To clarify the terminology: by 'objective', I take it to mean, generally, 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-independent"; and by 'subjective', I take it to mean the inverse: 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-dependent".
I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality). — Bob Ross
If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.
Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?I find that it is a false dilemma to posit a thing as either objective or subjective, as there can be emergent things from the relationship between the two.
I think that 'truth' is a prime example of this ... — Bob Ross
Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?
1) Can anything at all emerge from truth? What could be that?
Can truth ever be objective? Who is out there who can speak about it? And if he can speak about it, wouldn't that have a subjective tint?
I have more questions, but I don't want either to overwhelm you or become too critical (because I already seem to be! :smile:)
I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality). — Bob Ross
If I didn't understand you mistakenly, your point here is that, despite the fact that truth is not objective or subjective, it cannot really exist without our minds.
Well, I personally think that truth can be objective.
I have another definition of truth from Plato:
A year ago, I read an interesting paper by Richard A. Fumerton
Conclusion of what I try to argue: reality does exist objectively but we manipulate it through our mind and that’s why we never really know if something is “real”
Interesting! I didn’t really follow plato’s definition: how exactly are you defining truth then? Is it a platonic form for you? — Bob Ross
For you, it sounds like, perhaps, truth is just being, which is the light, so to speak, of reality (as plato thought?)? — Bob Ross
There can be no asserted being without a subject, and there can be no actual being without an object. Truth itself is thusly neither object nor subject but, rather, when the subject correctly 'maps' (or corresponds) their assertion (in thought) with something which exists (in reality).
I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality)
Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of finite spirit.”
—Hegel, Science of Logic, p.29
I have another definition of truth from Plato: “This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of the good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth in so far as known.”
Or as Augustine puts it: "all truth is God's truth." The Father is the universal ground, so all truths trace back to God (and are known through the Son/Logos, by the Spirit). — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't know if it is a platonic form of definition. But I would define truth as "the reality itself when it is perceived objectively".
What I tried to argue is that truth or reality are independent selves.
Yet, we can end up in a complex situation regarding the interpretation of truth: hallucination.
The latter is part of our "subjectiveness" more than we wish and then, can elaborate biased definitions and interpretations while the reality and truth are just there.
For example: colors. But there are also other objects that already existed even before our own existence. For example, the universe. I think we apply a lot of "inter-subjectivity" in terms of defining both groups. My conclusion is that the universe is a reality or truth that exists independently. It doesn't need to be linked to our minds to make an "existence".
Here's a trick to help you remember the difference between subjective and objective. Subjectivity is self-centered and based on speculations, sentiments, and experiences. Objectivity is outward-focused and based on observable facts and data that can be proven true.
Right, it "unfolds" from the interplay of object and subject. This is a problem if we have a metaphysics of objects (maybe) because this might entail something coming from nothing, right? It seems that way, unless we can justify some sort of "strong emergence." But it doesn't seem to necessarily be a problem for a metaphysics of process
Unless by “perceived objectively” you mean a “perspectiveless perceiver of reality”? — Bob Ross
It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, you are using ‘truth’ and ‘being’ interchangeably; — Bob Ross
Unless by “perceived objectively” you mean a “perspectiveless perceiver of reality”? — Bob Ross
Exactly.
This is true, but I don’t think it is a weakness of truth—it is a question pertaining to how well we can come to know the truth.Apart from those premises, I still defend that one of the "weaknesses" of truth is hallucinations or the abuse of subjectiveness when we are defining. Sometimes, we can all be wrong when we "uncover" what it is.
But this is a contradiction in terms: you can’t have a perspectiveless perspective, nor a non-perceiver perception. — Bob Ross
I agree with your position. I sound contradictory trying to find out a definition.
I believe that truth is self-evident, and I do not know how extensive mind-dependence is on it.
I must admit that it is difficult for me to express myself properly, but the paper I shared yesterday explains better what I want to mean
But we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object?
"we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists...
