No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede." — Leontiskos

it is true — Leontiskos

...because i believe it is true

Is the best we've gotten, though. Im unsure you caught what i was trying to say.
I agree with you, in principle, but there has not been any account which does what you're positing to establish the truth of any moral statement.

No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede." — Leontiskos

I should say, this isn't true, and to the high, high statistical degree in which is does consist, it's mainly people pretending that they understand the work an expert has done, to accede to the expert's belief without saying as much.

Which is odd - as this is basically how children acquire what their parents think is knowledge (particularly cosmological and philosophical knowledge - religious indoctrination being a prime example).

Is the best we've gotten, though. Im unsure you caught what i was trying to say.
I agree with you, in principle, but there has not been any account which does what you're positing to establish the truth of any moral statement. — AmadeusD

See:

The point here, though, is that belief qua belief is insufficient to justify moral claims.

I should say, this isn't true, and to the high, high statistical degree in which is does consist, it's mainly people pretending that they understand the work an expert has done, to accede to the expert's belief without saying as much. — AmadeusD

Yes, there are arguments from authority. But such a thing is more than mere belief. It is belief + authority.

It is belief + authority. — Leontiskos

what about this:
belief + expectations + authority ....combined with what else though?. I don't know why were adding or using the plus sign, its not worth adding these words up, why do we need or think an equation will be able to find that balance? But okay lets add these words, with all random values from all different valued random minds and solve!!! I am down but not here on the forum to solve anything. I come because I dont have many people in my realm who I am able to talk about these deep philosophical thinkings that I had before I even knew the word "philosophy" even meant, literally the word was not known by definition or by example or influence personally until I took a required general philosophy class in college at the age of 22..but i was reminded that my thoughts were the same as yours but I didnt know I was able to THINK ABOUT MY THINKING let alone LEARN from thinking thoughts. Just being, I was. Now, its been 7 years and I am proud of where I took this self taught journey and more importantly, WHY? I could be doing MANY other things and focusing on a goal...but the thing is, I just went where it made sense for me...I was able to now learn differently and in an environment and realm where i am myself shocked at my deep interests. I have better things to do, i know for a fact thats true..but here I am. I impressed myself and its impressive how much i have learned now that I know how to learn...and with passion and interest and will its not learning anymore its a knowing and what you learn is up to you and from others subjective stances that will help you learn how to learn, if thats what you want. Do what you want....I am, right now...I am getting off track, my apologies...I am LEARNING! Im on track actually, but my pace is just off, or not even off...im just differently moving along it....Where was I? OH YES, the math! Lets add together or shall i say combine the meanings behinda belief + an authority + an EXPECTATION/s if thats what we must do but it might not be worth the time....

Whatever the answer is I believe, whether if or how it that exists or it that can exist, the moral objective final truth I believe can differ or maybe not be constrained or bound to or from the group of objective truths. Its a balance of answers that will help this group find its perfect place...A balanced equation isnt the answer but it may really just be the base to get there but its important to know how material might always effect each equation every time its repeated... each load or force or weight or value that were put unto the ground which we take our stances...it cant be done with one standard formula, but these equations can be solved to bring new answers despite using the same "formula" and I think that is because of timing and the unreliability of human error in general.

When trying to balance or come to conclusive answers, it seems that objective moral truths may not be truths...what if its just the TRUTH? What if its a place? It can be denied and also too far to reach but eventually TIME will take us and maybe then reached by those better fit for it. though if authority is misused, misplaced it overrides or over powers the entire point...and that in itself is a way to figure out the limits were willing to take to get there...

I want to believe this place exists, but it I cant be too bothered.

I am moved though. It might be very far down a long road or is it that we are on this road but keep missing the turn or getting lost or incapable of getting there physically....mentally, emotionally? I think at least the first two should both arrive together with a real self awareness that is proven with you as the source, be credible, be that reference! Or dont...maybe thats the better option. We will never get to an answer without your word being able to be taken for what it REALLY is. I think words arent even necessary really because sometimes they dont add up..It dont add up, doesnt make sense for some reason...And one, with the life they lead will reveal everything needed to know, no words needed, and now is rightfully judged and questioned and with a chance to make a proof become an example.... of why it isnt about adding up anything...

As humans with such specific needs, can we see it through the words that we see and share on this forum...?

Well, I can see you.

I have scrolled every topic from every page here, and find myself going back again and again to see if I find anything I missed.... I love this site, I learn a lot and I am on the site a lot...I like like-mindedness and I think that is something we all have in common to any degree small or large...we sought out or stumbled upon or was referred or just looking to connect to someone who gives the time...whatever got us here (i think some might just want to chat and find friends lol thats fine too not cool but fine) but we all signed up to be members here on THE PHILOSOPHY FORUM....

Not every account contributes and I see the regulars, I see how those that do, use the site, engage, I see what you comment on, I see what you introduce to the thread in your OP's and that tells me a lot where or what ideas you lean towards and how you go about them also tells its own sometimes story in itself...and I must say, I have been highly impressed by the shared content and work by a lot of you while I have also cursed aloud reading somethings posted by others but those others mean that I am aloud to JUDGE because its not about what I think is complete bullshit nonsense. I really think the positive outweighs the bad here greatly. I love the openness andI dont want to say it because its not the right word, but the bravery some people have as they confidently share stuff I find to be...regurgitated and wrong...but THATS ON ME...and I would like to have more confidence in sharing myself. You have helped shine a light in my darkness. That counts for something.

But I am not there yet, I question myself and its valid that I do. BUT IM HERE, thats progress. Im proud.

I need to format better and type in a way more people can clearly understand my point but the point is not having one all the time still allows one to come...I think in this case I am replying because I have something and I wonder can you see that?...its because of YOU ALL HERE!

I have been highly motivated by the contributions I have seen to work on my communications, but I still think where i lack in organization and formatting can be easily improved but what I am saying now i decided is worth the risk of facing the outcomes or fear I have, being dismissed or belittled or corrected without AUTHORITY..

Yeah you can say I am going off the rails, over explaining myself. I can see someone saying I am doing it so much so that it may have little to NO VALUE to what concerns the OP. But I would not question that feedback, because i didnt ask for any. I am not agreeing or disagreeing I just like the direction this post has taken. Thanks for being you. But not thanks as in, you did something i needed...i would have been fine. I wasnt losing sleep or now seeing something I didnt already...I'm just glad to see the like mindedness and jumping in because of it in this thread...

I may see it more as a whole but its not real yet as a whole but its being built...I am seeing it as a whole, while those who may be taking the value of their views more seriously then the part itself, when the part is nothing without the whole...where if this forum were to be gone tomorrow, would you get or be willing to share your ideas and what do you seek? Who is your audience? How is feedback turned into new value for you? How can you be bothered? How bored are you? How much do you like like minded people?
...Its amazing how I seem to forget how much I need and crave getting into the minds of others who are well taught and educated and interesting and talented and well spoken too! I dont get to talk to people day to day without having to stop myself from going too deep getting to the bottom of things. Things like understanding people better for them without them even knowing. But I like to understand more then you may know. I see me in those of you with similar deep thinking thoughts and I have been intimidated by how beautifully some people can articulate without going off the rails like me...but maybe thats what I want to do...i'm being true in that, if you need prove...I havent commented on anything on this forum WITHOUT GOING OFF the rails at least a little, but I think if you get anything from this know feedback exists in me for many of you if you ever need to hear it for yourself....

what I meant about me seeing this place (the forum) as the whole rather than interacting as a part that is of no whole, i mean to say... when i say "whole" and "part" i think of a machine that is still being built but we have the parts but its not fully built yet...its hard to build something that was never designed before but it isnt hard to get there from a vision of the whole for what its worth...and TIME IS LIMITING but how so? (another topic I can go on an on about and shall one day) AND one day this machine will serve its function as a whole, and a successful one at that! When the parts come together with the function of it known undeniably serving its purpose but how did we get assembled and how many machines exists like this?
I am trying to say SOMETHING but I cant do it efficiently YET...For me, seeing that I am a part in this whole,its clear I am not established yet or successfully set in this whole, where is my place? Do i belong? I feel I can find my place as a part though, but not for me this time for the whole only! Not me any part will do....

