I think you are on the right track, but perhaps it would be instructive to examine your definitions of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity':

To clarify the terminology: by 'objective', I take it to mean, generally, 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-independent"; and by 'subjective', I take it to mean the inverse: 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-dependent".

I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality). — Bob Ross

If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.

Thus the problem arises that, according to your definitions, objective and subjective propositions do not even exist. This isn't odd; it happens all the time. The words 'objective' and 'subjective' tend to be vague, ambiguous, and historically recent. Attempts to pin them down are quite hard.

That said, I agree with you that truth involves a correspondence between mind and reality, and therefore cannot be reduced to either one in isolation.

If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.

This is a very good point that I am honestly slapping myself for it! I definitely need to refurbish my definitions, as they are clearly insufficient. For 'objectivity', then, I think I am trying to express "that which is not contingent on minds" and by 'subjectivity' 'that which is contingent on minds'. Defining them in terms of propositions, as you noted, cannot work since propositions are an expression of truth-values.

Within these new definitions, it would be said that propositionalizing things, as well as all Truth in general, is contingent on both object (being) and subject (mind).

I am going to refurbish the OP to reflect this definitional change: thank you Leontiskos!

I find that it is a false dilemma to posit a thing as either objective or subjective, as there can be emergent things from the relationship between the two.
I think that 'truth' is a prime example of this ... — Bob Ross

Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?
You offer "truth" as a prime example of it. But this poses some problems related to your proposition:
1) Can anything at all emerge from truth? What could be that?
2) Can truth ever be objective? Who is out there who can speak about it? And if he can speak about it, wouldn't that have a subjective tint?

I have more questions, but I don't want either to overwhelm you or become too critical (because I already seem to be! :smile:)

Hello Alkis Piskas,

Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?

I am not sure if I fully understood the question, but I would say that it is possible for a thing to exist as emergent from the relationship between subject and object; that is, between a thinking mind and the world of which it thinks about.

1) Can anything at all emerge from truth? What could be that?

I don’t think anything emerges from truth per se in the same manner as truth is emergent from the relationship between object and subject; as only ‘emergent’ things from truth are really just aspects of the truth: there’s nothing extra emerging. However, with both subject and object, there really is a new thing which we call ‘truth’, which is a correspondence of thought with the referent thereof.

Can truth ever be objective? Who is out there who can speak about it? And if he can speak about it, wouldn't that have a subjective tint?

I would say that truth is neither objective nor subjective but, rather, a relationship between the two. It is still absolute (i.e., we do not get to make up the truth), but it isn’t objective.

I have more questions, but I don't want either to overwhelm you or become too critical (because I already seem to be! :smile:)

Feel free to ask away my friend! I can assure you that I will not think you are being too critical nor that you are overwhelming me. Depending on what you say, I may need to take some time to think it over, but that is the nature of these kinds of substantive conversations!

I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality). — Bob Ross

Hello Bob Ross!

I cannot say that truth is subjective either. But you claimed that reality is mind-dependent and thus, there can be no asserted being without a subject. If I didn't understand you mistakenly, your point here is that, despite the fact that truth is not objective or subjective, it cannot really exist without our minds.

Well, I personally think that truth can be objective.

I have another definition of truth from Plato: “This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of the good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth in so far as known.”

A year ago, I read an interesting paper by Richard A. Fumerton called Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception. He asked to the participants the following question: How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object? If you are interested, here is the link to the thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12945/hallucination-and-truth/p1

I agree with his points that “real objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things that appear are, most of the time, real.”
Yet, this assertions can be contradicted by your arguments and I thought it was interesting to share them in your thread. I personally think that truth exists objectively but we even interpret wrongly due to hallucinations.
Conclusion of what I try to argue: reality does exist objectively but we manipulate it through our mind and that’s why we never really know if something is “real”

Hello javi,

If I didn't understand you mistakenly, your point here is that, despite the fact that truth is not objective or subjective, it cannot really exist without our minds.

Correct.

Well, I personally think that truth can be objective.

I have another definition of truth from Plato:

Interesting! I didn’t really follow plato’s definition: how exactly are you defining truth then? Is it a platonic form for you?

A year ago, I read an interesting paper by Richard A. Fumerton

Thank you for sharing!

Conclusion of what I try to argue: reality does exist objectively but we manipulate it through our mind and that’s why we never really know if something is “real”

I think our disagreement is going to lie in the fact that I don’t think truth is synonymous with being; it is, rather, a process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent). For you, it sounds like, perhaps, truth is just being, which is the light, so to speak, of reality (as plato thought?)?

