Spinoza's idea of substance was very different than Aristotle's. Not sure about Aquinas' since I am little familiar with his writings. — Janus

Yes, but they agreed that we did not need two substances.

Really? How contemporary is contemporary? Most people are monists these days, no? — bert1

When you say "most people" do you mean most "people" or most "philosophers of mind"? Either way, it seems to me that most "philosophers of mind" (including monists) accept the need to address the "interaction" between mind and entities not having the characteristics of mind.

Substituting one form of "substance" ontology for another does eliminate the issue?

Do you think a mindless universe is possible? What do you think would happen to this universe if all minds disappeared? Would the stars, galaxies, planets, etc. still be here?

Do you think a mindless universe is possible? — RogueAI

If you mean biological minds, then, yes, I think a mindless universe is possible and that this was such a universe for a long time. On the other hand, the laws of nature (not to be confused with their approximate descriptions, the laws of physics) are intentional in Franz Brentano's sense, for they are about the succession of physical states they lead to, just as by intention to go to the store is about my arriving at the store. Intentions imply a source of intention, namely a Mind. So, I think a lawful universe entails an intending Mind.

Substituting one form of "substance" ontology for another does eliminate the issue? — Arne

Interaction requires two or more things to interact. If we are one thing, which seems pretty obvious, this mis-states the question, and bad questions lead to bad answers. We can ask what is the relation between intentional and physical actions without assuming that that relation is an interaction. That is a sensible question and has sensible answers involving the origin and nature of such relations, not interactions.

The form, idea or principle is not something that exists - at least, in the sense that a particular exists. The intelligible form of particulars is a universal. — Wayfarer

This is a misrepresentation. The idea, as design or form in the mind of the artist exists as the idea of a particular, not of a universal. The thing desired is very particular, not universal. We can characterize "desire" as a general feeling, a universal, in the way that "hunger" is a universal, as a general feeling, or urge, but when the individual human being is moved to act on a specific desire, or intent to create something, the object of intent becomes very particular, as a goal of a particular material consequence. The general "hunger" becomes the goal to eat a particular thing.

In Aristotelian and classical philosophy, the law of identity is a logical law that is general and not tied specifically to particulars. — Wayfarer

The law of identity is a general law, but it applies to particulars just like any inductive law. So is tied specifically to particulars, as a statement about what all particulars have in common. It states something about all particulars which differentiates a particular from a universal. It is actually intended to represent the very difference you refer to above, the difference between a particular and an universal, in order to prevent the sophistry which follows from failing to maintain this difference, such as the tendency to allow that mathematical objects, like numbers, have the same type of existence as material objects.

The law of identity says that "a thing" (i.e. a particular) is the same as itself. It serves to differentiate the use of "same" in reference to particular individuals from the use of "same" in reference to type or category, and avoid the sophistry employed through the use of equivocation and the employment of this category mistake. When the law of identity is well understood, this usefulness becomes very evident.

When two things are of the same type, people commonly say that they are the "same". However, they are not "the same" by the law of identity, because that would imply that they are one thing, not two. The law of identity dictates that "same" refers only to a relation which a thing has with itself, not a relation with other things. Therefore being judged as "of the same type" whereby two distinct things are said to be "the same" is best represented as establishing a relation of equality between the two. They are equal according to the parameters of the type, and are said to be "the same" by those specific parameters. They are not "the same" in the sense of the law of identity which is an absolute sameness.

The law of identity allows only that a particular has that specific relation, "same" with itself making "same" absolute rather than relative. Therefore whenever someone argues that two things which are equal, such as what is represented by the left side and what is represented by the right side of a mathematical equation, are "the same" because they are equal, they violate the law of identity. I believe it was Hegel who initiated the modern trend of violating the law of identity, by insisting that it could not be useful. And we might say that this violation is always carried out for some sophistic purpose. That purpose is usually to support an untenable ontology such as Pythagorean idealism, where the potential referred to by numerical figuring is said to be the very same as the "potential" of matter. But this is a category mistake.

No. You cannot have an interaction between a prior intention and its instantiation anymore than a line can interact with its terminal point. First, the intention to create terminates once the object is created, and second, a form as plan is not a form as actuality. If they were, we would have an actuality whenever we had a plan. — Dfpolis

Under Aristotelian principles, all instances of "form" are actual. Are you seriously trying to deny this, or are you proposing something non-Aristotelian? This is how the interaction problem is resolved by Aristotle, by making forms actual.. And there is interaction between the prior intent, and the instantiation, it's called "becoming". Becoming requires a period of time within which the two interact, as an artist interacts with one's work, with the intent to perfect it.

True, but that continuity does not make a plan the same as an actuality. — Dfpolis

A plan is a form, and a form is an actuality. That is Aristotle 101. The object of intent is an actuality, that is how it acts as a cause, final cause.

We must not confuse accidents as unplanned outcomes with metaphysical accidents, which are notes of intelligibility that inhere in, and can be predicated of, the the whole. It is not unplanned accidents that make a thing actual, but the efficient cause implementing the plan. Accidents inhering in a being cannot be prior to that being. Matter as potential is prior, but once we have an actuality, all accidents belong to that actuality or form. For a human artisan, the actuality may depart from the plan because of the stuff used, but that is not the reason a plan is not an actuality. — Dfpolis

The accidents are attributable to the matter's prior form. The artist chooses one's medium, as "the matter" to work with, but that matter necessarily has a form. The form which this matter has, which is not properly accounted for by the artist's plan is the reason for accidents, "form" in the created object which is not a part of the "form" of the design. In this way, the accidents are prior to the material object, and they are causal in the sense of "material cause". "Material cause" referring to that which was prior to, and persists after the act of becoming.

