Moliere, I echo Banno's appreciation for your careful reading. — J

Thanks back :) It's always nice to feel appreciated.

About “phlogiston” and meaning change: Really? This is a rather eccentric use of “meaning,” isn’t it? I’ll grant you that phlogiston now has vastly different connotations and employments than it originally did, but has the meaning actually changed? Or perhaps I’m not understanding you deeply enough. — J

Perhaps my repeating the mantra "meaning is use" is obscuring my judgment. However, yes, really. I wouldn't have any idea how to tabulate how much phlogiston, and yet many practicing chemists in the past would have started with that tabulation. It's very easy to imagine that it was the same as we do it now but since we aren't there (or would it be better to say "since we aren't then"?) we don't know that simply, meaning we have to make inferences. Further we don't really use the same instruments that they used at that time, which to me is the most important part in thinking about meaning in science (I'm more on the experimental side than the theoretical side).

So while I accept it sounds weird I think the meaning of phlogiston has sufficiently changed to count as a kind of big change at least in terms of switching concepts. I'm still on the fence about radical, though.

I feel I should note that for me the loss doesn't need to be a net-loss for it to count -- it's not like we change concepts for no reason at all. The important part there is that there is a loss of knowledge in changing concepts. Some loss is common in revolutions that aren't scientific -- why wouldn't the same hold with the social organizations of scientists?

Why would different assignments of “either-true-or-false”, rather than different assignments of “true” and “false”, make any difference to the question of scheme-content dualism? — J

In thinking about sentences which are false, but in the form of the proposition, I always like to go to the example of astrology. If this is a bad example for you then I can find another one.

The difference is in the way I interpret people who speak about astrology -- I would say astrology is a language which people use to talk about their or other people's identities/feelings/histories/etc. and look for a reason why they are the way they are. Which is to say that while it uses the words of planets and positions it doesn't mean that. So if we are to interpret these speakers with respect to the usual meaning we'd be forced -- if we are improperly performing a rational, literal analysis -- to say "These sentences are false. When you speak them I'd use these other sentences", to which we'd surely receive frustration because while I don't believe in astrology, the astrologist-speaking person usually does. But what's important isn't the literal meanings -- it's the talk about who they are and such that's important.

I think that the WMT-person would be inclined to interpret the CMT-person in the same manner that I interpret astrology, and that is what makes communication at least difficult -- but here Davidson would note that since I've stated the case in words we aren't in principle incommensurable. In fact he'd use my example above in a similar manner that he uses the ketch example, I think. But note how this argument can be rendered in the transcendental form: the only possible way for us to disagree is if we agree. We disagree, and therefore we agree (at bottom) :D

But then I have to admit that there is a solid difference between meaningful disagreement, which does seem to need agreement to at least continue, and silence or absurdity. So Davidson still has a point to me, and I feel, in reading all this, that I'm even more uncertain than when I started in spite of spilling so many words.

Can a scientific theory talk about the notion of truth though in the way Davidson does? Can science tell you about translatability in the sense a philosopher like Davidson is interested in? I think this kind of theorizing still has role alongside the more scientific stuff, looking at stuff the science doesn't directly look at, even if its more about analyzing our prior intuitions.


Not sure I interpret you correctly, but I think what you say may be correct in the case of Kuhn's incommensurability /"conceptual schemes". Scientists construct models of how the world may be beyond the limitations of direct observation. Its not just about fitting labels to observations; scientific models operate in the opposite way too in the sense that they stipulate what can and might happen in certain situations. We try to make sense of observations by constructing models of worlds which is not directly observable. Different scientists may happen to be drawn to different models that say completely different things about the world.

No, the theories are incommensurate because they don't have matching directly translatable terms but because they are incommensurate doesn't prevent someone from one background learning the other in a way that is intelligible, or perhaps reconstructing an interpretation of it that they find intelligible.

