But I don't think that Ryle plays that card in this book. I could be wrong. — Ludwig V
Eliminativism holds that there is no hard problem of consciousness because there is no consciousness to worry about in the first place. Eliminativism is most clearly defended by Rey 1997, but see also Dennett 1978, 1988, Wilkes 1984, and Ryle 1949. On the face of it, this response sounds absurd: how can one deny that conscious experience exists? Consciousness might be the one thing that is certain in our epistemology. But eliminativist views resist the idea that what we call experience is equivalent to consciousness, at least in the phenomenal, “what it’s like” sense. They hold that consciousness so-conceived is a philosopher’s construction, one that can be rejected without absurdity. If it is definitional of consciousness that it is nonfunctional, then holding that the mind is fully functional amounts to a denial of consciousness. Alternately, if qualia are construed as nonrelational, intrinsic qualities of experience, then one might deny that qualia exist (Dennett 1988). And if qualia are essential to consciousness, this, too, amounts to an eliminativism about consciousness.
What might justify consciousness eliminativism? First, the very notion of consciousness, upon close examination, may not have well-defined conditions of application—there may be no single phenomenon that the term picks out (Wilkes 1984). Or the term may serve no use at all in any scientific theory, and so may drop out of a scientifically-fixed ontology (Rey 1997). If science tells us what there is (as some naturalists hold), and science has no place for nonfunctional intrinsic qualities, then there is no consciousness, so defined. Finally, it might be that the term ‘consciousness’ gets its meaning as part of a falsifiable theory, our folk psychology. The entities posited by a theory stand or fall with the success of the theory. If the theory is falsified, then the entities it posits do not exist (compare P.M. Churchland 1981). And there is no guarantee that folk psychology will not be supplanted by a better theory of the mind, perhaps a neuroscientific or even quantum mechanical theory, at some point. Thus, consciousness might be eliminated from our ontology. If that occurs, obviously there is no hard problem to worry about. No consciousness, no problem!
But eliminativism seems much too strong a reaction to the hard problem, one that throws the baby out with the bathwater. First, it is highly counterintuitive to deny that consciousness exists. It seems extremely basic to our conception of minds and persons. A more desirable view would avoid this move. Second, it is not clear why we must accept that consciousness, by definition, is nonfunctional or intrinsic. Definitional, “analytic” claims are highly controversial at best, particularly with difficult terms like ‘consciousness’ (compare Quine 1951, Wittgenstein 1953). A better solution would hold that consciousness still exists, but it is functional and relational in nature. This is the strong reductionist approach. — Hard Problem of Consciousness
The quote is Ryle, not I; so it's not I who does not say. — Banno
One charitably presumes that here, in the first chapter, he is setting a direction, on which he continues in the remainder of the book. — Banno
It seems from this that you think making a category error as carving stuff up wrong. — Banno
The question arose for me .... — Fooloso4
But further, your critique looks misplaced. — Banno
I hope it's clear from the SEP article that it's more about taking a term from one category and misapplying it in another. — Banno
The discussion of categories is complicated. — Ludwig V
(By the way, if I've understood the metaphor correctly, categories don't carve anything up. That privilege is reserved to concepts in certain categories. — Ludwig V
One might easily get the impression that philosophers waste their time with things that no one in their right mind would have the least concern with. — Fooloso4
@Ludwig VI think they both do, but will focus on the second lecture. — Fooloso4
Well perhaps so. But this has nothing to do with Ryle - or Wittgenstein, either. Ryle does wish to eliminate Cartesian consciousness, but that's a different story because it's about a conception of consciousness, not consciousness. BTW I have very little time for Dennett's idea that consciousness is an illusion; he should have read Austin before developing that illusory idea.Eliminativism holds that there is no hard problem of consciousness because there is no consciousness to worry about in the first place. (you quote from "Hard Problem of Consciousness).....So I guess, if you can't explain it, eliminate it. — schopenhauer1
Yes, some people do make a terrible meal of it. But they are mostly logicians. 'nuff said.A bald king of France drives them crazy. — schopenhauer1
Well perhaps so. But this has nothing to do with Ryle - or Wittgenstein, either. Ryle does wish to eliminate Cartesian consciousness, but that's a different story because it's about a conception of consciousness, not consciousness. BTW I have very little time for Dennett's idea that consciousness is an illusion; he should have read Austin before developing that illusory idea.
