So what is the point of the comment? Logic has been used extensively in real life, science and technology and metaphysics. You add the contents to the logic and process, and get the result you want. Logic has no content, because you hadn't added any? — Corvus

Logics determine the forms that contents must take. The point of the comment was to remind you that logic, as such, tells us nothing about the world.

I am sure your comment was with Kant's metaphysics, and it sounded unfounded, hence I asked for the original quotes supporting your points. It is a norm for asking the original quotes if the points you are making are unclear. Never not appropriate. — Corvus

Yes, but I quickly added that it applies to all synthetic or speculative philosophy just as it does to the arts. It might be possible to make the case that it applies to any philosophy which is not simply repeating what others have already said, but I am not concerned with making that stronger claim. To put the point simply, if we are creating new ideas, imagination must be involved. How could it be otherwise?

It seems obvious that metaphysics is not a legitimate source of empirical knowledge. On the other hand, would you not agree that it gives us knowledge of what it is possible to imagine as well as what it is not possible to imagine?

How do you know how accurate the knowledge humans can gain through the prism of their experience to reality? Why can’t reality be, for example, actually acausal, irrational, etc.? — Bob Ross

Because our experiments show us that the data we are receiving reacts from something that is not merely mental - in other words, there is retrodiction that fits in to events we can now see and evaluate. Which is why I believe that when are mental faculties happen to coincide with aspects of the external world, we have a science.

But it seems we disagree here on science. And of course, experience can be all you mention, but the same question can be raised: how do you know what you call irrational is actually irrational? But this then trends down to skepticism, which is not the main topic.

My point was that the chair does exist, if it there right now, independently of your observation of it; but that this is just a model of experience, and that is not to say that reality has chairs, atoms, nor planets like we perceive them. — Bob Ross

Chairs are folk-psychological concepts, heck, you if you put a trashcan upside down, you can call it and use it as a chair. There is flexibility in folk concepts that are severely restricted in the sciences. There we don't postulate folk concepts, we postulate very specific entities (electrons or photons, etc.) that must have those specific properties, otherwise they aren't photons or electrons, the rigidity does not apply to chairs or trees and much else.

A chair does not remain in the world, something very much like a photon will remain.

So, the phenomena vs. in-itself is an incomplete: the absolute is whatever exists beyond our possible forms of experience, and the in-themselves and phenomena are within the possibility of our experience. — Bob Ross

Here I disagree completely, things in themselves must be the ground stuff of reality. Adding another layer does fall prey to infinite regress. Which is why I think in these domains we stick to negative claims about what they cannot be.

But the knowledge of them is dependent on our experience, and so we can only say that we should expect them to behave within experience as if they persisted beyond our experience in a similar manner within a noumenal space and time—knowing full well we know nothing about what is actually happening in the world in-itself. — Bob Ross

Because atoms and planets behave as if we were not watching them. You have to account for how our science is able to retrodict things we weren't here to experience. Yes, the qualitative side of things, the color of the planet, what we call it, that is a mystery absent us. But not that they move in ellipses around the sun, or what we call "the sun", if you want to be very specific.

But my OP is using the definition of metaphysics which is the study of that which is beyond all possible experience, so within that terminology I am saying it is an illegitimate source of knowledge (which you seem to agree with, but disagree with the semantics). — Bob Ross

But who studies metaphysics as that which is beyond all possible experience? Not Descartes, not Locke nor much that come to mind prior to Kant.

Where we disagree then, is that I think epistemic structural realism is correct, science really does describe the structural components of the world, as they are mind-independently (not beyond all possible experience), but you go beyond and say, science describes our experience of the world, not aspects independent of us, so I think that's the main issue.

But [Bob Ross] who studies metaphysics as that which is beyond all possible experience? Not Descartes, not Locke nor much that come to mind prior to Kant. — Manuel

:up: :up:

Hello Bob Ross

The OP's definition of metaphysics is too restrictive, so it seems the discussions will end up nowhere, even after months of circling around the points.