Again, no. The mental form part of the process of execution. There is no gap because that process terminates in the executed reality. If there were a gap, it would mean that were were finished making the thing before it became actual, a contradiction. — Dfpolis

If the form of the intended object and the form of the material object created, are not the same form, then there is necessarily a gap between the two, a lack of formal continuity which must be explained. Simply asserting "there is no gap" does not close the gap. As I described, and you seem to agree, the gap is commonly understood to be closed through the implication of "efficient cause", as the means to the end, which occurs during "becoming". However, as stated above, becoming requires a temporal duration, and the efficient causes must be directed during that time period. This is the interaction which closes the gap. But it requires either that the form of the object of intent is the very same form as the form of the created material object, or that they are distinct, and that there is interaction between the two during the process of becoming. Either way is dualist. Denying that the "form" which is called the object of intent, as plan or design, is actual, as you are doing, is not Aristotelian. Form is always actual.

But, it cannot, because it has no mind. God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak — Dfpolis

Anytime a plant or animal selects from possibilities, for a purpose, there must be intention involved. To say that intention necessarily involves "mind" makes mind prior to the material body of living beings. This is a problem which Aristotle addressed and I believe proposed a solution by separating the concept of "intellect" from that of "soul". At his time, "mind" and "soul" were often used synonymously and he pointed to this problem. But the soul is demonstrated to be prior to the body, while the intellect is posterior as dependent on the body. However, the soul is actual, and acts with purpose or final cause. Therefore "intent" or "final cause" does not necessarily imply "mind" or "intellect".

We have to turn to God immediately because oaks do not have minds, and we need a mind as a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

No, we do not need to refer to "a mind" here. That is a faulty restriction of the definition of "intentionality" which has become common in the modern vernacular. However, if you check a reasonable dictionary like OED, you will see that "intention" means simply to act with purpose. This modern tendency, to restrict "intention" as you do, thereby claiming that only human acts, or acts of "a mind" can be intentional, renders all the purposeful acts of all the creatures which have no mind, as unintelligible because then you have purpose without intent. Purpose without intent cannot be understood as it makes this sort of "purpose" a sort random chance selection, which cannot be "purpose".

It (the law of identity) states something about all particulars which differentiates a particular from a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’?

You can Google "the problem of universals" — Dfpolis

I've read up on it, to some extent. The paper you linked is highly specific, however.

This is a misrepresentation. The idea, as design or form in the mind of the artist exists as the idea of a particular, not of a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are misrepresenting what Wayfarer said. Ideas exist only in minds, not as particular substances, even though they may be about particulars.

The law of identity is a general law, but it applies to particulars just like any inductive law. — Metaphysician Undercover

The law of classical logic are abstractions, not inductions generalizing experience. If they were inductions, any new case might violate them, as happened with Newton's laws of motion, which were inductions based on a limited range of experience.

It states something about all particulars which differentiates a particular from a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not limited to particulars. Universal concepts are equally self-identical.

in order to prevent the sophistry which follows from failing to maintain this difference, such as the tendency to allow that mathematical objects, like numbers, have the same type of existence as material objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

What prevents mathematical objects from being physical is that they require a counting or a measuring operation to become actual, while bodies need not be observed to exist. So, mathematical objects are mental existents with a foundation in reality, not realities simplicitur.

When two things are of the same type, people commonly say that they are the "same". However, they are not "the same" by the law of identity, because that would imply that they are one thing, not two. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good! What makes them the "same" is that they can elicit the identical (universal) idea. They need not be equal. 1 kg of sugar is the same kind of thing as 5 kg of sugar, but they are not equal.

Therefore whenever someone argues that two things which are equal, such as what is represented by the left side and what is represented by the right side of a mathematical equation, are "the same" because they are equal, they violate the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense! They are saying nothing about the law of identity. You are equivocating on "the same." It has one meaning in identity, and a different meaning in equality.

Under Aristotelian principles, all instances of "form" are actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not in the same way. An actual idea is an ens rationis. An actual artifact is an ens reale.

This is how the interaction problem is resolved by Aristotle, by making forms actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he never has an interaction problem because one substance, a human being, cannot interact with itself. The interaction problem arises when you deny that we are one substance and make us two: res cogitans and res extensa.

And there is interaction between the prior intent, and the instantiation, it's called "becoming". — Metaphysician Undercover

Becoming cannot be an interaction with the product of becoming, because they do not co-exist. Once an artifact exists, its becoming has ceased. Aristotle defines change/becoming as "the actualization of a potential insofar as it is still in potency." Once the potency is actualized, it is no longer in potency, and so there is no change/becoming with respect to it.

Becoming requires a period of time within which the two interact, as an artist interacts with one's work, with the intent to perfect it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but while it is being perfected, it is not the finished (formed) product. When it reaches the intended form, it is perfected and no longer becoming. So, the imposition of mental form and the existence of the finished physical form are never concurrent. They are temporally adjacent. If Tf is the finishing time, then the becoming time is <Tf, and Tf is not included in <Tf.

The accidents are attributable to the matter's prior form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, if you mean departures from the artist's intent, not if you mean predicables.

they are causal in the sense of "material cause" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because the matter is not completely suitable. So?

If the form of the intended object and the form of the material object created, are not the same form, then there is necessarily a gap between the two, a lack of formal continuity which must be explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay. The plan was not executed perfectly for some reason. Maybe bad material, maybe a failure on the part of the artisan who is the efficient cause.

But it requires either that the form of the object of intent is the very same form as the form of the created material object, or that they are distinct, and that there is interaction between the two during the process of becoming. Either way is dualist. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you mean that there are two kinds of form, one the mental plan and the other the actuality of the product, I agree. If you mean that there are two substances in the product, which is what "dualism" usually means, I disagree.

There is certainly an interaction between the efficient case and the matter in the production of a product, but that is not the kind of interaction considered in "interactionism." It proposes an interaction between body and soul.