Interesting! I didn’t really follow plato’s definition: how exactly are you defining truth then? Is it a platonic form for you? — Bob Ross

I don't know if it is a platonic form of definition. But I would define truth as "the reality itself when it is perceived objectively".

For you, it sounds like, perhaps, truth is just being, which is the light, so to speak, of reality (as plato thought?)? — Bob Ross

Exactly.

What I tried to argue is that truth or reality are independent selves. They do exist there objectively, but the significance and definitions are mind-dependent. Here is where I agree with you. Yet, we can end up in a complex situation regarding the interpretation of truth: hallucination. The latter is part of our "subjectiveness" more than we wish and then, can elaborate biased definitions and interpretations while the reality and truth are just there.

It is true that there are some concepts which, without mind perception, cannot exist. For example: colors. But there are also other objects that already existed even before our own existence. For example, the universe. I think we apply a lot of "inter-subjectivity" in terms of defining both groups. My conclusion is that the universe is a reality or truth that exists independently. It doesn't need to be linked to our minds to make an "existence".

There can be no asserted being without a subject, and there can be no actual being without an object. Truth itself is thusly neither object nor subject but, rather, when the subject correctly 'maps' (or corresponds) their assertion (in thought) with something which exists (in reality).

Exactly. Truth is incoherent without the concept of falsity. Moreover, without belief in the mix, without subjectivity, why even bother with a concept of truth? There is just that which "is." Once subjectivity is on the scene though, then we can have belief. But, when we try to move to knowledge, "true belief," now we must also have a conception of false belief. If beliefs cannot be false, then there is no reason to distinguish belief from knowledge.

So, the concept of knowledge itself implies the potential for false belief. This possibility then negates our claims to truth-- how can we know that our beliefs aren't false? So, we end up with skepticism, like Descartes at the outset of the Meditations. This prompts us to justify some of our beliefs, to develop "justified true belief," negating the negation (skepticism) and producing a new conception of knowledge as true belief that has been challenged by skepticism and overcome it. That old Hegelian dialectical in action. :cool:

I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality)

Right, it "unfolds" from the interplay of object and subject. This is a problem if we have a metaphysics of objects (maybe) because this might entail something coming from nothing, right? It seems that way, unless we can justify some sort of "strong emergence." But it doesn't seem to necessarily be a problem for a metaphysics of process. Indeed, above it follows directly from a dialectical process.

Although, does such a process really take place "through time?" That's a trickier thing to figure out. When/where is this "emergence?"

Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of finite spirit.”

—Hegel, Science of Logic, p.29

It works this way for Hegel because he sees thought as coming first, methodologically and, to the extent he mirrors Boehme, ontologically as well. Of course, he also sees man coming from nature, the way we tend to do today, so this is hard to square.

I have another definition of truth from Plato: “This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of the good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth in so far as known.”

Or as Augustine puts it: "all truth is God's truth." The Father is the universal ground, so all truths trace back to God (and are known through the Son/Logos, by the Spirit).

Or as Augustine puts it: "all truth is God's truth." The Father is the universal ground, so all truths trace back to God (and are known through the Son/Logos, by the Spirit). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't know that definition of Aquinas. I personally think that it is simplistic and drives us to reductionism. I would understand it in a theological version but not from a metaphysical perspective.

St. Thomas believed, with Aristotle, that universal natures or essences are real and present in individual beings. I guess this is called "Realism"

While Aquinas might find some ground in Aristotle's metaphysics to quibble over the implications of this, it is quite obvious, for instance, from Aristotle's writings that his God works no miracles or in any other way abridges the regularity of the laws of nature -- something required by Christian theology.

On the other hand, I think we should mention William of Ockham who argued that only individual beings are real and that universals do not have objective existence, etc.

Hello javi,

I don't know if it is a platonic form of definition. But I would define truth as "the reality itself when it is perceived objectively".

With your definition here, I don’t see the actual disagreement with what I said, as the act of perceiving requires a subject. So truth, even under your definition, if I am understanding you correctly, is not objective. Unless by “perceived objectively” you mean a “perspectiveless perceiver of reality”?

What I tried to argue is that truth or reality are independent selves.

I think, in that case, then you are just talking about being; which, to me, isn’t truth. If that’s what ‘truth’ means, then it is just a redundant term and we need another term to denote the correspondence of asserted being with actual being.

