing requires an explanation. [...] "The principal of reason reads nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason." (The Principal of Reason, Heidegger, p. 3). He qualifies reason as, "that [which] one can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way instead of that" (p. 119). I submit the DH as the reason. — tim wood
Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3).Which presupposes a designer, yes? You do realize you're on the first step of an infinite regress, yes? No? — tim wood
Just a point about where I'm coming from. The law of gravity, sure, a mighty fine and useful law, and one of some we even depend on. But a reason? And to be sure, nothing falls, ever. Things follow geodesics in a curved space-time. The reason, then, or law if you will, is nothing but an idea - some ideas better than others, but just ideas. And ideas come into fashion and go out of fashion, usually slowly. And this all goes back to hinge propositions aka absolute presuppositions.We exclude the hot air balloon from the things that fall, and don't claim it as a falsification of the Laws of Gravity. — Banno
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