Denying that the "form" which is called the object of intent, as plan or design, is actual, as you are doing, is not Aristotelian. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not denying that. I am denying that the actual plan is the actuality of the finished product, however prefect it may be. The product is made according to the plan. It is not the plan, because it is a different sort of thing.

Anytime a plant or animal selects from possibilities, for a purpose, there must be intention involved. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. The problem is that there is no evidence that organisms other than humans make such choices.

To say that intention necessarily involves "mind" makes mind prior to the material body of living beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course.

But the soul is demonstrated to be prior to the body, while the intellect is posterior as dependent on the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem not to have read De Anima. Psyche is defined as the first actuality of a potentially living body. It cannot exist before there is an actual living body. The agent intellect is "divine" and separable, while the passive intellect is "perishable" and so physical.

However, the soul is actual, and acts with purpose or final cause. Therefore "intent" or "final cause" does not necessarily imply "mind" or "intellect". — Metaphysician Undercover

You forget that the prime mover is "self-thinking thought." Thus, Aristotle sees thought as the ultimate source of all change/motion.

"intention" means simply to act with purpose — Metaphysician Undercover

And having a purpose is an act of will. There is no concept of purpose in physics. It only occurs when we discuss psychology.

renders all the purposeful acts of all the creatures which have no mind, as unintelligible because then you have purpose without intent. Purpose without intent cannot be understood as it makes this sort of "purpose" a sort random chance selection, which cannot be "purpose". — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you. That is why we need God to complete the quest for explanations, as Aristotle saw.

I've read up on it, to some extent. The paper you linked is highly specific, however. — Wayfarer

Yes, it is. But, it is a critical datum that species are not eternal and unchanging, but evolve. It means that particulars do not instantiate Platonic Ideas or universal Exemplars in the mind of God. God intends to create whatever He creates, and He creates particulars. So, there is nothing "ungodly" in not conforming to a universal norm.

It means that particulars do not instantiate Platonic Ideas or universal — Dfpolis

Gotcha

Yes, but they agreed that we did not need two substances. — Dfpolis

AFAIK, Aristotle posited a potentially infinite number of substances in that he thought that the primary substances are individual objects.

The law of identity says that "a thing" (i.e. a particular) is the same as itself. It serves to differentiate the use of "same" in reference to particular individuals from the use of "same" in reference to type or category, and avoid the sophistry employed through the use of equivocation and the employment of this category mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems like pointing to a non-issue: categories are particular just as indivdual objects are.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

A signifies one particular. Therefore in that expression of the law of identity there is no difference between the left and right side. However, since this is a representation of the law of identity, "=" must signify "is the same as" not equality. "Is the same as" is a very special case of equality.

So what is the case, is that when the law of identity is represented as "A=A", "A" symbolizes the thing, and "=" symbolizes "is the same as". In mathematics, "=" symbolizes equality. Therefore in the quoted representation of the law of identity, "A=A", the "=" symbol must mean something different from what it means in mathematical usage.

The issue of, and history of, how the law of identity came to be stated as A=A, instead of as A is A, as proposed by Leibniz, and how "is the same as" became replaced with equality, is actually quite complex. If you study it, you might discover a sophistic trick, which is a type of inversion fallacy. The proposition is that in all instances of A, A is equal to A. And so A is equal to A is proposed as the law of identity in formal logic. It says something about A, that it is always equal to itself, and cannot not be equal to itself. However, A is equal to A is not as logically rigorous as A is the same as A. This is because in all cases of "is the same as", there is necessarily equality, but not in all cases of equality are the equal things the same. Therefore identity is a very special type of equality, a relation which a thing has with itself, but "A is equal to A" does not signify what the special type of equality is, which is stated as "is the same as".

Here's a quote from SEP:

Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly unproblematic, for it is just that relation everything has to itself and nothing else – and what could be less problematic than that? Moreover, if the notion is problematic it is difficult to see how the problems could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted by Quine (1964).

You are misrepresenting what Wayfarer said. Ideas exist only in minds, not as particular substances, even though they may be about particulars. — Dfpolis

Well, this is what is being debated, whether or not some ideas actually exist in some minds as particulars. Simply stating that they do not, does not argue your case. It seems to me, that if I see a piece of fruit on the counter, and my goal is to eat that particular piece of fruit, this is a very particular idea. Likewise, if I have a plan to put some particular pieces of lumber together with some particular nails that I have, in a very particular way, this is also a very particular idea.

What I explained above, is that intention starts out as something very general, a general desire or ambition, or in my example, the general feeling of hunger. But by the time the individual acts on one's intentions, the goal is something very particular, to manipulate very particular material objects in a very particular way. It must be that this is the case, because we manipulate particular things in the world, in particular circumstances, and we cannot move around, and work with particular material objects in a general way, because our actions are particularly shaped to the situation. Each instance of manipulation is particular, as is the thing manipulated, and the circumstances within which it is manipulated, so the corresponding ideas must also be particular.

This is the issue of moral philosophy. How do we apply general principles in particular situations. The reality is that we do not. The general principles act as a sort of guide which assist us to produce particular ideas which are suited to each particular situation in which we find ourselves.

What prevents mathematical objects from being physical is that they require a counting or a measuring operation to become actual, while bodies need not be observed to exist. So, mathematical objects are mental existents with a foundation in reality, not realities simplicitur. — Dfpolis

By Aristotle's Metaphysics, it is the mathematician's mind which actualizes mathematical objects, therefore they have actual existence within the mind.

Good! What makes them the "same" is that they can elicit the identical (universal) idea. They need not be equal. 1 kg of sugar is the same kind of thing as 5 kg of sugar, but they are not equal. — Dfpolis

As each is sugar they are equal, in that parameter, and can be measured by the same laws of measurement. In the same way, you and I are equal as human beings, and are subject to the same laws.