Yet, we can end up in a complex situation regarding the interpretation of truth: hallucination.

I think the problem you are going to run into is that it is true (viz., in truth) that you had the hallucination; so I don’t think you can cleanly separate truth from hallucination. Instead, I would argue that it is false to correspond the hallucination as something it is not (namely, whatever one is mistaking the illusion for), but the hallucination itself is true insofar as one recognizes it as one (since the claim would correspond with what actual is: the hallucination).

The latter is part of our "subjectiveness" more than we wish and then, can elaborate biased definitions and interpretations while the reality and truth are just there.

I sort of agree, but the biased definitions and interpretations themselves are in the truth. That’s why I say that truth is the correspondence of what is thought to what is. If there is a biased definition, then when it is claimed in thought that “there is a biased definition” it is true as they correspond.

For example: colors. But there are also other objects that already existed even before our own existence. For example, the universe. I think we apply a lot of "inter-subjectivity" in terms of defining both groups. My conclusion is that the universe is a reality or truth that exists independently. It doesn't need to be linked to our minds to make an "existence".

It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, you are using ‘truth’ and ‘being’ interchangeably; which in terms of the latter I do not disagree—but I don’t think that captures what truth is. It is the activity of uncovering what is, which is not what is itself.

I would also like to address the other post you mentioned me in:

Here's a trick to help you remember the difference between subjective and objective. Subjectivity is self-centered and based on speculations, sentiments, and experiences. Objectivity is outward-focused and based on observable facts and data that can be proven true.

I think this kind of definition is a good approximate but does not completely capture what ‘truth’ is. The “outward-focus” of objectivity is just what I mean by truth; that is, the impartial uncovering of what is. The subjectivity that is mentioned here (e.g., speculations, sentiments, and experiences) is pretty much what I mean by “thinking”. It is true that I speculated about X iff that assertion corresponds to reality—viz., I actually speculated about it. That’s truth.

Hello Count,

Wonderful post! I agreed with a lot of it.

Right, it "unfolds" from the interplay of object and subject. This is a problem if we have a metaphysics of objects (maybe) because this might entail something coming from nothing, right? It seems that way, unless we can justify some sort of "strong emergence." But it doesn't seem to necessarily be a problem for a metaphysics of process

I am not sure how ‘truth’ as an relation between subject and object would entail strong emergence: one can reduce ‘truth’ to a relationship between the two. Why would it be strongly emergent?

I am interested in this “process” style metaphysics, could you tell me more?

In terms of Hegel, I am still reading him so I am not entirely sure what he meant yet; but I followed your references and agreed with them.

Unless by “perceived objectively” you mean a “perspectiveless perceiver of reality”? — Bob Ross

Exactly.

It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, you are using ‘truth’ and ‘being’ interchangeably; — Bob Ross

No, I use them as different terms as clearly. On one hand, we have "being" that needs a precise definition of its concept. Every object is a "being" and we just define them to introduce them into our vocabulary with the aim of understanding our "reality".
On the other hand, we have “truth”, which also needs a precise definition of the concept. I agree with you in this point, when you interpret it as “It is the activity of uncovering what is, which is not what is itself.”

Apart from those premises, I still defend that one of the "weaknesses" of truth is hallucinations or the abuse of subjectiveness when we are defining. Sometimes, we can all be wrong when we "uncover" what it is.

Hello javi,

Unless by “perceived objectively” you mean a “perspectiveless perceiver of reality”? — Bob Ross

Exactly.

But this is a contradiction in terms: you can’t have a perspectiveless perspective, nor a non-perceiver perception.

Apart from those premises, I still defend that one of the "weaknesses" of truth is hallucinations or the abuse of subjectiveness when we are defining. Sometimes, we can all be wrong when we "uncover" what it is.

This is true, but I don’t think it is a weakness of truth—it is a question pertaining to how well we can come to know the truth.

But this is a contradiction in terms: you can’t have a perspectiveless perspective, nor a non-perceiver perception. — Bob Ross

Hello again Bob!

I agree with your position. I sound contradictory trying to find out a definition. I will try again: I think "perspectiveless" is not what I was thinking about when I was typing my answer. I believe that truth is self-evident, and I do not know how extensive mind-dependence is on it.

I must admit that it is difficult for me to express myself properly, but the paper I shared yesterday explains better what I want to mean: "But we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object?"
Then, it seems to be interesting for me the appreciate that Richard A. Fumerton did: "we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists..."

I follow Fumerton's argument. In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states, but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.