I think what you say may be correct in the case of Kuhn's incommensurability /"conceptual schemes". Scientists construct models of how the world may be beyond the limitations of direct observation. It’s not just about fitting labels to observations; scientific models operate in the opposite way too in the sense that they stipulate what can and might happen in certain situations. We try to make sense of observations by constructing models of worlds which is not directly observable. Different scientists may happen to be drawn to different models that say completely different things about the world — Apustimelogist

I’m inclined to say that for Kuhn it’s not a question of a theoretical scheme, or an aspect of it, being beyond the limits of direct observation, but of direct observation being in itself an element of discursive practice. What we observe cannot be divorced from methods of measure and apparatus of observation. They are intrinsic to the meaning of what is directly observed. This is where Davidson gets confused, I think. He understands schemes as either fitting or organizing “sense data, surface irrita­tions or sensory promptings”. While it is certainly true that for Kuhn scientific practices and theories organize their subject matter, the content they organize does not consist of such stuff supposedly external to discourse.

Joseph Rouse puts it this way:

“The "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant “objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. The practice itself, however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted

I’m inclined to say that for Kuhn it’s not a question of a theoretical scheme, or an aspect of it, being beyond the limits of direct observation, but of direct observation being in itself an element of discursive practice. What we observe cannot be divorced from methods of measure and apparatus of observation — Joshs

I would say you could argue that they are somewhat equivalent, the ambiguity of the latter implying the former.

While it is certainly true that for Kuhn scientific practices and theories organize their subject matter, the content they organize does not consist of such stuff supposedly external to discourse. — Joshs

“The "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant “objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. The practice itself, however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted

Can you elaborate on what this means?

I feel, in reading all this, that I'm even more uncertain than when I started in spite of spilling so many words. — Moliere

My sentiments exactly! But I think this is one of the great benefits of doing this kind of intensive and text-based discussion: You understand from the inside out, so to speak, why these questions are so difficult to resolve.

the method, has no need for transcendence as much as situatedness. — Moliere

We can write from the point of view of those who see the rabbit, or those who see the duck. That's being "situated" because we are able to contrast the two . But we can also from the view of those who see the duck-rabbit. With what is this to be contrasted?

Or if you prefer, being "situated" is always post-hoc.

It could be built in, as with the residents of the two dimensional world. We can see that they're conceptually limited, but they can't even see us.

We can write from the point of view of those who see the rabbit, or those who see the duck. That's being "situated" because we are able to contrast the two . But we can also from the view of those who see the duck-rabbit. With what is this to be contrasted?

Or if you prefer, being "situated" is always post-hoc. — Banno

Yes, I think that's the idea: that there's no real way to get around the post hoc choice of a situation to write a history from so the best one can do is specify it. You pick duck, you pick rabbit, or you pick duck-rabbit and organize the documents to tell your story accordingly. There's a pluralism here: they're all good for something, and a fuller understanding of history arises by including all of the perspectives. They're still bound by the documents and such to demonstrate their case, too: it can't just be making shit up.

So I have two points.
1) The content of Tomasello's point which might inform Wang's approach (perhaps?)
2) A critique of the a priori Quine approach in general (mainly the idea of conceptual schemes as a thing outside of any observations/experiments),

Starting with the content, taken from the OP for example:

“Our common-sense experience is the product of the dialectical interaction between our basic experiential concepts and experiential input from nature, whatever it may be.” — J

'

Cabrera reviewing Tomasello has this summary of Tomasello's theory of "shared intentionality":

