Moliere, I echo Banno's appreciation for your careful reading. — J
About “phlogiston” and meaning change: Really? This is a rather eccentric use of “meaning,” isn’t it? I’ll grant you that phlogiston now has vastly different connotations and employments than it originally did, but has the meaning actually changed? Or perhaps I’m not understanding you deeply enough. — J
Why would different assignments of “either-true-or-false”, rather than different assignments of “true” and “false”, make any difference to the question of scheme-content dualism? — J
I think what you say may be correct in the case of Kuhn's incommensurability /"conceptual schemes". Scientists construct models of how the world may be beyond the limitations of direct observation. It’s not just about fitting labels to observations; scientific models operate in the opposite way too in the sense that they stipulate what can and might happen in certain situations. We try to make sense of observations by constructing models of worlds which is not directly observable. Different scientists may happen to be drawn to different models that say completely different things about the world — Apustimelogist
“The "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant “objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. The practice itself, however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted
I’m inclined to say that for Kuhn it’s not a question of a theoretical scheme, or an aspect of it, being beyond the limits of direct observation, but of direct observation being in itself an element of discursive practice. What we observe cannot be divorced from methods of measure and apparatus of observation — Joshs
While it is certainly true that for Kuhn scientific practices and theories organize their subject matter, the content they organize does not consist of such stuff supposedly external to discourse. — Joshs
“The "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant “objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. The practice itself, however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted
I feel, in reading all this, that I'm even more uncertain than when I started in spite of spilling so many words. — Moliere
the method, has no need for transcendence as much as situatedness. — Moliere
We can write from the point of view of those who see the rabbit, or those who see the duck. That's being "situated" because we are able to contrast the two . But we can also from the view of those who see the duck-rabbit. With what is this to be contrasted?
Or if you prefer, being "situated" is always post-hoc. — Banno
'“Our common-sense experience is the product of the dialectical interaction between our basic experiential concepts and experiential input from nature, whatever it may be.” — J
This might actually accord with Tomasello's notion of how language develops:
Unlike Vygotsky, whose work focused
on the process of cultural transmission and its efects on human psychology, this
neo-Vygotskian theory takes a step back to look at the adaptations that facilitate the
kind of social and mental coordination that facilitate human cultural adaptations.
In this way, Tomasello builds not only on the work of classical developmental psychologists but also upon theoretical concepts from philosophy (joint agency, shared
and collective intentionality) and evolutionary developmental biology (ontogenetic
adaptations, ontogenetic pathways, developmental plasticity).
According to Tomasello, the last common ancestor of humans, bonobos, and
chimpanzees was cognitively characterized by individual intentionality (e.g., ‘I want
to forage for termites’), as opposed to shared intentionality. They were able to entertain abstract representations and simple inferences. In terms of their social capacities, they had prosocial tendencies for helping and sharing with others. Early humans
were characterized by cognitive capacities for joint intentionality (e.g., ‘We want to
hunt a stag’)—a basic form of shared intentionality that enables humans to understand their partner’s perspective in a joint activity and make recursive inferences
about their mental states. From a sociomoral point of view, they developed a form of
second-personal morality based on joint commitment towards shared activities and
a sense of fairness that ensures one’s partner’s trust and sustained cooperation over
time. Later in evolution, modern humans preserved these ancestral traits but were
also selected to extend these capacities to a collective level by entertaining representations that go beyond an individual’s perspective because of the need to apply them
to a large pool of peers. These representations are then conceived as being somewhat objective, which in turn increased the epistemic demands on humans by creating standards of what is reasonable and justifable. From a sociomoral perspective,
this led to a form of group-minded morality characterized by explicit social norms. — Ivan Gonzalez‑Cabrera1
It is correct that studies suggest an early onset of in-group favoritism, and in some
cases even negativity toward out-group members. For example, young children preferentially benefit, imitate, help, and seek positively biased information about members
of their in-group (Aboud 2003; Buttelmann et al. 2013; Over 2018; Over et al. 2018).
But experimentally constructed “minimal groups” with their clearly delineated memberships do not pose the same challenge as real life groups, with their fluid and not
always visible boundaries. Children may not always be aware of those groups as
groups and their own membership in them. It is our hunch that they often presuppose
knowledge and practices to be shared by others without recognizing them as belonging
to a group. Let’s give an example. Say you grow up in a household in which one family
member infrequently and irregularly interjects words from a language other than, but
similar to, the one spoken by all others at all times. When entering school, you use these
pieces of vocabulary with your classmates only to find them scratching their heads and
asking you what you mean. It is through their lack of understanding that you find out
that the phrases originate in a group of language speakers you do not even know
existed. This example serves to show that groups and their memberships aren’t always
visible to young children, and the degree to which they identify with them varies. This
observation agrees with social-developmental studies showing that a child’s group
attitudes are more experience-dependent than age-dependent, with contingent factors
such as particular group membership and the group’s emphasis of in-group/out-group
distinctions impacting the child’s group-mindedness (Nesdale 2004; Nesdale et al.
2005).
Another potential problem we see with Tomasello’s characterization of collective
intentionality pertains to the aspect of (intergroup) competition. — Henrike Moll1 & Ryan Nichols2 & Jacob L. Mackey
On Searle, I wrote:Tomasello himself was very influenced by philosophers such as John Searle with their idea of "social facts". But he did not stop at just going off on a mind-journey. He actually experimented and observed. — schopenhauer1
Collective intentionality
You can't play football on your own.