Hello Javi,

I agree with your position. I sound contradictory trying to find out a definition.

I see. I am just a bit confused, as if you agree with my position, then wouldn’t that entail you agree with my definition? Or are you only partially agreeing with me?

I believe that truth is self-evident, and I do not know how extensive mind-dependence is on it.

I disagree: facts which we know now were not, in the past, self-evident to anyone (e.g., washing one’s hands helps prevent illnesses) and something that was self-evident to people sometimes turn out to be non-factual (e.g., racist claims towards other groups of people).

I must admit that it is difficult for me to express myself properly, but the paper I shared yesterday explains better what I want to mean

Absolutely no worries! I am just trying to understand your position better, and I am still a bit confused.

But we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object?

Perhaps this is because I am unfamiliar with Fumerton’s work, but, to me, veridical perception includes hallucinatory perception; so I don’t see this kind of divide fruitful in defining ‘truth’. Again, to claim that one was hallucinating when they were would be true (and in the truth: veridical). Or, perhaps, since he is focusing on perceptions, then there are, indeed, misleading vs. non-misleading perceptions; but, then, truth is allegedly reduced to what is perceived, and I would say truth is not related to the subject in perception but, rather, in thought.

"we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists...

This is true: our conscious experience is a representation of the world-in-itself.

I follow Fumerton's argument. In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states

I find this questionable; as I can be mislead about my own mental activity (e.g., be deluded about it or downright wrong). For example, I could mistake the feeling of serenity with a feeling of vast pleasure. In this case, my assertion does not correspond to reality and, thusly, is false.

but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.

We come to know subject and object in the same manner: as representations. I come to know myself as myself unfolds within my representations.

Hi Bob!

At first your post seemed very compelling to me, but now I'm not so sure if you got it right.

It isn't clear that a proposition is necessarily subjective. Sure, until recently propositions were produced by subjective beings, but does that make them in themselves subjective?

You quoted Aristotle, is this quote a subjective emission of a man, or is it an objective artifact that outlived its creator, who is now not even dust?

Does the truth of the propositions in a math book depend on the the fact that a subjective human happened to write them? Or is it independent of their creator?

Of course, now AI can write them and all other propositions as well. Does the fact that AI wrote them somehow affect their truth?

There are three things, I think, not two:


____(1)____ _____(2)_____ ___(3)__
Formulator --> Proposition<--->Reality

1 is (often) subjective, 2 and 3 are objective, and truth is the relationship between 2 and 3.

Hello again Bob!

then wouldn’t that entail you agree with my definition? Or are you only partially agreeing with me? — Bob Ross

Yes, I am partially agree with you.



The problem with my premises or Furmeton’s arguments is that it proves too much. Taken with sufficient seriousness, it is an argument against the possibility of knowledge in general, not just against naive realism. Fumerton cannot recover from the wider implications of such an argument, and his own honest conclusions are that scepticism is difficult to refute, that he doesn't see how we can do so, and that perhaps a philosopher shouldn't adopt some sort of program to refute scepticism.

Real objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things that appear are, most of the time, real. That is just the point.
I personally believe that this is common sense. Objects, themselves, are real and we should perceive them objectively. How important is it to perceive them subjectively if we can make the mistake of misinterpretation?

Yet, the big issue is to discern when there is a real object and when there isn't. This weakness on the objective side of perception indicates that the relation between subject and object is not one that, even with undecidability, is ontologically symmetrical (in other words, whether there is always one when there is supposed to be other).

Hello Hypericin,

You positing something very thought provoking! Let me see if I can adequately respond.

Firstly, I would say that propositions are statements that express alleged truth and are not independent of a subject. So, here’s your diagram:

____(1)____ _____(2)_____ ___(3)__
Formulator --> Proposition<----> Reality

I would say something like this:

__________(2)__________
Proposition
____(1)____ ___(3)___
Formulator --> Reality

In other words, a proposition references a ‘formulation’ (i.e., an assertion) which is allegedly corresponding to something in reality; and it is true insofar as it actually does correspond and false if it doesn’t. The proposition, by my lights, cannot exist independently of formulation (i.e., of subjects).

I think for the propositions to exist subject-independently, which is what I am understanding you to be voicing as a concern here (that that may actually be the case), they would have to be abstract objects (like platonic forms); and I don’t really see any justification for claiming that (at this point).

Now, another interesting thing that you brought up is:

You quoted Aristotle, is this quote a subjective emission of a man, or is it an objective artifact that outlived its creator, who is now not even dust?

