Hello Manuel,

Astronomical and physics based evidence suggests otherwise, if you take these sciences seriously, you have to seriously consider that the external world exists.

I never said the external world doesn’t exist; and astronomy and physics produce models of reality based off of predicting our experience (i.e., empirical evidence) and thusly are only valid insofar as they reference experience, which is conditioned by our forms thereof.

Not to mention archeological evidence

All of archeological discoveries are conditioned, epistemically, by our possible forms of knowledge (namely space and time): if not, then please provide me with any empirical evidence you have of any archeology whatsoever which is not derived nor contingent at all on human (or animal) experience.

Yes, all these sciences are constrained by our modes of cognition, but when our cognition coincides with aspects of the external world, we get a science.

I disagree. When our cognition can be predicted, we have science. Whether or not one wants to imagine that that predictability suggests a correspondence to reality (beyond our cognition) is another matter.

If that's not enough, or if you think this is not firm enough foundation, then, the only sense which I think cannot be "thought away", is solidity or impenetrability. Everything else is could be modified.

Solidity and impenetrability are grounded, like all other qualities, in our experience. Try to think of anything solid which has empirical evidence for its existence that is sans our experience. This is why, for example, idealists can come up with perfectly coherent metaphysical theories that posit tangibility as a synthetic a priori property (of human cognition).

So either we assert, full stop, that we cannot know anything about the external world, or we say that some aspects we can tease out, most of them we cannot.

In the sense of the external world that transcends us, I would say we can’t know full stop.

But we have to be somewhat realistic, we cannot attain the kind of certainty you are looking for, that is, one that defeats skepticism about these topics.

I am not a hard skeptic. My proposal to you is simple (I think at least). To distinguish something from [human] imagination, it must have empirical content (i.e., empirical evidence for it). Our forms of experience are just that: ours and not the external world’s itself (irregardless of whether one wants to posit another noumenal space and time). All of our knowledge which has any empirical content is derived from experience, and thusly are conditioned by our forms of experience. Any claim about that which lies beyond our experience cannot be grounded in anything empirically accessible to us, since we can only know things from our experience, and thusly it is indistinguishable from the imagination because it has no empirical content [for us]. If you think I am wrong, then I would challenge you to either (1) provide a means of providing empirical evidence for a claim which pertains to that which is beyond our experience or (2) provide justification for how we can know that our experience is accurate to the external world (of which is not appealing to models of reality which are determined by predicting our experience: which, naturally, are conditioned by our experience).

I have no problem with gaining knowledge that is useful for experience from experience, even if it doesn’t provide absolute certainty. For predicting what one could experience is very useful and is an empirically verified way of gaining more knowledge about the world that we experience; but not the world as it is.

But then by definition, we cannot say what metaphysics is, because it is beyond all possible experience.

We can say what it is, but not engage it as a practice. There is nothing stopping me from defining it, for example, as I can know that it is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience without trying to derive anything true of that which is <…>.

My point was simple, we have a model, which we use to navigate the world as is given to us. If there was no world, we wouldn't need a model.

But a model doesn’t really make claims about things beyond possible experience: it just says, hey, look, we can predict stuff in experience if we treat stuff like they are this, so, until we come up with a more predictive model, let’s use that to navigate experience. It doesn’t say: this is actually how the world in-itself is.

Hello 180 Proof,

Inferences with "beyond" premises (e.g. magic, myths, ideals), whether or not they are valid, cannot be sound. Metaphysics is rational, at best, and itself is never theoretical (i.e. explanatory of nature)

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? Because, to me, metaphysics is ‘“beyond” premises’.

In the sense of Aristotle’s original definition, saying it is the study of what ‘comes after’ the physics is really, to me, the same thing as saying ‘to study that which we cannot possibly experience, but would like to explain’.

Hello T Clark,

He says similar things about time. Is it your position that space and time are illegitimate concepts?

Kant, as can be seen in your quote of CPR, was making most of his arguments from the model that we represent the world; which, from that perspective, I find his arguments convincing.

However, my argument is more fundamental than that: it doesn’t grant, initially, that we are representing anything. Instead, it just notes that we ‘experience’ with two possible forms: space and time. Whether, in our model of reality, we attribute those forms to our representative faculties is irrelevant. Just by determining our forms of experience we thereby determine the ultimate limitations of our knowledge.