But this is a side-issue. We're moving on. — Ludwig V
if Ryle is against Cartesian consciousness, that usually implies a sort of rejection understanding of basic sensory things such as "red" and "sound", — schopenhauer1
No, I don't suppose it is, given that he was taught by Ryle. But it doesn't follow that whatever Dennett thought is something Ryle thought.I don't think it's totally disconnected from Ryle — schopenhauer1
Why on earth would that be true? What is a "rejection understanding"? All that is at stake is a philosophical theory, a way of thinking about things. — Ludwig V
If someone explains to you about rainbows, are they denying the existence of rainbows? There are, or used to be, people who said that rainbows had been explained "away". Is that true? There are others who said that the scientific explanation "reduced" rainbows (to raindrops and light) and took away their magic. I maintain that nothing is "taken away". I'm even prepared to say that if you want magic, the process that produces rainbows should be magic enough for anyone. — Ludwig V
I'm sorry. I don't have the bandwidth to take this on right now. I've already said that I don't think his version of behaviourism is satisfactory.The way I interpret his "Cartesian" rejection, — schopenhauer1
Ryle’s next move seems a bit strange. “If a city-engineer has constructed a roundabout where there had been dangerous cross-roads, he may properly claim to have reduced the number of accidents. He may say that lots of accidents that would otherwise have occurred have been prevented by his piece of road improvement. But suppose we now ask him to give us a list of the particular accidents which he has averted. He can do nothing but laugh at us.” (p. 24/25) How does this relate to fatalism? His conclusion is “Averted fatalities are not fatalities. In short, we cannot, in logic, say of any designated fatality that it was averted-and this sounds like saying that it is logically impossible to avert any fatalities.” (p.25) — Ludwig V
So we can stipulate a possible world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet that does not help us in listing which fatalities were avoided. We can even stipulate a world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet the number of accidents was reduced. — Banno
Knowing is basically about the realm of propositional reasoning and becoming is the realm of cause and effect of objects. — schopenhauer1
I liken Ryle's idea of a "contradiction" of an event that already occurred — schopenhauer1
On that, the identity of people has an additional complication, that they can decide what criteria of their own identity are important (to them) and those criteria may not be the same as the criteria used by everyone else. I think that many people must have the slightly dizzying experience of contemplating the possibility that their actual parents could have married - or whatever - someone else. I understand their bewilderment, though I don't think it is necessary. — Ludwig V
I think it’s a huge issue and opens a can of worms but, I don’t see how you can defend a claim that if you were born in different “circumstances”, then you would still be “you”; it’s is not even something you can entertain in any real sense beyond imagining after the fact. — schopenhauer1
One of the first things that Russell and Whitehead observed in attempting this was that the ancient paradox of Epimenides - "Epimenides was a Cretan who said, 'Cretans always lie' " - was built upon classification and metaclassification. I have presented the paradox here in the form of a quotation within a quotation, and this is precisely how the paradox is generated. The larger quotation becomes a classifier for the smaller, until the smaller quotation takes over and reclassifies the larger, to create contradiction. — Bateson
[My bold]For the abstract presentation, consider the case of a very simple relationship between two organisms in which organism A has emitted some sort of sound or posture from which B could learn something about the state of A relevant to B's own existence. It might be a threat, a sexual advance , a move towards nurturing , or an indication of membership in the same species. I already noted in the discussion of coding (criterion 5) that no message, under any circumstances, is that which precipitated it.
There is always a partly predictable and therefore rather regular relation between message and referent, that relation indeed never being direct or simple. Therefore, if B is going to deal with A's indication, it is absolutely necessary that B know what those indications mean. Thus, there comes into existence another class of information, which B must assimilate, to tell B about the coding of messages or indications coming from A. Messages of this class will be, not about A or B, but about the coding of messages . They will be of a different logical type. I will call them metamessages.
Again, beyond messages about simple coding, there are much more subtle messages that become necessary because codes are conditional; that is, the meaning of a given type of action or sound changes relative to context, and especially relative to the changing state of the relationship between A and B. If at a given moment the relation be comes playful, this will change the meaning of many signals. — Bateson
I agree in the sense that it is a very difficult issue to give a clear answer to.
But what circumstances are sufficiently different to make a problem? For example, I might, quite easily, have been born five days before, or five days after, my actual birthday. That might well not be important. But suppose I discover that I was born a year later than I thought. Whether that matters or not (i.e. is sufficiently different to make a difference) is moot. The issue is further complicated by the fact that my parents, friends, society might decide differently from me.
Then there's the meaning of entertaining, never mind imagining, the possibility. I suggest that one could deduce some factual differences. If I had been born in India, I would be living in a very different climate and a very different society. The part that I cannot imagine, or even seriously entertain, is what difference that would make to "me". And here I remember Berkeley's "master argument", which points out that when imagining those circumstances, I will be imagining myself in those circumstances, not imagining the person I would (might) have been. (Berkeley uses this point for his own ends, but I think the point applies here, as well.)
When I said that the bewilderment is not necessary, I didn't mean that answers would be easy to come by, but that it is possible to reflect that it is, in one sense, up to me to decide what matters. — Ludwig V
I'm not clear how this relates to Ryle's use of the idea. — Ludwig V
When considering the parents' duties, we have no doubt that they are to blame if they do not mould their son's conduct, feelings and thoughts. When considering the son's behaviour we have no doubt that he and not they should be blamed for some of the things that he does. Our answer to the one problem seems to rule out our answer to the other, and then at second remove to rule itself out too. — Ryle
I agree with what you say, particularly about the discovery that one's parents are not the people who are bringing you up. But I also think that minor variations do not make a difference. Are you seriously trying to tell me that if I had been born five minutes earlier, or five hours earlier, it would not have been me that was born? I concede that someone might decide to take it that way, but, under otherwise normal circumstances, most people, I am sure, would not. — Ludwig V
Our moral judgement is made to judge itself unfavourably. — unenlightened
To which I reply that is true. But the question is, who am I? I would ask, in addition, who decides who I am?But I am not even going down that route. I'm simply saying, that there is no way you "could have" been any other person than "you". — schopenhauer1
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