But what about everything else? I agree that having imperfection seems to entail having the idea of perfection, but outside of isolated cases, I don't see why this apparent fact of our constitution is this way. — Manuel

I mentioned building before. When building it is desirable to get everything as level plumb and square as possible, otherwise errors compound and horrible difficulties arise if one's initial setting out has been too far from perfect. So, accuracy is a practical necessity and once understood the idea of perfect accuracy, although unattainable, follows.

The problem here, out of many which can be pointed to, is to so much what we add to things, but more so what the objects give to us. It's very obscure. Although no longer tenable, Locke's distinction of primary secondary qualities is a useful heuristic. — Manuel

I would say that following empirical investigation, scientific observation, analysis and theory, show us what objects appear to give us. Once it is realized that we are dealing with things only as they appear the idea of things as they are in themselves logically, dialectically, follows, it seems to me.

About that I think all we can say is that pre-cognitive processes give rise to a phenomenal world which appears the same to all of us. Our investigations are always already carried out from within the cognitively given shared world, and they can be our only guide. Whether or not they are a good guide is impossible to know with certainty, but it does seem plausible that they would be.

I agree that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a valid one, as far as it goes; but it cannot get us beyond appearances. For me it seems that the most important thing for humans just is the world of appearances, it is the only real world for us. On the other hand I think the fcat that we conceive of the "in itself" has had huge consequences for the intellectual and imaginative life of humanity. So, the in itself may, as some say, "drop out of the conversation" but the fact that we can think the in itself as the idea of what we cannot think and can never know is a different matter.

I mentioned building before. When building it is desirable to get everything as level plumb and square as possible, otherwise errors compound and horrible difficulties arise if one's initial setting out has been too far from perfect. So, accuracy is a practical necessity and once understood the idea of perfect accuracy, although unattainable, follows. — Janus

I'm a bit skeptical. I could imagine a case in which "good enough" would do the job, with no conception of perfection. I'm entertaining the idea that perfection is something transferred over from mathematics, but I admit I have to think about this in more depth. Outside of that, currently, I don't see why perfection must necessarily arise for us, though it does.

I would say that following empirical investigation, scientific observation, analysis and theory, show us what objects appear to give us. Once it is realized that we are dealing with things only as they appear the idea of things as they are in themselves logically, dialectically, follows, it seems to me. — Janus

There certainly is the idea of something hidden or beyond us in the history of human thought, call it the Veil of Maya or the Dao or The One - it's a common theme.

Yet many did think that the things we experienced were things in themselves, it follows naturally from common sense. It became a serious topic of enquiry in the 17th century.

Our investigations are always already carried out from within the cognitively given shared world, and they can be our only guide. — Janus

Absolutely, completely agree.

I agree that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a valid one, as far as it goes; but it cannot get us beyond appearances. For me it seems that the most important thing for humans just is the world of appearances, it is the only real world for us. On the other hand I think the fcat that we conceive of the "in itself" has had huge consequences for the intellectual and imaginative life of humanity. So, the in itself may, as some say, "drop out of the conversation" but the fact that we can think the in itself as the idea of what we cannot think and can never know is a different matter. — Janus

It's the most fascinating topic of all for me. I wish some of the classics (and contemporaries) talked about it much more.

But what we do have may suffice, given how hard the topic is, and how little we can say about it.

I'm a bit skeptical. I could imagine a case in which "good enough" would do the job, with no conception of perfection. I'm entertaining the idea that perfection is something transferred over from mathematics, but I admit I have to think about this in more depth. Outside of that, currently, I don't see why perfection must necessarily arise for us, though it does. — Manuel

You don't think the inevitable idea of degrees of accuracy logically terminates in the idea of perfect accuracy? To my way of thinking this would be similar to how the idea of infinity logically follows from there being no limit to counting, or the idea of degrees of darkness or cold terminates in the idea of absolute darkness or cold.