Sorry its long winded, I have typed this up and enjoyed doing it. Those lost let me know where I lost you, to where the point of the OP may become NOT LOST for me but just pushed aside for the moment, because thats HOW I DO THINGS right now...If the worst happens, I'm dismissed and belittled and booted from the forum by someone or everyone on here and that alone would tell me a lot. Is that not useful real knowledge? Yeah, I would get my feelings hurt (thats my problem) and want to defend my honor (also my problem) but I STILL CANNOT BE BOTHERED because I would be learning regardless...Where my part in this belongs and is taught to me but not by any worthy teacher...education is lost when I realize the student depending on these "teachers"...by teachers I mean, strangers asking strangers "what is the meaning of life" and being dead serious like the answer is here...IF it is and was, WHY WOULD WE TELL YOU? You cant just ask that LOL I judge stuff like that but am I wrong?
EVEN IF WE KNOW FOR SURE...Its like they expect people to hand them the answer they worked hard to arrive to...They lose the chance to get there on their own, do they even know what they WANT? Is it THE TRUTH? And doing it in the least authentic, most basic way, and without questioning who and what they get an answer from... just a "thanks!" they say to those who has the patience to give them any attention, you are better then me...but do they not know that people still give an answer, even when they dont know themselves for sure...its interesting to see it happen. It does here, its all here.

I Question things, I question myself for questioning things...but I need to make it make sense for ME and from there I can make sense of things with others..together we can arrive at a truth thats objectively true, i think. I think regardless if no one responds. Thinking thoughts are sometimes not worth questioning too deep as its just the brain being with you... I am willing to be corrected but from where I stand who is to bother?

Look at all these words!!! Dont have to read to see.... Look what you did to me, I cant thank you enough.

I was moved to share all this, but its the work im tasking myself with...I have written a lot about moral objectivity not as a task, but for fun in my free time from such a subjective POV that isnt necessarily about "me" being the subject but a subjective POV from a person willing to take on a role and be a part of a team...the whole is real, but its hard to imagine human kind getting there as good as parts of a whole that is just doing what its function...its doing what its supposed to, a machine with parts of the whole...are we as humans doing this too? Perhaps...I am not asking because I want or need that answer from any one part here but I question it and want to see the parts in action....even if its not what I want to see.

...I dont want to see anything, I just wanted to let those know...and say for another moment, I did ask the people here, are we as humans doing this and heading there? are you all doing your part? and everyone replied with a confident "yes" I wouldnt question that but I need to be sure you do...because I will eventually question it anyways or someone will...Is lack of questioning and acceptance a problem to be bothered with? If that is what is preventing people and the will they have to participate in what I think is actually positive growth in humanity but can we see just how positive it really is? How can we see it as the whole when we are in it too deep ourselves?

What I may actually want to ask as a real question to this audience is this:
What the hell is an objective moral truth going to do for me today? Even if say we all agreed that we found at least one of them? How important really is an objective moral truth if I can be almost certain that my existence may be unknown to someone and never have any affect on the ways of our lives... I am doing my part and my faith is certain in the hopes and belief that an objective moral truth exists but we dont have any business driving that bus to get there...our bus is planet earth and we are here together headed....to i guess another place.

The chance doesnt exist, that my life will not interact or be known to many or anoher person whom is far far away from me and my world, that is my realm of reality and theirs is theirs but we both can live objectively without even knowing that we are moving together without bounds, doing our part, living our lives is doing our part and losing our lives is also our part, life and death, starts are ends...but we are unbothered by eachother because we dont know what about the existence of another, its impossible to know....I always think about stuff like that, that someone exists out there that cannot be bothered by me, even with all the authority I have.

Free will? Or free from a will to worry? That is a choice, i think...What do I know? I know that we can get to the bottom of things, but where we chose to go wont tell us anything about a real ETA because we dont have a GPS that takes us, we dont have an address to type into one! We dont even have the means to get there...but we dont stop...we keep moving, not just in time WITH IT.

And hey, we have proof! Proof is in the pudding! Our growth and knowledge that we chosen and even LIKE more in the learning part itself over the whole point or final answer is good enough but sometimes with indirect communication comes great ideas for the self but not any one else..and we cant get anywhere without selfless self awareness, but its not revealing an answer that can work every time...I dont think its worth being bothered over really...because of TIME...we are someones past and of the future but here now...

The fact that I can relate to a Philosophers mind that are centuries older, of a different country, of a different sex,of a different language of a different TIME [ (im a 27 year old Female from Central Fla who is self taught in philosophy with a degree in Drafting and Design, I do AutoCAD and Solidworks for work) this is not important really, only worth mentioning because my outspoken (some may be thinking OVERLY spoken, fine) I am saying this because im not known here, I dont reply to much but when I have its overly done perhaps and lacking what the forum is interested in hearing, but I have many bookmarked OP's and many opinions on topics brought up by the good people of the forum...not that your good or bad but im addressing the members as "the good people" because its a community, we are not ever going to find common grounds but I think a common ground can come from a POV that isnt of this community but is like us because of an interest in knowing the questions we all think about..

These deep questions that is labeled and organized and laid out here for us to share what we consider to be philosophically worth of discussion exists in even in the unlikely, like-minded stranger...because they dont know how deep it is yet and yet they still are doing their part.
That person is thinking and wondering, WE, THEM, US, cant avoid that search as humans but it seems avoiding the dive is worth it for certain minds, and they are right...and that is there part and they know how to play it...No one can see things like you but maybe they could...you may never know. Its not about them as a they but without them are we able to see an US?
I dont think I will see the day WE as THEY can live that way but I know it is true that one day it may happen...that what is being discussed here isnt really worth the back and forth bullshit unless you think we can get somewhere...with ME INCLUDED!
Perhaps more direction is needed but we not need to keep asking the good people of the forum...unless you want to argue, which is also I guess fine and judgement is not coming from me if you like arguing with the same people. Who am I to judge is not the question, because I can answer that. Its that judgement, I believe is perceived and given and taken and passed and wrongly sometimes rightly so...but its the stance one is able to judge from... Even if one may tell you they arent judging, why do you believe them? Some times they may be telling the truth but privacy in the mind allows our judgements to flow and happen and perhaps manifest into certain behaviors, actions, reactions that clearly demonstrate how you COULD judge.

Objective ways to possibly moralize can come from expectations perhaps and I have a lot to say on this, but I had to make certain things clear to get HERE NOW....thats okay. Im just doing my part.