Does the truth of the propositions in a math book depend on the the fact that a subjective human happened to write them? Or is it independent of their creator?

In summary: does the truthity expressed in those propositions, when true, persist beyond (1) their initial formulator and (2) all subjects? This is a very interesting question.

I would say that propositions do not exist subject-independently, but that the proposition will hold equally so for any possible subject; so if Aristotle asserted something which corresponds to reality at his time period (or what not), then for any other subject (of past, present, or future) that proposition would hold true—but it wouldn’t itself be an abstract object (or something like that). Without any subject, propositions don’t mean anything: without subjects, truth dissolves into mere being.

Of course, now AI can write them and all other propositions as well. Does the fact that AI wrote them somehow affect their truth?

I would say no, but that the proposition itself doesn’t exist subject-independently in the world because of that; for I am claiming that truth is subject-dependent—not dependent on some particular subject or subset of subjects (assuming AIs are classified as true subjects, which, as a side note, I doubt).

So, in short, the relationship between the assertion (i.e., the formulation) and being (i.e., reality) is contained as the referent of the concept (or idea) of a ‘proposition’.

Hopefully that was an adequate response!

Hello Javi,

Yes, I am partially agree with you.

I see. Unfortunately, I am not entirely following where our disagreement lies: could you please refresh my memory as to what, then, you are disagreeing with in my assessment of truth?

Yet, the big issue is to discern when there is a real object and when there isn't

I don’t think this quite captures truth (for reasons I have already expounded); and, as another reason, it seems perception-dependent, which doesn’t capture many truth statements. For example, if it is just about determining if one is perceiving something illusory or non-illusory, then one could never determine the concept of concepts (or the concept of anything) because it is non-perceptive.

could you please refresh my memory as to what, then, you are disagreeing with in my assessment of truth? — Bob Ross

We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind. I didn't say it previously, but I believe that truth doesn't depend on the value of mind or conciousness. Truth is a reality that does exist and "is there", doesn't matter if we are percievers or not. Nonetheless, you consider truth as a "process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent)."
Here is where it lies our discrepancies. I interpret truth objectively but subjectively (If I am not wrong...)

For example, if it is just about determining if one is perceiving something illusory or non-illusory, then one could never determine the concept of concepts (or the concept of anything) because it is non-perceptive. — Bob Ross

I understand. But this is a problem that relies on us, not the truth itself. Again, "determining the concept of concepts" is a task inherent in our knowledge because we need to expand our criteria. But I do not see why that's necessary to uncover the truth, when perception can lead us to artificial illusory "truths"

Strong emergence just means that something is a product of, or somehow ontological dependant on, other things. In this case, if subjectivity does not exist, then truth doesn't seem to exist as a coherent concept.

Strong emergence is the idea that something can exist which depends on other things, but which is not reducible to them. For example, if consciousness is "strongly emergent," in the popular materialism of our day, it would mean that subjective experience cannot be adequately explained only in terms of biology/chemistry/physics. Weak emergence is a claim that we simply cannot predict how higher order things will emerge from relations between things, e.g. we can't tell how a tornado will progress simply from knowing how air molecules work, but in theory a tornado is reducible to the things that make up the atmosphere (maybe).

Process ontology is the idea that everything is process, flux, not discrete objects.

This is a long quote so I highlighted the most relevant parts:

Process conceptions of the world have had a presence in Western thought at least since Heraclitus, but have been dominated and overshadowed by substance and atomistic metaphysical frameworks at least since Empedocles and Democritus. In fact, Parmenides argued against Heraclitus that, far from everything being flux, change is not possible at all: in order for A to change into B, A would have to disappear into nothingness and B emerge out of nothingness. Nothingness does not exist, so change does not exist. The nothingness that Parmenides was denying perhaps has a contemporary parallel in the notion of the nothingness outside of the universe (vacuum is not nothingness in this sense). It is not clear that such a notion makes any sense, and this was roughly the Parmenidean point. Furthermore, for the ancient Greeks, to think about something or to refer to something was akin to pointing to it, and it is not possible to point at nothing. For a modern parallel to this, consider the difficulties that Russell or Fodor (and many others) have had accounting for representing nothing or something that is false [Hylton, 1990].

