P. 15Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 'directly'-a great favourite among philosophers, but actually one of the less con- spicuous snakes in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a very special-use, being gradually stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it.
Therefore, the question to which the argument from illusion purports to provide an answer is a purely linguistic question, not a question of fact...
This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, — Ludwig V
It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. — Ludwig V
He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework. — Antony Nickles
Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.
I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it. — Ludwig V
I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V
But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake. — Ludwig V
Well, sometimes what we see is what there is... — Banno
We do not see an immaterial barn, an immaterial church, or an immaterial anything else.
n the case of the camouflaged church what we see is not, as Austin claims, "a church that now looks like a barn". (30) What we see is a barn. If we didn't what would be the point of camouflaging it? — Fooloso4
I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V
To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. — Corvus
The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).
Part of the difficulty is understanding the significance of what he says. It is too easy to trivialize "ordinary language". — Ludwig V
But I think that is a reaction to the difficulty of seeing what one might do next in philosophy. So much is being dismantled that the landscape can seem to be a desert. Bringing the nonsense in philosophy to an end is one thing. But bringing philosophy to an end is something else. Whatever motivates philosophy has certainly not gone away. — Ludwig V
He is not offering another theory to explain “perceiving” or something to replace it. He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework. — Antony Nickles
But his method (as with Wittgenstein) is to set out what we say and do about a topic as evidence of how that thing actually works. That is to say, he is learning about the world. For example, in examining what we say and do about looking, he is making a claim about how "looking" works, the mechanics of it. “Seeing” something is not biological—which would simply be vision—and neither is judging, identifying, categorizing, etc. (“perception” is a made up thing, never defined nor explained p. 47). . Austin is showing us that “seeing” is a learned, public process (of focus and identification). “Do you see that? What, that dog? That’s not a dog, it’s a giant rabbit; see the ears.” — Antony Nickles
The "pie in the face" moment as I like to call it is when you understand you've been on a wild goose chase all along. — Ciceronianus
The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:
The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). — Fooloso4
I've never believed little blobs of color are fundamental to perception, so I missed out on the pie. I don't think any scientists believe that either, if any ever did. — frank
I don't recall mentioning "little blobs of color" or their relation to perception. Perhaps you're being deceived by your senses, yet again. — Ciceronianus
Thanks for the clarification. The pie I got hit with was rather tasty, but I'm glad you avoided getting hit by one. — Ciceronianus
To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.
I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others. — Banno
And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it. — Banno
So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science. — Banno
No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.
The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup. — Banno
That admission seems to be how he denies any sort of comprehensive indirect realism. — frank
Terms such as 'realism' in all its variety of flavors confuse me. I try to avoid them. The fault may be entirely my own, but I have not been able to find any consistent usage that makes me confident that those who talk about such things have the same concerns and are arguing for or against the same things. — Fooloso4
all I see is patches and blobs from which I infer(?) the existence of a cup. — frank
(emphasis added)Anyway, pointing out the eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. — Corvus
I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. — frank
[Eyes as a medium for visual perception] could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. — Corvus
obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue — Corvus
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works? — Corvus
Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff). — Antony Nickles
I think the indirect realist gets it backwards. She sees the cup and based on a theory of perception infers that she sees patches and blobs.
Put her in a room that contains only patches and blobs my guess is she would see patches and blobs. But if some of those patches and blobs were arranged in a certain way, in dim light, and at enough of a distance she might see a cup or pen or chair. That is to say, there is, I think, a constructive element of seeing. — Fooloso4
It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions. — Corvus
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