I'm thinking like when a person can BE LET DOWN BECAUSE OF AN EXPECTATION that was unmet say or even if one was LET DOWN BECAUSE their EXPECTATIONS were OFF and they say to themselves "How could I have not seen that coming?!? WTF?" Now what I notice is that what that thinking person may do is behave in a way that is hard on their mind and body and what they are giving out into the world by allowing themselves to be bothered with that expectation they placed even if they knew they had them...
Perhaps if they can ask those questions to themselves but WITHOUT JUDGMENT ON their own self, it wouldnt be as easy to pick up on how morals really are affecting someones well being and peace of mind. These expectations speak for you and speak for me...it just takes someone to notice them. People brush off the idea of an expectation, as its a common thing to hear people claim they dont have any, because they know it will let them down...I do this depending on who, what, where why and how I am going about doing a thing, that I have experience being let down in before in a similar case just a different time. But why not give an expectation a chance?
I am reminded even when I think I am free from expecting anything, If I really think about the question and really answer it to myself FOR MYSELF...and when that doesnt work, I can ask the right person to get me back to a place where I am not to question myself and what i expected...that isnt always the problem. Dont ask if you just want a pick me up or sulking buddy or the one who will tell you what you WANT to hear (unless you admit you arent ready for the truth, thats fine if aware of what your doing in that act of avoiding or masking)....If you are lucky enough, ask that question first to your self and then someone whose word or life means something to you..someone who knows you and who can give you an answer in a way that can force through that prior harsh self judgement AND find the reminder and the goodness you really wanted and how you are going to deal with what comes to bother you again down the line. Its all good, and not because the subject has expectations...its that they are using them to discovering truth in themselves and seeing it in them and getting to see it from another.
The good is the growth and I think we are all growing here..that proof exists no matter what. Its just that who really cares? It doesnt matter how far you come because the way another will be able to get the full good from the objective moral truths created by US will eventually see the whole for WHAT ITS WORTH and they can judge the lengths we took to get there from there growth as well. No growth is almost like really really slow growth or maybe growth that started and never finished but stopped growing while still living..You cant ever really know how much anything was ever worth from this place I think were all talking about, the one and only truth. But if we cant catch up in time to see this truth, if time doesnt stop can we just slow it down...Maybe lose track of time? I have done that before, it comes with a consequence but sometimes is worth it. Maybe we could lose the track we say of time....if we knew the track at all, I dont think its possible to all arrive on time and on track to any where any place any world any space...but that time can be spotted, i think, when IT from US spots it, how could they understand all that? What knows US? WHO knows US? Maybe its not us they see just the progress and ideas we bring to the world from earth...I think US is through me and you and every one it has to be SO BIG and SO SURE. With US what CAN happen? We can decide...i think.

But “Vanilla ice cream tastes good,” is nothing like, “One ought not torture babies.” Only from the latter can we infer something about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory

That’s true, but that wasn’t the point. It was to demonstrate why your analogy to math failed.

A belief never makes a moral judgment true

Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good?

“Jane believes ice cream tastes good,” is a third-person proposition, and what you say of it is obviously false. A first-person statement like, “I feel pain,” is infallible, but belief statements are not like this. To say, “I believe I feel pain,” is therefore already confused, and is therefore an unused sort of locution. The same holds with, “I enjoy ice cream”/“I believe I enjoy ice cream.” Infallible statements are usually not belief statements, and to make them so is to stretch the sense of 'belief'. But again, these are non-moral according to your definition in the OP.

All reasoning for why a proposition is true is fallible; so I am not sure what you mean here. Third-person vs. first-person sentences has nothing to do with the fallibility of the statements or lack thereof. I can believe that “I love yogurt” and be wrong about that, same as I can believe that I believe I love yogurt and be wrong about that too: they are not infallible statements.

If I said, “Leontiskos believes everyone has brown hair,” this would be a false statement, and particularly problematic insofar as I know that not everyone has brown hair

You would be wrong about that if you actually don’t believe it; and of course whether or not people have brown hair is independent of your belief on it because there is a fact of the matter that makes it true...this isn’t the case with morality.

Saying that it is “true relative to myself” is a non-response.

The statement “I love yogurt” can be true relative to me and false relative to you, because we need to know who we are referring to by ‘I’.

If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others.

This is a straw man: if you disapprove it for everyone, then you disapprove it for everyone. Obviously, if you only disapprove of yourself doing something, then, of course, you don’t necessarily disapprove of it for other people.

Look, do you yourself even think personal/subjective reasons are able to justify claims about other persons?

What do you mean by “personal/subjective reasons”? I would say that some propositions are made true in virtue of beliefs we have—e.g., “I believe people shouldn’t torture babies”, “I like chocolate ice cream”, etc.

The reason it is irrational to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream on the basis of my own idiosyncratic taste is because the putative reason does not have justificatory force for the sort of claim in question

You are just begging the question with “justificatory force”: sure, I don’t approve of forcing someone to eat chocolate ice cream, but if I did then I wouldn’t have a problem with—hence approval/disapproval.

Your deeper claim seems to be, "Yes, it is irrational. But your moral realism is irrational too, so I am justified in doing this." But even if moral realism were irrational, this would not justify you in doing irrational things.

Again, show me the contradiction or incoherent with two propositions I am holding with moral subjectivism, and I will concede it is irrational. Until then, I don’t think it is.

You seem to be like another gentleman/lady I was discussing with that thought that pyshopathic serial killers cannot act rationally with respect to their torturing and killing of innocent people because their actions are immoral and that makes it irrational. I am not saying you think that, but saying people who are consistent with their goals are irrational (which is what you are saying) are irrational seems similar to me.

That’s true — Bob Ross

And the point here is that opinions about vanilla ice cream are not moral judgments.

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos

Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross

That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.

All reasoning for why a proposition is true is fallible; so I am not sure what you mean here. — Bob Ross

Your point depends on infallibility. You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.

You would be wrong about that if you actually don’t believe it; — Bob Ross

I would be wrong whether or not I believe it. Belief makes no difference.

The statement “I love yogurt” can be true relative to me and false relative to you, because we need to know who we are referring to by ‘I’. — Bob Ross

Yes, and we are talking about predications regarding others, not predications involving only oneself. That's the whole point! "No one should torture babies," is not like, "I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."

If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. — Leontiskos

This is a straw man: if you disapprove it for everyone, then you disapprove it for everyone. Obviously, if you only disapprove of yourself doing something, then, of course, you don’t necessarily disapprove of it for other people. — Bob Ross

How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?

What do you mean by “personal/subjective reasons”? I would say that some propositions are made true in virtue of beliefs we have—e.g., “I believe people shouldn’t torture babies”, “I like chocolate ice cream”, etc. — Bob Ross

So then you think this is a rational exchange:

• Leontiskos: Why should I not torture babies?
• Bob Ross: Because I believe you shouldn't.

You are just begging the question with “justificatory force”: sure, I don’t approve of forcing someone to eat chocolate ice cream, but if I did then I wouldn’t have a problem with—hence approval/disapproval. — Bob Ross

Of course I am not. Does or does not the claim, "Because I believe you shouldn't," justify the question at hand? Either your belief justifies your claim or else it doesn't. If it does justify it then a perfectly rational Leontiskos would respond, "Ah, wonderful response. I am now convinced. You have justified your claim." I am concerned with what is rational and what is irrational.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify any universal moral truths, then moral subjectivism is a preposterous theory. If—as seems to be the case here—the moral subjectivist is able to do nothing more than assert their own personal beliefs, then clearly moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such truths.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." — Leontiskos

Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies?

If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. — Leontiskos

The same goes for moral realism.

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos
Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross

That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.

That wasn’t the point: it was an analogy. If I say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging.

You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.

It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that “I feel pain” is infallible makes “I believe one ought not torture babies” infallible: they are self-referential. “I believe I feel pain” is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about one’s current state of pain or lack thereof. “I feel pain”, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isn’t referring to something else, like ‘I think 1+1=2’. Same thing with moral judgments.

"I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."

“I believe no one everyone should have brown hair” is like the former statements, and not the latter.

Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting “beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgment’s truthity” and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. My arguments are in the moral subjectivism OP: if one accepts there are true moral judgments and they are propositional and they are not expressing something objective, then they are expressing something subjective. You would have to contend with those arguments if you want to change my mind.

How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?

You used a misleading example that doesn’t fit what I am targeting. If you wanted to make your point, you should have demonstrated why “I disapprove of it for everyone” is incoherent and not “I disapprove of it for myself, therefore I disapprove of it for others”: the latter was never an inference I was making.

