One of them is the definition of identity. You seem to have what I think of a strict definition of identity. Any change is a change of identity. This follows from a strict application of the Identity of Indiscernibles and it seems to follow that the identity of anything consists only of a series of time-slices of what is represented as a single enduring object in "common sense". I don't share that view but recognize that the other view is, in some sense, possible, because I don't think that there is a conclusive refutation of it.
On the other hand, there is the fact that people, unlike beings and objects that are not self-aware, are capable of making choices about what changes in themselves make a difference to their identity and what changes do not. Their choices may not be the same as the choices of other people, and this may create problems. The decision that some change does not imply a change of identity, I characterize as deciding that change is "minor".
You identity the other issue by your comparison with Ryle's argument about Waterloo, which I think is correct, when you think about the problem before conception. But your strict view of identity seems to suggest that, once I am conceived, everything is inevitable and there are no possibilities - and no uncertainties - in my life. In other words, a fatalist view of my life. — Ludwig V
In other words, you could NEVER have been anyone but what you are now when discussing your initial conception and birth. — schopenhauer1
So the so-called world of science which, we gather, has the title to replace our everyday world is, I suggest, the world not of science in general but of atomic and sub-atomic physics in particular, enhanced by some slightly incongruous appendages borrowed from one branch of neuro-physiology. — Ryle
I am questioning nothing that any scientist says on weekdays in his working tone of voice. But I certainly am questioning most of what a very few of them say in an edifying tone of voice on Sundays. — Ryle
I guess you are not impressed by Ryle's arguments. It would be interesting to know why. — Ludwig V
Your formulation is a bit confusing, since your use of "anyone" suggests that we are talking about people, but your use of "what I am" suggests that you are talking about things. Since, at conception, I am not (yet) a person, you are not asking the interesting question, which is "WHO I am". The difference between those two questions needs a bit of sorting out before we could begin answering either question.
Most people take birth as the moment when a person's life begins, though they also accept that there's a long way before one becomes an adult, fully-grown person. The question of identity in the case of human beings is complicated for that reason.
Another reason why it is more complicated than you seem to allow that I can, and do, make decisions about my own identity, and, although one might say that those choices should be respected, other people also make decisions. Conflicts are, in some cases, very difficult to resolve.
That would be an interesting thread, but for this thread, the interesting and relevant question is why you are not impressed with Ryle's arguments against fatalism. — Ludwig V
Yes. I was more interested in the differences between the three than the similarities. But I didn't mean to suggest that there were no similarities. I was, I admit, concerned to bring out how little OLP was ever a school or a movement in a conventional sense. So I wouldn't argue with what you say here.So, Ludwig V, I do take the focus on particulars, dichotomies, goals, means of reasoning, criteria of what matters, similarities and differences, case-specific categories, and considerations in each case, to be right up the same alley as Austin and Wittgenstein — Antony Nickles
is a bit misleading. It took me a while to realize what was going on.Ryle does say it is not our logic, but our relationship to others that is the problem. (p.1) — Antony Nickles
This is right. He does say, in the first sentence of the same para. 3 p.1 "… which are not rival solutions of the same problem, but rather solutions or would-be solutions of different problems, and which, none the less, seem to be irreconcilable with one another." But this is only the first version of what he says. Take the three examples he offers:-Perhaps Ryle will say that we see others as rivals because of our pushing an agenda (“goal”) from the start, much as we fixate only on the example that makes our best case (pain, illusion, etc.) — Antony Nickles
I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you. — schopenhauer1
I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. The issue is what features of me matter - and not all of them matter. You can decide as you wish, but others will decide as they wish.
By the way, almost all of my features are the result of a combination of genes and environment. — Ludwig V
I was more interested in the differences between the three than the similarities. — Ludwig V
In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.