This might actually accord with Tomasello's notion of how language develops:
Unlike Vygotsky, whose work focused
on the process of cultural transmission and its efects on human psychology, this
neo-Vygotskian theory takes a step back to look at the adaptations that facilitate the
kind of social and mental coordination that facilitate human cultural adaptations.
In this way, Tomasello builds not only on the work of classical developmental psychologists but also upon theoretical concepts from philosophy (joint agency, shared
and collective intentionality) and evolutionary developmental biology (ontogenetic
adaptations, ontogenetic pathways, developmental plasticity).
According to Tomasello, the last common ancestor of humans, bonobos, and
chimpanzees was cognitively characterized by individual intentionality (e.g., ‘I want
to forage for termites’), as opposed to shared intentionality. They were able to entertain abstract representations and simple inferences. In terms of their social capacities, they had prosocial tendencies for helping and sharing with others. Early humans
were characterized by cognitive capacities for joint intentionality (e.g., ‘We want to
hunt a stag’)—a basic form of shared intentionality that enables humans to understand their partner’s perspective in a joint activity and make recursive inferences
about their mental states. From a sociomoral point of view, they developed a form of
second-personal morality based on joint commitment towards shared activities and
a sense of fairness that ensures one’s partner’s trust and sustained cooperation over
time. Later in evolution, modern humans preserved these ancestral traits but were
also selected to extend these capacities to a collective level by entertaining representations that go beyond an individual’s perspective because of the need to apply them
to a large pool of peers. These representations are then conceived as being somewhat objective, which in turn increased the epistemic demands on humans by creating standards of what is reasonable and justifable. From a sociomoral perspective,
this led to a form of group-minded morality characterized by explicit social norms. — Ivan Gonzalez‑Cabrera1

IFF this is leading to an empirically informed and accurate theory of human language, then indeed, there has to be something about human evolution that allows for a sort of "common-sense" way we interpret the world that is "theory-laden", only in the sense that we have a "theory of mind" capacity shared in some sense with other great apes, but a novel/unique sense that by the age of 3 we have the ability to have "joint ventures of intention" with other humans. This equates to a sort of "principle of charity" (pace Davidson), that has to be there for language and cultural diffusion to work in general.

To the second point about the greater project of some philosophy of "conceptual schemes" that is not derived from observation/experimentation, look at this other quote critiquing Tomasello's theory. Now, first let me say, Tomasello himself was very influenced by philosophers such as John Searle with their idea of "social facts". But he did not stop at just going off on a mind-journey. He actually experimented and observed. Now, here is a critique:

It is correct that studies suggest an early onset of in-group favoritism, and in some
cases even negativity toward out-group members. For example, young children preferentially benefit, imitate, help, and seek positively biased information about members
of their in-group (Aboud 2003; Buttelmann et al. 2013; Over 2018; Over et al. 2018).
But experimentally constructed “minimal groups” with their clearly delineated memberships do not pose the same challenge as real life groups, with their fluid and not
always visible boundaries. Children may not always be aware of those groups as
groups and their own membership in them. It is our hunch that they often presuppose
knowledge and practices to be shared by others without recognizing them as belonging
to a group. Let’s give an example. Say you grow up in a household in which one family
member infrequently and irregularly interjects words from a language other than, but
similar to, the one spoken by all others at all times. When entering school, you use these
pieces of vocabulary with your classmates only to find them scratching their heads and
asking you what you mean. It is through their lack of understanding that you find out
that the phrases originate in a group of language speakers you do not even know
existed. This example serves to show that groups and their memberships aren’t always
visible to young children, and the degree to which they identify with them varies. This
observation agrees with social-developmental studies showing that a child’s group
attitudes are more experience-dependent than age-dependent, with contingent factors
such as particular group membership and the group’s emphasis of in-group/out-group
distinctions impacting the child’s group-mindedness (Nesdale 2004; Nesdale et al.
2005).
Another potential problem we see with Tomasello’s characterization of collective
intentionality pertains to the aspect of (intergroup) competition. — Henrike Moll1 & Ryan Nichols2 & Jacob L. Mackey

Ok, so the point here is to not just completely give you a 180 of Tomasello. These colleagues admire and generally agree with Tomasello's theory, but are pointing to some scientific studies that may challenge some of the details of his (generally agreed upon) view of joint intentionality. That is to say, it is building upon his theory, through empirical means. It isn't just fighting non-empirical thought with non-empirical thought. Rather, the empiricism informs the substance and conclusions of the debate.

Presumably, these conflicts will be resolved with further studies which will then circle around a narrower consensus that is based on the evidence. Arguably, a "meta-theory" then of the complex phenomenon of language can be constructed from these types of empirical studies and consensus-building.