So then you think this is a rational exchange:
• Leontiskos: Why should I not torture babies?
• Bob Ross: Because I believe you shouldn't.

I think it is rational insofar as my hypothetical response here would justify myself in stopping you but not justify you in not doing it. I would have to convince you that you shouldn’t torture babies (by means I have described in length in the OP), but the my justification for stopping you in this case is valid but doesn’t provide you with any good reasons to believe it yourself.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory.

“No one should torture babies” seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesn’t think those exist. If you mean “I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies”, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine.

I thought I understood what you meant by objective and subjective, so let me clarify it as I've understood it from our past conversations. I assumed that what was 'mind-independent' was essentially the thing in itself. We had spoken about that and I agreed with you that know one can know what the thing in itself is, it can only represent it within its mind. This is what I thought you meant by 'mind-dependent'.

This seems to fit as you revise truth to be objective. As I understood it it would be when a person has a representation of a thing in itself that happens to correspond with the thing in itself. This correspondence is not mind-dependent, as it is not the mind trying to represent the correspondence. The correspondence is a thing in itself.

If I had the above correct, there is nothing objective we can ever reference with any clarity besides, "the thing in itself" But:

You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it.

I disagree. We come to know what is objective through reasoning and observance. We intuit that there is stuff which exists without us trying to think about them and that is what is objective. — Bob Ross

But we can't if I understood it correctly. Reasoning and observance are all subjective representations of the world. What we can conclude are reasoning and observance that seem to correspond with the thing in itself. An active representation of this could be called 'knowledge'. But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself. We can only at best, represent it correct? Meaning intuition is subjective. The only thing we can know about objectivity through our subjective reasoning, is that we can never know what the thing in itself is.

Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent

No. The claim or statement is trying to express something objective. Of course, we only approach the limit of what objectively is out there; but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist nor that we don’t have good reasons to believe it does — Bob Ross

I agree that we approach the limit of what is objective, or mind-independent by basically using 'lack'. A thing in itself is the thing that we attempt to identify, but it is defined by the fact that it is always a representation and never an actual understanding of what it is in itself.

"An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully".

This just begs the question by invoking “truthfully”; as truth is the correspondence of thought (subjectivity) with reality (objectivity). — Bob Ross

I wouldn't say its begging the question. We can also take correspondence of thought and not know it truthfully. For example, we may believe that a particular apple is healthy, but we're unaware that there is a small rotten piece inside that contains nasty bacteria. We only know when we don't correspond to reality when it demonstrates our correspondence doesn't work. But to know a correspondence doesn't work, that correspondence must be tested. We have plenty of things we subjectively know and believe that are not true, we simply haven't put it to the test yet or misinterpreted the results.

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.

Moral facticity is not just what you described there. If a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality such that what it purports thereof is and ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, then a moral fact is a statement which accurately purports a state-of-affairs about reality that in virtue of which makes the moral judgment true (and thusly a fact). This means that there are states-of-affairs, if there are moral facts, that do inform us how reality ought to be, which violates P1. — Bob Ross

But Bob, if something is permissable, omissable, or obligatory, then this can be simplified to what 'should' or 'should not' be. Within the language that implies states of affairs. Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory. If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality. To state something moral is by definition to state, "Reality in this state is better than in this state."

If P1 does not address states of reality, then you cannot have morality. Your true P2 should be "Morality is the claim that reality in one state is permissable, omissable, or obligatory over comparative states of reality". While P1 can indicate that any particular state alone cannot demonstrate morality, it doesn't negate the fact that morality is an act of comparison. If you cannot compare, you have no morality.

A potential state of reality in the sense of what could possibly happen due to the current state does not inform us of what ought to be either. You could tell me “this ball will probably hit this other ball” and I would not know from that claim anything normative, although I would know something about the next potential state of reality. — Bob Ross

That's simply untrue. As soon as you compare states of reality you have a moral choice. That's the only way something is permissable. To be permissable it must be the case that we can change the state to something else that is not permissable.

If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.

If I was a being that was born into a reality without time where a baby lay dead, then yes, this slice of reality alone cannot tell me what is morally permissable. In this only, I completely agree with P1. It is only after experiencing multiple states of reality and comparing them can we come to conclusion that some states of reality 'should' exist over others. Morality does not exist in a stateless non-comparative state. It only exists in a stateful comparison analysis.

Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.

#1 here is not a summary of prong-1 (of the thesis). Prong-1 is moral cognitivism, which is the view that moral judgments are truth-apt statements (i.e., propositions) and not that moral judgments are made by subjects.

#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective.

#3 True! (: — Bob Ross

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

This would then follow with:

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective. — Bob Ross

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective. We of course cannot know if they are true because we cannot, as subjects, know what is objective. It is a correspondence that happens despite our beliefs or observations as what is objective is completely independent from minds (subjects). The tweak I made I think makes this more clear.

3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here. Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me.

As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done.

It indicates what moral properties subsist in or of and what their nature is. Of course it doesn’t indicate what should be done, because it isn’t a normative ethical theory. That’s what I was trying to convey in the other thread! Metaethical theories should not be conflated with normative theories! — Bob Ross

Lets simplify this further. You set up some definitions and propositional assumptions without a conclusion. That's not a normative theory. A theory has a conclusion with proof. No one cares about normative or metaethical as concepts except scholars with too much time on their hands. Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters. It is a trap in philosophy I've seen many brilliant people fall into over the years. To focus on terminology and miss the one true point: usefulness and applicability. Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest. You didn't do anything meaningful in your setup.

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.

I think you are trying to step outside of morality, but I say that action implicitly concedes that morality exists. You cannot go and eat a sandwich without implicitly, in action, conceding it is morally permissible to do. You can say “morality doesn’t exist”, but your actions do not match your words. — Bob Ross

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible? Action simply implies something has been done. The question of whether that action should have been committed or not is morality. If you state that all actions are permissible, then no actions are impermissible. In which case, there is no question of how we should act, and thus no morality.

Depends on what you mean. It certainly answers what the nature of morality is and what moral properties subsist in or of and answers various metatethical concerns underpinning normative ethics. — Bob Ross

I don't see that at all. Basically what you've done is set up basic definitions.

1. There is truth, definitions of objective, subjective.
2. We are subjects. What we say, do, think, comprehend, etc is subjective.
3. What is objective is mind-independent. Truth is mind-independent, therefore objective.
4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.
4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.
5. Except that this is true for any statement, word, or concept in existence because of the way you've defined subjective. Making this statement meaningless and getting us no where closer to understanding or solving the question of morality.

No. Moral cognitivism is that moral judgments are statements that are truth-apt. Whether or not any of them are true needs a different argument because it is a different claim. — Bob Ross

Again, I can replace 'Moral cognitivism' with any phrase I want. "Claims about dogs are statements that are truth-apt." Any statement is truth-apt Bob. If you claim there is truth, and that statements which are true are those that correspond with reality, that's all you need. If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.

I only say this because I think you're brilliant Bob. I do not mean to say this as talking down to you, but with great respect as I see your amazing potential. Yes, we must understand the names to be successful in the philosophical world. I understand. But don't get caught up in naming math. DO math. Because you can while so many can't. Let them worry about naming it. While I disagree with your repurposing of subjective and objective for the reason's I've given, the underlying concept as I've understood it from your previous writings makes sense. That's the math. Math is what changes the world and allows humanity to achieve great things. I don't care what you call it. Neither should you.

I appreciate your courage, openness, and insights.

I appreciate your response!

Firstly, I agree that the simplest way to convey something is the best but, as of now, with all due respect, I think your simplifications are over-simplifications; and, believe it or not, the OP is the most concise, precise, and simplest way I have found to convey my metaethical theory.