In any case, Parmenides’ argument was taken very seriously, and both the substance and the atomistic metaphysical frameworks were proposed as responses. Empedocles’ substances of earth, air, fire, and water were unchanging in themselves, thus satisfying the Parmenidean constraint, and Democritus’ atoms were similarly unchanging wholes [Graham, 2006; Guthrie, 1965; Wright, 1997]. In both cases, apparent changes were accounted for in terms of changes in the mixtures and structural configurations of the underlying basic realities…

These are the traditions that have dominated for over two millennia, and in many respects, still do. There is, however, a historical move away from substance models toward process models: almost every science has had an initial phase in which its basic phenomena were conceptualized in terms of some kind of substance — in which the central issues were to determine what kind of substance — but has moved beyond that to a recognition of those phenomena as processes. This shift is manifest in, for example, understanding fire in terms of phlogiston to understanding fire in terms of combustion, heat in terms of random kinetic motion rather than the substance caloric, life in terms of certain kinds of far from thermodynamic equilibrium processes rather than in terms of vital fluid, and so on. Sciences of the mind, arguably, have not yet made this transition [Bickhard, 2004].

---

The default for substances and Democritean “atoms” is stability. Change requires explanation, and there are no self-movers. This is reversed in a process view, with change always occurring, and it is the stabilities of organizations or patterns of process, if such should occur, that require explanation.

There are two basic categories of process stability. The first is what might be called energy well stabilities. These are process organizations that will remain stable so long as no above threshold energy impinges on them. Contemporary atoms would be a canonical example: they are constituted as organizations of process that can remain stable for cosmological time periods.

The second category of process stability is that of process organizations that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Unlike energy well stabilities, these require ongoing maintenance of their far from equilibrium conditions. Otherwise, they go to equilibrium and cease to exist...

---

Positing a metaphysical realm of substances or atoms induces a fundamental split in the overall metaphysics of the world. In particular, the realm of substances or atoms is a realm that might be held to involve fact, cause, and other physicalistic properties and phenomena, but it excludes such phenomena as normativity, intentionality, and modality into a second metaphysical realm. It induces a split metaphysics.

Given such a split, there are only three basic possibilities — though, of course, unbounded potential variations on the three. One could posit some version of the two realms as fundamental, and attempt to account for the world in terms of them. Aristotle’s substance and form, Descartes’ two kinds of substances, Kant’s two realms, and the realm of fact and science distinct from that of modality and normativity of analytic philosophy are examples. Or, one could attempt to account for everything in terms of the “mental” side of the split, yielding idealisms, such as for Hegel, Green, and Bradley. Or, finally, one could attempt to account for everything in terms of the physical realm, such as Hobbes, Hume (on many interpretations), Quine, and much of contemporary science and philosophy.

It might be tempting to try to account for the whole range of phenomena in terms of some kind of emergence of normative and mental phenomena out of nonnormative phenomena, but emergence is excluded by the metaphysical frameworks that induce the split in the first place.

Adopting a process metaphysics, however, reverses the exclusion of emergence, and opens the possibility that normativity, intentionality, and other phenomena might be modeled as natural emergents in the world. This integrative program is, in fact, being pursued in contemporary work [Bickhard, 2004; 2009a; 2009b; in preparation]

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It makes no internal sense to ask why Empedoclean earth, air, fire, and water have the properties that they do, nor why they have the relationships among themselves, nor where they came from, and so on. They constitute a ground of metaphysics with which much can be done, but about which there is little that can be meaningfully questioned — at least from within that framework itself.

That has certainly not prevented such questioning, but the questions are necessarily of the metaphysical framework itself, not questions within that framework. This kind of barrier to further questioning is a further consequence that is reversed by the shift to a process framework. In general, it does make sense to ask of a process why it has the properties that it does or the relationships to other processes or where it came from. The possibility that the process in question is emergent from others by itself legitimates such questions as questions within the process metaphysical framework. Answers may or may not be discoverable, but there is no metaphysical barrier to asking the questions and seeking for answers.

Mark H. Bickhard - Systems and Process Metaphysics - Handbook of the of Science Philosophy Philosophy of Complex Systems

Process metaphysics does have challenges with delineating boundaries and individuals, but at the same time it isn't clear that substance metaphysics does this well either. Human beings for example replace 90+% of the atoms in their body on a regular basis, so in what sense are we defined by supervenience?

Hello Javi,

We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind. I didn't say it previously, but I believe that truth doesn't depend on the value of mind or conciousness. Truth is a reality that does exist and "is there", doesn't matter if we are percievers or not. Nonetheless, you consider truth as a "process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent)."
Here is where it lies our discrepancies. I interpret truth objectively but subjectively (If I am not wrong...)