Tomasello himself was very influenced by philosophers such as John Searle with their idea of "social facts". But he did not stop at just going off on a mind-journey. He actually experimented and observed. — schopenhauer1

On Searle, I wrote:

Collective intentionality

You can't play football on your own.

And if you send 36 players onto a field, with each trying to kick the ball between the goal posts, but that does not amount to a game of football.

But 18 people trying together to kick the ball between the posts, with another 18 trying together to stop them - there's the makings of a game.

So it is clear that there is a difference between "I am trying to kick a goal" and "We are trying to kick a goal". Collective intent is not simply the concatenation or addition of individual intents. Collective intent is shared; collective intentionality is shared.

Searle introduced the term in his paper "Collective intentions and actions". The argument there is that collective intentions are not reducible to individual intentions and beliefs, and yet happen in an individual's mind. There is no supernatural linking of minds here, just the intent to work as a group.

Briefly and dogmatically, Searle contends that
We-intentions do not reduce to I-intentions; they are basic,
We-intentions happen in individuals
We-intentions have as a background that there are others who may engage in the collective exercise
We-intentions have an intent and a propositional content, S(p), that aligns with the force and propositional content of speech acts, F(p). — Banno

So where does Tomasello differ to Searle, what sort of evidence is there, as opposed to hypothesising, and how does that fit in with this thread?

Searle introduced the term in his paper "Collective intentions and actions". The argument there is that collective intentions are not reducible to individual intentions and beliefs, and yet happen in an individual's mind. There is no supernatural linking of minds here, just the intent to work as a group. — Banno

Yes, this is the theory I am (more-or-less) supporting, but not because it sounds good (which it does sound very reasonable), but because it has been tested and currently being refined in various experiments.

So where does Tomasello differ to Searle, what sort of evidence is there, as opposed to hypothesising, and how does that fit in with this thread? — Banno

So he doesn't differ tremendously from Searle. He in fact, is confirming Searle's hypothesis. But my point is that these debates on language (is it commensurable, do "conceptual schemes" even exist as a phenomenon in human psychology), should be empirically derived and tested, not just remain at the level of theory built on various traditions that philosophers have made up and thus become their own thing.

Searle is only as good as experiments reveal him to be correct. Same with any philosopher regarding language. It seems to me it should be a problem situated in the empirical sciences. It is one of evolutionary and neurobiology, as well as cognitive and developmental psychology. One can throw in comparative animal studies and anthropology as well, as it touches upon all of it.

However, as a "meta-theory of language- its origins and function", those more empirical fields are most relevant in developing it.

If I am to take the idea of "conceptual schemes" seriously (why should I, for what evidence other than it's in a certain philosophy tradition used by Quine), then perhaps Wang is supported here in his idea of "common-sense" and Davidson is supported in his own way with his theory of "principle of charity", in that evolutionarily our brains, by age three are neurobiologically predisposed to care about what others think and how you can get them to see what you are thinking. The common-sense in a way, is built in. Otherwise, all communication is incommensurate. We would be going back to ape-world where there is a "gulf" of common-ground of intention. It would go back to simply the "I-world" of non-joint intentionality. I take the "joint intentionality" as a common-sense of sorts. A built in ability to carry on "joint ventures of intention" from early development.

But now I think I am just restating what I said in my earlier post, so I suppose it is now on you to see where I am not fitting in to Wang et al and the OP's idea of "conceptual schemes", as I laid out my ideas for both 1 and 2 in the previous post. One was about specifically how Tomasello confirms a sort of common-sense (I am connecting it via joint/collective intention being a foundation and roughly conforms to that notion that there needs to be some common ground of experience), and then I am making a broader critique of making theories that are not empirically based in the first place. I can go on and on, but I'd have to see where your issue or lack of understanding of what I am saying lies. In other words, I'd have to work with you in some sort of joint intention of understanding that may or may not be fruitful :).

