Dear Ludwig, thanks for your analysis and argumentative explanation. I really appreciate it.

On the other hand, I beg your pardon if you think that my posts are not clear or difficult to follow on, because it is true. I am very interested in philosophy, but my knowledge of the matter is basic, and I just wanted to take part in this thread, but roughly. I am aware that I am not capable of providing more substantial answers.

Continuing to the main point...

Firstly, I thought the paper of Austin was a matter of linguistics rather than metaphysics. This is what I interpreted when I read:

Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 'directly'-a great favourite among philosophers, but actually one of the less con- spicuous snakes in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a very special-use, being gradually stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it.

P. 15

And then in P. 59, he also states:

Therefore, the question to which the argument from illusion purports to provide an answer is a purely linguistic question, not a question of fact...

Nonetheless, if I am not wrong, the main direction in Austin's work is metaphysical. It makes me wonder whether Austin wants to disagree with Ayer for being 'idealistic linguistic' or if he actually considers that 'sense' and 'sensibilia' are a subject of Philosophy of Language. - or at least an approach to -

Finally, rereading what I posted previously, I think you are right. Austin agrees with Kant and Berkeley, and disagrees with Ayer. But it doesn't seem to me that he disagrees in everything about Ayer, but some points. At least, in an analytical perspective, Austin agrees with Ayer.

This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, — Ludwig V

The fact that a philosopher may not attach a label to themselves does not mean a label cannot be attached to them.

As the IEP in its article John Langshaw Austin (1911—1960) writes:

Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his ‘linguistic phenomenology’, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts and ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, “to say something is to do something”).

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It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. — Ludwig V

Perhaps one should look at Dunmett, Sellars, Wittgenstein and Austin who are making this kind of claim.

Wittgenstein wrote in 5.62 of Tractatus "The World is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world."

Sellars is known for his Inferential Role Semantics. His most famous work is "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). In it, he criticizes the view that knowledge of what we perceive can be independent of the conceptual processes which result in perception. He named this "The Myth of the Given," attributing it to sense-data theories of knowledge. (Wikipedia - Wilfrid Sellars).

Dummett is known for his Semantic Antirealism, also known as Semantic Inferentialism, a position suggesting that truth cannot serve as the central notion in the theory of meaning and must be replaced by verifiability (Wikipedia - Michael Dummett).

Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. He argues that all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning (Wikipedia - JL Austin).

Austin is promoting an ordinary language philosophy with the aim of removing what he argues are false distinctions made by classical philosophy, resulting from the misuse of words such as "direct" and "indirect". He proposes going back to the ordinary use of a word rather than its metaphorical use.

He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework. — Antony Nickles

I was reading him as having a less dramatic point. I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. I think he's targeting a specific argument wrt that interpretation, that is, that we don't perceive the world around us, but rather we only perceive sense data, which is unique to each individual, as the medium for communication with the world.

I think the sense data theory is fine as a first stab at hypothesizing about perception. It's the idea that the fundamentals of perception are little blobs of light and color along with borders and shapes. The problem I see is that this conception of the fundamentals contains all the elements of the supposed higher levels. If you see a blob of light, you've tuned your attention to exclude everything except that, and "blob" is an interpretation. It's not raw perception, in other words. So I agree with Austin that the sense data theory doesn't do what it's supposed to do. I don't see Austin as establishing any great insights beyond that, though.

Austin's point here is that "direct" and "indirect" are a pair, linked by their opposition. Each derives it's meaning from the other, like "north" and "south", "up" and "down", "hot" and "cold". If you say that all perceptions are indirect, and imply that no perception is, or could be, direct, you deprive "direct" of any "meaning" and hence render "indirect" meaningless as well.

I don't accept that my eye is an intermediary, getting in the way of my perception. It would be simplistic to say that indirect perception is perception aided by something that is not (part of) me, but it is a start, and at least rules out the idea that my eye, which enables me to perceive at all, is somehow an intermediary in a process which could not happen without it. — Ludwig V

Indirect and direct are just words, which are adjectives to describe the noun, how it works. Perceptions are not by definition or essence linked to Direct or Indirect.

