No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede." — Leontiskos
it is true — Leontiskos
No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede." — Leontiskos
Is the best we've gotten, though. Im unsure you caught what i was trying to say.
I agree with you, in principle, but there has not been any account which does what you're positing to establish the truth of any moral statement. — AmadeusD
I should say, this isn't true, and to the high, high statistical degree in which is does consist, it's mainly people pretending that they understand the work an expert has done, to accede to the expert's belief without saying as much. — AmadeusD
what about this:It is belief + authority. — Leontiskos
But “Vanilla ice cream tastes good,” is nothing like, “One ought not torture babies.” Only from the latter can we infer something about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory
A belief never makes a moral judgment true
“Jane believes ice cream tastes good,” is a third-person proposition, and what you say of it is obviously false. A first-person statement like, “I feel pain,” is infallible, but belief statements are not like this. To say, “I believe I feel pain,” is therefore already confused, and is therefore an unused sort of locution. The same holds with, “I enjoy ice cream”/“I believe I enjoy ice cream.” Infallible statements are usually not belief statements, and to make them so is to stretch the sense of 'belief'. But again, these are non-moral according to your definition in the OP.
If I said, “Leontiskos believes everyone has brown hair,” this would be a false statement, and particularly problematic insofar as I know that not everyone has brown hair
Saying that it is “true relative to myself” is a non-response.
If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others.
Look, do you yourself even think personal/subjective reasons are able to justify claims about other persons?
The reason it is irrational to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream on the basis of my own idiosyncratic taste is because the putative reason does not have justificatory force for the sort of claim in question
Your deeper claim seems to be, "Yes, it is irrational. But your moral realism is irrational too, so I am justified in doing this." But even if moral realism were irrational, this would not justify you in doing irrational things.
That’s true — Bob Ross
A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos
Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross
All reasoning for why a proposition is true is fallible; so I am not sure what you mean here. — Bob Ross
You would be wrong about that if you actually don’t believe it; — Bob Ross
The statement “I love yogurt” can be true relative to me and false relative to you, because we need to know who we are referring to by ‘I’. — Bob Ross
If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. — Leontiskos
This is a straw man: if you disapprove it for everyone, then you disapprove it for everyone. Obviously, if you only disapprove of yourself doing something, then, of course, you don’t necessarily disapprove of it for other people. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “personal/subjective reasons”? I would say that some propositions are made true in virtue of beliefs we have—e.g., “I believe people shouldn’t torture babies”, “I like chocolate ice cream”, etc. — Bob Ross
You are just begging the question with “justificatory force”: sure, I don’t approve of forcing someone to eat chocolate ice cream, but if I did then I wouldn’t have a problem with—hence approval/disapproval. — Bob Ross
The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." — Leontiskos
If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. — Leontiskos
A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos
Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross
That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.
You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.
"I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."
How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?
So then you think this is a rational exchange:
• Leontiskos: Why should I not torture babies?
• Bob Ross: Because I believe you shouldn't.
The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory.
You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it.
I disagree. We come to know what is objective through reasoning and observance. We intuit that there is stuff which exists without us trying to think about them and that is what is objective. — Bob Ross
Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent
No. The claim or statement is trying to express something objective. Of course, we only approach the limit of what objectively is out there; but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist nor that we don’t have good reasons to believe it does — Bob Ross
"An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully".
This just begs the question by invoking “truthfully”; as truth is the correspondence of thought (subjectivity) with reality (objectivity). — Bob Ross
Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross
Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.
Moral facticity is not just what you described there. If a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality such that what it purports thereof is and ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, then a moral fact is a statement which accurately purports a state-of-affairs about reality that in virtue of which makes the moral judgment true (and thusly a fact). This means that there are states-of-affairs, if there are moral facts, that do inform us how reality ought to be, which violates P1. — Bob Ross
A potential state of reality in the sense of what could possibly happen due to the current state does not inform us of what ought to be either. You could tell me “this ball will probably hit this other ball” and I would not know from that claim anything normative, although I would know something about the next potential state of reality. — Bob Ross
Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.
#1 here is not a summary of prong-1 (of the thesis). Prong-1 is moral cognitivism, which is the view that moral judgments are truth-apt statements (i.e., propositions) and not that moral judgments are made by subjects.
#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective.