Yet many did think that the things we experienced were things in themselves, it follows naturally from common sense. It became a serious topic of enquiry in the 17th century. — Manuel

It seems reasonable to think we do experience things in themselves if that is taken to mean that how things are in themselves (including ourselves of course) is determinative of what we experience. But it is a different thing to say that we could experience things as they are in themselves; the very idea stipulates that we cannot because the distinction is based on saying that whatever we can experience of things is things as they appear to us and the in itself is the dialectical counterpart of that.

It's the most fascinating topic of all for me. I wish some of the classics (and contemporaries) talked about it much more.

But what we do have may suffice, given how hard the topic is, and how little we can say about it. — Manuel

:up: I find it fascinating too!

I see...so would 'immanent' be simply possible [human] knowledge of things?

Fair enough! I was just trying to understand your position, as I still don't know what you are exactly saying; but if you would like to agree to disagree, then that is fine too. I will leave it up to you.

so would 'immanent' be simply possible [human] knowledge of things? — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I dunno. Immanent/transcendent relates mostly to understanding. Understanding is the faculty of thought, so immanent/transcendent relate to the manner of thinking of things. Thought with immanent quality will be about things of possible experience, transcendent thought will be about things not possible to experience.

You don't think the inevitable idea of degrees of accuracy logically terminates in the idea of perfect accuracy? To my way of thinking this would be similar to how the idea of infinity logically follows from there being no limit to counting, or the idea of degrees of darkness or cold terminates in the idea of absolute darkness or cold. — Janus

Not inevitably no, that's the thing, I don't see it as necessity following. You could add numbers for a long time, and not necessarily have the idea of infinity, because for all you know, numbers could come to an end. Infinity is an idea that goes "beyond" numbers alone, it's a different, though perhaps related concept.

Likewise, with improving something. But it's my current mood at the moment, I could be wrong. I'm not wedded to this view. Maybe it's because I've read Hume several times that I am being skeptical or maybe it's a passing phase...

It seems reasonable to think we do experience things in themselves if that is taken to mean that how things are in themselves (including ourselves of course) is determinative of what we experience. But it is a different thing to say that we could experience things as they are in themselves; the very idea stipulates that we cannot because the distinction is based on saying that whatever we can experience of things is things as they appear to us and the in itself is the dialectical counterpart of that. — Janus

No no, I mean, I agree with that completely. I'm talking about "ordinary people', if they don't dwell on this topic much or in depth, they would naturally assume that what we experience are things in themselves.

It would take a philosopher or maybe a scientist, to tell them this is not the case, and it would be easy to provide examples, such as what is the color of the object if there is no light or if say, you point out that a dog and a bear experience the world differently from us, who has the "correct view" of the world?

Then this will likely prompt the admission that there is something we are missing in our account of things.

And so on.

:up:

You could add numbers for a long time, and not necessarily have the idea of infinity, because for all you know, numbers could come to an end. Infinity is an idea that goes "beyond" numbers alone, it's a different, though perhaps related concept. — Manuel

Right, for all we know number could come to an end, but that seems extremely implausible given there is no logical reason why we cannot, in prinicple, keep adding forever.

Likewise, with improving something. — Manuel

Yes, we can only improve accuracy to the degree allowed by our eyes, the materials we are working with and our measuring implements, so of course perfect accuracy, just as reaching infinity, is impossible in practice, but they both seem to be conceptually coherent.

if there is no light or if say, you point out that a dog and a bear experience the world differently from us, who has the "correct view" of the world? — Manuel

My view is that animals will probably see things differently because they are differently constituted and equipped. So, it would seem to follow that we and the other animals all see things as they naturally appear to the particular beings we are. Those appearances I would say are all "correct", all real functions of the "in-itself" nature of ourselves, other animals and the world.

My view is that animals will probably see things differently because they are differently constituted and equipped. So, it would seem to follow that we and the other animals all see things as they naturally appear to the particular beings we are. Those appearances I would say are all "correct", all real functions of the "in-itself" nature of ourselves, other animals and the world. — Janus

In terms of "common sense", that is, how ordinary people view the world, it would seem somewhat striking to consider the idea that many likely radically different interpretations of the world are all correct. But as you say, no animal is wrong.

And yes, I also think that the nature of things-in-themselves plays this role for all experiencing creatures.

:cool: