And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac

Where did I claim it isn't?

I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra

One does not 'see' percepts though. A percept is the result of seeing, you don't then 'see' it, otherwise what results form that process? Another percept? A percept of a percept? — Isaac

I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully.

I'm struggling to think of an example where I obtain knowledge directly from my senses without any inference. Perhaps you could provide one? — Isaac

I already have: knowledge of the keyboard I am typing on. Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be)

Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra

What difference would that make, even if I were to agree? — Isaac

Example: To infer X from empirically observed A, B, and C is not to empirically observe X.

The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye

Its not a made up term.

You're trying to establish it's a real thing (but not material), I'm trying to establish the opposite (not real, but if it were anything it would be in the brain). — Isaac

You're again bringing metaphysics into this. I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience.

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal?

we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra

We're not. You've declared the mind's eye to be the sort of thing that cannot be empirically observed. That's not a discussion it's a lecture. — Isaac

No. It is, again, a falsifiable proposition which - because I both believe it to be true and to be sufficiently justified - I then assert as a (fallible) knowledge claim. As per the initial post to which you responded with illustration of the brain, this proposition remains substantiated till falsified.

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra

No, you don't. You see several perspectives, you see aspects of the table that are behind and shaded, aspects that are out of focus, or moving. Part of the process of 'seeing' involves inferring these details. — Isaac

Those aren't different points of views - aka perspectives - but different aspects of what is seen from a singular point of view (i.e., perspective). And, again, they are not conscious inferences. We are not here addressing the unconscious mind but only the conscious mind - this since we are addressing the first-person awareness of an imagined table.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra

What? You say it's singular, so therefore you know it's singular? That doesn't make any sense, and I know it doesn't make any sense because I just said it doesn't — Isaac

You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience.

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra

Of course you aren't. There's no such thing. A 'cognitive perspective' can't 'see' anything — Isaac

I'll reword this if it helps: a cognitive first-person point of view (in contrast to, for one example, a camera's point of view) - to be clear, this where "cognitive" addresses all conscious aspects of an intellect, as in "cognitive science". Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything?

[Edit: given that there are unconscious agencies of one’s mind capable of perceiving that which one consciously doesn’t (e.g., such as is inferred to occur in subliminal processing of stimuli), these unconscious agencies can easily be further inferred to hold unconscious first-person awareness of stimuli. Hence, for clarity, from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is – as expressed in the above paragraph – here meant to strictly address one’s own conscious faculties of mind). Yes, language can sometimes be unclear in expressing that which one intends to convey by it’s use. Still, hopefully this will better clarify the above paragraph.]

I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra

Yes, and we're all waiting for an actual argument to back up that claim that isn't self-referential. — Isaac

You have this backwards. The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) and reasoning (such as that provided in my last post regarding constituent parts and the whole which you have so far not addressed).

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra

That depends on the circumstances. If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, then you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration.

If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration. — wonderer1

Firstly, I/we don't visually experience that which we imagine via our physiological eyes (e.g., one can so imagine just fine if not better with both eyes closed).

Secondly, as I previously commented in my last post: because we are here strictly addressing first-person awareness, the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced (this by first-person awareness).

And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac


Where did I claim it isn't? — javra

You said...

is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. — javra

I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully. — javra

Well then you don't see things 'as a percept' You see things. I see a table, I see a chair. I don't see them as percepts, I see them as objects in the world.

Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be) — javra

But you have inferred it to be black. You senses have picked up all sorts of cues and you've inferred from those cues that the keyboard is black (as opposed to grey but in shadow, or green but in the dark, or translucent but reflecting a black object...)

The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac


https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye

Its not a made up term. — javra

Does something about making up a term prevent it from appearing in wiktionary?

I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience. — javra

You're not. Let's get this clear. You're addressing, at best, your memory of experiences you have seconds ago, filtered through you cultural expectations and values, the terms of the language community, the biases and objectives of this argument... There's nothing 'direct' about what you're doing with your experiences by talking about them here.

It is, again, a falsifiable proposition — javra

It's not falsifiable unless you explain what it is we're looking for. Else my equally falsifiable proposition "there's an invisible jabberwocky above your head". Shall we engage in serious discussion about that proposition?