I follow Fumerton's argument. In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states
but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.
then wouldn’t that entail you agree with my definition? Or are you only partially agreeing with me? — Bob Ross
You quoted Aristotle, is this quote a subjective emission of a man, or is it an objective artifact that outlived its creator, who is now not even dust?
Does the truth of the propositions in a math book depend on the the fact that a subjective human happened to write them? Or is it independent of their creator?
Of course, now AI can write them and all other propositions as well. Does the fact that AI wrote them somehow affect their truth?
Yes, I am partially agree with you.
Yet, the big issue is to discern when there is a real object and when there isn't
could you please refresh my memory as to what, then, you are disagreeing with in my assessment of truth? — Bob Ross
For example, if it is just about determining if one is perceiving something illusory or non-illusory, then one could never determine the concept of concepts (or the concept of anything) because it is non-perceptive. — Bob Ross
Process conceptions of the world have had a presence in Western thought at least since Heraclitus, but have been dominated and overshadowed by substance and atomistic metaphysical frameworks at least since Empedocles and Democritus. In fact, Parmenides argued against Heraclitus that, far from everything being flux, change is not possible at all: in order for A to change into B, A would have to disappear into nothingness and B emerge out of nothingness. Nothingness does not exist, so change does not exist. The nothingness that Parmenides was denying perhaps has a contemporary parallel in the notion of the nothingness outside of the universe (vacuum is not nothingness in this sense). It is not clear that such a notion makes any sense, and this was roughly the Parmenidean point. Furthermore, for the ancient Greeks, to think about something or to refer to something was akin to pointing to it, and it is not possible to point at nothing. For a modern parallel to this, consider the difficulties that Russell or Fodor (and many others) have had accounting for representing nothing or something that is false [Hylton, 1990].
In any case, Parmenides’ argument was taken very seriously, and both the substance and the atomistic metaphysical frameworks were proposed as responses. Empedocles’ substances of earth, air, fire, and water were unchanging in themselves, thus satisfying the Parmenidean constraint, and Democritus’ atoms were similarly unchanging wholes [Graham, 2006; Guthrie, 1965; Wright, 1997]. In both cases, apparent changes were accounted for in terms of changes in the mixtures and structural configurations of the underlying basic realities…
These are the traditions that have dominated for over two millennia, and in many respects, still do. There is, however, a historical move away from substance models toward process models: almost every science has had an initial phase in which its basic phenomena were conceptualized in terms of some kind of substance — in which the central issues were to determine what kind of substance — but has moved beyond that to a recognition of those phenomena as processes. This shift is manifest in, for example, understanding fire in terms of phlogiston to understanding fire in terms of combustion, heat in terms of random kinetic motion rather than the substance caloric, life in terms of certain kinds of far from thermodynamic equilibrium processes rather than in terms of vital fluid, and so on. Sciences of the mind, arguably, have not yet made this transition [Bickhard, 2004].
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The default for substances and Democritean “atoms” is stability. Change requires explanation, and there are no self-movers. This is reversed in a process view, with change always occurring, and it is the stabilities of organizations or patterns of process, if such should occur, that require explanation.
There are two basic categories of process stability. The first is what might be called energy well stabilities. These are process organizations that will remain stable so long as no above threshold energy impinges on them. Contemporary atoms would be a canonical example: they are constituted as organizations of process that can remain stable for cosmological time periods.
The second category of process stability is that of process organizations that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Unlike energy well stabilities, these require ongoing maintenance of their far from equilibrium conditions. Otherwise, they go to equilibrium and cease to exist...
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Positing a metaphysical realm of substances or atoms induces a fundamental split in the overall metaphysics of the world. In particular, the realm of substances or atoms is a realm that might be held to involve fact, cause, and other physicalistic properties and phenomena, but it excludes such phenomena as normativity, intentionality, and modality into a second metaphysical realm. It induces a split metaphysics.