Coincidentally, there’s an article in the new Phil. of Science by Lorenzo Lorenzetti called “Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality” that’s apropos. Lorenzetti talks about theories rather than conceptual schemes, but I think his questions apply.

Suppose A and B are rival theories, but B can be functionally reduced to A. (This would apply to all the examples Wang gives, I think.) So why not invoke the extension/intension distinction and “maintain that the reduced and reducing entities are coextensive and identical but have a different intension”? As he says, this would be a basic Kripkean response to the question of radically different theories. But the problem is, this doesn't explain the asymmetry of the relationship. A and B don’t just offer different descriptions; the claim is that B can be reduced to A (crudely, that A provides a better explanation) but not the reverse. Lorenzetti calls this “the puzzle of identity,” because we seem to want to say two contradictory things: that A and B wind up talking about identical entities, and that they aren’t the same because the reduction relation is asymmetrical.

Lorenzetti has some good ideas about how to resolve this, but my question concerns the astrology example. I’m realizing that, unlike a traditional pair of “incommensurable” scientific theories, astronomy doesn’t actually claim to offer a reductive explanation of everything contained in astrology. Since astrology is talking about human behavior, among other things, a truly alternative explanation would have to go far afield from astronomy and invoke some psychological/biological laws. What, then, do we want to say is the relationship between astrology and astronomy? “Asymmetrical” doesn’t seem to cover it. Any ideas?

I would propose this idea is even more acute in more established academic sciences (unlike "astrology"). For example, I would think human language should have an overriding theory for its origins and function, but that is far from clear. Often there is no consensus within a field (anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, etc.) let alone between fields. Terrence Deacon wrote a book called The Symbolic Species which focuses much on semiotics and the sign relation, etc. However, none of this kind of speak is in Tomasello's notion of language as deriving from "joint attention". So how do those two theories fit together? Should they? Can they? Why are they so disparate-seeming? How does one create a synthesis of the two, or is this not the correct approach?

This then leads to the point of science. Is science leading to consensus or is it just interesting experiment after interesting experiment? Some things are amenable to no more questions (there is a particle for mass, these biological molecules work with these other ones, etc.), and there are some that are more abstract. The more abstract questions then become widely various in their interpretations and methodology. There are so many "findings" from "studies" that if you go to any science website, none seems particularly like a "breakthrough" because there are so many theories touching on the same thing saying different things and possibly not even connecting with the other studies (though some probably are). Science, the pursuit of, has become so various that it creates a lot of noise.

However, it is an odd shoe-horn to then ask how well language makes truth-conditional statements, or if that is even the real function of language. Rather, the biology recenters these debates away from truth-finding, and more about evolutionary-biological, species-apt theories. — schopenhauer1

I'm late to this discussion and haven't looked into what other responses there may have been to this. So please excuse me if this is redundant.

Having spent some serious time thinking about and debating against Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), I think a strong case can be made for human linguistic ability being evolutionarily adaptive, on the basis that it does provide humans the ability to communicate truths to each other. Undoubtedly partial truths, but a degree of truth that has historically been adaptive for humans. I think I would say that biology does recenter, and in the process expand the fields of knowledge that are relevant to the discussion. However, I'd emphasize that that is far from saying that humans commmunicating truths is out of the picture, given naturalistic evolution. (As Plantinga suggests.)

Having spent some serious time thinking about and debating against Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), I think a strong case can be made for human linguistic ability being evolutionarily adaptive, on the basis that it does provide humans the ability to communicate truths to each other. Undoubtedly partial truths, but a degree of truth that has historically been adaptive for humans. I think I would say that biology does recenter, and in the process expand the fields of knowledge that are relevant to the discussion. However, I'd emphasize that that is far from saying that humans commmunicating truths is out of the picture, given naturalistic evolution. (As Plantinga suggests.) — wonderer1

I am not saying that we do can't make truth-apt statements, but rather, if science is indeed telling us about the natural world, it would have be demonstrated empirically. And I'm sure if we look up various experience we can find evidence of that. But that demonstration would doubtfully move away from evolutionary or at the least naturalistic accounts for it. There are some, Chomsky comes to mind, who are both naturalists, but not evolutionists when it comes to language origins. Using simply his powers of incredulity, he supposes language came about in one major exaptation (not adaptation) via a massive rearrangement of brain architecture or some such. According to him of course, he needs no evidence. Apparently, he thinks "self-talk" really came first and thus language was more about cognitive space than it is about communication. Interesting idea, but again, it needs empirical proof.