Nonsense! They are saying nothing about the law of identity. You are equivocating on "the same." It has one meaning in identity, and a different meaning in equality. — Dfpolis

I suggest you speak to some mathematicians on this forum. There are many here who insist that "2+2=4" means that "2+2" is the same as "4", by the law of indentity. I believe it is the axiom of extensionality in set theory which gives rise to this way of thinking. Here's something Wikipedia says about that axiom: "Thus, what the axiom is really saying is that two sets are equal if and only if they have precisely the same members." Notice that under this axiom. for two sets to be equal, they must be the same. This axiom supports the claim that if two things are equal they are therefore the same.

No, he never has an interaction problem because one substance, a human being, cannot interact with itself. The interaction problem arises when you deny that we are one substance and make us two: res cogitans and res extensa. — Dfpolis

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle distinguished primary and secondary substance. Primary substance is one individual, consisting of matter and form, but secondary substance is formal only. Since each sense of "form" is actual, we need to resolve how primary and secondary substance interact with each other.

Becoming cannot be an interaction with the product of becoming, because they do not co-exist. — Dfpolis

You have no grounds for this statement because "becoming" is incompatible with the states of being and not being. So when a thing comes into being from not being, through the means of becoming, you have no principles to argue that becoming cannot overlap both the not being, and the being of the thing which is coming into existence. By Aristotle's principles, "becoming" violates the law of excluded middle, neither being nor not being, but by Hegel's principles, "becoming" encompasses bot being and not being. So we really cannot say with any amount of certainty whether becoming truly overlaps the being of a thing or not.

I would say that since a thing is always changing, and maintains its identity as the same thing, despite undergoing change, according to the law of identity, we must conclude that the being and the becoming of the very same thing, do co-exist.

Yes, but while it is being perfected, it is not the finished (formed) product. — Dfpolis

By the law of identity it is still the same thing, during that extended period of time which it is undergoing the changes which are attempts to perfect it. Clearly, the becoming of a thing must overlap the being of the thing, and this is why there cannot be a clearly and distinctly defined "point in time" at which the not-being of the thing is replaced with the being of the thing. There can always be debate as to the precise point in time when a thing actually starts to be the thing that it is.

If you mean that there are two kinds of form, one the mental plan and the other the actuality of the product, I agree. If you mean that there are two substances in the product, which is what "dualism" usually means, I disagree. — Dfpolis

It appears like you are just manipulating your use of "substance" to suit your purpose. That's fine, if you do not want to call the immaterial form which precedes in time the material form, a "substance", because "substance" implies matter to you, then we can proceed on those terms. Still we must account for the reality of that immaterial actuality.

You seem not to have read De Anima. Psyche is defined as the first actuality of a potentially living body. It cannot exist before there is an actual living body. The agent intellect is "divine" and separable, while the passive intellect is "perishable" and so physical. — Dfpolis

I've had extensive discussion on De Anima, on this forum, and I've read it multiple times. It contains ambiguity and reason for differing interpretations. By my translation, "soul" is defined as the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This means soul is prior to life. But you and I have already discussed the two senses of "actuality" used by Aristotle in this book, and I would be willing to further this discussion. It is an interesting topic.

seems like pointing to a non-issue: categories are particular just as indivdual objects are. — Janus

I would not agree to that. A category is a universal, not a particular.

I would not agree to that. A category is a universal, not a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point was that each category is particular and distinct from all other categories.

AFAIK, Aristotle posited a potentially infinite number of substances in that he thought that the primary substances are individual objects. — Janus

He did not posit, but recognized, that individual things were the basis of our concept of reality. That is why he said that ousia is tode ti (=this something). Ousia (translated "substance") meant true reality, not a kind of stuff, in Greek. Aristotle's word for the stuff things are made out of was hyle (=timber and poorly translated as "matter"). Spinoza used the same Latin word, substantia, but with a different definition in his writings.

Where do you think our concept of reality comes from?

A category is "specific", not "particular". This is because the parameters of the category are specified, and are not necessarily "particular", meaning of that specific category and not other categories. Call me pedantic, but logic fails when it is not rigorous.

Plato demonstrated this problem in The Parmenides. If a whole, "One" (category in this case) is defined as a collection of individuals, (particulars in this case), then One (as category) cannot be an individual (particular) because then there is no logical separation between the One and the Many. Therefore the metaphysically, or ontological acceptable, as in logically rigorous, way of proceeding is to employ a further definition which distinguishes the category from the things which exist as members of that category. So if the members are said to be particulars, then the category itself must be something other than a particular. We call it a universal.

Whether or not set theory adheres to this principle is debatable. Set theory makes a set an individual, as a mathematical object, which the members of the set also are, mathematical objects. This is a metaphysical or ontological flaw. which I believe produces the problem described above, resulting in "Russel's Paradox". I believe that the conventional solutions to this problem do not provide the required separation between the definition of "set" and the definition of "element" to actually resolve the problem. To produce the required ontological separation would annihilate the validity of set theory.

That a "set" is necessarily distinct from an "element" of a set, therefore requiring different defining terms, is evident from proofs which show the reality of the "empty set". The empty set is distinct from the set which contains zero as an element. And that it is possible to have an object (set, as mathematical object), which consists of nothing at all, no substance, demonstrates the need for a separation between "category" as specified, and "particular" as an element of the category. The latter, the particular, cannot consist of nothing, no substance, but the former the empty set is very real as a logical possibility.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

Are you familiar with the law of identity? I mean do you understand its presentation and meaning, rather than just being able to copy the conventional representation of "A=A"? Did you read the SEP quote, which states that identity is a relation which can only hold between a thing and itself?