Secondly, with respect to the terms, I hate semantics just as much as the next guy! So I agree that we should not get caught up on the terminology: the reason I use the terms I have been using is they are the most widely accepted and precise ways of conveying exactly what I want to convey—so why would I makeup new words or use less precise words to convey the exact same thing?

Thirdly, I think there is one core issue in our conversation that needs sorting out before we can continue, namely that you seem to think metaethics is useless and normative ethics is all that matters. Of course, this metaethical theory doesn’t address what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory...it isn’t supposed to! That’s for normative ethics. So, I think I need to provide a case not for moral subjectivism (specifically) but, rather, for the study of metaethics. If you don’t see any value in metaethics, then there’s no point in discussing moral subjectivism, since it is a metaethical theory.

As a side note, I am working on a normative ethical theory, I just haven’t posted it yet. It isn’t posted with this metaethical theory because (1) I find it is useful to split the two so as to hone in on metaethical and normative ethical disputes separately and (2) I haven’t finished my normative ethical theory yet (to my liking).

Now, let me address some points you made to hopefully demonstrate why metaethics is important; but, first, let me outline some general points. Metaethics is about the nature of moral judgments and properties, and not what is right or wrong. This is incredibly important because it is important to know, beyond what is being expressed as right or wrong, what a moral judgment itself actually is (e.g., is it truth-apt? Is it expressing something subjective or objective? Are any of them true?). As an example, let’s take the metaethical claim that ‘there is at least one true moral judgment’: if this is false, then morality is pointless and always incorrect—hence, error theory. Let’s take ‘moral judgments are proposition’: if they aren’t, then we cannot use them as propositions which, in turn, entails we cannot apply logic to them—hence moral non-cognitivism. Let’s take ‘moral judgments express something objective’: if this is false, then there is no moral fact out there that makes a moral judgment true—hence moral subjectivism. You are saying all of this is useless…..but your own normative ethical theory we are discussing in the other form implicitly assumes metaethical claims.

Any statement is truth-apt Bob.

I would like to note the following:

1. Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!’, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!’ but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesn’t get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism.

2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement “this statement is false” is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity.

If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.

The proposition “1+1=2” presupposes that it is truth-apt; but you seem to be trying to argue that it is truth-apt because it is a proposition—that isn’t valid. If ‘1+1=2’ can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? That would be a meta-mathematical debate. However, this is a metaethical debate about whether moral judgments like ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ are truth-apt or not.

Mathematics would presuppose, and does presuppose, that mathematical judgments are proposition; just like how your normative ethical theory presupposes that moral judgments are propositional.

4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.

Of course not! That’s what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory.

4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.

I’ve never argued this. This is clearly false.

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?

No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do so—it wouldn’t make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.

Also, I don’t why it would be the case that “for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible”, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I don’t see your point.

A theory has a conclusion with proof.

I gave an argument for all three prongs of the thesis, so it is theory. You haven’t actually dealt with all of them. They were not definitions.

Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters.

As long as it is useful to me, then that’s good with me. Also, it isn’t a fair criticism to claim that a theory is false because no one thinks it is useful. Likewise, most people don’t find many things I find useful useful: why does that matter?

Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest

I agree that one should keep it simple, but you seem (to me) to be oversimplifying it. With all due respect, you keep conflating the two in important ways, and that is why I keep bringing it up. For example, in your other thread you assume moral realism is true without proving it...you didn’t even attempt to. Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. That’s why each prong I have has an argument for it, even if one, at the end of the day, doesn’t agree with them.

Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here.

Correct. It is a prong of a thesis, not an argument. I outlined the thesis first, then argued for it. The argument for it is later on in the OP.

Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me

That’s not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgments—i.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. I am explicitly denying that with this prong of the thesis, and proceed to give an argument for it later on in the OP.

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.

No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that.

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjective—i.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of one’s pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality.

You statement “we can make subjective moral judgments that are true” could be compatible with a moral realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something objective” just as much as a moral anti-realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something subjective”.

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false.

By agreeing to ‘moral judgments are propositional’, the person has in no way conceded that ‘there is at least one true moral judgment’. But with your revision, they would have to accept both.

Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory.
…
If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.

This is fine, but I think we may have talked passed each other. P1 would dictate that in this baby example there is no fact you can cite which makes any of the moral judgments true, such as ‘one should step in front of the baby first’. What I am not saying, nor does P1 imply that, states of affairs inform our moral judgments—rather, P1 dictates that there is no amount of consideration of what is the case nor the possible outcomes in this baby example that tells me anything about fundamentally what I should morally judge, it just supplements it.

In other words, the moral judgments are sui generis of your psychology: there’s no moral fact you are able to cite in this baby example that tells you what to do, instead the non-moral facts inform you, based off of your psychology of what you approve or disapprove of, what you should do. The non-moral facts are not enough to dictate what should happen, there is a moral judgment, or multiple, that are just facts about your psychology that make you morally judge one way or another given the circumstances. For a moral realist, this is not the case, from the baby example there is a moral fact-of-the-matter out there in that possible world or this actual one that dictates what one should do, and one is just trying to discover what that is—they aren’t projecting their own opinions on what one should do.

All you seem to be noting, and correct me if I am wrong, is that we use the current and potential states of affairs to supplement our moral judgments, which is totally fine and I absolutely agree with...but I disagree that if you were to just give me the facts about the baby scenario, that I would be able to know what I should do—there is some ‘should’ or ‘shoulds’ which are being projected by my psychology that ultimately dictate, once I am informed of the facts about the baby example, what I decide I ought to do.

If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality.

Not quite. Since I believe moral judgments are not made true by moral facts out there, I think that we project what we approve or disapprove of and use that to determine what to do. I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: “there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena” as nietzsche put it.

Someone morally judging a situation based off of that situation and potential states-of-affairs is perfectly compatible with P1. P1 just says that there is no way to infer strictly from those mind-independent states-of-affairs what should be.

But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.

I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isn’t. There isn’t a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They don’t come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. If it were an object, like an apple, then you would be right.

Truth is only objective in the sense that that abstract relationship is not contingent on subject’s determinations of it. If you are just noting that we can’t be absolutely certain that that relationship exists from our subjective standpoint, then I wholly agree.

I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

If I say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging. — Bob Ross

Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.

It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that “I feel pain” is infallible makes “I believe one ought not torture babies” infallible: they are self-referential. “I believe I feel pain” is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about one’s current state of pain or lack thereof. “I feel pain”, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isn’t referring to something else, like ‘I think 1+1=2’. Same thing with moral judgments. — Bob Ross

But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.

Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting “beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgment’s truthity” and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. — Bob Ross

I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.

I would have to convince you that you shouldn’t torture babies... — Bob Ross

If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.

(by means I have described in length in the OP) — Bob Ross

Again, if something is truth-apt then it can be argued for directly. Your OP presumed that it can only be argued for indirectly and accidentally. It seems that you do not believe such claims are really truth-apt if they cannot be argued for directly and/or rationally justified.

“No one should torture babies” seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesn’t think those exist. If you mean “I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies”, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine. — Bob Ross

Yikes. :groan:

Either the proposition, "No one should torture babies," is true, or else it isn't. Your belief can't make it true. You know this. Or you will upon further reflection. If you have no way to rationally justify a claim, then it is otiose to call such a claim "true." This whole "subjectivism" approach assumes something like the idea that beliefs, in themselves, can make moral claims true, and this is patently false. Such approaches are non-starters.

Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael

;

I’m sorry but I’m not going to read 20 different papers to try to understand your position. Would you mind giving, in you own words, an answer to my question? How do you justify your belief that no one should torture babies?

You keep asking @Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same.