Now, you can then turn around and say how do I know that empirical proof is the way towards a truth using some combination of Hume's Problem of Induction. Indeed here is where we can only speculate, and I can provide that speculation, but we know it "works" in terms of application and hypothesis verified or falsified by observations.

That is to say, clearly for humans, some accordance of prediction, problem-solving, and inferencing are necessary for our survival. The fact that hypothesis have been experimentally shown valid and applied via technology seems a pretty good indicator that we have a grasp on various things. But notice, we probably can't have a grasp on everything in its fullest picture. You can never tell if every theory one holds is THE truth, only that it works as far as the methods we know how at this time and place. To throw the baby out with the bathwater seems like a bad faith move to make theological point.

My point more broadly was that the more it is shown that language is embedded in evolutionary development, the more you are grounding it in the "real". The more you move it to some isolated thing, like a computer program, you are moving away from the origins and functions of language to a fantasy-land of how language arose and the reason for it. It's like studying computer language AS IF it was detached from the intentions of its programmer (in this case evolutionary fit).

Added the video.

Interesting article. I like the modal approach, but it might be overly formal. I think your Astrology point shows that the article does not apply to incommensurable "theories" or "Conceptual schema"; the defining characteristic being the way of measurement (or if you prefer, assessment) within the systems cannot be matched against each other. In the article such a matching is assumed. Astronomy measures success in a vey different way to astrology.

Have a read of this: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

Here's the conclusion:

Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

Interdisciplinary work is valuable and scientists are welcome to contribute to age-old philosophical questions. But unless they engage with existing arguments first, rather than picking a definition they like and attacking others for not meeting it, their claims will simply be confused.

Observation, and empirical science generally, is insufficient when conceptual clarification is needed.

I agree with the author of this site's conclusion about Sapolsky's conclusion. Admittedly, I haven't read his full book. Assuming the author of this article has read it... it seems Sapolsky, though informed in various senses regarding the neuroscience behind decision-making and one's disposition to choose a course of action, doesn't seem to engage with the broader philosophical debate that he is venturing into.

But this isn't quite what I'm talking about when it comes to language. The question can be, "Is language originated in and a function of evolutionary forces?" If the answer is yes, then truly it is more a matter of empirical research for how language originated, and what the functions of language seem to be for our species. I especially bring up Chomsky because he brings up the a priori, but intriguing idea that language was more about "cognitive internal talk" or something of that nature, rather than starting out as externalized avenues for joint attention (Tomasello, Searle, et al.). Chomsky may have a point, but I'd like to see more hard evidence for it. He did say there is "overwhelming evidence".. Not so sure of that Chomsky...

But whence this pursuit of truth? I mean, I make fun of the Wittgenstein stuff, but his idea of language games and deflating the need for "certainty" was not necessarily wrong in the sense that philosophy is a tradition that goes back to the Greek (Cartesian) notion of TRUTH (certainty). But then I do criticize Wittgenstein by creating his own echo-chamber of linguistic self-referentialism. Rather, he should have then said, "And now let's look at the evidence based on the empirical research in anthropology, neuroscience, and the like."

But here we have the logical positivists who had a fetish for both empirical verification and logic. In the middle we have squishy things like how is empirical verification to be actually verified (or falsified?). Are scientific disciplines and studies commensurable if done in completely different fields and techniques? Are languages commensurable? Are individual people's "conceptual schemes" even commensurable given different initial conditions and frameworks? And we get the inklings of broader differences in pragmatist/post-modern versus analytic/positivist ideas of truth.