Correct me if I am wrong, but then it sounds like you are simply completely disagreeing with me, no? What are we in agreement about then?

It sounds like, when you say “truth is a reality that does exist and ‘is there’” that you are just using truth as synonymous with being; as if a thing exists, then it does so independently of minds. In this view, I think it doesn’t capture what truth is, as when we say “he is after the truth” or “he is in the truth” we do not merely mean that something exists but, rather, that his assertions correspond to what exists.

I understand. But this is a problem that relies on us, not the truth itself

If by ‘truth’ I was meaning ‘being’, then I would agree with you here. Whatever exists, well, exists! This doesn’t rely on a subject; but whether or not something is true or not does insofar as it presupposes a subject that is asserting something.

But I do not see why that's necessary to uncover the truth, when perception can lead us to artificial illusory "truths"

What ‘truth’ is is different than how well we can obtain it. Truth can be the correspondence of assertion (thought) to reality (being) all the while humans could be, let’s say, always 100% false in their assertions. This would just entail that what is asserted always does not correspond to reality (i.e., it is false). Therefore, the definition of truth stays intact irregardless of human error in obtaining it.

Hello Count,

Strong emergence just means that something is a product of, or somehow ontological dependant on, other things.
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Strong emergence is the idea that something can exist which depends on other things, but which is not reducible to them

I think the former definition is inadequate (as that is really just the definition of ‘emergence’, not strong emergence), but the latter one I agree with.

I have many problems with strong emergence (as opposed to weak emergence); and perhaps you can help me sort them out. To say that a property (or something) exists as emergent from a system (i.e., parts and the relationship/process between those parts) but cannot be conceptually reduced to such parts and relationships/processes between those parts is to posit an extra component to the emergence of this property (or something) that isn’t from the system; and, thusly, it is either to posit (1) that the system still is wholly responsible for the emergent property whilst being inadequate to explain it, or (2) that warrants the positing of another system to explain it. In the case of #1, one ends up with magic, in my opinion, as an explanation; for there is quite literally a piece to the puzzle that cannot be reduced to the system that allegedly caused the emergence—but then why think it emerged out of it (other than it being pure magic)?

For example:

For example, if consciousness is "strongly emergent," in the popular materialism of our day, it would mean that subjective experience cannot be adequately explained only in terms of biology/chemistry/physics.

To me, irreductive materialism is nonsense (and I say that with all due respect—and, perhaps, you can show me where I am wrong here): if one cannot conceptually explain yet consciousness in terms of the parts and relations/processes of parts that allegedly produced it, then one cannot say they know if that system produces it (although they may still find it plausible). Secondly, if they cannot explain it ever, which is what irreductive approaches are conceding, then they should look elsewhere, or amend that original formulation, for what produced it (and not just posit it still somehow magically emerges from it). Please correct me where I am wrong.

Thank you for sharing that quote: I am not sure I completely followed, but I will respond as adequately as I can:

Adopting a process metaphysics, however, reverses the exclusion of emergence, and opens the possibility that normativity, intentionality, and other phenomena might be modeled as natural emergents in the world. This integrative program is, in fact, being pursued in contemporary work

Where I am confused, is that if there’s just constant change, wouldn’t we still be able to nominally reduce phenomena to the estimated flux of parts that caused it (and thusly still are doing a form of reductionism)? I have no problem with admitting that the world has constant change in it, but how does that help evade the divide of mind and matter (e.g., “reverses the exclusion of emergence”)? To take your example, a tornado may just be a flux of parts relating to each other in just the right way to form a tornado; but that’s still a reductionist account of a tornado, no? There’s not strongly emergent property that cannot be explained here (by my lights).

Human beings for example replace 90+% of the atoms in their body on a regular basis, so in what sense are we defined by supervenience?

I think for people who deny continuance of identity through time, they would just respond that the mind (or body as a whole) is emergent from some parts which can be replaced periodically without damaging the emergent property (just like slowly moving data from one hard drive to another shouldn’t harm the data thereon); and, so, in the example of atoms, it doesn’t really entail, in itself, that we are not the same person even though we are not the same body anymore.

Hello again Bob.

Correct me if I am wrong, but then it sounds like you are simply completely disagreeing with me, no? What are we in agreement about then? — Bob Ross

I agree with your explanation of the truth. I think here is where we agree definitively. You explained that, as much as I interpret truth, it seems that I see truth as a synonymous of being. Well, this is true, you know what is - more or less - on my side in this debate. I wish I had better grammar skills because I am aware that I am not expressing myself properly and maybe this is why you are confused.

