And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac
I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra
One does not 'see' percepts though. A percept is the result of seeing, you don't then 'see' it, otherwise what results form that process? Another percept? A percept of a percept? — Isaac
I'm struggling to think of an example where I obtain knowledge directly from my senses without any inference. Perhaps you could provide one? — Isaac
Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra
What difference would that make, even if I were to agree? — Isaac
The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac
You're trying to establish it's a real thing (but not material), I'm trying to establish the opposite (not real, but if it were anything it would be in the brain). — Isaac
we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra
We're not. You've declared the mind's eye to be the sort of thing that cannot be empirically observed. That's not a discussion it's a lecture. — Isaac
When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra
No, you don't. You see several perspectives, you see aspects of the table that are behind and shaded, aspects that are out of focus, or moving. Part of the process of 'seeing' involves inferring these details. — Isaac
In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra
What? You say it's singular, so therefore you know it's singular? That doesn't make any sense, and I know it doesn't make any sense because I just said it doesn't — Isaac
I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra
Of course you aren't. There's no such thing. A 'cognitive perspective' can't 'see' anything — Isaac
I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra
Yes, and we're all waiting for an actual argument to back up that claim that isn't self-referential. — Isaac
When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra
If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration. — wonderer1
And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac
Where did I claim it isn't? — javra
is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. — javra
I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully. — javra
Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be) — javra
The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye
Its not a made up term. — javra
I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience. — javra
It is, again, a falsifiable proposition — javra
You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience. — javra
Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything? — javra
The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) — javra
for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory — javra
from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness — javra
...the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced... — javra
If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look. — wonderer1
"Did your point of view see the match last yesterday?" — Isaac
As far as this conversation being over, as you wish. — javra
Did you see that ludicrous display last night? — Srap Tasmaner
Did you see that ludicrous display last night?
— Srap Tasmaner
No, but my first-person-instatiated-point-of-view saw it. I was out. — Isaac
The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture. — Isaac
Very convincing though, you've clearly been practising. — Isaac
Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra
If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other? — javra
LadGPT — Srap Tasmaner
'Things I imagine' — Isaac
Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines? — javra
one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra
I agree with Chalmers, on the grounds that objective physical sciences exclude the first person as a matter of principle.
— Wayfarer
But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.
Can you show me somewhere, where this principle you speak of is written down? — wonderer1
Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table. — Isaac
the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.
Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra
Yes. — Isaac
one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra
I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps — Isaac
But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.
— wonderer1
There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption. — Wayfarer
I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided.
— javra
Really? What does one look like then? You said
No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”.
— javra
So presumably, at least, you've never seen one (you think no-one has). So how do you know the image I've posted isn't one? You seem to on the one hand want to say no one's ever seen one, but on the other you seem to know exactly what one should look like. — Isaac
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