Well, if we are to agree language is an evolutionary development, I would think we should look at how it is that humans develop language, what are the biological substrates of language, what is the archeological evidence, and the like. From here, we can build up a theory as to how it is that language helps us to survive. And indeed, that may be how aptly we can use our experiences to make inferences, problem solve, and the like. IF Tomasello et al is correct, then language's primary function is to allow for joint attention, which led to other cultural collaborations. If the question is, "Is there some theoretical component to even 'common sense/experience'?" then the answer would be "Yes, some sort of joint attention component is built into the human language learning mechanism". That comes from empirical research though, not from a bunch of questions asked by someone in an armchair. It's a good start, but it's not where the question is confirmed.

There are some, Chomsky comes to mind, who are both naturalists, but not evolutionists when it comes to language origins. Using simply his powers of incredulity, he supposes language came about in one major exaptation (not adaptation) via a massive rearrangement of brain architecture or some such. — schopenhauer1

This is a somewhat cringe-worthy statement.

The process is called punctuated equilibrium - a well respected theory of evolution which is perfectly capable of accounting for a relatively sudden exaptation of a universal grammar among humans in our evolutionary timeline.

Also, exaptations are adaptations - !?!?! - just that that which is addressed is adaptive due to a secondary function relative to that function it initially had when it first emerged. Wings used for flight are one example of this. But one doesn't claim that this major exaptation is not adaptation.

As to evidence for universal grammar, there's plenty. Pinker's book The Language Instinct, for example, is a work that makes a very good case for it.

According to [Chomsky] of course, he needs no evidence. — schopenhauer1

Interesting. Can you provide some reference that substantiates this otherwise vacuous claim.

That comes from empirical research though, not from a bunch of questions asked by someone in an armchair. — schopenhauer1

Up you get, then.

Up you get, then. — Banno

:razz:

I mean I'll gladly read about the research and share!

But something tells me, you are super into the science yourself. And I am just holding the empirical tradition to its own need for empiricism.

And I am just holding the empirical tradition to its own need for empiricism. — schopenhauer1

You are aware that nucleic acids, neurons, and brains don't fossilize - much less behaviors. Which leaves us with best inferences when it comes to the evolutionary history of psychological attributes such as human language.

The process is called punctuated equilibrium - a well respected theory of evolution which is perfectly capable of accounting for a relatively sudden exaptation of a universal grammar among humans in our evolutionary timeline. — javra

So, I am not saying that it can't be true, but that many biologists disagree and have more evidence to back it up. I am not even disagreeing with the notion of varying speeds of evolutionary development (pace Gould and Eldredge). Rather, many biologists think that language occurred drawn out over species, probably starting with Homo erectus, and for social needs, not as a unique, all at once event for internal self-talk or mentalese.

Wow, I just found a podcast about this very subject!! Here it is: https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2023/08/21/ep323-1-tomasello-chomsky-language/#:~:text=Tomasello%20disagreed%20with%20Chomsky's%20claim,innovatively%20using%20complex%20sentence%20structures.
Maybe @Banno would find it interesting...

But, the one I was looking up is here:

The idea that we have brains hardwired with a mental template for learning grammar—famously espoused by Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—has dominated linguistics for almost half a century. Recently, though, cognitive scientists and linguists have abandoned Chomsky’s “universal grammar” theory in droves because of new research examining many different languages—and the way young children learn to understand and speak the tongues of their communities. That work fails to support Chomsky’s assertions. The research suggests a radically different view, in which learning of a child’s first language does not rely on an innate grammar module. Instead the new research shows that young children use various types of thinking that may not be specific to language at all—such as the ability to classify the world into categories (people or objects, for instance) and to understand the relations among things. These capabilities, coupled with a unique human ability to grasp what others intend to communicate, allow language to happen. The new findings indicate that if researchers truly want to understand how children, and others, learn languages, they need to look outside of Chomsky’s theory for guidance. — PAUL IBBOTSON & MICHAEL TOMASELLO

