Can we morally justify sacrificing people for the greater good, especially if it is a huge sacrifice (like getting tortured constantly)? — Bob Ross

No we cannot. And the reason for this is, all of us do not have the moral entitlement to live. None!

I find it amusing that with the hundreds and thousands of posts here at TPF, we're still not getting the point of ethics and morality. Entitlement is not the same as being treated as a moral agent. If you live in a civilized society, you have the right to be treated ethically, within reason. But to intentionally break a moral principle, so others could continue to live is unethical. If you have the money to buy the body organs, enticing the financially desperate and the greedy people to give up their lives so you could preserve your health, you're immoral and a criminal.

I agree. What normative ethical theory do you subscribe to? A form of deontology, perhaps virtue ethics?

What normative ethical theory do you subscribe to? A form of deontology, perhaps virtue ethics? — Bob Ross

Yes. Nicomachean ethics. Virtue ethics. Because we don't waste our time debating about its being objective or its being relative.

NO: one cannot torture a child nor kill a child even if it saves the entire human species. — Bob Ross

Someone would.

I merely created a thought experiment taking this to its extreme: what if, right now, we had to perpetually torture a child (and I will let you use your imagination on what exactly is done to them) to prevent the immediate annihilation of the entire human species — Bob Ross

I am puzzled by your thought experiment. As it is formulated, it seems that the two scenarios are, respectively, one in which a single child X is annihilated and/or tortured while the rest of the human species is not immediately annihilated. The other scenario is one in which the entire human species (including millions of other children), including child X, is immediately annihilated. In other words, in both scenarios that child won’t be safe anyways. Even if you meant that in at least one scenario the child would be safe, one may wonder: how would a child even live and evolve as a psychologically and biologically sound human being if the rest of humanity would be immediately annihilated?

Even if we want to put aside our suspension of disbelief (but why exactly?), I would also wonder: if we must choose, would it be permissible to have child X to be safe at the expense of the rest of the human species to be immediately annihilated? Because if neither killing/torturing a child is permissible even when the rest of humanity would be safe, nor having the rest of humanity safe at the expense of killing/torturing a child, and we must choose anyways (why exactly?), what lesson do you wish to draw from this hypothetical predicament? If your thought experiment was designed to lead to a moral choice paralysis, I do wonder: what’s even the point of moral reasoning over thought experiments designed to fail in guiding choice and action exactly?

BTW, since we put aside our suspension of disbelief, we can be more fancy in elaborating the original thought experiment: let’s imagine that that child X whom nobody is permitted to sacrifice, is somebody who will soon develop a torturing mortal disease for natural causes and die atrociously even if the rest of the human species was immediately annihilated to save the child, or that the child is a psychopath who enjoys torturing living creatures before killing them for the rest of his life or a Hitler on steroids which will torture and exterminate the entire human species anyways and repeatedly if he only had the chance. What would be morally legitimate to do? What if the lesson we draw from the thought experiment varies remarkably depending on how the thought experiment is construed?

The problem is not much that there is a moral rule (where?!) that says “do not torture or kill any child ever for whatever reason” but more why would we be committed to such rule exactly? Saying because it is moral, it would shift the problem: how did this rule get the label “moral” in the first place? What is there in claiming “morality” that would me make me feel (?!) or taken (?!) to be committed to it or compelled BY DEFAULT and without consulting me first? And if it is not that what is implied, what else is exactly?

It's an odd kind of universe. How is it set up in Omelas? Why does the child need to be tortured?

I know thought experiments are supposed to abstract away details to get to the principles involved, but I like to know the practical details anyway. The thing is, there never is an idealised context-free situation, so we never actually have to make such a determination. And it's not as if we have to decide in the abstract before we must decide in the concrete.

I presume
The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas
is still under copyright, so I won't post a link. However, a quick copy and paste and Google will turn up lots of sites hosting pdf copies.

It is very short, and very well worth reading.

Neither deontology nor consequentialism seem to fully match our intuitions, since you can construct cases where either violate them. An approach that somehow combines both would probably be needed. I think I lean towards consequentialism, while acknowledging there are cases it cannot account for.

In unnatural situations like this one, which our intuitions weren't designed for, things are bound to fall apart.

My own intuition says, torture the child, since it doesn't really distinguish between that and killing them. Would you agree to kill the child?


Why a child? What if it were middle aged, or elderly?