You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience. — javra

No. You said "I term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye". Other than you declaring it to be so, we have no evidence of it actually being so.

Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything? — javra

The latter. A 'point of view' isn't the sort of thing that can see. People see. 'points of view' don't. They don't do anything. No-one talks like that. We don't say "Oh, Bob, what did your point of view see on telly last night?", "Did your point of view see the match last yesterday?"

The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) — javra

... same with jabberwockies...

My apologies, but for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory. We appear to disagree on the referents which words address - this if we even agree that the words expressed, such that of "a mind's eye", reference anything at all. You, for example, maybe for this reason have not replied to the questions I've asked.

for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory — javra

Uh huh...

from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness — javra

.... Dressing anyone?

Hm, because taking text out of context is supposed to be ... ?

As far as this conversation being over, as you wish.

...the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced... — javra

If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look.

If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look. — wonderer1

I'm quite familiar with such articles - and fully acknowledge their worth. You however appear to not have understood what I expressed.

"Did your point of view see the match last yesterday?" — Isaac

Did you see that ludicrous display last night? What was Wenger thinking, sending Walcott in that early? The thing about Arsenal is, they always try to walk it in.

As far as this conversation being over, as you wish. — javra

You responded to a several hundred word post fully citing each quote by declaring the whole thing 'word salad' and you have the audacity to complain about me not answering your questions.

And no, the conversation is not over. I never wished any such thing. Feel free to respond any time you can penetrate my byzantine locution.

Did you see that ludicrous display last night? — Srap Tasmaner

No, but my first-person-instatiated-point-of-view saw it. I was out.

And no, the conversation is not over. — Isaac

OK. I'd like an answer to the following so as to gauge were we currently stand:

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal? — javra

The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture.

Did you see that ludicrous display last night?
— Srap Tasmaner

No, but my first-person-instatiated-point-of-view saw it. I was out. — Isaac

Try googling what you quoted there, and if you don't recognize it, you're welcome.

Brilliant. I thought I recognised it (but obviously didn't get the reference initially). Very convincing though, you've clearly been practising.

The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture. — Isaac

So far your reply doesn't make sense to me. Maybe you could help me make sense of it.

When I engage in the process of imagination I can imagine various things - granted, this as thought I were looking at them (maybe this is a personal quirk though). But, importantly here, the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other?

Very convincing though, you've clearly been practising. — Isaac

Now you can just get the app, LadGPT.

Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra

Yes.

If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other? — javra

'Me', 'myself', 'I'

'Things I imagine'

LadGPT — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saved.

If only I'd have had this when I was a teenager, I wouldn't have had to become a fucking psychology professor to get any social currency. I could have been a builder...

'Things I imagine' — Isaac

Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines?

If so, how is this "I" aware of what it willfully imagines?

(In philosophical speculations, one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed; the two processes - that of willing X and that of having visual awareness of X - are not logically entailed, as far as I can currently discern. But we could debate this if you'd like.)

Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines? — javra

Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table.

one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra

I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps

But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell. — wonderer1

There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption.

I agree with Chalmers, on the grounds that objective physical sciences exclude the first person as a matter of principle.
— Wayfarer

But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.

Can you show me somewhere, where this principle you speak of is written down? — wonderer1

Chalmers never said that first person data is excluded from consideration by scientists, and Einstein's thought experiments specifically reference the first person point of view.

Do you know what it's like to be you?

Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table. — Isaac

Different in this respect:

the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra

To which you've already replied:

Yes. — Isaac

I asked so as to confirm that this same understanding is there in your proposed expression of, "Things I imagine," but it doesn't appear to be.

So you deem the "I" addressed to be identical to you as body. And yet, the imagined table is only an aspect of your bodily processes, specifically of certain aspects of your CNS - the very same CNS from which this "I" results (at least as its typically understood; such that the I is one of many functioning process of the body - along with a multitude of unconscious processes of mind - but is not the body itself). But then in deeming this "I" identical to you as body there is grave incoherence in terms of what is being referenced in the expression, "Things I imagine".

Given this incoherence, again, in which way then do you deem what you refer to as "I" to be in any way different from the imagined table? (To emphasize: Both are functions of your body, which according to you is equivalent to the you which can imagine tables and the like. But then, again, how would this "I" be in any way different from the table it imagines?)

