How does each individual respond to their culture inheritance? — Joshs
...aren’t biologistic and physicalist terms like blood sugar, calories and oxygen contestable concepts that shift their sense along with revolutionary changes in the scientific and cultural epistemes that make them intelligible — Joshs
↪plaque flag Are the two vases the same, or different? What's "the" vase?
I've in mind something along the lines of the analysis of simples in Philosophical Investigations, §48 and thereabouts. You have some understanding of Wittgenstein. Hilary Lawson seems not to have moved past the Tractatus.
I do not wish to conclude that there is a vase, since that there is exactly one vase is taken as granted in Joshs' story. I am just pointing to the error in concluding either that there are only vase-phenomena or that there are no true sentences about the vase. — Banno
I tend to agree with Josh in spirit, but on this issue he may not give the world enough attention. We experience the [ same ] red flower differently (in a series of adumbrations perhaps). — plaque flag
...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself, that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which experience ignores.
We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself. I feel like saying: "Here at any rate there can't be a variety of interpretations. If you are seeing a thing you are seeing identity too." Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shews me to the case of two things?
216. "A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted. We might also say: "Every thing fits into itself." Or again: "Every thing fits into its own shape." At the same time we look at a thing and imagine that there was a blank left for it, and that now it fits into it exactly.”
224. The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
225. The use of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are interwoven. (As are the use of "proposition" and the use of "true”)
...aren’t biologistic and physicalist terms like blood sugar, calories and oxygen contestable concepts that shift their sense along with revolutionary changes in the scientific and cultural epistemes that make them intelligible
— Joshs
Not really. That is just unrealistic thinking about science that you seem to have inherited from your culture — wonderer1
one neither passively absorbs, nor jointly negotiates the normative practices of that culture, but validates one's own construction of the world using the resources of that culture — Joshs
The cultural control we see is one which is within the person’s own construct system and it is imposed upon him only in the sense that it limits the kinds of evidence at his disposal. How he handles this evidence is his own affair, and persons manage it in a tremendous variety of ways. — Kelly
The Greek term logos gives us a better sense of the problem then 'language'. What is at issue is the logic of saying, a logos of logos. The ability to give a comprehensive account. — Fooloso4
There can be no comprehensive account of being without a comprehensive account of non-being. But what is other is without limit and cannot be comprehended. On the one hand this means that there can never be a comprehensive account of the whole, but on the other, it encourages an openness to what might be; beyond our limits of comprehension. — Fooloso4
it seems to me that the idea of a same world for everyone is precisely the sort of thinking that the above philosophical perspectives put into question as relying on the assumption of a private sense. — Joshs
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922According to Apel, in light of these innovative traditions, the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be fundamentally reconceived. In particular, the conditions for intersubjectively valid knowledge cannot be explicated in terms of the structure of consciousness or the cognitive capacities of the individual knowing subject but only through a systematic investigation of language as the medium of symbolically mediated knowledge. The pragmatic turn, initiated by Peirce and Charles W. Morris (1901–1979) and continued in the early twenty-first century in speech act theory, further implies that an adequate explanation of how meaningful communication is possible cannot be achieved by a semantic theory alone. Rather, it must be supplemented by a pragmatic study of the relation between linguistic signs and the conditions of their use by speakers. Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).
Well, there’s certainly SOMETHING that constrains our constructions, but aren’t biologistic and physicalist terms like blood sugar, calories and oxygen contestable concepts that shift their sense along with revolutionary changes in the scientific and cultural epistemes that make them intelligible? — Joshs
It's true, of course, that each individual organism needs to construct their own, in some sense 'private', model of the world (and themselves in it), because that's what brain development just is, but it's not true that each organism constructs the framework they will use to construct the world from scratch. There's an inheritance. A lot of 'choices' have already been made for you (by evolution, and on top of that by culture) so you build your own, sure, but not completely idiosyncratically -- and not incommensurably -- but using the same inheritance as everyone else, for the base level, and as everyone in your culture, your speech community, and so on, for others. — Srap Tasmaner
Ontogeny gets to recapitulate phylogeny rapidly because what used to be endlessly branching little pathways are now high-speed rails. As Hume put it, there are questions Nature has deemed too important to leave to our own fallible and imperfect reason. — Srap Tasmaner
”On could say, then, that the rule for the use of the word ‘same’ is instantiated in performances that are bound together by family resemblance, which means that they have no one thing in common. — Joshs
I understand why one would say this, but I'd counter that impressions and sounds and so on only make sense within a tacitly accepted framework on an animal in an environment. — plaque flag
I take this synthetic apriori as the generation of hypotheses from experience. But I'd say such knowledge is fallible. We may act on it without checking (and surely we do), but it could turn out to be wrong. Math might be an exception, but that gets us into the weeds of the philosophy of mathematics. — plaque flag
As if we never actually taste the oyster; instead what we taste is a synthetic inference from the impressions, sounds, feels and images that we experience.We don't actually experience a world; it is a synthetic inference from the impressions, sounds, feels and images that we experience. — Janus
As if we never actually taste the oyster; instead what we taste is a synthetic inference from the impressions, sounds, feels and images that we experience.
No. That "synthetic inference from the impressions, sounds, feels and images that we experience" is the taste of oysters.
The problem is set up by an excessive emphasis on "internal" and "external", and appears to be inherent in the phenomenological approach itself, from it's emphasis on direct experience. — Banno
I understand that, on the contrary, Wittgenstein took use, not just discourse, as "primary and grounding". Not what we say, but what we do, is what makes the difference between following and running counter to a rule.I am in agreement with Witt and phenomenology that discourse must by considered primary and grounding. — Joshs
217. “How am I able to follow a rule?” If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule.
Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”.
Gather 10 people in a room, and include persons from all corners of that world and all eras of human history. Ask them to paint the ‘same ‘ vase of flowers as accurately as possible. Compare the results and try and find any aspect of their paintings which exactly match each other. The wide variety of differences shows us how we actually interact with each other on the basis of supposedly shared experience. — Joshs
but I'd argue that such frameworks are inferentially synthesized by animals, including humans, from out of an initial "buzzing, blooming confusion", — Janus
So there is a view, more often implied that expressed, that what we perceive are such neural models. But that is mistaken; indeed, it is an iteration of the homunculus, this time with the little man looking at it's own neural pathways. Rather, those neural models constitute our perceiving. — Banno
That is, the folk looking at the vase see the vase, not each their own neural net. — Banno
Oooo almost. Following Austin, I have to say not that "we experience representations of plants and animals", but that our experiencing is a representing of... plants and animals. It's still the plants and animals that are being experienced, not their representations.So, in one sense we can rightly say that we experience plants and animals, and in another sense, we can rightly say that we experience representations of plants and animals. — Janus
Oooo almost. Following Austin, I have to say not that "we experience representations of plants and animals", but that our experiencing is a representing of... plants and animals. It's still the plants and animals that are being experienced, not their representations.
And this should be understood not as a piece of neuroscience, but a clarification of how to use words like "experience" and "representation". — Banno
Do you think that Kant's synthetic a priori derivation of the "pure forms of intuition" and categories of judgement could be mistaken (bearing in mind that they are only presented as being relevant to the context of human experience and judgement)? — Janus
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