I don't quite follow: doesn't Aristotle believe that the good is objective?

I think you missed the point of the OP, it is not about would but should.

Even if you meant that in at least one scenario the child would be safe, one may wonder: how would a child even live and evolve as a psychologically and biologically sound human being if the rest of humanity would be immediately annihilated?

Fair question, but not the point of the thought experiment. It could be the case that no one is morally justified in sacrificing that child and that the child would have, if they were the sole survivor, no feasible living arrangement afterwards.

Perhaps this factors into your moral reasoning though: to you, does that reason count in favor of potentially sacrificing the child? I don’t believe so.

if we must choose, would it be permissible to have child X to be safe at the expense of the rest of the human species to be immediately annihilated?

My answer would also be no. That child nor I can use other people as a means to and end, even if that end is saving other people. I cannot throw you into a moving car to stop it from running over my child.

Because if neither killing/torturing a child is permissible even when the rest of humanity would be safe, nor having the rest of humanity safe at the expense of killing/torturing a child, and we must choose anyways (why exactly?)

You have the choice to refrain from actively violating someone’s rights in both scenarios: what you don’t have control over is the predestined stipulations of the thought-experiment. You can say no and simply not be morally blameworthy for the annihilation of the human species (by my lights).

what lesson do you wish to draw from this hypothetical predicament?

Is consequentialist normative ethical theories valid in any scenario? That’s the question.

I do wonder: what’s even the point of moral reasoning over thought experiments designed to fail in guiding choice and action exactly?

To make our moral intuitions and principles consistent and coherent.

let’s imagine that that child X whom nobody is permitted to sacrifice, is somebody who will soon develop a torturing mortal disease for natural causes and die atrociously even if the rest of the human species was immediately annihilated to save the child, or that the child a psychopathic which enjoys torturing living creatures before killing them for the rest of his life or a Hitler on steroids which will torture and exterminate the entire human species anyways and repeatedly if he only had the chance. What would be morally legitimate to do?

I like it (: and I would say an emphatic NO, you cannot violate that child’s rights, period. Doesn’t make baby hitler right in doing atrocities later in life, but we cannot violate peoples rights period; especially over ‘forseeable’ consequences of their existence (which I find really unreliable, but that’s irrelevant to my main point).

What if the lesson we draw from the thought experiment varies remarkably depending on how the thought experiment is construed?

That is anticipated and good for working out one’s normative ethical theory. Afterall, there’s no way one will magically just know that their theory works as expected in applied ethics without putting in the work to test it.

The problem is not much that there is a moral rule (where?!) that says “do not torture or kill any child ever for whatever reason” but more why would we be committed to such rule exactly? Saying because it is moral, it would shift the problem: how did this rule get the label “moral” in the first place? What is there in claiming “morality” that would me make me feel (?!) or taken (?!) to be committed to it or compelled BY DEFAULT and without consulting me first? And if it is not that what is implied, what else is exactly?

Metaethically, I would say there aren’t any moral facts. With respect to normative ethics, I would say we must treat persons with respect as objects of intrinsic respect. Admittedly, I am still working out the details.

I would suggest reading it yourself: there's free PDFs online and it is only like 5 pages (if I remember correctly).

Fair. I typo'd it. Let me update that.

Neither deontology nor consequentialism seem to fully match our intuitions, since you can construct cases where either violate them. An approach that somehow combines both would probably be needed. I think I lean towards consequentialism, while acknowledging there are cases it cannot account for.

Interesting. What problems can you construct for deontology? I lean much more towards that than consequentialism.

In unnatural situations like this one, which our intuitions weren't designed for, things are bound to fall apart.

It isn’t that unnatural, and that’s why “The One’s Who Walk Away from Omelas” is such a good, quick read. Enslaving 1% of the population would increase the well-being of the 99% (if we presuppose specifically utilitarianism), wouldn’t it? Etc.

My own intuition says, torture the child, since it doesn't really distinguish between that and killing them. Would you agree to kill the child?

Nope. Seems like we shouldn’t violate that child’s rights to me.

Why a child? What if it were middle aged, or elderly?

Good idea: what about 99 year old man that you know is going to die tomorrow anyways? I still say nah.

What problems can you construct for deontology? — Bob Ross

For instance, an example that came up in one of your other threads: Would you lie to the Gestapo about Jews hiding in your house?