I will try it again:

I think that the basic element to understand truth is to understand "objective" and "subjective" previously, because I am considering that "truth" depends on one or the other. "Objective" is where metaphysical or epistemological questions depend on objects. "Subjective" is where they depend on the or a subject. Where objects exist independently of subjects, existence and knowledge are also independent of subjects. "Subjective" implies dependence on what may be relative, uncertain, idiosyncratic, whimsical, and arbitrary.

With those premises, I consider truth objectively as much as existence and knowledge. Otherwise, we can make the mistake of being arbitrary or idiosyncratic. We cannot achieve the truth if subjectiveness kicks in. I said "hallucination" in my previous posts, but we can use other kind of flaw subjective interference. For example: what is truth for you, it could be fake for me. Nonetheless, we have to accept the premise that there is something out there which is real. Whether it is true or false doesn't affect the being.

It works this way for Hegel because he sees thought as coming first, methodologically and, to the extent he mirrors Boehme, ontologically as well. Of course, he also sees man coming from nature, the way we tend to do today, so this is hard to square. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A dynamic in Hegel that helps confound the matter further is how the development of the individual is a matter of the concrete in distinction to a mere idea that only appears in thought. To some degree, that is an inversion of the individual subject for Kant and Reason's relation to the World. And to keep the snowball of the "Idealism" rolling further, Marx performs his 'inversion' of Hegel.

I don't expect to leave school with my lunch money....

Hello Javi,

I wish I had better grammar skills because I am aware that I am not expressing myself properly and maybe this is why you are confused.

No worries my friend! I may also just be my slow mind understanding what you are saying. This is where I am confused:

I agree with your explanation of the truth. I think here is where we agree definitively.
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We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind.

To me, these two claims are incoherent with each other: you say, on the one hand, that you agree with my definition (which entails that it is not objective) but then, on the other hand, say you disagree because it is objective.

However, I think I may be understanding now better what you are trying to say:

We cannot achieve the truth if subjectiveness kicks in. I said "hallucination" in my previous posts, but we can use other kind of flaw subjective interference. For example: what is truth for you, it could be fake for me. Nonetheless, we have to accept the premise that there is something out there which is real. Whether it is true or false doesn't affect the being.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are noting that truth isn’t ‘subjective’ in the sense that we get to make up what is true; and, that, I totally agree with! However, I would say that truth is absolute to capture that and not objective. Perhaps it is just a difference in terms, but I would say that the assertion → actuality relation holds true for every subject (and is not contingent on any particular subject); however, it is still subjective insofar as there needs to be a subject to assert it (if that makes sense). It can’t be objective, by my lights, if it requires a subject (i.e., is contingent in any way on a subject), but it can still be absolute (viz., if my assertion corresponds to reality, then if you were to assert the same thing then it would also have to be true—we don’t get to change propositional values based off of our ‘feelings’ or the like). Is that what you are trying to convey?

This is why I have always found Aristotle's definition of truth to be the most compelling: "Well, falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107). Truth seems, by my lights, to be an act of uncovering and lies to be the act of covering up what was already uncovered; and this depends on there being both a subject and object.

What do you all think? — Bob Ross

This last part especially appeals to me. I associate it with Heidegger, who was strongly influenced by Aristotle. Truth-telling is often a pointing-out or a directing-attention-to. We are all in the same world together, talking about that single shared world, disclosing it for one another in greater depth and clarity, disabusing one another of various confusions and superstitions.

Hello Plaque Flag,

I agree. I was going to quote Heidegger's Being & Time where he talks about the act of uncovering, but I couldn't find the quote in any timely manner; but, yes, what I am saying is essentially what heidegger said without diving into dasein (because I don't think it is necessary in order to define truth to use his entire framework).

I totally respect going at Heidegger's themes without the baggage. I love Heidegger, especially the earlier stuff, but it's still nice to try to find a different vocabulary and different vector of approach. At the moment I'm kneedeep in Husserl, also great.

There can be no asserted being without a subject, and there can be no actual being without an object. — Bob Ross

I think you are aiming at something like what I call the entanglement of the object and subject. They cannot be isolated without absurdity.

Indeed, I think the being-in-a-world-with-others-in-language is a single phenomena with different aspects. People try to snap off pieces and end up in performative contradiction and nonsense. As a philosopher, I cannot reject this minimal foundation, because it's basically already implicit in the concept/project of philosophy.