Also the OP conclusion that metaphysics is an illegitimate source of knowledge seems inconsistent with the content of the arguments in the OP's replies. The content of the OP's post is filled with both metaphysical and pseudo metaphysical concepts and comments, which are self contradictory and inconsistent.

My definition of metaphysics is broad, and sometimes I even define metaphysics as philosophy itself.
I feel that if metaphysics is eliminated, then there is not much to discuss in philosophy.

Logics determine the forms that contents must take. The point of the comment was to remind you that logic, as such, tells us nothing about the world. — Janus

You learn how to make use of Logic in real life applications by manipulating the formulas and filling the variables with your own data to apply to the real world.

The comment that Logic doesn't add any content sounds like the bowl is empty, it is not very useful. You must open the fridge door get some milk out pour into the bowl, and add some cornflakes in order to have your breakfast instead of shouting the bowl is empty, it doesn't give anything. :)

Yes, but I quickly added that it applies to all synthetic or speculative philosophy just as it does to the arts. It might be possible to make the case that it applies to any philosophy which is not simply repeating what others have already said, but I am not concerned with making that stronger claim. To put the point simply, if we are creating new ideas, imagination must be involved. How could it be otherwise? — Janus

Philosophy rarely uses imagination. It mainly uses intuition, reasoning and logic, even for discovering new ideas.

The main operation of Philosophy is not about creating new ideas, but evaluating the existing ideas and claims with the critical analysis and reasoning, and judge them as valid or nonsense.

The comment that Logic doesn't add any content sounds like the bowl is empty, it is not very useful. — Corvus

Not very useful to who? The fact that logic is not about content, but about form stands whether you think it is useful or not.

Philosophy rarely uses imagination. It mainly uses intuition, reasoning and logic, even for discovering new ideas. — Corvus

The main operation of Philosophy is not about creating new ideas, but evaluating the existing ideas and claims with the critical analysis and reasoning, and judge them as valid or nonsense. — Corvus

How about you present an example of a philosophical claim, from anywhere you like, and tell me what you think it is based on.

Otherwise, I have no further interest in wasting my time responding to your unargued assertions.

Hello Joshs,

I think phenomenologists would agree that our ability to represent or model is not primary. They would say instead that there is no experience of any kind that is not conditioned by prior experience, which anticipatively projects forward into and shapes what we actually experience

Oh, I see. What about initial experience then? Or were you conveying a priori knowledge as opposed to “prior experience”?

This mutual dependence between subjective projection and objective appearance is most fundamentally what the world actually is, and we can never get beyond or beneath this intertwined structure of experience to get to an independently objective world or an inner subjective realm.

This sounds an awful lot like Kantianism.

Hello 180 Proof,

And the truth-makers for these statements are?

Why is this relevant? Can a statement not be truth-apt without having a truth-maker?

Without any mind to construct the proposition, the proposition itself still expresses, if constructed, a truth-apt claim.

e.g. An assembled pile of logs, Bob, is not equivalent to a painting of "a log cabin".

To determine “what things are” is semantically equivalent to deducing concepts and interpretations of “what things are”. They are the same painting of the log cabin, expresses verbally differently.

Those modifiers ain't working ...

I don’t know what you are referring to: could you please elaborate?

Metaphysics is the study of what it rationally makes sense to say about the most general prerequisites and implications of counterintuitive physics

Something making rational sense about the prerequisites of physics entails it is a claim pertaining to something which is beyond experience but necessary to explain that experience.

On the other hand, would you not agree that it gives us knowledge of what it is possible to imagine as well as what it is not possible to imagine?

Sure, I can get on board with that. But it doesn't give us knowledge of reality (other than knowledge of human conceivability).

Sure, I can get on board with that. But it doesn't give us knowledge of reality (other than knowledge of human conceivability). — Bob Ross

:up:

Hello Manuel,

Because our experiments show us that the data we are receiving reacts from something that is not merely mental - in other words, there is retrodiction that fits in to events we can now see and evaluate. Which is why I believe that when are mental faculties happen to coincide with aspects of the external world, we have a science.

