This is why i used the term "bi-reality" in the other thread. It's dualism submerged in unity. We create the world (philosophy), and the world thru atoms make us (science). Reconciling this is the goal of Hegel's entire body of work. More on this latter..

What does "reality" mean in Hegel? Is the dualism for the world(s), or between body and mind like the Cartesians?

We create the world (philosophy), and the world thru atoms make us (science) — Gregory

Do we create the world? How do we do that?

The dualism between mind and body is real in Hegel, but at the completion of Spirit all is One, as it always was. Few point this out, but Hegel has matter "sublate" mind as well as mind sublating body. We are one with Spirit so we are in the creating of the world, but not to the denial of us being immediate bodies within Nature. I was gathering some Hegel quotes last night. I will post them latter in the day

"In this regard it must be remarked that the assertion that the [Kantian] categories by themselves are empty is certainly correct in the sense that we ought not to rest content with them and the totality which they form (the logical Idea), but to advance to the real domains of Nature and Spirit. This advance, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that the logical Idea comes to receive an alien content that stems from outside it; on the contrary, it is the proper activity of the logical Idea to determine itself further and unfold itself into Nature and Spirit." Paragraph 43, pg 86 in the lesser Logic "The Encyclopaedia Logic", translated by Geraets, Suchting, and Harris, 1991, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

The dualism between mind and body is real in Hegel, but at the completion of Spirit all is One, as it always was. — Gregory

The concept "spirit" is too abstract if not unclear and esoteric in Hegel. Does it contain both mind and body? Or is it some disembodied entity? Or is it something which instantiates when body dies?

Esoteric does have its place in knowledge. Yes Spirit is mind, body, matter. It is the actuality of all things. You can call it God in fact. It arises in all things and experiences in all things. YOU are your Ego but the true ground is Spirit. It is at the beginning and yet not at the beginning because it is at the end

In Kainz (GWF Hegel), spirit is divided into,

1) Subjective
2) Objective
3) Absolute

Which spirit has the esoteric aspects?

"Recently Kant has opposed to what has usually been called logic another, namely, a transcendental logic. What has been here called objective logic would correspond in part to what with him is transcendental logic." See para. 81

Absolute Spirit is entirely mystical, hence entirely esoteric

OK, good citing from Science of Logic. It is amazing to realise how Hegel's philosophy is largely based on the critique of Kant. That little edition of "Science of Logic" printed by Amazon is quite nice actually. Very concise and clearly translated.

Ye it's abrigded. I'm gonna try to finish it again. Kant influenced Hegel's whole generation. Everyone was talking about him. By the time of Hegel's death Hegel himself was one of the most famous professors in the world

I recall reading that Schopenhauer criticised Hegel a lot. What was the main point of the criticism?

Will was higher than Platonic Forms for Schopenhauer, while Forms and Nous are equal to Will in Hegel's works. Schopenhauer was clearly unfair to Hegel. Hegel had a lot to offer philosophically in terms of Schopenhauer's type of philosophy. Schopenhauer's "Will" was without direction, ultimately free. Hegel says there is Fate founded on Reason. They are both right in a way

Whether will is truly free with or without Reason is a good debate. Which is greater, intellect or will? It seems will is because intellect is completely under the control of will. It's its servant. But can will be without its servant? It seems to me it at least has to have some concepts of its own to function

Which is greater, intellect or will? — Gregory

Will translates into volition. How does intellect get to be understood? Going by its original Latin roots, intellect could be understood as the understanding. Not understanding when interpreted as anything other which is understood – e.g. a concept, an idea, etc. – but instead that intrinsic and often accumulative understanding of the first-person agent which facilitates the agents capacity to so understanding that which is other than itself: again, with concepts and ideas as examples of the latter. (Example: both a dog and a human toddler has some such proto-understanding as agents which facilitates their understanding of the external world but, while the dog’s understanding is capped at a level far lower than any adult human’s, the human toddler’s so-called “proto-understanding” of things understood readily holds the capacity to develop into the vastly more content-filled “proto-understanding” of an adult human.)

If one entertains this definition of the intellect, then one’s intellect shall be one aspect of one’s will at large – maybe being the most pivotal aspect of will conceivable. Such that there can be no will in the complete absence of any and all understanding.

And this perspective, in a way, then brings to mind Viktor Frankl’s “Will to Meaning”; here, in the sense of intending ever-greater (nonquantitative) magnitudes of what I’ve here tentatively termed one’s intellect as “proto-understanding” … via which one understands, and in this one sense knows; to include a yet awaiting potential understanding of the world, or reality, or even of being itself.

