Notice how close this is getting to the dictum of classical metaphysics - that ‘to be is to be intelligible’.
The problem is that for some reason I thought the Logic was notoriously dense but at least shorter than the Phenomenology. Then the book arrives and it's like 1,000 damn pages. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Copenhagen has a metaphysical perspective, it's one that is heavily influenced by logical positivism and Carnap — Count Timothy von Icarus
Some time ago there was a meeting of philosophers, most of them positivists, here in Copenhagen, during which members of the Vienna Circle played a prominent part. I (Bohr) was asked to address them on the interpretation of quantum theory. After my lecture, no one raised any objections or asked any embarrassing questions, but I must say this very fact proved a terrible disappointment to me. For those who are not shocked when they first come across quantum theory cannot possibly have understood it. Probably I spoke so badly that no one knew what I was talking about....
I can readily agree with the positivists about the things they want, but not about the things they reject. …Positivist insistence on conceptual clarity is, of course, something I fully endorse, but their prohibition of any discussion of the wider issues, simply because we lack clear-cut enough concepts in this realm, does not seem very useful to me—this same ban would prevent our understanding of quantum theory. — Werner Heisenberg, Positivism, Metaphysics, and Religion (in Physics and Beyond)
Not that I am at all an advocate for "consciousness causes collapse," but sometimes exploring theories you don't like tells you important things about the ones you do like. In any event, in comparison to infinite parallel universes and infinite copies of ourselves, it doesn't
seem that wild. If the Fine Tuning Problem is bad enough to make people embrace multiple worlds, maybe consciousness causes collapse is due for a resurgence? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Just because uncertainty is a physical truth doesn't mean that the electron doesn't exist. — Moliere
The electron, whatever it might mean, is literally a point and a wave. — Moliere
How can 'something' be 'literally' two completely different kinds? — Wayfarer
even though we still puzzle over what it means. — Moliere
Neither the moon nor the electron cease to exist — Moliere
the Copenhagen interpretation encouraged shut up and calculate — Moliere
why not biology as a first science rather than physics? Maybe the results in physics, at certain times at least, aren't fundamental but specific to the system they're studying, and the aggregates of the physical world don't follow the same rules. — Moliere
To understand biology you need to study biology. To understand chemistry you need study chemistry, and all the same for the other subjects. The intersection between these fields isn't so clean as you present. — Moliere
I'm skeptical.The reverse is not true. — T Clark
That is -- putting biology first isn't so crazy as it sounds because we're not modeling the world off of natural selection, but instead questioning what sort of causation is truly fundamental.
Or, if we are dedicated Humeans, we'll note that neither is fundamental at all, that there is no most basic kind of causation that everything can be reduced to, that it's a mere habit of the mind. — Moliere
This reminds me of the problems of emergentism and notions of "downward causation". How does a higher level influence a lower level, if the higher level doesn't exist yet? Are we going to invoke some sort of quantum level of indeterminacy of time? That seems a stretch. I am not saying it's necessarily wrong, but that approach seems a stretch. — schopenhauer1
I've been pondering this. It is possible, I suppose, that the mathematics in quantum theory has been reified to some extent. The Mathematical Universe is this idea writ large. — jgill
There isn't any one mainstream theory for this. Rather, there is a constellation of widely variant theories that focus on anything from "all complex enough computation results in experience," to "certain energy patterns = experience," to panpsychism, to brainwaves, to a quantum level explanations. — Count Timothy von Icarus
What is surprising is that, even if we could resolve individual synapses, we aren't sure this would give us an answer. That is, most theories are such that, even if we magically had that sort of resolution, they couldn't tell us "look for X and X will show you if a thing is conscious or not." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Further -- the big conflict here, with respect to interpreting the sciences in a philosophical manner, is on different notions of causation. The SEP has a lovely page on Teleological Notions in Biology, which you won't find in chemistry except as metaphor. The intersection between physics and biology is interesting specifically because it's where we might be able to understand the relationship between our traditional notion of causation in science (not quite billiard-ball, anymore, but still), and the frequent use of teleology in understanding living systems. That is -- putting biology first isn't so crazy as it sounds because we're not modeling the world off of natural selection, but instead questioning what sort of causation is truly fundamental. — Moliere
Or, if we are dedicated Humeans, we'll note that neither is fundamental at all, that there is no most basic kind of causation that everything can be reduced to, that it's a mere habit of the mind. — Moliere
I read a book a while ago "What is life? : how chemistry becomes biology" by Addy Pross. It's about abiogenesis and Pross writes, somewhat convincingly, that it would make sense to think of everything, including non-living matter, as subject to natural selection. That could be seen as evidence for your position, although I don't think it is. Cross-fertilization between disciplines is useful, necessary. That's different from understanding science, all human understanding, as a system of hierarchical levels. Perhaps you don't see that as a useful way of seeing things, but I do. — T Clark
You might be interested in Adam Becker's book "What is Real?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes. I think Bohr's magical/statistical metaphor was taken literally by those who wanted a more mechanical/physical explanation for the non-classical "Quantum Weirdness" that perturbed the pioneers of sub-atomic physics. Apparently the literalists intended to make Bohr's implicit mind-over-matter notion seem absurd. For them, unreal Mind & real Matter are like oil & water.Again, there is no literal 'wave function collapse'. It's a metaphorical expression for the reduction of possibilities to a certainty. The mystery is the implication that prior to measurement, the target object cannot be said to definitely exist. And if the purported 'building blocks of reality' can't be said to exist, then you have to ask 'what is real?' which is the name of one of the books mentioned about this subject. — Wayfarer
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