How do you know this? Those experiments are just experiences more precisely and rationally carried out (than every-day-to-day ones). Thusly, it cannot be said that we receive anything if we take away the forms of our experience, since there isn’t even justification for there being causality.

Chairs are folk-psychological concepts, heck, you if you put a trashcan upside down, you can call it and use it as a chair

But this is just a semantic issue. I am talking about the thing which we normally call a ‘chair’, which is not a trashcan flipped upside down. My point was that the thing we point out as a chair is just as real as what we point out as an atom.

A chair does not remain in the world, something very much like a photon will remain.

This doesn’t make sense to me, since you argued this on the basis of semantics. The word ‘chair’ will certainly cease to exist, but not the thing we referred to as the chair.

Here I disagree completely, things in themselves must be the ground stuff of reality. Adding another layer does fall prey to infinite regress. Which is why I think in these domains we stick to negative claims about what they cannot be.

But they can’t be said to ground reality sans the model, which is where Kant goes wrong, since we cannot grant that anything we experience exists beyond it. Takeaway the forms of one’s experience, and nothing we experienced remains.

Because atoms and planets behave as if we were not watching them

Exactly, and this why we behave as though they do exist beyond our experience of them. My own identity as an existent person that is experiencing the planet is equally conditioned by my forms of experience, and are not valid beyond them.

But who studies metaphysics as that which is beyond all possible experience? Not Descartes, not Locke nor much that come to mind prior to Kant.

How did they define metaphysics?

Where we disagree then, is that I think epistemic structural realism is correct, science really does describe the structural components of the world, as they are mind-independently (not beyond all possible experience), but you go beyond and say, science describes our experience of the world, not aspects independent of us, so I think that's the main issue.

I would say they study things independent of us: but the very concept of “independence of oneself” is conditioned by those forms of experience, and are not valid beyond that.

Hello Corvus,

The OP's definition of metaphysics is too restrictive, so it seems the discussions will end up nowhere, even after months of circling around the points.

Then, what is your definition? I don’t remember you ever giving one (although I may just be misremembering).

Also the OP conclusion that metaphysics is an illegitimate source of knowledge seems inconsistent with the content of the arguments in the OP's replies. The content of the OP's post is filled with both metaphysical and pseudo metaphysical concepts and comments, which are self contradictory and inconsistent.

Could you please give me an example (so that we can go over it)?

Not very useful to who? The fact that logic is not about content, but about form stands whether you think it is useful or not. — Janus

Who? You raised the issue. Who else? Yes, I was saying because you never added content to logic, maybe that is your point on logic? My use of Logic was always full of content.

How about you present an example of a philosophical claim, from anywhere you like, and tell me what you think it is based on.

Otherwise, I have no further interest in wasting my time responding to your unargued assertions. — Janus

That is my own point on Philosophical methodology. If you want examples, read up on Philosophy of Language, or any Analytic Philosophy. In fact it is a character of all philosophy in general from the very ancient Greek Philosophy. Could you tell us which philosophy is based on imagination?
Same here, and I would have thought it was already clear from my last post.

Hello Bob Ross

Then, what is your definition? I don’t remember you ever giving one (although I may just be misremembering) — Bob Ross

As I have said already, my definition is various. But I usually go by metaphysics is philosophy itself.

Could you please give me an example (so that we can go over it)? — Bob Ross

All my previous posts in this thread have been pointing out on this issue. But your replies seemed not relevant to my points.

How do you know this? Those experiments are just experiences more precisely and rationally carried out (than every-day-to-day ones). Thusly, it cannot be said that we receive anything if we take away the forms of our experience, since there isn’t even justification for there being causality. — Bob Ross

But this sounds as if experience is experience of something that is only a representation and nothing else in any case. I don't think that follows, are natural numbers a representation or are they real constituents of reality? That 2+2=4, regardless of how you write the numbers, will be a fact, regardless of people being around or not, it's a fact - it's true regardless of belief or consciousness.

As for causality, again, yes, we discover it through experience. But we have to options: either things "just happen", that is, there is no reason why light can't escape a black hole, which suggests that there is no reason why light could escape a black hole, or why a photon couldn't turn in to an electron.