Given such a split, there are only three basic possibilities — though, of course, unbounded potential variations on the three. One could posit some version of the two realms as fundamental, and attempt to account for the world in terms of them. Aristotle’s substance and form, Descartes’ two kinds of substances, Kant’s two realms, and the realm of fact and science distinct from that of modality and normativity of analytic philosophy are examples. Or, one could attempt to account for everything in terms of the “mental” side of the split, yielding idealisms, such as for Hegel, Green, and Bradley. Or, finally, one could attempt to account for everything in terms of the physical realm, such as Hobbes, Hume (on many interpretations), Quine, and much of contemporary science and philosophy.
It might be tempting to try to account for the whole range of phenomena in terms of some kind of emergence of normative and mental phenomena out of nonnormative phenomena, but emergence is excluded by the metaphysical frameworks that induce the split in the first place.
Adopting a process metaphysics, however, reverses the exclusion of emergence, and opens the possibility that normativity, intentionality, and other phenomena might be modeled as natural emergents in the world. This integrative program is, in fact, being pursued in contemporary work [Bickhard, 2004; 2009a; 2009b; in preparation]
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It makes no internal sense to ask why Empedoclean earth, air, fire, and water have the properties that they do, nor why they have the relationships among themselves, nor where they came from, and so on. They constitute a ground of metaphysics with which much can be done, but about which there is little that can be meaningfully questioned — at least from within that framework itself.
That has certainly not prevented such questioning, but the questions are necessarily of the metaphysical framework itself, not questions within that framework. This kind of barrier to further questioning is a further consequence that is reversed by the shift to a process framework. In general, it does make sense to ask of a process why it has the properties that it does or the relationships to other processes or where it came from. The possibility that the process in question is emergent from others by itself legitimates such questions as questions within the process metaphysical framework. Answers may or may not be discoverable, but there is no metaphysical barrier to asking the questions and seeking for answers.
We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind. I didn't say it previously, but I believe that truth doesn't depend on the value of mind or conciousness. Truth is a reality that does exist and "is there", doesn't matter if we are percievers or not. Nonetheless, you consider truth as a "process of uncovering, which requires an uncoverer (mind) and the covered (mind-independent)."
Here is where it lies our discrepancies. I interpret truth objectively but subjectively (If I am not wrong...)
I understand. But this is a problem that relies on us, not the truth itself
But I do not see why that's necessary to uncover the truth, when perception can lead us to artificial illusory "truths"
Strong emergence just means that something is a product of, or somehow ontological dependant on, other things.
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Strong emergence is the idea that something can exist which depends on other things, but which is not reducible to them
For example, if consciousness is "strongly emergent," in the popular materialism of our day, it would mean that subjective experience cannot be adequately explained only in terms of biology/chemistry/physics.
Adopting a process metaphysics, however, reverses the exclusion of emergence, and opens the possibility that normativity, intentionality, and other phenomena might be modeled as natural emergents in the world. This integrative program is, in fact, being pursued in contemporary work
Human beings for example replace 90+% of the atoms in their body on a regular basis, so in what sense are we defined by supervenience?
Correct me if I am wrong, but then it sounds like you are simply completely disagreeing with me, no? What are we in agreement about then? — Bob Ross
It works this way for Hegel because he sees thought as coming first, methodologically and, to the extent he mirrors Boehme, ontologically as well. Of course, he also sees man coming from nature, the way we tend to do today, so this is hard to square. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I wish I had better grammar skills because I am aware that I am not expressing myself properly and maybe this is why you are confused.
I agree with your explanation of the truth. I think here is where we agree definitively.
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We disagree in the assessment of truth because I interpret this concept objectively, without any interference of mind.
We cannot achieve the truth if subjectiveness kicks in. I said "hallucination" in my previous posts, but we can use other kind of flaw subjective interference. For example: what is truth for you, it could be fake for me. Nonetheless, we have to accept the premise that there is something out there which is real. Whether it is true or false doesn't affect the being.
This is why I have always found Aristotle's definition of truth to be the most compelling: "Well, falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107). Truth seems, by my lights, to be an act of uncovering and lies to be the act of covering up what was already uncovered; and this depends on there being both a subject and object.
What do you all think? — Bob Ross
There can be no asserted being without a subject, and there can be no actual being without an object. — Bob Ross
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