Surely you must understand that "a thing" is a particular, not the representation of a particular. And the meaning of "can only hold between a thing and itself", is self-evident. Therefore representing a particular individual with a symbol ("A "for example), does not produce an identity relation, when the law of identity is formally adhered to. The commonly accepted notion of "identity", the vulgar notion, by which a thing is identified with a name, is not consistent with the law of identity. This is a corrupted "identity" which is derived from a faulty ontology, and cannot provide for a rigorous logic.

You are misrepresenting what Wayfarer said. Ideas exist only in minds, not as particular substances, even though they may be about particulars. — Dfpolis
Well, this is what is being debated, whether or not some ideas actually exist in some minds as particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are debating the truth of the claim, not what Wafarer said, which we call all read for our selves.

If you think ideas exist as particulars, then you need to define "particulars," because what I see is particular humans thinking ideas. The dependence on humans makes an idea an accident in the sense of a predicable, not a "this something" (tode ti), as humans are.

if I have a plan to put some particular pieces of lumber together with some particular nails that I have, in a very particular way, this is also a very particular idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it is an idea about particulars. If I am thinking of the universal identity of action and passion that is as particular an idea as the one you offer, because it is me thinking it at a specific time. Still it is about a universal fact: all actions are identical with their correlative passions.

By Aristotle's Metaphysics, it is the mathematician's mind which actualizes mathematical objects, therefore they have actual existence within the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

The universal ideas are in the mind, but they are not objects because objects are particular instances. The particular quantities (mathematical objects) in reality are actualized by the operations I mentioned.

suggest you speak to some mathematicians on this forum. There are many here who insist that "2+2=4" means that "2+2" is the same as "4", by the law of indentity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then they are not very good mathematicians. I took courses in abstract mathematics, and addition is not identity. Mathematicians have a different notion of identity than philosophers, and say that x=x is true by their principle of identity.

Notice that under this axiom. for two sets to be equal, they must be the same. This axiom supports the claim that if two things are equal they are therefore the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It is defining "set equality," not equality in general, because quantities are not sets, but can be equal.

we need to resolve how primary and secondary substance interact with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

They don't. Primary substances are real, secondary substances are abstractions. Only agents can act and so interact.

-- more later

Interaction requires two or more things to interact. If we are one thing, which seems pretty obvious, this mis-states the question, and bad questions lead to bad answers. We can ask what is the relation between intentional and physical actions without assuming that that relation is an interaction. That is a sensible question and has sensible answers involving the origin and nature of such relations, not interactions. — Dfpolis

Because explaining how mind "relates" to entities not having the characteristics of mind is so much easier than explaining how mind "interacts" with entities not having the characteristics of mind?

Because explaining how mind "relates" to entities not having the characteristics of mind is so much easier than explaining how mind "interacts" with entities not having the characteristics of mind? — Arne

No. Because if you start with the false premise that the human mind and body are two things, you miss the fact that one thing, a human being, can act both physically and intentionally. By seeing human unity, the question of how res cogitans and res extensa interact never arises to distract us from the issue of how human beings interact with intelligible objects.

We still need to explain how knowledge, which is not neurally encoded information, but consciousness of neurally encoded information, arises. That problem is solvable and I shall publish a solution shortly.

Since each sense of "form" is actual, we need to resolve how primary and secondary substance interact with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

To continue: Primary substances are the things from which we abstract the concepts of species and genera. This is done by sensation and the actualization of selected notes of intelligibility by the agent intellect.

You have no grounds for this statement because "becoming" is incompatible with the states of being and not being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please read Aristotle's Physics I, where he explains the relation between these concepts.

By Aristotle's principles, "becoming" violates the law of excluded middle — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it does not. There is no middle ground between being the completed thing and not yet being the completed thing (an entelecheia).

Hegel's principles, "becoming" encompasses bot[h] being and not being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hegel was confused. He seemed not to understand potentiality and the definition of change.

So we really cannot say with any amount of certainty whether becoming truly overlaps the being of a thing or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we can. What we may not be able to say is where the line is. For example, when is a fetus a human being? Still, wherever the line is, before that, we have becoming and from that point on we have the being.

I would say that since a thing is always changing, and maintains its identity as the same thing, despite undergoing change, according to the law of identity, we must conclude that the being and the becoming of the very same thing, do co-exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, we are not completely identical at different times, so the law of identity does not apply. Second, we are the same being because of our dynamic continuity, not because of the same stuff or the exact same form. Third, being and becoming do co-exist, but not with respect to the same terminus. When I was 10 years old, I was becoming 11, not 10.

By the law of identity it is still the same thing — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no, that is not the reason. My 10 year old self was not identical to my 11 year old self.

Clearly, the becoming of a thing must overlap the being of the thing, and this is why there cannot be a clearly and distinctly defined "point in time" at which the not-being of the thing is replaced with the being of the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that applying our concepts can be fuzzy. This results from our concepts not being as clear as we would like, and perceptions being inadequate to determining sharp lines. These are epistemological, not ontological problems.

It appears like you are just manipulating your use of "substance" to suit your purpose — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am applying the term in the different ways it was applied historically. Aristotle and Aquinas define a substance as "this something" (an ostensible unity). Descartes and the modern tradition see substance as a kind of stuff things are made of (an analogue of matter). These are radically different concepts.

if you do not want to call the immaterial form which precedes in time the material form, a "substance", because "substance" implies matter to you, then we can proceed on those terms. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misunderstand. I am objecting on Aristotelian grounds. Concepts are not substances because they inhere in people, who are instances of "this something," i.e. substances.

Still we must account for the reality of that immaterial actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Concepts are real because they are acts of real people, e.g. the concept <apple> is people thinking of apples.

By my translation, "soul" is defined as the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This means soul is prior to life. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it absolutely does not. Living, and the actuality of being alive, are one and the same. There is no actuality of a potentially living body before there is an actual living being.