But, to answer your question, if I were to engage in metaphysics, in the sense of trying to get at ontology as opposed to mere modelling [of reality], then I would go for a more Kantian view that space and time do not pertain to the world as it is in-itself: there’s no noumenal space and time. Although, I should note that Kant didn’t quite go that far, he only wanted to prove that the space and time we directly apprehend is not something in the world in-itself, which is fine.

Hello Corvus,

I am not sure if the OP's definition on Metaphysics is formally accepted by the public and academics. Metaphysics doesn't use imagination and conjectures all the time as its investigative methods.

My definition of metaphysics is that is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience, and not that it is a process of using the imagination. For most metaphysicians, they use principles like parsimony, explanatory power, internal/external coherence, (logical) consistency, intuitions, etc. to determine metaphysical theories.

For instance, Kant's Metaphysics arrives at its conclusions via rigorous logical arguments.

Logic devoid of empirically verified content is indistinguishable from the imagination. I can make a logically consistent argument for the world being comprised of one giant cookie monster.

and it asks and investigates the topics these subjects cannot deal with or ask, such as the "why" questions.

Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience.

Hello Pantagruel,

If you start trying to wrap your head around the emergence of physical properties as the manifestation of pointer states in the process of the decoherence of quantum superposition from the web of entanglement it is hard not to think that you're thinking in metaphysical terms.

For me, it is really easy to see how it wouldn’t be: I would just say quantum physics is a model that we use to navigate reality; and is not legitimate beyond the possibility of experience.

Awe! I see now that we are in complete agreement! I think you are the first, and perhaps the only one who will, agree with me (:

But the point is that it doesn't tell the whole story. Rather, it raises a whole host of questions about the relationships between "properties" and events, and why some configurations are "preferred" by the universe versus others. Science is one colour on the palette. Metaphysics is about the palette, and the picture, and the painter, and the model.

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? — Bob Ross

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/840954

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/841463

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/841753

Because, to me, metaphysics is ‘“beyond” premises’

Non-rational metaphysics (i.e. supernaturalist, mythical, subjectivist, etc) is neither classical nor modern.

My definition of metaphysics is that is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience, and not that it is a process of using the imagination. For most metaphysicians, they use principles like parsimony, explanatory power, internal/external coherence, (logical) consistency, intuitions, etc. to determine metaphysical theories. — Bob Ross

There are many aspects of science which they cannot observe and verify empirically, but still have to deal with. In those cases, science uses hypotheses which are imagination in nature. When metaphysics works with science, it can use reasoning and inference for the unobservable objects. If you are only relying on the observable and verifiable objects only, you would have very little to work with.

For instance most of the astronomical objects are unreachable from earth. They are only viewable by telescope from a far distance. You can see them, but you cannot verify them, but they still use inference to come to the theories and answers. In this case, their studies and investigations are metaphysical rather than scientific. Hence there are parts where science and metaphysics cross each other's boundary too.

Logic devoid of empirically verified content is indistinguishable from the imagination. I can make a logically consistent argument for the world being comprised of one giant cookie monster. — Bob Ross

Where empirically verified content is devoid, Logic uses inference for coming to their conclusions which is one of the main empirical scientific methods.

Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience. — Bob Ross

I don't understand this point here. Could you please elaborate in detail with some examples please? Thanks.

For instance, Kant's Metaphysics arrives at its conclusions via rigorous logical arguments. Aristotle's Metaphysics analyses the abstract concepts and universals again via logic. I don't see any imagination there at all. — Corvus

Logic supplies no content; it consists in procedural rules. Kant's philosophy is the product of logically constrained imagination; that is it consists in imagining the entailments of some basic premises in a logically rigorous, i.e. coherent and consistent, way.

Logic supplies no content; it consists in procedural rules. — Janus

Could you please clarify which logic you mean here? There are vast many different types of Logic.

Deductive Logic
Inductive Logic
Predicate Logic
Philosophical Logic
Modal Logic
Non-Classical Logic
Dialectic Logic

Kant's philosophy is the product of logically constrained imagination; that is it consists in imagining the entailments of some basic premises in a logically rigorous, i.e. coherent and consistent, way. — Janus

Could you please elaborate your points with the relevant quotes from Kant's CPR or any of his own writings?

But the point is that it doesn't tell the whole story. Rather, it raises a whole host of questions about the relationships between "properties" and events, and why some configurations are "preferred" by the universe versus others

Nothing we empirically study is nature herself, it is our model of nature derived from experience. Nature does not have to be anything remotely like what we experience, nor that we could comprehend.

Science is one colour on the palette. Metaphysics is about the palette, and the picture, and the painter, and the model.