Or there is a reason which we discover and attribute to the external world, and it happens to be an excellent approximation of what happens.

But this is just a semantic issue. I am talking about the thing which we normally call a ‘chair’, which is not a trashcan flipped upside down. My point was that the thing we point out as a chair is just as real as what we point out as an atom. — Bob Ross

I don't agree. It's not a semantic issue, but a conceptual one. We don't sit on what we interpret as "spikes", but we could sit on many things - that depends on what we take to fit under the conception of chair.

An atom is not like this, I cannot, with significant flexibility, decide that an atom is a proton or that energy is made of particles. That doesn't happen with chairs or tables or keys, etc.

But they can’t be said to ground reality sans the model, which is where Kant goes wrong, since we cannot grant that anything we experience exists beyond it. Takeaway the forms of one’s experience, and nothing we experienced remains. — Bob Ross

We can't have a form of experience without something providing that form which is not experience. Otherwise, I could, by mere thinking change a notebook to a puddle of water. But I can't. Something prevents me, which is not my imagination, but a fact about something existing.

How did they define metaphysics? — Bob Ross

They didn't really have a definition, it was an activity. It was them describing what the world consisted in. As we know Descartes - with very good reasons for his time - thought the world was made of matter and mind.

Locke is much more subtle, and says we do not know if only matter exists, or if dualism is true. For all we know, he says, matter can think, it is not beyond the power of God to give this capacity to matter.

But they also discussed issues such as the self and skepticism, under the rubric of metaphysics.

I would say they study things independent of us: but the very concept of “independence of oneself” is conditioned by those forms of experience, and are not valid beyond that. — Bob Ross

That's fine. We don't see things similarly here.

Can a statement not be truth-apt without having a truth-maker? — Bob Ross

What makes a statement "truth-apt" that does not refer, even if only in principle, to at least one truth-maker? C'mon, Bob. Without indicating possible truth-makers, statements cannot be truth-claims. I think meta-statements (i.e. suppositions e.g. metaphysics) only interpret – evaluate – object-statements (i.e. propositions e.g. physics).

As for what is beyond the possible forms of experience - who knows what types of experience are possible? The human psyche is still a vast uncharted ocean, with realms of possibility that we might never dream of. I think it's a mistake to deprecate the imagination, after all, Einstein himself said imagination was more important than knowledge. He discovered the theory of relativity mainly through thought-experiments.

Overall I think it's a mistake to dismiss metaphysics. — Wayfarer

I am quoting myself from the Brain in the Vat thread, I think it is applicable:

The role of imagination in scientific theorizing is not in question. Also, I certainty would not say that philosophy cannot offer insights to a scientist. In nice article by John Norton, "How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity", provides a nice summary how these two philosophers, belonging to the empiricist/positivist traditions, influenced Einstein's abandonment of the idea of absolute time and simultaneity. However, even in this article, Einstein echoed what I have been saying. In section 3.1, titled "Concepts Must be Grounded in Experiences", he quotes Einstein, "‘Similarly,’ Einstein continued, ‘with the concept of simultaneity. The concept really exists for the physicist only when in a concrete case there is some possibility of deciding whether the concept is or is not applicable."

So while imagination is important, I would say it should be characterize as a fiction until its successful application. This, in turn, tells us something about this world.

Hello Corvus,

I apologize for the belated response. I was very busy the past week (or so), but I can assure you that your response was not forgotten.

As I have said already, my definition is various. But I usually go by metaphysics is philosophy itself.
…

All my previous posts in this thread have been pointing out on this issue. But your replies seemed not relevant to my points.

Ok, so, after thoroughly digesting my own OP for the past week or so, I think I understand more what you are getting at; and I am going to provide a counter-argument to my OP as an amending thereof. Please, if you are still interested in this discussion board, read it and let me know what you think.

Hello Manuel,

I am sorry for the late response, my friend! I have not forgotten your response, but haven’t had the time to respond.

Firstly, after digesting my OP more, I think my original argument is flawed (and will be posting an amendment to the OP to address that, which I would really appreciate it if you read it and shared your thoughts thereon).