Clarification would be useful to further discussions.

one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra

I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps — Isaac

OK, so when one intends to imagine a table, you take it that one consciously holds awareness of all the table's imagined properties instantaneously to so intending, aka willing. My experiences affirm that when I want to imagine a table and proceed to do so, my unconsciousness fills in a lot of blanks so as to form a coherent image (also called "picture" in common English usage) of the table - such that my willing to imagine precedes the visual representation which I then apprehend as an imagined given, or thing. It's also not hard for me to suppose that one could want to imagine X but be unable to form a mental image of X. Worse things can happen in psychological processes. But, maybe, all this doesn't matter too much to the discussion.

I'll check in latter on, probably sometime tomorrow.

But physical sciences don't exclude the first person as far as I can tell.
— wonderer1

There is the presumption that their findings are observer-independent i.e. replicable by anyone, They’re ‘third person’ in that sense. It’s an implicit assumption. — Wayfarer

Right, so the "anyone's" the findings are replicable by are not first persons? If they are first persons then please explain how they have been excluded.

Addressed in this post

I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided.
— javra

Really? What does one look like then? You said

No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”.
— javra

So presumably, at least, you've never seen one (you think no-one has). So how do you know the image I've posted isn't one? You seem to on the one hand want to say no one's ever seen one, but on the other you seem to know exactly what one should look like. — Isaac

This exchange seems quite absurd to me. @Javra argues that no one can see the mind's eye which, like the physical eye, cannot see itself in the act of seeing. So, he is claiming that the mind's eye does not look like anything because it is not visible, and here the analogy breaks down because the physical eye is visible.

This seems to depend on what is meant by 'seeing'. We can say the physical eye does not actually see anything, that it is the person who sees things. Or we might say that the seeing happens in the visual cortex. and the person who sees is a kind of illusion created by the reflexive awareness of that seeing.

So, Javra says that the mind's eye is not empirically observable but is real. So what does real mean here? Can the mind's eye be seen by the person who owns it? If the mind's eye imagines something, can the thing imagined be seen just as objects external to the body can be seen? Could that depend on the subject, that is can some people visualize "photographically" and others not? What could we have to go on other than individual reports?

Isaac seems to be arguing that if the mind's eye is not an empirical object, then obviously it cannot be seen, thereby agreeing with Javra. So, what exactly is the disagreement about? Is it about whether the mind's eye is real or a fiction? But if to be real is to be empirically observable, which both seem to agree the mind's eye is not, then it would seem the only possible point the argument could be over is the meaning of "real".

Can anything be subjectively real? Say I am imagining a table right now, is the picture I have of the table real? How could I ever prove it is real if no one else can see it? Isn't that the basic problem with these kinds of arguments over qualia? I can't prove that the picture I have of the table is real, other than by appealing to others' experiences by saying something like, "don't you also visualize objects?".
If it is admitted that we do visualize objects, and then we go on to claim that this visualizing must entail the existence of a mind's eye analogous to how seeing involves the existence of a physical eye, is that a justifiable analogy?

Is it a justifiable analogy, given that seeing involves far more than just the physical eye, and that visualizing may just be pretty much the same kind of brain process, absent the involvement of the physical eyes and the optic nerves? If that were so it would just mean that the mind's eye is sometimes fed information via the physical eyes and other times not, and that we are always "visualizing" regardless of whether it is driven by external or internal input, or by extrenal as well as internal input, is we want to say that there is always internal input in any case?

The argument seems to come down to the contesting the reality of qualia, which in turn comes down to defining the term 'real'. It seems that such arguments always involve a shitload of talking past one another...and to what purpose?

I don't see the question of the exclusion of the subject being addressed there, rather it is about whether or not qualia should be excluded from the conversation.

The argument between Dennett and Chalmers is just an argument over the reality of qualia. Whether or not one believes in the existence of qualia has no bearing on whether or not the subject is being eliminated as far as I can tell.

Let's say the subject is not real anyway, per Buddhism for example, and that the body is not real in any sense other than the empirical, meaning that what is real is defined as being only what enters, or could enter, awareness, where would that leave us?