I like this analogy, but, for me, the pallette, picture, and painter become the model of our experience, and science is the relationships of the colors, shapes, etc. on the painting.

None of your links are of you giving a definition.

Hello Corvus,

In those cases, science uses hypotheses which are imagination in nature.

I have no problem with the imagination being used to try to sort of something empirical—it is when we going beyond the empirical that gets sketchy to me.

If you are only relying on the observable and verifiable objects only, you would have very little to work with.

Every valid aspect of science is a prediction about something which could be possibly experienced. Metaphysics is about that which, in principle, can never be.

For instance most of the astronomical objects are unreachable from earth. They are only viewable by telescope from a far distance.

Viewing it from a telescope is a form of experiencing it. How do you ‘view’ whether the world is actually made of a physical or mental substance? Or that there actually are Universals, or just particulars?

In this case, their studies and investigations are metaphysical rather than scientific

Positing hypotheses to try to predict objects within possible experience is not metaphysics.

Where empirically verified content is devoid, Logic uses inference for coming to their conclusions which is one of the main empirical scientific methods.

Logic is the form of an argument (i.e., the form of reasoning), and does not pertain to the content of arguments. As I read your other post (to another person), I feel I need to clarify this as well (just to anticipate your response):

Could you please clarify which logic you mean here? There are vast many different types of Logic.

Deductive Logic
Inductive Logic
Predicate Logic
Philosophical Logic
Modal Logic
Non-Classical Logic
Dialectic Logic

All of these (except maybe ‘dialectic logic’, depending on what you mean there) share that pertain to the form of argumentation and not the content.

Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience. — Bob Ross

I don't understand this point here. Could you please elaborate in detail with some examples please? Thanks.

Of course! Metaphysics, in the sense that I defined it in the OP, is about ontological things; that is, about that which is beyond the possibility of experience (e.g., Universals vs. particulars, nature of time, nature of space, substances, etc.). Now, all we can ever know empirically is from our experience, so the best we can ever do in terms of explaining the ‘nature’ of things is what is conditioned, right off the bat, by our possible forms of experience (and, not to mention, our means of cognizing the world) (namely space and time) and thusly are only valid constrained to them. Take away your forms of experience, and everyone else’s, and what is intelligible left (with any metaphysical claim you can think of)? Absolutely nothing.

:roll:

Spoon-feeding ain't my jam, Bob.

I never said the external world doesn’t exist; and astronomy and physics produce models of reality based off of predicting our experience (i.e., empirical evidence) and thusly are only valid insofar as they reference experience, which is conditioned by our forms thereof. — Bob Ross

While I agree that it is not possible to separate epistemology from metaphysics, I think you are trying to make the distinction way too strongly. Yes, models of reality - not models of models, the models we produce, if on the right track, tell us something about the way the world works absent us. Yes, experience tells us this, yes models are not reality, but they refer to it, not to a model.

All of archeological discoveries are conditioned, epistemically, by our possible forms of knowledge (namely space and time): if not, then please provide me with any empirical evidence you have of any archeology whatsoever which is not derived nor contingent at all on human (or animal) experience. — Bob Ross

Correct. But I ask you, is there any other way to get any knowledge at all about anything, that's not through a particular experience, related to the relevant creature? Knowledge is relational.

But you are limiting the historical scope of metaphysics only to things-in-themselves, not even Kant did this. He spoke about morals and religion as aspects of metaphysics.

And even Kant had things to say about things-in-themselves, that they are non-relational, and that they ground the objects of experience.

Finally, we should recognize, that appearances are part of empirical reality.

I disagree. When our cognition can be predicted, we have science. Whether or not one wants to imagine that that predictability suggests a correspondence to reality (beyond our cognition) is another matter. — Bob Ross

I think the topic of things-in-themselves to be, the single most interesting aspect in all of philosophy. And while this is true of me, I do not know why you insist on using this as the benchmark for metaphysics.

It's been known since the 17th century, that we have no access to this, except for a negative approach, as in saying, what they could be not. We can speculate. But here we are in free fall, even if we are carful.

If you think I am wrong, then I would challenge you to either (1) provide a means of providing empirical evidence for a claim which pertains to that which is beyond our experience or (2) provide justification for how we can know that our experience is accurate to the external world (of which is not appealing to models of reality which are determined by predicting our experience: which, naturally, are conditioned by our experience). — Bob Ross

Let's take Kant's proposal, one of several. Things in themselves are the ground of appearance and are non-relational. I happen to believe that thought experiments are empirical, because I don't limit empirical to the publicly observable, which is a mistake.