Ayer and Austin could have picked up other words to describe perception, but they are the words they used to describe perception.

The terms direct and indirect only get attached to perception when one is asked "how perception works". Because obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue, and the point we are discussing to describe the perception process is, by looking at all entities in the chain and their involvements in perception. We are not asking who is perceiving the tree in the garden, and what perception is made of, but how perception works.

To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.

I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V

You can't understand what direct perception doesn't follow therefore indirect perception is not valid. It just proves perceptions are not direct, but they are indirect.

But if you ask how a rainbow is made, the rainbow will not be part of the explanation. The sunlight, and the raindrops involved are not the rainbow, but the rainbow is not an entity distinct from them either. This should not be surprising. If the analysandum is part of the analysis, you have a circularity. So looking to find a process or event that is the perception inside one's head is a mistake. — Ludwig V

Again, we are not asking what perception is made of, but how perception works.
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works?

OK. All noted. Will get back with my response in due course as I am in the middle of doing other things :)

Well, sometimes what we see is what there is... — Banno

In the case of the camouflaged church what we see is not, as Austin claims, "a church that now looks like a barn". (30) What we see is a barn. If we didn't what would be the point of camouflaging it?

He continues:

We do not see an immaterial barn, an immaterial church, or an immaterial anything else.

While this is true, and is the reason why he cites this example, the distinction between what we see and what it looks like cannot be made unless we can see that what it is, a camouflaged church, is something other than what it looks like. If the camouflage is removed we might say that what we see is a church that now looks like a church, but if the camouflage was not there in the first place we would not say that what we see is a church that now looks like a church.

n the case of the camouflaged church what we see is not, as Austin claims, "a church that now looks like a barn". (30) What we see is a barn. If we didn't what would be the point of camouflaging it? — Fooloso4

To say that what we see is "a church that now looks like a barn" is to admit that ideas and interpretation are parts of perception. That admission seems to be how he denies any sort of comprehensive indirect realism.

If we read him while focusing on what's happening with truth, he's saying we arrive at truth by various means, including reason. He's saying that Ayers was a truth skeptic. I don't know if he actually was. I've never read Ayers. :grin:

I am also trying to understand that, because unless I do understand that, I don't understand what "indirect" means. — Ludwig V

To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. — Corvus

The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:

The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).

Goofup

Goof2

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank

Part of the difficulty is understanding the significance of what he says. It is too easy to trivialize "ordinary language". — Ludwig V

I tried to take a stab at this confusion above in saying Austin is not taking the views of the common person to address the concerns of philosophy (to say they conflict). He is employing a new (old) method that by looking at what we ordinarily say (in the course of business) shows (is evidence, but not “empirical” @javi2541997) that we have way more standards then philosophy’s singular standard (direct or not). It is not that our ordinary activities solve philosophy’s problems, but only show that philosophy turned our concerns into a problem it created only able to be solved by a particular (direct, objective, scientific) solution, however mysterious (and so Austin is deconstructing metaphysics @javi2541997).

But I think that is a reaction to the difficulty of seeing what one might do next in philosophy. So much is being dismantled that the landscape can seem to be a desert. Bringing the nonsense in philosophy to an end is one thing. But bringing philosophy to an end is something else. Whatever motivates philosophy has certainly not gone away. — Ludwig V

This method is to draw out our ways of judging (which we rarely examine), in the same way Socrates did, but without jumping to (starting with really) the standard that we must end up with a type of knowledge that fixes the precipitous conclusions that philosophy imagines (skepticism, relativism) because it does not take into account the ordinary ways we have of resolving our errors and conflicting cases. This doesn’t finish philosophy but only shows that we can disagree on rational terms where philosophy did not think it was capable only because it set the standard for rationality up front.

Wittgenstein will echo that this method “seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)” #118 But he will focus on the outcome that we now have a clear view, that there is a value in the discovery. The work on morality, other minds, etc. are each different, and continue.

He is not offering another theory to explain “perceiving” or something to replace it. He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework. — Antony Nickles

He's establishing that as well, to my satisfaction at least. The "pie in the face" moment as I like to call it is when you understand you've been on a wild goose chase all along. It's not an easy thing to acknowledge, as is being shown.