Particular categories are defined by specific criteria, just as particular objects are defined by specific attributes.

Most contemporary philosophers of mind employ a Cartesian conceptual space in which reality is (at least potentially) divided into res extensa and res cogitans. — Dfpolis

Contemporary philosophers of science, or at least the ones I think are worth reading, are much more likely to talk about self-organizing matter and systems than extended stuff.

... Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. — Dfpolis

The material of an acorn or an oak is not timber or wood. If it were our buildings would have some very odd features.

If timber or wood is the hyle of the oak and acorn what is the hyle of the timber or wood?

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. — Dfpolis

A great deal hinges on this for you, but it is an assertion without sufficient evidence.

But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation — Dfpolis

So, you are an ontological and epistemological dualist.

Spinoza, as I read him, treats substance as being or true reality, not as "stuff". I think we get our concept of reality from our experience of a shared world. We distinguish between what is real for us and what is fictional or imaginary. We are dialectically capable of imagining that there is a reality beyond or in addition to how things appear to us. This comes with the realization that things do not depend in us for their existence, although their appearances obviously do depend on us as well as the objects which appear to us.

If you think ideas exist as particulars, then you need to define "particulars," because what I see is particular humans thinking ideas. The dependence on humans makes an idea an accident in the sense of a predicable, not a "this something" (tode ti), as humans are. — Dfpolis

OK, I think we can start from this point. What I described as a "particular idea", you say is not a particular at all, in the sense of substance, but since it is dependent on a human being, it is a predicable. However, since this sort of idea which I was talking about, the idea which circumscribes the means to an end, or personal goal, is unique to the individual, in a particular set of circumstances, it is as you say an accident, and therefore not a universal. Would you agree with me that this sort of idea is better represented as an activity, a thinking activity, always changing according to the evolving circumstances as physical activities are carried out? And would you agree that although habit plays an important role in this sort of thinking activity, there are many ideas which stretch beyond habit, freely willed ideas, which contribute to creativity?

Please read Aristotle's Physics I, where he explains the relation between these concepts. — Dfpolis

I have, more than once, and my objection stands.

There is no middle ground between being the completed thing and not yet being the completed thing (an entelecheia). — Dfpolis

There is always a middle ground, it's called "becoming", and becoming is fundamentally incompatible with being, as explained by Aristotle. There are two logical states, the being of the thing and the not-being of the thing. The middle ground between these two is what we know as "change", or becoming.

Suppose at t1 we have the not being of a particular thing, A, and at t2 we have the being of A. Between t1 and t2 there is necessarily change, becoming. If we describe the change in terms of a different being, and suppose that halfway between t1 and t2, at t1.5, we have a different being, being B, then we must account for the change between being B and being A, in the time between t1.5 and t12. Now we posit being C at t1.75. You can see that this leads to an infinite regress of different beings at each conceivable moment of passing time in the duration of change.

So Aristotle concluded that "becoming" is incompatible with the logical terms of being and not-being. He stated that sophists who adhere strictly to the fundamental laws of logic are known to "demonstrate" or prove absurd conclusions ( Zeno's paradoxes for example) by doing this. His solution was to allow that the law of excluded middle be violated in instances where potential (may or may not be) was involved and this is the case for "becoming".

Therefore we need to conclude that there is always a middle ground in an activity of change. The potential of activity cannot be described in terms of being and not being, due to the problem of infinite regress outlined by Aristotle, and there must always be something in between any two distinct states of being, which cannot be described as a state of being, because it is change, becoming.

Yes, we can. What we may not be able to say is where the line is. For example, when is a fetus a human being? Still, wherever the line is, before that, we have becoming and from that point on we have the being. — Dfpolis

As demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, there is not a line, there is always necessarily a duration of change, or becoming, and this cannot be described as a line between two distinct states of being. If we try to describe this with lines between distinct states of being we have an infinite regress, of an infinite number of distinct states of being between each moment in time.

First, we are not completely identical at different times, so the law of identity does not apply. — Dfpolis

This is a misunderstanding of the law of identity. The law of identity allows that the very same thing is changing as time passes, because a thing is the same as itself, not the same as any description of it. This is the beauty of the law of identity, and why it is so ontologically useful in understanding the nature of material existence. We notice that objects are constantly changing, they get chipped, dented, or otherwise damaged, or altered. If the "identity" of a thing is a description which is supposed to correspond, then at each passing moment, a thing which consists of moving parts, must have a new identity, i.e. be a new thing at each passing moment. However, we also see the need to allow that a thing maintains its identity as the same thing, despite changes to it. So Aristotle was very intuitive to clarify the law of identity to account for this reality of observed temporal continuity, that a thing maintains its identity as the thing it is, despite changes to its form, as time passes.

Second, we are the same being because of our dynamic continuity, not because of the same stuff or the exact same form. — Dfpolis

This dynamic continuity is exactly the reality which the law of identity accounts for. And this is why I said being and becoming must overlap. A thing, such as a human being for example, is continuously changing, becoming, yet maintaining its identity as the same being.

My 10 year old self was not identical to my 11 year old self. — Dfpolis

You maintained your identity as the same being when you were 10, when you were 11, and still now. You were always the same being despite many changes, and you were always "the same as yourself". That is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". No specific description forms the identity of a thing.

I agree that applying our concepts can be fuzzy. This results from our concepts not being as clear as we would like, and perceptions being inadequate to determining sharp lines. These are epistemological, not ontological problems. — Dfpolis

The infinite regress demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, is a very significant ontological problem. This is why we cannot accurately account for the nature of reality by simply assuming one substance. The substance would exist in distinct states, but there would be an infinite regress of distinct states in each moment of time. So we must accept that there is something other, which is incompatible with this one substance existing in distinct states. It doesn't matter that you do not want to call this 'other' thing "substance", so that you can avoid substance dualism, because we end up in the same situation any way. Instead of having two real substances, we now have real substance and real non-substance, so what's the difference?