I’m sorry but I’m not going to read 20 different papers to try to understand your position. Would you mind giving, in you own words, an answer to my question? How do you justify your belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael

I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you.

You keep asking Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same. — Michael

This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic.

I reviewed this and MAN is this long. A lot of these points address several details that honestly lead up to the summary at the end. I think the issues are summarized as follows:

1. Making sure I understand your definitions of objective, subjective, and truth and their logical conclusions.
2. Noting that the claim that all of our moral judgements are subjective, as is anything we do. Defining what it means to have a true moral judgement.
3. Noting that you have no underlying claim as to why all true moral judgements are based on psychology through the definitions you use, and why such a claim leads to contradictions.

I may repeat myself in points, so feel free to make the next focus about those three points so you don't have to spend too long on individual issues. For me, its the 3 points that matter, and all the details are an attempt to get to those points.

Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!’, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!’ but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesn’t get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism. — Bob Ross

Ah, you didn't mention that specific definition of judgement. I would note that, or reference that there are some definitions like judgement which are being used in accordance with certain moral theories. But let me show you that what I noted still stands. Everything you do is truth apt. I'll explain below.

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Meaning that anything a subject does either corresponds with reality, or does not. Including our feelings. I might feel angry at the idea of killing a baby and judge that I shouldn't. We can imagine an animal for example. Should it though? Its either true or false. Language is not needed. Morality is about the intent to act and the question on whether it should be acted upon or not. Its either true or false that you should. But the fact that its false that you should doesn't necessitate that its true that you shouldn't.

In other words, if there is no true morality. there is no should, then it is false that you should. But this still makes moral judgements truth apt, as when something is false, it enters into the binary of the possibility of true. Truth-apt simply means what is stated could be true or false conceptually. It makes no claims as to the actual outcome.

Meaning, if I take your definition of truth, subjectivity, and objectivity, everything is truth-apt. Either a belief, statement, emotion, etc. corresponds to reality, or it does not.

2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement “this statement is false” is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity. — Bob Ross

But it is true that the statement is false. Many statements require implicit context for meaning. If we remove those implicit contexts, then It says nothing meaningful. Sentences which lack meaning are not truth apt, because they mean nothing but noise. Don't get caught up in the classic word game. :) We simply break the statement from nonsense into something that makes sense.

A. This is a sentence - True
B. A is false - False

The above word game is just a classic mistaken case of combining two propositions and their assertions into one sentence. Regardless, you are talking about moral judgements, which are evaluations of what one should do. Anytime you introduce the word should, there is the result of its true that you should, or false that you should.

If ‘1+1=2’ can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? — Bob Ross

Because it is either true that 1+1=2, or it is false. I can write 1+2=2. This is also truth-apt. It is either true or false that 1+2=2. If something is true, it is truth-apt. If something is false, it is truth-apt.

"A sentence is truth apt if there is some context in which it could be uttered (with its present meaning) and express a true or false proposition."
https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845

Yes, there are specific cases when there is no question of truth or falsity, but we're not talking about exceptions into here when we're speaking about morality and simple statements. The question isn't whether judgements and statements are truth-apt. The question is, "What is true?" And you've already answered that. So when we say true in your paper we mean, a subjective statement which is in concurrence with reality. The concurrence with reality is objective, and outside of the ability of the subject to know.

Of course not! That’s what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory. — Bob Ross

I definitely did miss the point! =D I suppose from my end, once you defined truth, its a given that judgements and statements are truth apt. However, something being truth-apt does not mean it is true. Which leaves me scratching my head when you make the leap to "Whatever a person judges morally, is true by their psychology." This is a claim that needs proof.

A. Morality is about what I should do. It is truth-apt, meaning what should be done could be true, or
false.
B. A true moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that corresponds with reality. A
false moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that does not correspond with
reality.
C. There is the possibility that I make an incorrect moral judgement, or one that does not correspond to
reality. This would be a false moral judgement.
D. I have a psychology. I make a moral judgement that I should do X because of my psychology.
E. It is true that I should do X because of my psychology.
F. But I have not shown why my psychology concurs with what should be in objective reality.
G. Because of that, I can state, "It is false that I should do X because of my psychology." with equal
weight.
Therefore: G contradicts E.
(I go over this again as a summary at the end)

In other words Bob, for something to be truth apt, it must have the possibility of being assigned a true and a false condition. An example of something that is not truth-apt is something like the amateur understanding of God. There is no condition in which it is possible for God to be false, therefore God is not truth-apt, God is simply true.

To demonstrate that a moral judgement is truth apt, there must be a condition for a moral judgement in which it could be false. Can you give me an example of a moral judgement based on one's psychology that would be false? And what I mean is, the condition. For example, "God is a physical being." It doesn't matter whether this is true or false, it simply means that if its true, God is physical, and if its false, God is not. What is the truth-apt condition of making moral decisions based on our judgements?

4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.

I’ve never argued this. This is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. We cannot know things in themselves. You've eliminated the term "objectivity" from any meaningful understanding besides "That which exists which we cannot know." So there could be an objective morality, but it would be beyond our knowledge. For if we could know it, that knowledge would be mind dependent. Known and discussed morality, by your definition, is subjective. As is everything we speak, judge, etc. So technically I should be saying, "Morality as we know it is subjective." But if we state that there is a true moral judgement, this means that our subjective moral judgement is concurrent with objective reality. This concurrence is itself objective, as it does not require our subject to realize this is happening. Truth as well is "a thing in itself" (More details on this later!) Since everything we discuss is from a subject Bob, everything as we know it is subjective.

Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. — Bob Ross

First, I haven't been thinking at all in these terms. I'm just using the terms of your OP and showing where I see them logically leading. If I am oversimplifying, please correct me when you see it.

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?

No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do so—it wouldn’t make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.

Also, I don’t why it would be the case that “for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible”, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I don’t see your point. — Bob Ross

Ok, I've been wracking my brain trying to understand how you're arriving at this conclusion, and this is the best I can come up with. So are you stating that because you think morality is based on our own psychology, whatever we do we must view as permissible? Because the logical equivalent is that whatever we do not do, is not permissible. Which means if at a future date, we decide not to eat a sandwich, not eating is permissible, while eating it is impermissible. The only way this binary does not exist is if there are actions that are not permissible nor impermissible. In which case, we cannot say that everything we do or do not do is permissible or impermissible. In which case, your claim that whatever we do is permissible doesn't work.

If permissible is synonymous with 'our actions', then why not just say, 'our actions'? We have to be very careful when we redefine words in philosophy, a thing I struggle with as well. The reality is, we all want a particular outcome. Sometimes we like the emotional intention of the original words, but want to change the underlying meaning. This is because the original meaning contradicts with the outcome we want with words. But when we change the original meaning of the words and try to use the original emotional intention, that can result in flawed philosophy. Its as logical a fallacy as any other.

The original intention of 'permissible' is what should or should not be done, but also assumes that someone can make an action that is impermissible, or not take an action on what is permissible. The emotional intention is a strong law that should be enforced. But all you're doing is taking the first portion of the word and throwing away the second part. But without the second part, what separate 'permissible' from moral? In which case, why not just use the word 'moral'?

I feel like your overall point is simple, but its bogged down at points by redefinitions and unnecessary labor. I get it. When I first wrote my knowledge paper years ago it was just like this. It was an over 200 page monster saddled with ideas, definitions, redefinitions, and thoughts that ultimately were unnecessary for the overall point. Its the nature of creating something unique and interesting. Few people understand the amount of thinking, labor, rewriting, etc. that lead to a succinct and solid idea. It is a compliment to your creativity and thinking, please don't take my attempts to simplify the points as trying to overcome your intent. I'm simply trying to cut what I see as fat to get to the meat. Where I oversimplify, please add why and how I can fix it.