However, with that being said, I am going to respond to your response in light my shifted thinking (that way we don’t waste time arguing about things we may agree with each other on now).

But this sounds as if experience is experience of something that is only a representation and nothing else in any case. I don't think that follows, are natural numbers a representation or are they real constituents of reality?

Of course, our experience of something is a mixture of a priori and empirical datum, so some of our content of our representations are really a reflection of non-representations (such as math): so I can get on board here (with you). However, I must confess ignorance on whether the things-in-themselves adhere to mathematical principles; but I can say that our representations (of them) do (as a priori means by which we represent them in space and time).

That 2+2=4, regardless of how you write the numbers, will be a fact, regardless of people being around or not, it's a fact - it's true regardless of belief or consciousness.

True, but it doesn’t follow (from that) that math pertains to the objects-in-themselves nor the representations of them. For a full-blown mathematical anti-realist, I would imagine they would say that 2+2=4 is a mathematical proposition which is true irregardless of how we feel or what we experience; but that it is only a reflection of our self-reflective cognition (i.e., reason) as the means by which we think about our representations.

As for causality, again, yes, we discover it through experience. But we have to options: either things "just happen", that is, there is no reason why light can't escape a black hole, which suggests that there is no reason why light could escape a black hole, or why a photon couldn't turn in to an electron.

So, I am starting to embrace Kantianism a bit more: I find it quite plausible that causality is the necessary inference we make of (intuited) sensations and thusly is it a priori certain—albeit not necessarily pertaining to the objects-in-themselves.

However, yes, one could just argued inductively for causality; but then it doesn’t carry the necessity that the term used to mean.

I don't agree. It's not a semantic issue, but a conceptual one. We don't sit on what we interpret as "spikes", but we could sit on many things - that depends on what we take to fit under the conception of chair.

An atom is not like this, I cannot, with significant flexibility, decide that an atom is a proton or that energy is made of particles. That doesn't happen with chairs or tables or keys, etc.

I understand what you are saying; but let me be more specific to clarify. Let’s say a ‘chair’ is a 4-legged object with a flat surface (on top) to sit on. Now, in the same manner that I can point to something and claim it is an ‘atom’ or it isn’t, I can do so with a ‘chair’. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are just noting that the concept of a chair is looser than the concept of an atom, which I agree with.

We can't have a form of experience without something providing that form which is not experience. Otherwise, I could, by mere thinking change a notebook to a puddle of water. But I can't. Something prevents me, which is not my imagination, but a fact about something existing.

I don’t agree with my original argument (and I will note it in the OP why), but I don’t think that it necessarily follows that the form of experience is provided by something transcendentally beyond it: I think that is borrowed from experience itself.

Also, just because you can think you way into changing what you experience, does not mean that you know anything about what is beyond it. I think there is another way, I would say, to infer that my argument is flawed (which I will put in the OP).

Hello 180 Proof,

I am sorry for the later response! I got rather busy, but I did not forget about your response.

What makes a statement "truth-apt" that does not refer, even if only in principle, to at least one truth-maker?

The same way that a moral law can exist without a moral law maker: the statement just needs to, in principle, be able to be evaluated as true or false (as being in a state of one or the other). Why would something be truth-apt require an agent to create it?

However, I must confess ignorance on whether the things-in-themselves adhere to mathematical principles; but I can say that our representations (of them) do (as a priori means by which we represent them in space and time). — Bob Ross

Then this is not much of a problem. I think we agree.

So, I am starting to embrace Kantianism a bit more: I find it quite plausible that causality is the necessary inference we make of (intuited) sensations and thusly is it a priori certain—albeit not necessarily pertaining to the objects-in-themselves.

However, yes, one could just argued inductively for causality; but then it doesn’t carry the necessity that the term used to mean. — Bob Ross

That it is a-priori is not in doubt. Nevertheless, it is intelligible for me to suppose that there is a reason (which we may not know, nor ever know) for why the universe acts in one way rather than another, than for no reason at all, meaning, that in a few seconds, we'd begin to see apples going back up to the trees and so forth.