No, I am applying the term in the different ways it was applied historically. Aristotle and Aquinas define a substance as "this something" (an ostensible unity). Descartes and the modern tradition see substance as a kind of stuff things are made of (an analogue of matter). These are radically different concepts. — Dfpolis

Again, you are adhering to Aristotle's "primary substance", and conveniently ignoring his "secondary substance", in your definition of substance.

Concepts are real because they are acts of real people, e.g. the concept <apple> is people thinking of apples. — Dfpolis

So, we're back to the top of my post. Concepts are "acts", as stated here, and as described at the beginning of this post. And, as described in the rest of this post, activity, as change, becoming, is what lies between states of being, as something incompatible with the descriptive conventions of being and not being. So concepts are very real occurrences of "non-substance".

But now we have a problem with your definition of "substance", as "this something". Every time we point to a "this something", we find that it is engaged in change, activity, so it is also non-substance at the very same time. Any instance of substance, a thing, also consists of active becoming or change, and by your exclusionary definition of "substance", this must be "non-substance". So now, instead of violating the law of excluded middle, which Aristotle recommended, you violated the law of noncontradiction, which Aristotle strongly urged us not to do in this situation of trying to account for the dual reality of being and becoming.

There is no actuality of a potentially living body before there is an actual living being. — Dfpolis

There is necessarily an actuality which is before, that's what Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument demonstrates. A potentiality cannot actualize itself, something actual is required. So if there is a body with life potentially in it, it is required that there is an actuality which actualizes this body and makes this become an actual living body. This is "the soul", the actuality which is necessarily prior to the actual living body.

Contemporary philosophers of science, or at least the ones I think are worth reading, are much more likely to talk about self-organizing matter and systems than extended stuff. — Fooloso4

Thinking of matter in a different in terms of self-organization and systems (rather than extension) neither rejects nor replaces the dualist conceptual space.

The material of an acorn or an oak is not timber or wood. If it were our buildings would have some very odd features. — Fooloso4

No one said it was. Aristotle took an existing word, hyle, an gave it a new meaning, namely that "out of which" something comes to be.

A great deal hinges on this for you, but it is an assertion without sufficient evidence. — Fooloso4

It is based on reason applied to experience. It is just not what I am arguing in this thread.

So, you are an ontological and epistemological dualist. — Fooloso4

You have provided no arguments to support this strange claim.

Spinoza, as I read him, treats substance as being or true reality, not as "stuff". — Janus

Yes, classically, substance/ousia refers to true reality. What I mean is that for Spinoza, there is one substance, and what we see as things are its "modes." Another way of saying this is that the things of experience are "made of" his one substance. That makes it a kind of stuff. So, while his language is not materialistic, his way of thinking about reality is.

We are dialectically capable of imagining that there is a reality beyond or in addition to how things appear to us. This comes with the realization that things do not depend in us for their existence, although their appearances obviously do depend on us as well as the objects which appear to us. — Janus

Beginning with what we can imagine and ending with reality is fundamentally unsound.

Also, "appearances" is poorly defined here. It can mean what we see, or how we see it. What we see does not depend on us in the way you seem to be thinking -- or at least you need to be more specific about what you mean. How we receive it, the qualia of perception, does depend on us.

Thinking of matter in a different in terms of self-organization and systems (rather than extension) neither rejects nor replaces the dualist conceptual space. — Dfpolis

The development of self-organizing matter gives rise to the development of organisms. No dualism.

No one said it was. Aristotle took an existing word, hyle, an gave it a new meaning, namely that "out of which" something comes to be. — Dfpolis

This is still misleading. What you said was:

(hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") — Dfpolis

That out of which an acorn comes to be is not timber. Timber comes to be out of a tree. An oak comes to be out of an acorn. Translating hyle as 'timber' is at least if not more problematic than matter.

It is based on reason applied to experience. — Dfpolis

It is at best a likely story. Plato's Timaeus has a great deal to say about likely stories (ton eikota mython). They are stories about things we do not know. A likely story is without sufficient evidence to determine whether it is true:

So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised.

(Timaeus 29c)

Aristotle says:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually …

(982a)

How far is it possible to know all things? Aristotle says that:

... it is through experience that men acquire science and art ...

(981a)

Without the possibility of knowledge of beginnings and ends the wise man’s knowledge falls short of knowledge of all things. Our knowledge and experience is limited. We are somewhere between the beginning and the end. We have not experience of the arche or source or beginning, only conjecture, only likely stories.

So, you are an ontological and epistemological dualist.
— Fooloso4

You have provided no arguments to support this strange claim. — Dfpolis

What you said is:

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. — Dfpolis

This is a dualism of God and world.

it is as you say an accident, and therefore not a universal — Metaphysician Undercover

All ideas, being actions (humans thinking of something) inhere in the persons thinking them, and are therefore accidents in the sense of predicables. This is true whether we are thinking of singulars or universals.

Would you agree with me that this sort of idea is better represented as an activity, a thinking activity, always changing according to the evolving circumstances as physical activities are carried out? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is an activity, and it can change but it is not always changing.

And would you agree that although habit plays an important role in this sort of thinking activity, there are many ideas which stretch beyond habit, freely willed ideas, which contribute to creativity? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

There is no middle ground between being the completed thing and not yet being the completed thing (an entelecheia). — Dfpolis
There is always a middle ground, it's called "becoming", and becoming is fundamentally incompatible with being, as explained by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Becoming x has ceases when x complete.

Becoming is not incompatible with being. At each stage, what is becoming is what it is. For example, the developing human may be a zygote or a fetus. Let's face it, Aristotle's account of becoming is a simplified model. Most organisms continue to develop. So, there is no one entelechy.