In our human form understanding and will might be one faculty with two modes. One "soul". But in metaphysical questions of the origin of the world distictions between Will and Intellect can be useful. Will has active power. Intellect is passive, Platonic Ideas

In our human form understanding and will might be one faculty with two modes. One "soul". But in metaphysical questions of the origin of the world distictions between Will and Intellect can be useful. Will has active power. Intellect is passive, Platonic Ideas — Gregory

I can readily understand that. For what its worth, I don't myself subscribe to an origin of existence; an origin of the universe as its commonly known sure; but not of existence at large. I can accept that the will is active and the intellect passive, but from the perspectives I so far adopt, in so conceiving, the whole reason for being of the will is to best satisfy the desires of the intellect. Eudemonia, for example, is not found in the active will's doings per se but in the passive intellect's state of so being, for lack of better words, happy.

I concur that the intellect gives happiness, but so does the will. It's interactive. Schopenhauer was so dark in his writings because he placed will over reason and Spinozian philosophy is so bland because there is no will that is truly free in it's freedom, able to choose between options. Part of myself just accepts science as it is taught but there is a strong intuition for something else behind all the spinning atoms and emerging chemicals

Schopenhauer's "Will" was without direction, ultimately free. Hegel says there is Fate founded on Reason. They are both right in a way — Gregory

It sounds like Will is some sort of agent or force with no principle on its operation. Is it something that is contrary to rationality or intelligence? All biological creatures seem to have will to life. For example, a spider will run for its life, when it is about to be stepped on, or vacuumed off from the floor.

Sun flowers keep turning to the direction of the Sun lights. All for their survival and growth i.e. will to life.
Could it be life force prior to intelligence or reasoning founded under the bio structured all living bodies?
Or could it be even one of the principles for the existence of the universe and world?

Or maybe will doesn't exist at all. It could be an illusion believing in the existence of will? Would it be rather intentions or motivations for the actions performed by the intelligent beings? There are reasoned actions as well as willed actions.

Whether will is truly free with or without Reason is a good debate. — Gregory

The fact that we can perform actions driven by will means that will could combine with reasoning.
When reason and will combine, they become motivated actions.

But there are wills which operate in the bodily level seeking pleasures, comforts and life.

This is why i used the term "bi-reality" in the other thread. It's dualism submerged in unity. We create the world (philosophy), and the world thru atoms make us (science). Reconciling this is the goal of Hegel's entire body of work. More on this latter — Gregory

It cannot be because that already presupposes terms, such as atom or world. For Hegel it is the 'movement of the concept' that creates such dualisms.

"In this regard it must be remarked that the assertion that the [Kantian] categories by themselves are empty is certainly correct in the sense that we ought not to rest content with them and the totality which they form (the logical Idea), but to advance to the real domains of Nature and Spirit. This advance, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that the logical Idea comes to receive an alien content that stems from outside it; on the contrary, it is the proper activity of the logical Idea to determine itself further and unfold itself into Nature and Spirit." — Gregory

I read this in light of his criticism of Kant that his categories are 'formal'. Kant 'deduced' them, in some merely mental exercise. For Hegel they would show themselves both mentally as well as in the history of the world, in the emergence of spirit. The processes by which the world shows itself are the same as the operations of thought. 'Substance as subject'.

The concept "spirit" is too abstract if not unclear and esoteric in Hegel. Does it contain both mind and body? Or is it some disembodied entity? Or is it something which instantiates when body dies? — Corvus

It is not some metaphysical entity but merely the manifestation of reason in the world. The world is not without reason, in the sense that what happens is rationally understandable. There is indeed and always was a 'hole' as Gregory explained in Hegel.

It sounds like Will is some sort of agent or force with no principle on its operation. Is it something that is contrary to rationality or intelligence? All — Corvus

They work together but also have their autonomy. Will is setting down the law of action in view of something seen by Reason for the reason that it wants it because it wants to exercise freedom. Reason is the seeing into truth

It cannot be because that already presupposes terms, such as atom or world. For Hegel it is the 'movement of the concept' that creates such dualisms — Tobias

Remember how he has nothing sublate itself and being and being in turn sublate nothing and itself. Everything sublates everything else in Hegel, although thatbis not the total history of the movement

read this in light of his criticism of Kant that his categories are 'formal'. Kant 'deduced' them, in some merely mental exercise. For Hegel they would show themselves both mentally as well as in the history of the world, in the emergence of spirit. The processes by which the world shows itself are the same as the operations of thought. 'Substance as subject — Tobias

Very good

The processes by which the world shows itself are the same as the operations of thought. 'Substance as subject'. — Tobias

The 'substance' of Aristotelian philosophy resulted from the Latin translation of the Greek 'ouisia' . But ‘ouisua’ is the Greek verb meaning 'to be'. So the meaning of 'substance' in philosophy was originally nearer than 'subject' or ‘being’ than the usual meaning of the word, which is ‘a material with uniform properties.’