This kind of philosophy is well described as therapeutic, I think. It's directed to the treatment and (it's to be hoped) cure of a kind of disorder or disease which leads us to believe that we are, in effect, the homunculus Banno refers to, watching a movie screen or TV in our minds.

But his method (as with Wittgenstein) is to set out what we say and do about a topic as evidence of how that thing actually works. That is to say, he is learning about the world. For example, in examining what we say and do about looking, he is making a claim about how "looking" works, the mechanics of it. “Seeing” something is not biological—which would simply be vision—and neither is judging, identifying, categorizing, etc. (“perception” is a made up thing, never defined nor explained p. 47). . Austin is showing us that “seeing” is a learned, public process (of focus and identification). “Do you see that? What, that dog? That’s not a dog, it’s a giant rabbit; see the ears.” — Antony Nickles

I think you see this in Deweyian pragmatism as well. Perceiving, thinking, doing is how we learn of and interact with the rest of the world. The tendency of philosophers has been to treat "the mind" as something different from the world in a sense, unconcerned with the mundane when appropriately engaged and thus capable of ascertaining what lies beyond the prejudices of the "common herd" regarding the nature and reality of things with which it deals every day, like cups.

The "pie in the face" moment as I like to call it is when you understand you've been on a wild goose chase all along. — Ciceronianus

I've never believed little blobs of color are fundamental to perception, so I missed out on the pie. I don't think any scientists believe that either, if any ever did.

The distinction between direct and indirect is stated on page 2:

The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). — Fooloso4

Thanks for your quote. :pray: The fact that Austin starts with direct and indirect perception in his book implies that he took the issue not lightly?  Just guessing.  

Anyway, pointing out eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. It could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. If one reminds oneself that it is also part of the claim from phenomenologists such as Merlou-Ponty, who takes the physical body as a base of perception.

All neurologist and psychologists will never leave out eyes as a medium and sense organ for their account of visual perception. Berkeley has written a book on Visual Perception which exclusively explains how eyes work with the distant and close object for visual perception.

 Of course phenomenology would be off topic in this thread, so we won't go there deeper, but perception cannot be discussed without discussions of sense organs to some degree.

I've never believed little blobs of color are fundamental to perception, so I missed out on the pie. I don't think any scientists believe that either, if any ever did. — frank

I don't recall mentioning "little blobs of color" or their relation to perception. Perhaps you're being deceived by your senses, yet again.

I don't recall mentioning "little blobs of color" or their relation to perception. Perhaps you're being deceived by your senses, yet again. — Ciceronianus

Per the SEP, that's what sense data is. That's what Austin is complaining about: little blobs of color.

Thanks for the clarification. The pie I got hit with was rather tasty, but I'm glad you avoided getting hit by one.

Thanks for the clarification. The pie I got hit with was rather tasty, but I'm glad you avoided getting hit by one. — Ciceronianus

Was it coconut? :worry:

To say eyes are one of the mediums of visual perception is to point out that perceptions are indirect. It had been mentioned particularly, because it is the most obvious and unmistakable example of the medium in visual perception by anyone, due to the fact that some folks in this thread seem to have problems in understanding why perceptions are indirect.

One problem I have with your obvious and unmistakeable example is routine biology. One usually uses her eyes to view mediums. So how does one view the medium of her own eyes, if not with her eyes?

I don't wish to dissuade you, indeed there is no alternative, as you must begin where your thoughts are now. The material we are considering takes some digestion, especially as much of it is contrary to what is usually taken as granted in these fora. But from what you have written here you have been following Austin's account well, which is far more than can be said for others. — Banno

Thanks mate. :)

And here it is not at all clear what it would mean to see something without using one's eyes, or any other sense organ. So it's not clear what the direct/indirect distinction is doing in this case. Austin doesn't directly address such an argument, because no one, least of all Ayer, was so gormless as to present it. — Banno

The fact that Ayer and Austin both deal with the issues regarding direct and indirect perception implies, that they must have taken the distinction not lightly. Especially if you notice Austin starts his first and second page of the book with general account of indirect perception, which he notes has been the classic view on the perception how it works.