You can see that this leads to an infinite regress of different beings at each conceivable moment of passing time in the duration of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Aristotelian answer to this is that this infinity is potential, not actual. It is not that we have different being, but a different kind of being. "Kind" is a conceptual reality, based on the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time. That intelligibility does not become an actual "kind" unless the agent intellect actualizes it, and forms a universal concept by prescinding from individuating notes of intelligibility. So, while we have an infinite number of potential kinds, we only have as many actual kinds as the agent intellect is able to generate.

So Aristotle concluded that "becoming" is incompatible with the logical terms of being and not-being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Give me the text and citation.

His solution was to allow that the law of excluded middle be violated — Metaphysician Undercover

Citation? His solution was to point out an equivocation.

The potential of activity cannot be described in terms of being and not being, due to the problem of infinite regress outlined by Aristotle, and there must always be something in between any two distinct states of being, which cannot be described as a state of being, because it is change, becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense. Aristotle did not say what you claim. There is no middle ground between being and non-being. Every potential is grounded in actual being. New forms of being come from old forms of being, not from non-being absolutely considered. In other words, the non-being of a potential being is not absolute non-being, so the new being comes from something, rather than from nothing.

The law of identity allows that the very same thing is changing as time passes — Metaphysician Undercover

Citation? The Law of Identity is "Whatever is, is and whatever is not, is not." So, you are making up your own law. Please state what you think it is.

If the "identity" of a thing is a description which is supposed to correspond, then at each passing moment, a thing which consists of moving parts, must have a new identity, i.e. be a new thing at each passing moment. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the self-identity of a changing being is based on organic continuity. I do not have the same description I did when I was conceived, but I have organically developed developed from that zygote into the person I am today.

So Aristotle was very intuitive to clarify the law of identity to account for this reality of observed temporal continuity, that a thing maintains its identity as the thing it is, despite changes to its form, as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where did he do so?

No specific description forms the identity of a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

We agree on this. Aristotle contributes his distinction between substantial and accidental changes to the discussion. Still, he seems to have stuck with Plato's notion of static universal forms, even though he rejected Platonic Ideas.

The infinite regress demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, is a very significant ontological problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not. As I explained earlier, to have actual "kinds" requires a mental act.

This is why we cannot accurately account for the nature of reality by simply assuming one substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Neither Aristotle nor I assume one substance. He defines each ostensible unity (each tode ti = this something) to be a substance (ousia).

So we must accept that there is something other, which is incompatible with this one substance existing in distinct states. — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not follow. In Aristotle's view I am the same substance I was the moment I qualified as a rational animal. What need is there for another substance?

Again, you are adhering to Aristotle's "primary substance", and conveniently ignoring his "secondary substance", in your definition of substance — Metaphysician Undercover

That is because secondary substances (species and genera) are derivative on primary substances. They only exist in our minds because primary substances act on our senses to form phantasms (neural states) from which we abstract species concepts.

So concepts are very real occurrences of "non-substance". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep, they're accidents. Still accidental being is a type of being, not non-being.

But now we have a problem with your definition of "substance", as "this something". — Metaphysician Undercover

It is Aristotle's definition. I just accepted it.

Every time we point to a "this something", we find that it is engaged in change, activity, so it is also non-substance at the very same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not by Aristotle's definition. He knows that things undergo accidental changes and remain the same substance. Read De Generatione et Corruptione. I have lost a lot of hair, but I am still a human and will be until I die.

Any instance of substance, a thing, also consists of active becoming or change, and by your exclusionary definition of "substance", this must be "non-substance" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but most of these changes do not break the thing's organic continuity. It is the same unity, the same "this," and so the same substance.

There is necessarily an actuality which is before, that's what Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument demonstrates. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is, but it is not the actuality of a potentially living body. It is an actual efficient cause.

This is "the soul", the actuality which is necessarily prior to the actual living body. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As I just said, it is the actuality of the efficient cause, not of the potentially living body, which it must be to satisfy the definition of psyche.

The development of self-organizing matter gives rise to the development of organisms. No dualism. — Fooloso4

Putting aside that matter does not organize itself (the laws of nature do), this does nothing to explain human intentional acts, such as awareness of contents. When that is considered, it is still done so using Cartesian categories. That is where dualism comes in. Even if thinking stuff is rejected, no other way of framing the problem is considered.

This is still misleading. What you said was:
(hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") — Dfpolis — Fooloso4

Yes, and the context was an explanation of Aristotle's technical terms. As you see, I am happy to answer questions if my are explanations inadequate.

That out of which an acorn comes to be is not timber. Timber comes to be out of a tree. An oak comes to be out of an acorn. Translating hyle as 'timber' is at least if not more problematic than matter. — Fooloso4

Quite right. That is why I often do not translate it. It is a technical term with no good English equivalent.

We have not experience of the arche or source or beginning, only conjecture, only likely stories. — Fooloso4

Not quite. We experience everything through its action on us. When we see a red apple it is because it has acted to scatter red light into our eyes, and sufficient light triggers a neuron and so on until the action has changed our brain state. The apple informing our brain state is, identically, our brain state being informed by the apple. This identity is the basis of knowledge.

The same thing (hypothetically) happens if God acts to keep us in existence -- we would be acted upon in a potentially informative way. So examining the dynamics of our existence may lead to knowledge of God. That is the framework for Aristotle's and Aquinas's arguments. This is not the place to give them, but I suggest that you be open to the possibility that there is more than a story here.

This is a dualism of God and world. — Fooloso4

I hold that God is radically different, but inseparable, from the world. Still, that is not the kind of dualism we are discussing. The dualism we are discussing has one kind of thing doing physical acts and a separate kind of thing doing mental acts.