In itself.... we do not know. But I also assume there is a reason why we don't have access to the world in itself, there is a why instead of a "no reason". But I could be wrong, this is my intuiton.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are just noting that the concept of a chair is looser than the concept of an atom, which I agree with. — Bob Ross

It's a bit stronger. I believe an atom has mind-independent properties, a chair does not. But we do not know if an atom reaches the in itself or no.

As for the OP, let me be brief, to not make this post too, too long:

I think this is much much better, as Strawson argues that we are directly acquainted with certain experiential aspects of the world which are ultimate. That is, that consciousness as we experience it, is as it is in itself. But what it reveals of the world, is not an in itself, beyond experience.

A truth-maker is a referent to which a truth-claim (i.e. truth-bearer) statement refers that makes the statement true; it's not the "agent" asserting or "making" the statement.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

I apologize for the belated response. I was very busy the past week (or so), but I can assure you that your response was not forgotten. — Bob Ross

Hello Bob Ross
No problems. No need for apology. We get all busy time to time. Thank you for getting back to me.

Ok, so, after thoroughly digesting my own OP for the past week or so, I think I understand more what you are getting at; and I am going to provide a counter-argument to my OP as an amending thereof. Please, if you are still interested in this discussion board, read it and let me know what you think. — Bob Ross

Yes, by all means. I will read your counter-argument, and get back to you. My response will also be not too quick due to other things I have to do in my daily life. Please bear with us. :) Thank you.

Hello Manuel,

That it is a-priori is not in doubt. Nevertheless, it is intelligible for me to suppose that there is a reason (which we may not know, nor ever know) for why the universe acts in one way rather than another, than for no reason at all, meaning, that in a few seconds, we'd begin to see apples going back up to the trees and so forth.

That is fair and I agree now. I think we must be able to get at some transcendent truths to get the whole transcendental philosophy afoot. If we know that we sense ‘objects’ (whatever they may be), then the strict regularity of our experience must indicate that the sensations of the objects is regular (transcendentally) and that suggests the objects themselves are regular (be them whatever they may actually be). This could potentially work as an argument for causality beyond our a priori ability to represent objects. Then, again, it could be that some of reality is causally linked, and some of it isn’t; and we only have access to those that are.

It's a bit stronger. I believe an atom has mind-independent properties, a chair does not. But we do not know if an atom reaches the in itself or no.

So, you don’t think the property of ‘being able to sit on it’ is mind-independent?

A truth-maker is a referent to which a truth-claim (i.e. truth-bearer) statement refers that makes the statement true; it's not the "agent" asserting or "making" the statement.

I read the article you mentioned, and I don't see how it helps your case (but perhaps I am misunderstanding). I am not talking about truth-bearing statements but, rather, truth-apt statements, which appear to be different: the former is a proposition which is true, which clearly indicates the need of a truth-maker, and the latter is merely the capacity to be true or false. Hence, even at the very beginning of your article (that you linked), it said:

“x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker

If a 'p' is false, then there is absolutely no truth-maker for p; but p is truth-apt. A non-truth-apt proposition is one that cannot be, even in principle, evaluated to true or false (such as desires in emotivism): they are non-cognitive.

Yes, by all means. I will read your counter-argument, and get back to you. My response will also be not too quick due to other things I have to do in my daily life. Please bear with us. :) Thank you.

Absolutely no worries, my friend! I look forward to you response!

I am not talking about truth-bearing statements but, rather, truth-apt statements, which appear to be different: the former is a proposition which is true, which clearly indicates the need of a truth-maker, and the latter is merely the capacity to be true or false. — Bob Ross

:roll: You've conjured up a distinction without a difference, Bob

My point about the confused OP stands:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842289

Philosophical statements are propositional, because they are truth-apt. Let's take one of your previous examples (of a philosophical statement that you say is non-propositional): "Consciousness is fundamental to reality". Are you saying that, in principle, that statement is not truth-apt? Are you, likewise, saying it is a non-cognitive statement?