It isn’t that unnatural, and that’s why “The One’s Who Walk Away from Omelas” is such a good, quick read. Enslaving 1% of the population would increase the well-being of the 99% (if we presuppose specifically utilitarianism), wouldn’t it? Etc. — Bob Ross

I'll read it when I get a chance. This seems to be a problematic case for utilitarianism, and consequentialism in general. What if the benefit for the 99% exceeds the harm done to the 1%? Would that make it ok? I think not. But your case goes the other way. The harm done to all humanity grossly exceeds the harm done to the child.

Nope. Seems like we shouldn’t violate that child’s rights to me. — Bob Ross

But what of the rights of everyone else? Are you not maximally violating the rights of every person on earth, by making the decision to preserve the child?

Interesting. What problems can you construct for deontology? I lean much more towards that than consequentialism. — Bob Ross

Consequentialism comes in a very wide variety of forms: from “the proof is in the pudding” type mentality that can be used as evidence that might makes right (with its associated potential atrocities) to notions such as that of karma (which at base is about cause and consequence).

Having touched upon that:

Of what good is deontology if it doesn’t produce good results, i.e. good consequences? If no satisfactory answer can be given to this question other than that of affirming it to be good on account of its good consequences, then deontology (as can then be likewise said of virtue ethics and so forth) will itself be a form of consequentialism broadly defined.

Of course, this is not to confuse all forms of consequentialism as being forms of utilitarianism (which can itself be understood in different ways).

BTW, the OP gives a nifty thought experiment. At this juncture, I’ll simply object to its supposition of necessity. I can’t yet fathom any logical scenario – irrespective of possible worlds - wherein it is necessary that an innocent being A be perpetually tortured so as to grant all other beings the opportunity to live, and this in a utopian state no less (other than it being so ordained by a not so nice omnipotent deity, kind of thing; but then I don't deem omnipotent deities to be logically possible to begin with ... different topic though).

(Edit: made some typos, now corrected.)

Would you lie to the Gestapo about Jews hiding in your house?

Yes, because they have forfeited their right to be told the truth by actively engaging in the violation of other peoples’ rights: I don’t see how this is incompatible with deontology, although certainly incompatible with Kantianism (or at least its original formulation).

But what of the rights of everyone else? Are you not maximally violating the rights of every person on earth, by making the decision to preserve the child?

I would say no. There’s a difference between violating someone’s rights (which requires active participation therein) and letting someone’s rights get violated (which is an inactive, passive, allowing of it to happen). In the latter, one is not morally blameworthy; whereas in the former they are.

If my child is about to get run over by a car and I save them by pushing you in the way, then I have actively participated in the violation of your rights, and are blameworthy for that violation. If I let my child get run over because the only way would have been to push you in the way but I refrained, then I am not, all else being equal, morally blameworthy for my child getting run over: it is the drunk driver, or what not, that is presumably at fault (all else being equal). No one would say “why didn’t you sacrifice that other person by shoving them in the way to save your child?”.

Same with not killing the child to stop the immanent death of all people: I am not blameworthy for whatever event is going to wipeout the human population—I am not killing everyone—but I am at fault if I kill that child.

Consequentialism comes in a very wide variety of forms: from “the proof is in the pudding” type mentality that can be used as evidence that might makes right (with its associated potential atrocities) to notions such as that of karma (which at base is about cause and consequence).

True, and they all have to contend with similar issues like this thought experiment in the OP.

Of what good is deontology if it doesn’t produce good results, i.e. good consequences? If no satisfactory answer can be given to this question other than that of affirming it to be good on account of its good consequences, then deontology (as can then be likewise said of virtue ethics and so forth) will itself be a form of consequentialism broadly defined.

Deontology is exactly not consequentialism: if a deontologist cites the consequences as the kernel of why they thought something was moral/immoral, then they are not a deontologist. Good is measured in deontology by intentions towards one’s duties and not the consequences they bring about. Consequences can help inform deontological decisions, but they are not what makes something good or bad.

At this juncture, I’ll simply object to its supposition of necessity

This is not a valid response: it is not a false dilemma—that is why it is a thought experiment. If I say “hypothetical if you had to choose A or B, which would you choose?” and you answer “neither, because I don’t have to choose A or B” then you have misunderstood the nature of hypothetical scenarios.