The way you are defining external world precludes evidence which shows that there are things absent us. Like planets or the stars. Yes, these are conditioned by our modes of cognition, but they happen to predict (and retrodict) things are subject to experiment and confirmation and refinement.

Unless you say that because all we have is a model, this model doesn't get to things in themselves, ergo planets and stars are not external to us.

I agree we possibly can't have knowledge of things in themselves, but I don't restrict metaphysics or reality to these terms - I don't see a good reason for doing so.

But a model doesn’t really make claims about things beyond possible experience: it just says, hey, look, we can predict stuff in experience if we treat stuff like they are this, so, until we come up with a more predictive model, let’s use that to navigate experience. It doesn’t say: this is actually how the world in-itself is. — Bob Ross

I mean, are we going to ask a model for it to predict something which is beyond all possible experience? That's incoherent.

But then, why is there any reason to believe that a more predictive model will tell us about things beyond all possible experience? We are still stuck in the same cage you set up. Astronomy says that X star in Y system exploded in a supernova 6 billion years ago, and the evidence supports the claim. That's a claim about the world absent human beings, we did not cause that event to occur, but can experience it.

Could you please clarify which logic you mean here? There are vast many different types of Logic. — Corvus

None of them provide any content.

Could you please elaborate your points with the relevant quotes from Kant's CPR or any of his own writings? — Corvus

It is a characterization of Kant's philosophy that applies to synthetic philosophies in general. Wherever there is creativity, it is a product of the imagination.

Hello Bob Ross.

I have no problem with the imagination being used to try to sort of something empirical—it is when we going beyond the empirical that gets sketchy to me. — Bob Ross

Can you trust all your empirical perception and observation? Are the data you gathered via your senses 100% error free?

Every valid aspect of science is a prediction about something which could be possibly experienced. Metaphysics is about that which, in principle, can never be. — Bob Ross

If you are insisting on only accepting possible experienceable phenomena as your valid science, I think you are limiting your knowledge to bare minimum. I doubt so called valid scientific knowledge in that nature would be much use.

Viewing it from a telescope is a form of experiencing it. How do you ‘view’ whether the world is actually made of a physical or mental substance? Or that there actually are Universals, or just particulars? — Bob Ross

The knowledge derived from the visual experience via telescope from millions of miles away from the astral objects without any kind of direct contact is nothing more than imaginary conjectures and inferences. Metaphysics use reasoning as the main methodology for their knowledge.

Positing hypotheses to try to predict objects within possible experience is not metaphysics. — Bob Ross

Metaphysics can deal with any objects and methodology if they are related to their topics, and also as part of their investigations.

All of these (except maybe ‘dialectic logic’, depending on what you mean there) share that pertain to the form of argumentation and not the content. — Bob Ross

The whole Marxist movement and running of the countries has been based on the Dialectic Logic. And All those logic listed above are used in many different sciences and technologies for applications to real life situations and device designs.

Of course! Metaphysics, in the sense that I defined it in the OP, is about ontological things; that is, about that which is beyond the possibility of experience (e.g., Universals vs. particulars, nature of time, nature of space, substances, etc.). Now, all we can ever know empirically is from our experience, so the best we can ever do in terms of explaining the ‘nature’ of things is what is conditioned, right off the bat, by our possible forms of experience (and, not to mention, our means of cognizing the world) (namely space and time) and thusly are only valid constrained to them. Take away your forms of experience, and everyone else’s, and what is intelligible left (with any metaphysical claim you can think of)? Absolutely nothing. — Bob Ross

Many of the concepts such as Time, Space, Substance are also studied by Physics, Chemistry and QM too. You are not just discarding metaphysics, but totally discarding also the general Science as well.

How do you know something is beyond possibility of experience, if you had not experienced it at all? If something is truly beyond possibility of experience, then you wouldn't even be able to mention it, because you have never experienced it, and your stance is that whatever beyond possibility of your experience is unknowable? Therefore it couldn't possibly be your criteria for declaring it is metaphysics. Is everything that is beyond your experience, metaphysics? You cannot declare what is unknowable and beyond possibility of experience to you as metaphysics, because it is unknowable. It is just unknowable.

I just don't think it is the case that all metaphysics topics are something that is beyond possibility of experience, because it also deals with experienceable objects as well.  I am not sure what you mean by experience too.  Does it mean visible and audible and touchable objects only?  Things that we talk about, fantasize, and even imagine, should they not also be mental experience in nature?