#3 True! (: — Bob Ross
#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective. — Bob Ross
As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done.
It indicates what moral properties subsist in or of and what their nature is. Of course it doesn’t indicate what should be done, because it isn’t a normative ethical theory. That’s what I was trying to convey in the other thread! Metaethical theories should not be conflated with normative theories! — Bob Ross
But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.
I think you are trying to step outside of morality, but I say that action implicitly concedes that morality exists. You cannot go and eat a sandwich without implicitly, in action, conceding it is morally permissible to do. You can say “morality doesn’t exist”, but your actions do not match your words. — Bob Ross
Depends on what you mean. It certainly answers what the nature of morality is and what moral properties subsist in or of and answers various metatethical concerns underpinning normative ethics. — Bob Ross
No. Moral cognitivism is that moral judgments are statements that are truth-apt. Whether or not any of them are true needs a different argument because it is a different claim. — Bob Ross
Any statement is truth-apt Bob.
If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.
4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.
4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.
There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?
A theory has a conclusion with proof.
Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters.
Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest
Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here.
Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me
If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.
2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."
Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory.
…
If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.
If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality.
But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.
If I say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging. — Bob Ross
It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that “I feel pain” is infallible makes “I believe one ought not torture babies” infallible: they are self-referential. “I believe I feel pain” is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about one’s current state of pain or lack thereof. “I feel pain”, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isn’t referring to something else, like ‘I think 1+1=2’. Same thing with moral judgments. — Bob Ross
Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting “beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgment’s truthity” and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. — Bob Ross
I would have to convince you that you shouldn’t torture babies... — Bob Ross
(by means I have described in length in the OP) — Bob Ross
“No one should torture babies” seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesn’t think those exist. If you mean “I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies”, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine. — Bob Ross
Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael
I’m sorry but I’m not going to read 20 different papers to try to understand your position. Would you mind giving, in you own words, an answer to my question? How do you justify your belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael
You keep asking Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same. — Michael
Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!’, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!’ but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesn’t get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism. — Bob Ross
Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross
2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement “this statement is false” is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity. — Bob Ross
If ‘1+1=2’ can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? — Bob Ross
Of course not! That’s what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory. — Bob Ross
4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.
I’ve never argued this. This is clearly false. — Bob Ross
Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. — Bob Ross
There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?
No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do so—it wouldn’t make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.
Also, I don’t why it would be the case that “for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible”, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I don’t see your point. — Bob Ross
That’s not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgments—i.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. — Bob Ross
If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.
No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that. — Bob Ross
2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."
You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjective—i.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of one’s pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality. — Bob Ross
You statement “we can make subjective moral judgments that are true” could be compatible with a moral realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something objective” just as much as a moral anti-realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something subjective”. — Bob Ross
Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false. — Bob Ross
I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: “there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena” as nietzsche put it. — Bob Ross
But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.
I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isn’t. There isn’t a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They don’t come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. — Bob Ross
I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you. — Leontiskos
This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic. — Leontiskos
Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!
1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.
The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves.
Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.
But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.
I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.
If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.
I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantively—so thank you! — Bob Ross
But truth isn’t a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me. — Bob Ross
Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics? — Bob Ross
1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former. — Bob Ross
2. You believe I didn’t provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective. — Bob Ross
3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as ‘this statement is false’, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not. — Bob Ross
For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I don’t see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesn’t mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective. — Bob Ross
You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself. — Bob Ross
7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesn’t entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it. — Bob Ross
8. I don’t think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim. — Bob Ross
10. At one point, you said I don’t believe there are true moral judgments, but I do. — Bob Ross
1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.
This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics]. — Bob Ross
Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. — Bob Ross
Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion. — Leontiskos
Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified? — wonderer1
You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol... — Leontiskos
Do you think you can prove me wrong? — wonderer1
Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to. — Leontiskos
The words true/truth have very different meanings/usages in math vs talking about the real world of human interactions.As noted above, I think, like 12*12=144, this is an objective truth known by a subject. — Leontiskos
Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!
Ah, here it is Bob! I almost missed it. We've already discussed at length on the meta-ethical considerations, but I will dismiss them here.
The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.
To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.
…
As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective.
I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application
So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology?
For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible
A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.
"True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.
Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.
Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (
↪Leontiskos
). Even Hume recognized this.
namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim.
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