That’s not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgments—i.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. — Bob Ross

Which is fine. Once again, we can more simply state, "Moral non-nihilism claims there is an objective morality." "Moral nihilists claim there is no objective morality". The excessive truth-apt true, false is just unnecessary wording that hinders the point. And yes, we understand that the morality as they know it is subjective in your terms, because anything we say, do, feel, etc is subjective.

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.

No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that. — Bob Ross

Yes. If you were making sure I understood this distinction, I do. So yes, if truth is objective, and there is a moral truth, then if a person's subjective claim to morality corresponds to this objectivity, it is a true moral judgement. This is as I've been intending. Because as I noted earlier Bob, everything we say, do, think, feel, etc. is subjective under your theory. So if I say, "true moral judgements are not subjective", this is of course a subjective statement. I am noting the thing in itself of the subjective judgement correlating with reality. Meaning the judgement as intended by the person is subjective, as everything is, but it so happens to correlate with the objective morality. This as well does not not that an objective morality exists.

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjective—i.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of one’s pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality. — Bob Ross

Once again, everything we ever do, say, judge, act, etc. is subjective. Which means that if my judgement corresponds with reality, then it is a true moral judgement. Which means we can make moral judgements which are true. Of course, since truth is objective, we can never know if our moral judgements are true, because what is objective can never be known as the thing in itself. Again, this is not me saying we have proven that an objective morality exists, only what must be entailed by a true moral judgement.

You statement “we can make subjective moral judgments that are true” could be compatible with a moral realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something objective” just as much as a moral anti-realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something subjective”. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is the logical result of your vocabulary. If it is the case that a judgement (remember, no need to add subjective to this, everything we do is subjective) is concurrent with reality, this concurrence is objective and true. It doesn't mean we as subjects realize it is true. Objective truth is the reality of the situation as it is in itself. If a person has a judgement that is not concurrent with reality then there is no objective concurrence. There is only the subjects claim to what is moral while reality does not concur. So both sentences are right depending on the context and intent.

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false. — Bob Ross

No Bob, I can. Just as I can logically say "False moral judgements are propositional". If something is true, then of course it has the capacity to be true or false. The capacity has nothing to do with whether it is true or false, only that by being true or false, there is the binary option of it being the other. If I use a proposition and state, "This proposition is true", it still has the capacity to be false in a logic set up. Typically this is done to set up logical fallacies or proof by contradiction.

I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: “there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena” as nietzsche put it. — Bob Ross

Ok, so you don't believe there's an objective morality, nor any true moral judgements. If morality does not exist mind independently, then any judgement to should or should will correlate with this lack of objectivity. Thus it would be true that there is no objective morality. Now all you have to do is prove it.

Problem is, you can't with your current evidence.

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.
2. Point 1 can be proven in two ways.
a. Explore all possible moral judgements and conclude they correlate with reality, including
contradictory psychological judgements.
b. Demonstrate why a moral judgement can never be contradicted by reality (Contradiction is an
opposition of opposite of correlation)
2. You claim our psychology is the basis for morality through your psychology.
3. I claim our psychology is not the basis for morality through my psychology.
4. This is a contradiction in reality.
5. Therefore neither of us can state morality is not objective until this contradiction is solved.
6. To solve this requires evidence to be presented to ascertain that either point 2 or point 3 is correct.
7. But, if point 2 is correct, then point 3 also stands, as my psychology can claim point 2 is wrong, and
you'll have to agree with me if point 2 is right.
Therefore if point 3 stands while point 2 stands, there is a contradiction. Therefore by point 6, point 2 is false.

But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.

I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isn’t. There isn’t a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They don’t come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. — Bob Ross

Yes, I understand but disagree with one statement. The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves. When our intentions about other things are expressed and they correlate with reality, then they are true. Of course, this does not mean we know they are true. How we would know they are true would be subjective. But the subject does not need to have the knowledge or idea of objects, thoughts, etc, only an existence, judgement, etc that is correlating with reality.

Thus, if I claimed, "I believe I should do this," the fact that you believed that you should do this correlates with reality and is true. Everything is self-referential, therefore true. But if you claim, "I believe you should do this," it is uncertain whether this correlates with reality and is a true moral judgement."

Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!

I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you. — Leontiskos

Because you want me to say “moral theory X is right and theory Y is wrong”?

I don’t have to say that. I am simply addressing the weaknesses in both theory X and theory Y. I don’t know why you think this means I’m not being serious.

This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic. — Leontiskos

You claimed that “we have a moral claim that we know to be true" as part of your counterargument. If you cannot justify this claim then your counterargument fails.

Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!

Merry Christmas to you too!

I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantively—so thank you!

Before I respond, I originally was going to wait to post my normative ethical theory until it was more refined and polished up, but, like you said, it doesn’t seem to make a different how precise I think I am using my terminology nor how exact the idea is—as someone is going to find something wrong with it from their perspective. Since I don’t think we are making all that much progress here metaethically and I think you enjoy the normative ethics stuff more, I suggest we go to my new thread to discuss normative ethics and then segue back here if need be...but I will leave it up to you as I am down for either.

Since our responses are getting quite lengthy, I am going to summarize what I got out of your response instead of trying to go paragraph by paragraph because that will end up being an essay longer than the OP (:

So, for my own sake of keeping track, I think you should pick a couple or perhaps one and we focus in on it first; otherwise, there is so many disputes going on here I don’t know we can safely maneuver all of them at once (;

Here’s some of our disputes:

1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former.
2. You believe I didn’t provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective.
3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as ‘this statement is false’, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not.
5. For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I don’t see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesn’t mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective.
6. You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself.
7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesn’t entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it.
8. I don’t think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim.
9. You seem to think you can simplify “moral judgments are propositional” to “true moral judgments are proposition”; but, to me, those are clearly too separate claims.
10. At one point, you said I don’t believe there are true moral judgments, but I do.
11. Number 11 here is this:

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.

This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics].


As a side note:

The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves.

This is fair. I don’t really have a problem saying that we also don’t know ourselves except for how we externally and internally affect our sensibility. So, yeah, I agree that things-in-themselves are not objects. But truth isn’t a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me.

Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics?

Bob

Hello Leontiskos,

Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.

Yes, I do. I am not playing devil’s advocate nor being deceptive: I genuinely believe that, ultimately, moral judgments express something subjective—there are no moral facts out there.

But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.

That’s why it is short-hand for ‘I believe no one should torture babies’. I feel like we are circling again.

I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.

No, Leontiskos, which premise of which argument that defends the thesis are you contending with? I provided a proof and you seem to just want to sidestep the whole OP.

If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.

Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. Me disapproving of it doesn’t count as convincing justification for you but this doesn’t mean I am not justified in subjectively holding you shouldn’t do it.

I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantively—so thank you! — Bob Ross

Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!

But truth isn’t a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me. — Bob Ross

I agree it is a bit weird. I was thinking of a better way to say it earlier today as thoughts on your paper were roaming through my head. The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.

Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics? — Bob Ross

Honestly Bob, whatever you want. I'm just another subject giving opinions as I look into your ideas from another viewpoint. At any time you can agree to disagree, simply note things that have been stated or move on. It is respect for the time and effort you've put into this work that I try to seriously read your ideas and give it thought. Where this is useful to you, lets us continue. Where it is not, it is not!

Let me at least answer your summaries, and feel free to select what you find worth discussing.

1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former. — Bob Ross

To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.

2. You believe I didn’t provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective. — Bob Ross

If your claim is simply "Moral judgments express something subjective", by you definition of subjective, this is a given. It is only when you introduce truth where the question of objective comes in. If the thing in itself of a moral judgement correlates with reality, then it is objectively true. To subjectively know this, we simply observe whether our judgement is contradicted by reality.