None of them provide any content. — Janus

If there was no Logic providing any content, you wouldn't have your computer or smartphone running and connected to the internet, typing up the message posting it. The whole computer architecture, software, apps, network etc are all based on the logical system working with the microprocessors in the servers, hubs and networks as well as all the operating systems in the personal computers and smart phones.

t is a characterization of Kant's philosophy that applies to synthetic philosophies in general. Wherever there is creativity, it is a product of the imagination. — Janus

I would appreciate the direct quotes from Kant's own books supporting your points. Thanks.

My definition of metaphysics is that is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience, — Bob Ross

The nature of experience is that it expands with knowledge. Compare the experience of the human, versus that of the single-celled creatures from which we sprang. Consider the experience of a symphony by a trained musician versus someone with no musical knowledge. Thomas Nagel stresses the point that our tools for comprehending reality are limited, but those limits are constantly evolving.

What say you? — Bob Ross

I would say you have a very common but wildly incorrect view of metaphysics. It's almost as if you haven't read a book about it.

Suppose you ask whether the universe begins with something or nothing. You'll find that both ideas don't work. What has this got to do with imagination? It's a simple piece of logical analysis. There is a good reason why metaphysics is often described as a science of logic. William James characterises it as 'nothing but an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly', and this is what it is.

Also, you place tight and unjustifiable limits on human experience. You're dismissing the claims of those who go beyond these limits with no argument, which is not a sensible practice.
.
Clearly metaphysics requires some imagination, but the whole point of it is to overcome imagination and get at the facts. ,

With all due respect, I am not going to come up with a definition for you. Either you have one or you don't: it should not be that hard to explicate if you do...

For example, I define it as "the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience".

Kant, as can be seen in your quote of CPR, was making most of his arguments from the model that we represent the world; — Bob Ross

Instead, it just notes that we ‘experience’ with two possible forms: space and time. Whether, in our model of reality, we attribute those forms to our representative faculties is irrelevant. — Bob Ross

You say "modeling," I say "ontology."

I would go for a more Kantian view that space and time do not pertain to the world as it is in-itself: there’s no noumenal space and time. — Bob Ross

I do agree with this.

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? — Bob Ross

Here is a paper by Kit Fine on the topic, "What is Metaphysics?"

For example, I define it as "the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience". — Bob Ross

To "define ... that which is beyond" seems patent nonsense to me. Also, "the possibility of experience" amounts to an anthropic / subjectivity-bias (contra Copernicus' mediocity principle & Peirce's fallibilism). Typical idealism.

Anyway, a summary of what I've written so far on this thread. To wit:

IME, metaphysics has always been the reflective study of the most general prerequisites (i.e. ontology) for rationally making sense – interpreting the paradigm changes, research programs & provisional results – of physics (i.e. the counter-intuitive, defeasible study of nature (i.e. ontics)).

In other words, metaphysics describes what also must be the case and not be the case in order for 'whatever we think can or cannot be the case' to be soundly explainable. Metaphysics, however, does not explain, or determine, whatever is or is not the case. Thus, it is the name of "the book that (deductively) follows from the book on nature." Study nature; then reflect on 'what makes it possible to study nature' (not merely to have 'subjective experiences') – Aristotle surpasses his teacher Plato here – this is metaphysics, or where ("first") philosophizing begins ("in wonder").

"What is Metaphysics?" https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/fine/accessible_fine/Fine_What-is-Metaphysics.pdf/quote]

A great article. :cool: :up: — Leontiskos

Here is a paper by Kit Fine on the topic, "What is Metaphysics?" — Leontiskos

Fine’s paper is an illustration of the divide between Analytic and contemporary Continental ways of thinking about metaphysics. This paragraph encapsulates the difference:

“…the elements of meta­physics are those of penultimate generality, next in generality to the logical elements. Thus anything more general than a metaphysical element will
be logical and anything less general will be neither metaphysical nor logi­cal. If we were to think of logic as relating to the structure of thought and of metaphysics as relating to the structure of reality, then logic would provide us with the most general traits of thought and metaphysics with the most general traits of reality.”

Fine’s paper exemplfies this thinking by using a logical grammar to articulate his definition of metaphysics. By contrast, for contemporary Continentalists of various stripes, logic is not more general than metaphysics, it is the contingent product of a certain era of metaphysics.