: I don’t see how this is incompatible with deontology, although certainly incompatible with Kantianism — Bob Ross

Suppose a good friend comes over, whom you know to be a strict Kantian. The Gestapo know this as well, and question him regularly. He notices a yarmulke inexplicitly lying on the couch. "Is someone staying here?" he blurts.

There’s a difference between violating someone’s rights (which requires active participation therein) and letting someone’s rights get violated (which is an inactive, passive, allowing of it to happen). In the latter, one is not morally blameworthy; whereas in the former they are. — Bob Ross

This is the trolley problem, and seems to be one of those cases where intuitions sharply differ. I am on the side of not considering the active/passive distinction, and I doubt I will be able to convince you. But consider:

You are taking a relaxing day off, fishing in your rowboat. Around a river bend, you come upon a drowning man. "Oh, thank God!", he cries. "Save me!"

"Sorry, friend!", you respond with a grin. "I didn't push you in, I'm afraid it's not my problem. But, best of luck!"

His final moments before submerging for the last time are spent watching you in astonishment as you row your boat down the river, whistling gaily.

Are you
a) As morally culpable as if you had pushed him in the river?
b) Less morally culpable than if you had pushed him in the river?
c) Not culpable at all?

I choose A.

Good is measured in deontology by intentions towards one’s duties and not the consequences they bring about. — Bob Ross

You asked for potential problems with deontology. Don't get me wrong. I've read up on deontology a bit. It's just that I so far find it lacking. Rephrasing my question in terms of your quoted appraisal: Of what ethical good is intending to keep one's established duties if so doing produces unethical results? The maintaining of duties within a community of slave-holders and slaves resulting in the lynching of those slaves that don't uphold said duties, for one example. Going hand in hand with this, Harriet Tubman then being decried as immoral for not honoring the established duties of her slave-owning community but, instead, escaping slavery. All the same, if this avenue of reasoning doesn't matter, then never mind.

There is no ethical dilemma then.

I don't quite follow: doesn't Aristotle believe that the good is objective? — Bob Ross

Here is Book II:

Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are enquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have been useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits that shall be formed depends on these.

Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of it hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its relations to the other virtues.[4]

But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were, and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, and matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more than matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is such, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness attainable:[5] because these fall not under any art or system of rules, but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.

He is not arguing for a universal, objective right reason.

The way I interpret the story is as a commentary on the dynamics of society in general, not as seriously presenting the ostensible ethical dilemma (though that’s the obvious conceit that draws us in). So, in order for society to function, what is sacrificed is the sense of wonder and imagination of the child substituted over time by a conceptual scheme of relationships that impose a set of more or less instrumental values that define what it is to be happy and successful and direct behaviour along clearly delineated paths which aim to make individuals in some sense superfluous. The “inner child” must be continuously tortured for people to be “happy” in so far as those people are integrated properly into an efficiently functioning whole and the more properly integrated they are, the more ideal and well-oiled the society is, the more the child must be continuously neglected, tortured and beaten, up, i.e. the more the imaginative faculties and the freedom they threaten any established order with are repressed and degraded. So, there’s a certain moral perfection to a society where no one goes astray, where there is no crime, people cooperate fully etc., but the emptiness of this social morality is highlighted by the cost necessary to achieve it.

So, there’s a certain moral perfection to a society where no-one goes astray, where there is no crime, people cooperate fully etc., but the emptiness of this social morality is highlighted by the cost necessary to achieve it. — Baden

Okay, good exegesis!

@Bob Ross, Nicomachean does not condone moral perfection at the expense of the happiness of others.

:up: :up:

Can we morally justify sacrificing people for the greater good, especially if it is a huge sacrifice (like getting tortured constantly)? — Bob Ross

IMO, that's instrumental reasoning (re: things, i.e. means-to-ends) and not moral reasoning (re: persons, i.e. ends-in-themselves) which I'd sketched out in this old post mentioning Le Guin's "Omelas":

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/365307

It could be the case that no one is morally justified in sacrificing that child and that the child would have, if they were the sole survivor, no feasible living arrangement afterwards.

Perhaps this factors into your moral reasoning though: to you, does that reason count in favor of potentially sacrificing the child? I don’t believe so. — Bob Ross

It would factor in my moral reasoning. Not sure that would be enough to reach my conclusion though, I’ll come back to this later.