The point I was trying to get at was not that this was 'wrong'. My point was that the definition of subjective is so broad, that this applies to anything we state, judge, do or say, even outside of morality. It also doesn't negate the fact that there is still objective truth, and how we know that truth subjectively. We might call this subjective truth a non-contradictory belief, or knowledge.

If you are claiming there are subjective moral judgements that are true, then there must be some underlying objective morality that is true. If there is no underlying objective morality in which our subjective judgement correlates with reality, then there is no true subjective moral judgement either. This goes for any statement, intent, action, etc.

3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as ‘this statement is false’, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not. — Bob Ross

That's fine, mine is another viewpoint to consider or dismiss.

For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I don’t see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesn’t mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective. — Bob Ross

I don't have a problem with the first part at all. But by consequence, this means that everything we analyze is purely subjective, as our analysis is mind dependent. As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective. As defined, everything is purely subjective that we discuss. I have no problem thinking along these lines, I just find that it just makes the term 'subjective' fairly pointless when discussing morality, as everything we do is subjective. For me it boils down to the question, "If what is objective is mind-dependent, how can we as minds ever analyze anything objective?" To me, we can't, therefore everything we do is subjective, not just morality.

You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself. — Bob Ross

I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application. So for example, if I claimed "God exists", someone should be able to ask, "So what would be the case in which God does not exist?" Even if that case is not true, I should be able to make a case such as, "If I pray and God does not answer, God does not exist". If the claim of God existing was not falsifiable, someone would always come up with an excuse or reason why that doesn't prove God false.

So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology? You need not reply to me, just something to ponder for yourself.

7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesn’t entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it. — Bob Ross

My problem with understanding your point was that you seemed to imply that acting in a particular way made it permissible. For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible. If all is permissible, then there is nothing impermissible. And if there is nothing impermissible, at that point, why even use the term permissibility?

As well, you seemed to imply it was actions itself that made something permissible. But if what is acted upon is permissible, then what is not acted on would be impermissible. Again, if what you did not act on was not impermissible, then it is permissible as well. But then we have everything permissible again, and it just seems simpler to say, "There is nothing one should or should not do, thus no morality."

8. I don’t think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim. — Bob Ross

Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_nihilism#:~:text=Moral%20nihilism%20(also%20called%20ethical,a%20particular%20culture%20or%20individual.

If there is no objective morality, then it can never be true nothing should or should not be. If nothing should or should not be, then morality does not exist.

10. At one point, you said I don’t believe there are true moral judgments, but I do. — Bob Ross

I wasn't trying to imply that you didn't believe there are true moral judgements, I was noting what it would entail to have a true moral judgement. A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.

This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics]. — Bob Ross

I claimed what it entails for there not to be an objective morality with your definitions. An objective morality in your definitions, would be a moral judgement that objectively correlates with reality. Our understanding of it would be subjective, most likely in our judgement not being contradicted by reality. If there is no objective morality, then all subjective judgements, even contradictory ones, correlate with reality. There is no truth in what one should or should not do, only actions.

Again, feel free to reply what you want to, or move on Bob. Take what is useful and discard the rest. :)

Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. — Bob Ross

Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.

Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.

Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (). Even Hume recognized this.

Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion. — Leontiskos

Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified?

Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified? — wonderer1

You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol...

You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol... — Leontiskos

The fact is, you have to settle for an approximation. Even if you were to get NIST to provide you with a measurement of your height, NIST would qualify their measurement result with an uncertainty.

So how is your belief, as to what your height is, rationally justified without settling for a simplistic answer at some point? I believe you settle for simplistic propositions without realizing that you are doing so. Do you think you can prove me wrong?

Do you think you can prove me wrong? — wonderer1

Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless @Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to.

Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to. — Leontiskos

Ah son, I've been involved in so many discussions with Christians like you, that I'm pretty unimpressed with threats to take your ball and go. Do what you need to do. Stomp the dust off your feet, or whatever.

I'm kind of a "He who has ears to hear, let him hear." sort of guy. So no sweat if you need to tune me out for awhile.

Still, perhaps I've instilled some subconscious recognition in you, of your tendency to look at things simplistically. Who knows? Perhaps some day you will have some recognition of how you have looked at morality simplistically.

- My post to you in the other thread sort of sums up what I think of your emotion-driven approach (). Those who lead with emotion and are weighed down by atheistic shoulder-chips often struggle when it comes to rationality. Again, if Ross is willing to back your strange argument I might respond.

As noted above, I think, like 12*12=144, this is an objective truth known by a subject. — Leontiskos

The words true/truth have very different meanings/usages in math vs talking about the real world of human interactions.

As I understand things, 12 * 12 = 144 is NOT an objective truth, instead it is a mathematical statement that can be proven to be true by applying the axioms of Peano Math. I say this acknowledging that mathematical realism considers this to be objectively true, but I somehow doubt that you are invoking mathematical realism in your statements.

Alternatively, If you were to say "I have 12 cartons of eggs each of which has 12 eggs in it, therefore I have 144 eggs?" That statement would be objectively true.

Just to be clear, when I say "objectively true" I am using the Correspondence Theory of Truth. If you are a witness in a USA court and you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth - you are using the Correspondence Theory of Truth.

But maybe you have a different definition/usage of the words true/truth.

Hello Philosophim,

Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!

I appreciate it! (:

Sorry I am playing catch up with all the responses, as I was busy, and I noticed in your other response to my normative theory:

Ah, here it is Bob! I almost missed it. We've already discussed at length on the meta-ethical considerations, but I will dismiss them here.

This is why I thought it may be better to move on to normative ethics because I think my metaethical position will make more sense in light of it, simply because my normative ethical theory outlines exactly what I think you are expecting out of my metaethical theory.

The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.

I mostly agree with this, if I am understanding it correctly. We never know 100% that what we think corresponds actually does; and I think that is what you are noting by truth is objective and something we cannot “know”. I just note that we can “know” it pragmatically, and that’s all that matters to me. Truth is not objective, however, in the sense that there is an existent entity of ‘truth’, which I think we both agree on.

To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.
…
As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective.

By a statement expressing something subjective or objective, I mean what it is purporting to understand. Yes, all I see is subjective in the sense that they are representations made by my mind, but those representations are somewhat accurate of whatever really is there: I am not just hallucinating. So, I can make claims which purport to, at least in principle, relate to the objects and not merely my representations of them. Again, knowing whether or not the statement actually latches onto anything objective is pragmatic: we can’t 100% know.

I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application

Whether or not our beliefs about morality make the moral judgments true is falsifiable.

So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology?

Whether or not our psychology can be wrong about a moral judgment is independent of whether the claim is falsifiable that our psychology is what makes our moral judgments true.

I would like to note, though, that ultimately our psychology, our approvals and disapprovals, are what make moral judgments true under my view; but psyches are an influx and complicated hierarchy of beliefs, desires, etc. and, thusly, one may have to choose between beliefs they have. Also, I do want to note that this should not be confused with making the claim that everything we cognitively say about morality is thereby true in virtue of being said: I can most certainly formulate false beliefs about my beliefs. I can say “I believe torturing babies is perfectly permissible”, but I don’t actually believe that.

For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible

I am not following why this would be the case.

A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.

Correct. It correlates to our psychology.

Bob

"True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.

You are confusing something being rationally justified for me in the sense that it wouldn’t rationally justify you in the same circumstances with my position that indexically it is rationally for everyone. But since it is indexical, it can rationally justify me without justifying you if you aren’t in the same circumstances.

Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.

Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (
↪Leontiskos
). Even Hume recognized this.

Which premise are you contending with? You just keep sidestepping the whole OP.

namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim.

I honestly am not familiar with what this claim is: could you elaborate? I can't really comment until I understand what the claim is conveying.