Well, I have quoted the bit I just quoted again here. You originally said that just after you quoted a long argument from me, trying to explain why I thought you were wrong. But all you give me is a claim that I am misconstruing the idea. There's no explanation of what the misconstruction is. So I have nothing to engage with (apart from the rather surprising remark that you agree with Ryle's argument against fatalism, again without explanation). But apparently you do not accept that what you say is an application of the fatalism argument to this special case, but you do not explain what the relevant difference is.I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you. — schopenhauer1
And so we go back and forth. To no purpose. What do you think is needed to break the cycle? From my point of view, it seems that I present examples to you that seem to me to be incompatible with what you say, but you ignore them, without explaining what is wrong with them. What do you think? — Ludwig V
Because you haven't seemed to grasp the main point of my argument which is that if a set of parents, even your own, had two gametes that were different than the ones that created you, that is indeed a different person. This isn't even controversial. If 10 seconds later, the there was another sperm, that is no longer you. That was someone else. We'd have to establish we agree here. — schopenhauer1
There you go again. I agree that you can call that a different person, but I claim that I can decide on a case-by-case basis whether the difference warrants a change of identity or not. In addition, I claim that a fertilized egg is not a person - yet. — Ludwig V
conceived in different conditions whereby the set of gametes was different than the ones that comprise you — schopenhauer1
You have two criteria there. Suppose I had been born in different circumstances (but the same parents) and the same DNA. For example suppose I was born as a second child, not the first. Would I be the same person? I say, yes. What would you say? — Ludwig V
That's what a discussion is about, surely. Listen to the other guy, adjust your view and on we go. With luck, we might even reach agreement!Well, you are slightly moving the goal post. — schopenhauer1
That can't be true. A clone of me (such as a possible identical twin) would not be me, either. And if you look carefully at what is written about DNA, there is a possibiity (several million to one) that someone else might be born with the same DNA as me.All I am establishing is that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is not you. — schopenhauer1
That can't be true. A clone of me (such as a possible identical twin) would not be me, either. And if you look carefully at what is written about DNA, there is a possibiity (several million to one) that someone else might be born with the same DNA as me.
I admit that DNA is treated as a unique identifier for me. But this is an empirical relationship, like the supposed unique pattern of my fingerprints (or, I understand, my palm-print or ear-print). I mean that the uniqueness of DNA was established on the basis of our understanding of personal identity. So it doesn't establish any logical relationship. — Ludwig V
After we establish this agreement (which I think you would be), then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.. You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1
So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1
I can't say this thread is working very well, but if two or three people are interested and actually reading the book, I'm perfectly happy to continue — Ludwig V
However, we have some way to go, and I'm a bit concerned that this issue is clearly off-topic. One of us could start a different thread, and I think that would be a good idea. How about it? — Ludwig V
But one thing he could not do--
logically and not merely epistemologically could not do. He
could not get the future events themselves for the heroes or
heroines of his story, since while it is still an askable question
whether or not a battle will be fought at Waterloo in 1815, he
cannot use with their normal force the phrase ' the Battle of
Waterloo' or the pronoun 'it'. While it, is still an askable
question whether my parents are going to have a fourth son, he
cannot use as a name the name 'Gilbert Ryle' or use as a pronoun designating their fourth son the pronoun 'he'. Roughly,
statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only
general propositions, where statements in the present and past
tense can convey both. More strictly, a statement to the effect
that something will exist or happen is, in so far, a general statement. When I predict the next eclipse of the moon, I have indeed
got the moon to make statements about, but I have not got her
next. eclipse to make statements about.
this argument… that nothing can be helped…goes directly counter to the piece of common knowledge that:
some things are our own fault,
some threatening disasters can be foreseen and averted, and
there is plenty of room for precautions, planning and weighing alternatives. — Ryle, p.16, broken apart by me
Very often, though certainly not always, when we say 'it was true that ... ' or 'it is false that ... ' we are commenting on some actual pronouncement made or opinion held by some identifiable person…. — Ryle, p.17 emphasis added
If you make a guess at the winner of the race, it will turn out right or wrong, correct or incorrect, but hardly true or false. These epithets are inappropriate…. — Ryle, p.18
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