That child nor I can use other people as a means to and end, even if that end is saving other people. I cannot throw you into a moving car to stop it from running over my child. — Bob Ross

People as a means to an end? We find it permissible to hire people as a means to an end which is making our own living as much as they make their own living by doing business with us, and some may find morally permissible even to do business over currently illegal jobs like prostitution, selling organs, dealing drugs.
How about living creatures, animals? Can you torture and kill animals as a means to people’s end? One might obviously argue that we already do this, we eat animals after all, and the food industry from start to end is a torturing experience for animals. So what makes human beings so special?

if we must choose, would it be permissible to have child X to be safe at the expense of the rest of the human species to be immediately annihilated?

My answer would also be no. — Bob Ross

You have the choice to refrain from actively violating someone’s rights in both scenarios: what you don’t have control over is the predestined stipulations of the thought-experiment. You can say no and simply not be morally blameworthy for the annihilation of the human species (by my lights). — Bob Ross

But if the premises of your thought experiment are:
- your choice determines the fate of humanity
- the moral rule is something like “do not sacrifice any life to save another for whatever reason in all possible scenarios” (so it is neither permissible to sacrifice the remaining human species to save a child, nor to sacrifice a child to save the remaining human species)
Why am I not blameworthy for the annihilation of the remaining human species, exactly? My choice to sacrifice the remaining human species as a means to save a child would still break the rule “do not sacrifice any life to save another for whatever reason in all possible scenarios”.
There is no room for distinguishing choice abstention from choosing to sacrifice (not to mention that even abstentions are often perceived as morally blameworthy).

what lesson do you wish to draw from this hypothetical predicament?


Is consequentialist normative ethical theories valid in any scenario? That’s the question. — Bob Ross

I’m reluctant to accept the distinction between consequentialism and deontology because I’m not sure to find it intelligible. Sometimes we reason in terms of rules as it happens with non-moral rules, like when playing games according to conventional rules. Sometimes we reason in terms of consequences or instrumentally given certain goals. Other times we reason in terms of basic social norms: e.g. those related to human rights. But even basic social norms don’t need to be intrinsically and unconditionally compelling. How would I identify such “basic” norms? In hierarchical terms, if I see other social norms based on them. And/or in temporary terms, if I see social norms that vary, while these are preserved. And/or in psychological terms, how they have been internalised: as default behaviour/habit or degree of readiness to willingly sacrifice at least one’s or beloved ones’ comfort and life for the sake of it. Your deontological position seems to me focusing on cases testing such internalisation/commitment in some form toward other people as people. What I would find more interesting is to explicit the reasons for such internalisation/commitment and to what extent they are taken/expected to be universal.

you cannot violate that child’s rights, period. Doesn’t make baby hitler right in doing atrocities later in life, but we cannot violate peoples rights period; especially over ‘forseeable’ consequences of their existence (which I find really unreliable, but that’s irrelevant to my main point). — Bob Ross

OK, take a more real life case: abortion.
- Scenario 1: We may save either mother or baby during a difficult delivery, but not both. Yet we know the kid has developed a torturing and deadly disease which will make it die any time soon after birth, should we let the mother die so we are not blameworthy to kill the baby?
- Scenario 2: We may save either mother or kid, but not both, and if we do not intervene they both will die. Killing a mother/baby even to save the other is immoral, so we let both die but we wouldn’t be blameworthy for it?

Metaethically, I would say there aren’t any moral facts. With respect to normative ethics, I would say we must treat persons with respect as objects of intrinsic respect. Admittedly, I am still working out the details. — Bob Ross

You can at least draft arguments for why people must follow what you claim to be “moral rules”, can’t you?

This story has been used for a long time to justify antinatalist arguments that refute consequential reasons for procreation that too easily dismiss the suffering of some for the many.

NO: one cannot torture a child nor kill a child even if it saves the entire human species. — Bob Ross

Correct.

currently illegal jobs like prostitution, selling organs, dealing drugs. — neomac

Given these are, either in restricted senses, or in other jurisdictions, completely legal, we have to accept that this is the case. People as means-to-ends seems imbedded in human interactions.
It seems 'morality' consists in the preventing ourselves from taking an advantage over those means as opposed to some form of co-operation.

Correct. — Patterner

On some accounts... I don't really understand how Bob is getting his 'must's. I'm also awaiting that draft of why we should assent.

I've only read the op so far, so don't know what you mean regarding "must's." I'll read later.