Furthermore, the general idea of the 'unity of mind and world' receives support both from classical metaphysics and also current cognitive science (per Charles Pinter's 'Mind and the Cosmic Order'.)

"But reason in its truth is spirit"

"Consciousness is spirit as concrete knowing, a knowing too, in which externality is involved"

Preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic (1812)

but merely the manifestation of reason in the world. — Tobias

How does reason manifest in the world without reasoner or reasoning?

The world is not without reason, in the sense that what happens is rationally understandable. — Tobias

Isn't some parts of the world unknown, irrational and mysterious? We don't exactly know why the world exists, or how it began. Who was the first ever folk in the world? Does God exist?

They work together but also have their autonomy. Will is setting down the law of action in view of something seen by Reason for the reason that it wants it because it wants to exercise freedom. Reason is the seeing into truth — Gregory

Julian Young's book on Schopenhauer says Schopenhauer's Will was Kant's Thing-in-Itself (pp.54, Routledge, 2005, Schopenhauer, juilian young), and he was wrong.

How does reason manifest in the world without reasoner or reasoning? — Corvus

Reasoning is going on, but what reasoning is is itself a manifestation of spirit, the flow of the idea. There is also different reasoning going on, religious reasoning, legal reasoning scientific reasoning and so on. They are however not a-priori there. The reasoner likewise is not prior to reasoning but as much constituted by reason as itself constitutive of reasoning, but perhaps I misunderstand your question.

Isn't some parts of the world is unknown, irrational and mysterious? We don't exactly know why the world exists, or how it began. Who was the first ever folk in the world? Does God exist? — Corvus

That we do not know something does not mean that we cannot know it. for Hegel we can know it as there cannot be anything apart from knowledge. How could we say something 'is' when we cannot even know it as a something? God for Hegel I believe is reason personified, but it is always a personification. My grasp of Hegels philosophy of religion is not that great though, but he sees in the elaboration of God a similar process of development as he sees in reason.

Remember how he has nothing sublate itself and being and being in turn sublate nothing and itself. Everything sublates everything else in Hegel, although thatbis not the total history of the movement — Gregory

Yes, but in that process being and nothing are not gone. They become 'moments' in this case of becoming. In a higher order being then returns as 'Wesen'.

The 'substance' of Aristotelian philosophy resulted from the Latin translation of the Greek 'ouisia' . But ‘ouisua’ is the Greek verb meaning 'to be'. So the meaning of 'substance' in philosophy was originally nearer than 'subject' or ‘being’ than the usual meaning of the word, which is ‘a material with uniform properties.’ — Wayfarer

Well possible. I think Hegel takes a lot from the ancient Greeks. He decried himself as Heraclitian all the way I believe. See also 'Hegel and Aristotle' by Alfredo Ferrarin, I only read parts of it, long ago though.

Julian Young's book on Schopenhauer says Schopenhauer's Will was Kant's Thing-in-Itself (…) and he was wrong. — Corvus

“….The thing in itself I have neither introduced surreptitiously nor inferred according to laws which exclude it, because they really belong to its phenomenal appearance; nor, in general, have I arrived at it by roundabout ways. On the contrary, I have shown it directly, there where it lies immediately, in the will, which reveals itself to every one directly as the in-itself of his own phenomenal being….”
(Schopenhauer, WWR, Vol 2, App., pg 85, 1818, in Haldane/Kemp 1909)
————-

Funny to have S brought into a thread on H….oil and water:

“….It became the fitting starting-point for the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid Hegel…”
(Ibid, pg 8)

“It” being K’s lacksidaisical invention of the ding an sich, re: being the lesser nonsense. Schopenhauer had less than even precious little respect for Hegel, berating the “young Hegelians” as well, for wasting their time at his lectures, much less cracking one of his books.

FYI.

They say Schopenhauer hated Hegel for some peculiar reasons. :)

Peculiar for us, maybe? Wonder what the peer-group at the time thought. Truth be told, I don’t know S’s relation to H as well as I know his relation to K, other than in the former he is not gentle in his derision.