Some folks deny the distinctions and some say they don't understand what direct perception means. It is because perhaps all perceptions are indirect in nature, and they cannot find any examples of direct perception.

I myself, cannot quite understand how perception works directly, but I do understand how it works indirectly, i.e. via sense organs and sense-data.

When one says perception is direct, i.e. it is between him and the objects or the world, I cannot quite get the point. Because the question was not who is perceiving the object, or the world, or who is responsible for the perception of the objects and the world, but the question was, how perception works.

It is like saying, how does a car work?, the person says, I drive the car. It is between me and the car, nothing in between. It is an answer which is from someone who totally misunderstood what the question was about.

You mention bringing eyes as a visual perceptual organ is absurd, simple and gormless. I feel it is not a reasonable or fair claim either.

Eyes were pointed out as a visual perceptual sense organ as a medium of visual perception, because without your eyes, you will not have visual perception. Simple as that. Of course everyone knows that eyes are the visual sense organ, but they seem to totally forget that eyes are the medium for transferring the image of the external objects into the brain, which makes the visual perception possible in the brain.

The working of eyes for visual perception could be quite complex. It wouldn't be something so simple and definitely not irrelevant with the visual perception topic, so saying it is not worth even mentioning such a simple thing in the discussion of how visual perception works sounds wrong and indeed addlepated.

Of course neither Austin nor Ayer mentions anything about the workings of eyes in visual perception in all of their books. That does not mean that they thought it would be gormless to talk about the sense organs in the theory of perception, but maybe they didn't know anything about how eyes worked in a neurological and biological way to perceive images and transfers into the brain.

So in those terms, there is nothing to understand. A so-called "direct realist" account of perception is the same as the standard account given by science. — Banno

Neurologists and Psychologists would say it would be addlepated for anyone talking about visual perception without going through ins and outs of the workings on the eyes, but Austin and Ayer had been doing it linguistically and logically, hence there are bound to be some muddles on the way. Still it is a useful exercise in semantics at least, and finding out what the actual issues are in the topic.

No. But they might say that when you look at a cup, what you are seeing is the cup, and not some philosophical innovation such as sense data or qualia. That you are not a homunculus sitting inside a head, looking at the a screen projecting images of cups.

The reply to this will be that we understand from recent scientific developments that our brains actively construct a model of the cup. That's quite right. But it would be an error to think that what we see is this model - the homunculus again. Rather, constructing the model is our seeing the cup. — Banno

This is wrong. Because in neurological research, human perception can never see the exact "NOW". There is time lapse of your seeing the cup, and your brain processing the object as a cognition of a cup of about 0.05ms, which means you never see the cup direct. What you are seeing is a memory of the cup of 0.05ms past even if you may be telling yourself that is the live real perception you are having of the cup. It is a processed and stored image you were seeing.

That admission seems to be how he denies any sort of comprehensive indirect realism. — frank

Terms such as 'realism' in all its variety of flavors confuse me. I try to avoid them. The fault may be entirely my own, but I have not been able to find any consistent usage that makes me confident that those who talk about such things have the same concerns and are arguing for or against the same things.

Terms such as 'realism' in all its variety of flavors confuse me. I try to avoid them. The fault may be entirely my own, but I have not been able to find any consistent usage that makes me confident that those who talk about such things have the same concerns and are arguing for or against the same things. — Fooloso4

There are all kinds of realisms and anti-realisms, so I agree there's no consistent usage. For this essay, I think an indirect realist believes there really are cups. The cups exist independently of me, it's just that all I see is patches and blobs from which I infer(?) the existence of a cup.

Austin is pointing out flaws in some arguments for that scenario, particularly in the wording of the argument, which appears to be misusing common words.

One problem I have with your obvious and unmistakeable example is routine biology. One usually uses her eyes to view mediums. So how does one view the medium of her own eyes, if not with her eyes? — NOS4A2

These videos explain how eyes work in our visual perception.

all I see is patches and blobs from which I infer(?) the existence of a cup. — frank

I think the indirect realist gets it backwards. She sees the cup and based on a theory of perception infers that she sees patches and blobs.