And if you send 36 players onto a field, with each trying to kick the ball between the goal posts, but that does not amount to a game of football.
But 18 people trying together to kick the ball between the posts, with another 18 trying together to stop them - there's the makings of a game.
So it is clear that there is a difference between "I am trying to kick a goal" and "We are trying to kick a goal". Collective intent is not simply the concatenation or addition of individual intents. Collective intent is shared; collective intentionality is shared.
Searle introduced the term in his paper "Collective intentions and actions". The argument there is that collective intentions are not reducible to individual intentions and beliefs, and yet happen in an individual's mind. There is no supernatural linking of minds here, just the intent to work as a group.
Briefly and dogmatically, Searle contends that
We-intentions do not reduce to I-intentions; they are basic,
We-intentions happen in individuals
We-intentions have as a background that there are others who may engage in the collective exercise
We-intentions have an intent and a propositional content, S(p), that aligns with the force and propositional content of speech acts, F(p). — Banno
Searle introduced the term in his paper "Collective intentions and actions". The argument there is that collective intentions are not reducible to individual intentions and beliefs, and yet happen in an individual's mind. There is no supernatural linking of minds here, just the intent to work as a group. — Banno
So where does Tomasello differ to Searle, what sort of evidence is there, as opposed to hypothesising, and how does that fit in with this thread? — Banno
However, it is an odd shoe-horn to then ask how well language makes truth-conditional statements, or if that is even the real function of language. Rather, the biology recenters these debates away from truth-finding, and more about evolutionary-biological, species-apt theories. — schopenhauer1
Having spent some serious time thinking about and debating against Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), I think a strong case can be made for human linguistic ability being evolutionarily adaptive, on the basis that it does provide humans the ability to communicate truths to each other. Undoubtedly partial truths, but a degree of truth that has historically been adaptive for humans. I think I would say that biology does recenter, and in the process expand the fields of knowledge that are relevant to the discussion. However, I'd emphasize that that is far from saying that humans commmunicating truths is out of the picture, given naturalistic evolution. (As Plantinga suggests.) — wonderer1
Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.
Interdisciplinary work is valuable and scientists are welcome to contribute to age-old philosophical questions. But unless they engage with existing arguments first, rather than picking a definition they like and attacking others for not meeting it, their claims will simply be confused.
There are some, Chomsky comes to mind, who are both naturalists, but not evolutionists when it comes to language origins. Using simply his powers of incredulity, he supposes language came about in one major exaptation (not adaptation) via a massive rearrangement of brain architecture or some such. — schopenhauer1
According to [Chomsky] of course, he needs no evidence. — schopenhauer1
That comes from empirical research though, not from a bunch of questions asked by someone in an armchair. — schopenhauer1
And I am just holding the empirical tradition to its own need for empiricism. — schopenhauer1
The process is called punctuated equilibrium - a well respected theory of evolution which is perfectly capable of accounting for a relatively sudden exaptation of a universal grammar among humans in our evolutionary timeline. — javra
The idea that we have brains hardwired with a mental template for learning grammar—famously espoused by Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—has dominated linguistics for almost half a century. Recently, though, cognitive scientists and linguists have abandoned Chomsky’s “universal grammar” theory in droves because of new research examining many different languages—and the way young children learn to understand and speak the tongues of their communities. That work fails to support Chomsky’s assertions. The research suggests a radically different view, in which learning of a child’s first language does not rely on an innate grammar module. Instead the new research shows that young children use various types of thinking that may not be specific to language at all—such as the ability to classify the world into categories (people or objects, for instance) and to understand the relations among things. These capabilities, coupled with a unique human ability to grasp what others intend to communicate, allow language to happen. The new findings indicate that if researchers truly want to understand how children, and others, learn languages, they need to look outside of Chomsky’s theory for guidance. — PAUL IBBOTSON & MICHAEL TOMASELLO
Also, exaptations are adaptations - !?!?! - just that that which is addressed is adaptive due to a secondary function relative to that function it initially had when it first emerged. Wings used for flight are one example of this. But one doesn't claim that this major exaptation is not adaptation. — javra
As to evidence for universal grammar, there's plenty. Pinker's book The Language Instinct, for example, is a work that makes a very good case for it. — javra
Interesting. Can you provide some reference that substantiates this otherwise vacuous claim. — javra
You are aware that nucleic acids, neurons, and brains don't fossilize - much less behaviors. Which leaves us with best inferences when it comes to the evolutionary history of psychological attributes such as human language. — javra
Rather, many biologists think that language occurred drawn out over species, probably starting with Homo erectus, and for social needs, not as a unique, all at once event for internal self-talk or mentalese. — schopenhauer1
Ok, then let me clarify. What I meant by this is that for Chomsky this new feature was not adapted for, but came by accident "all at once". This is him, not me talking, so I am not sure what you want to call that. — schopenhauer1
He seems to believe the notion that it was basically just a feature of a brain that developed a certain way for various happenstance reasons not related to enhancing that feature (of language use) and out of this change in brain architecture that happened, language appeared on the scene. — schopenhauer1
See article above for one. — schopenhauer1
I suggest listening to part 1 and 2 of the podcast for more background. — schopenhauer1
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