Also, exaptations are adaptations - !?!?! - just that that which is addressed is adaptive due to a secondary function relative to that function it initially had when it first emerged. Wings used for flight are one example of this. But one doesn't claim that this major exaptation is not adaptation. — javra

Ok, then let me clarify. What I meant by this is that for Chomsky this new feature was not adapted for, but came by accident "all at once". This is him, not me talking, so I am not sure what you want to call that. I think he places this final phase in which language appeared later than most anthropologists/evolutionary biologists would claim. He seems to believe the notion that it was basically just a feature of a brain that developed a certain way for various happenstance reasons not related to enhancing that feature (of language use) and out of this change in brain architecture that happened, language appeared on the scene.

As to evidence for universal grammar, there's plenty. Pinker's book The Language Instinct, for example, is a work that makes a very good case for it. — javra

Yes I'm aware of this. I don't even think Tomasello would disagree there is a component in our brains that helps with language acquisition. Rather, it is more the how and why, and how much this has to do with our being a social species, rather than a happy accident of brain architecture.

Interesting. Can you provide some reference that substantiates this otherwise vacuous claim. — javra

See article above for one.

You are aware that nucleic acids, neurons, and brains don't fossilize - much less behaviors. Which leaves us with best inferences when it comes to the evolutionary history of psychological attributes such as human language. — javra

Indeed, all the sadder for empiricists that they have less to talk about :sad:.

Rather, many biologists think that language occurred drawn out over species, probably starting with Homo erectus, and for social needs, not as a unique, all at once event for internal self-talk or mentalese. — schopenhauer1

OK, to make use of some of that armchair stuff called reasoning, first off, when we address "language" what are we referencing: A) communication or B) a grammatically sensible series of symbols?

Bees have outstanding communication skills, to not yet address the great apes or even monkeys for that matter. (Or else trees, but I'll leave this last one alone.) Communication of course evolved among different species of hominids, most of which died out.

But when it comes to language as grammar-dependent communication, the issue drastically changes. You are, I presume, familiar with the mitochondrial eve notion. In parallel, when it comes to grammatical language, one hominid's beneficial mutation which granted it the capacity for grammar who, as such, was immersed in a population wherein no other was endowed with it just might have held a significant evolutionary advantage. Why can only be best speculation, but it could have included the ability to think in greater abstractions (self-talk as you term it). Still, whatever the reason, this one individual might then have had more mates, leading to reproduction of these genes, leading to an initially small population of grammatical-language speakers, eventually leading to us.

I'm not here trying to make a case for particulars. But, unless the same thing happened multiple times via analogous evolution which later turned into convergent evolution - highly unlikely to say the least - then our current species-wide grammar adaptation is then on a par to how all humans are descendants of some mitochondrial eve. Only that in the former, there was a significant mutation involved (in our brains, of course) which facilitated grammar usage.

Ok, then let me clarify. What I meant by this is that for Chomsky this new feature was not adapted for, but came by accident "all at once". This is him, not me talking, so I am not sure what you want to call that. — schopenhauer1

A mutation (which happened to be beneficial).

He seems to believe the notion that it was basically just a feature of a brain that developed a certain way for various happenstance reasons not related to enhancing that feature (of language use) and out of this change in brain architecture that happened, language appeared on the scene. — schopenhauer1

Of course. There was no grammatical language before grammatical language was. Its a quantum leap of sorts on account of a mutation, one that fits a punctuated equilibrium model of evolution.

See article above for one. — schopenhauer1

Can you help me out in pinpointing it by giving a specific quote from the article.

To be continued. I suggest listening to part 1 and 2 of the podcast for more background.

I suggest listening to part 1 and 2 of the podcast for more background. — schopenhauer1

Since I'm short on time, I'll try to listen to those podcasts if they provide an alternative evolutionary theory for how grammatical language developed - instead of merely being naysayers in respect to universal grammar theory.

Do they provide such an evolutionary theory alternative to how grammatical language developed?