Put her in a room that contains only patches and blobs my guess is she would see patches and blobs. But if some of those patches and blobs were arranged in a certain way, in dim light, and at enough of a distance she might see a cup or pen or chair. That is to say, there is, I think, a constructive element of seeing.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank

We need to get past the picture of a process called "perception". If nothing else, Austin has shown that this is a figment that is simply manufactured by philosophy.

Anyway, pointing out the eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. — Corvus

(emphasis added)

"Perception" is just a catch-all for: seeing, looking, identifying, grouping, judging, etc. (as well as, elsewhere: thinking, understanding, intending, etc.) in order for philosophy to frame the issue as a specific type of singular problem. But all these other things are not internal processes, but are each separate activities (like actions) that are done by public mechanics (standards) that allow for rectifying errors and debate (see Sec. IV).

I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. — frank

He would say that we do not each have "our perception" and then we debate those, but that the things we interpret are publicly judged by standards that we share. And so "interpretation" is a public process of argument taking into consideration that we have to apply those standards. By Austin's method, we would understand "interpretation" by looking at the kinds of things we say about what we "interpret", as in commenting about a painting (which is a thing we are interpreting), or making explicit the implications of a text (which is a skill, again, involving some thing, say, like a rule, or a someone's hand gestures),

[Eyes as a medium for visual perception] could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. — Corvus

Now to say we have brains and they allow us to have senses, like vision, smell, touch, and we can study those, is an entirely different matter than our public practices. In doing philosophy we are not doing science, although as much as science imagines a mysterious process of "perception" that it can know, it is taking a fantasy of philosophy and treating it like a biological conundrum.

But also, whatever science learns about the brain is not going to resolve the issues of philosophy like skepticism of our relation to the world and each other (which creates the need for something to solve that "problem", here, by "direct perception". Or, when finding philosophy can't have the immediate or certain "knowledge" it desired (as a prerequisite), it does not admit the whole framework was wrong, but makes it about an imagined failing of our nature and creates "indirect perception" (appearances, etc.).

obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue — Corvus

But, having taken all that down a peg, this is just to say that you are not me, and I am not the world (because the world is not in my head, however "indirect", causing yours to be a different world). I do have personal tastes, interests, desires, commitments, guilt, motivations, etc. These are not wrapped up in a single theoretical conceptualization of "my perception".

When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works? — Corvus

Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff).

I know how eyes work. The question is: how are you able to view the medium of your eyes?

Usually we use our eyes to view mediums, such as light for example. So one might say we perceive light. But you’re saying the eyes are the medium. Eyes are no longer an aspect of the perceiver, but of the perceived. So it raises the question. If the eyes are the medium, and you believe that we perceive this medium, how are you perceiving them if not with eyes? Do you think the perceiver is the brain?

Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff). — Antony Nickles

It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions.

Eyes are the visual sense organ passing the lights into the brain. Of course eyes are not the perceiver, but it is part of the visual perceiving medium. The point was to explain the indirectness of perception.

I think the indirect realist gets it backwards. She sees the cup and based on a theory of perception infers that she sees patches and blobs.

Put her in a room that contains only patches and blobs my guess is she would see patches and blobs. But if some of those patches and blobs were arranged in a certain way, in dim light, and at enough of a distance she might see a cup or pen or chair. That is to say, there is, I think, a constructive element of seeing. — Fooloso4

Yes, if you read the SEP article on sense data, it asks you to focus just on blobs of color. I can do that, and it does have some philosophical significance to me, but I agree that it was probably misguided to say primal perception is blobs. We know, for instance, that there's a big section of the brain that's devoted to picking faces out of the visual field, so you're likely to see a face before you see a blob. :razz:

It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions. — Corvus

Philosophy created the idea of "perception" and the idea that they are "indirect" (as with Hume's appearance, Plato's shadows, etc.). That people imagine science can explain these particular phantasms is just where science is barking up the wrong tree in trying to solve the mistakes of philosophy. Again, that is not to say there are not things to learn about the brain, just not these things to solve a problem philosophy mistakenly created.

Austin is simply investigating Ayer's creation of the distinction in dismantling the whole framework of direct/indirect as well as "perception". I can go over any of the text you take to lead to that conclusion.