The existence of computers based on logical operations says nothing about content. Various logics are formalizations of the rules that are understood to govern thinking; consistency, non-contradiction and so on, and do not themselves mandate any particular view about anything.

t is a characterization of Kant's philosophy that applies to synthetic philosophies in general. Wherever there is creativity, it is a product of the imagination.
— Janus

I would appreciate the direct quotes from Kant's own books supporting your points. Thanks. — Corvus

I haven't claimed Kant said that—I am saying it, so your request for supporting quotes from Kant is not relevant.

The existence of computers based on logical operations says nothing about content. Various logics are formalizations of the rules that are understood to govern thinking; consistency, non-contradiction and so on, and do not themselves mandate any particular view about anything. — Janus

The various branches of Logic has been used for the real life technology applications by adding the contents into the formulas for a long time. I suppose they are the knowledge for the specialists.

I haven't claimed Kant said that—I am saying it, so your request for supporting quotes from Kant is not relevant. — Janus

I didn't say you claimed it. I asked you to back up your points with Kant's own writings. If one hasn't read any of the original writings of Kant, it is doubtful that one could make any meaningful comments or points on Kant's philosophy and system.

Hello Manuel,

Yes, models of reality - not models of models

I would say it is a model of experience--not necessarily reality. It is empirically ungrounded, I would say, to claim that our experience gives us any sort of accuracy into reality (unless by ‘reality’ you just mean the human conception of it).

if on the right track, tell us something about the way the world works absent us. Yes, experience tells us this, yes models are not reality, but they refer to it, not to a model.

On what grounds can your models of reality (or, more accurately, of experience) be said to tell us about something beyond that experience (i.e., ‘absent of you’)? I cannot know that the world has the chair of which I am sitting on right now nor that it persists in that world when no one is experiencing it—but I can say that one should expect, all else being equal, to experience it in the same manner next time.

Correct. But I ask you, is there any other way to get any knowledge at all about anything, that's not through a particular experience, related to the relevant creature? Knowledge is relational.

I would say that our knowledge is ‘relational’ (in the sense you described), but I have no clue what kind of creatures may exists in the world in-itself, nor all the actually possible ways by which knowledge can be acquired. I agree that, from our human perspective, it is hard to imagine that any creature would ever not be stuck in the paradigm I have provided—but that is no justification to say that is true of the world in-itself, as neither of us know if the world in-itself has to abide by what we find conceivable.

But you are limiting the historical scope of metaphysics only to things-in-themselves, not even Kant did this. He spoke about morals and religion as aspects of metaphysics.

I mean that’s pretty fair. I would say that morals and religion are also conditioned by our forms of experience and thusly say nothing of the world as it is in-itself.

And even Kant had things to say about things-in-themselves, that they are non-relational, and that they ground the objects of experience.

That is (sort of) true, and I have a hard time semantically distinguishing the subtle differences in my views vs. his. I would say that the ‘world in-itself’ as whatever is strictly beyond our experience is the ‘absolute’ and the ‘world in-itself’ within the model that we represent the world is one which would have to have certain properties (presupposed by the model itself)(such as causality, they “impact” us in some way, etc.).

But remove the forms of one’s experience, and it isn’t even clear that one is representing anything.

Finally, we should recognize, that appearances are part of empirical reality.

True; and, I would say, it is all we have access to in terms of empirical reality.

I do not know why you insist on using this as the benchmark for metaphysics.

I am not intending to say that metaphysics is solely the study of things-in-themselves: I am merely noting that it is impossible to know them (other than what is presupposed by the model that we represent them) and that we know nothing of the absolute.

The way you are defining external world precludes evidence which shows that there are things absent us. Like planets or the stars...Unless you say that because all we have is a model, this model doesn't get to things in themselves, ergo planets and stars are not external to us.

I would say that we can say there are stars and planets sans us as a valid statement for the possibility of experience: that is, we should treat them like they exist independently of us, because every time we experience them they behave as such. However, we have no clue if there are stars and planets, let alone our own bodies, let alone space and time, beyond what is conditioned by our experience. You know what I mean?

I agree we possibly can't have knowledge of things in themselves, but I don't restrict metaphysics or reality to these terms - I don't see a good reason for doing so.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like modeling our experience is a part of metaphysics for you; which just means we are semantically disagreeing (which is fine).

I mean, are we going to ask a model for it to predict something which is beyond all possible experience? That's incoherent.

Exactly. So why think that when it does predict something within experience that it would ever verify something that is beyond it? Which I think you anticipated my response here with:

But then, why is there any reason to believe that a more predictive model will tell us about things beyond all possible experience? We are still stuck in the same cage you set up.