I recently switched from utilitarianism to virtue ethics.

I was never convinced that utilitarianism could provide a comprehensive basis for moral philosophy, although elements of it are worthy of incorporation into more satisfying and comprehensive conceptions. I lean most strongly towards a conception of virtue ethics that involves the idea of 'moral intuition'. I think the idea of moral intuition works with a deontological conception of ethics also, and with some basic principles of utilitarianism.

I think pleasure is an inadequate basis for ethics, but the utilitarian idea of the common good ties in, for me, with moral intuition, only not in a utilitarian way.

For me it can be summed up as 'try to be kind'.

I'm not saying I'm particularly good at following that principle. But that's my aspiration.

I am a consequentialist, specifically a hedonic prioritarian [...] I see only the perfect as the good. — darthbarracuda

A small child gets up early, and creates a disaster area in the kitchen before scattering the results of their efforts all up the stairs and triumphantly presenting their parents, three hours early, with a completely inedible breakfast in bed.

The love is perfect, but the execution is lacking and the consequences are nothing but trouble. For myself, ethics are a matter of the heart being in the right place.

My views are roughly hedonist, but I've come to think hedonism itself can't be rationally defended, only understood through Socratic inquiry to be the only position that is practically defensible, and no argument can rule out the possibility that there are other goods which we can affirm that have nothing to do with our lives. But if one is interested in Socratic self-examination and a life in tune with that, I think hedonism is 'just about' demonstrable, not as a personal preference but as a rigorous philosophical truth, or as close to that as it's possible to get.

As for how that hedonism manifests, I think the default response, and the one people in general default to, is a kind of pre-modern or 'Homeric' hedonism: eat and drink well, win glory, destroy your enemies, celebrate beauty and like what's naturally better. But in environments where this isn't possible, the only recourse may be a maverick individualistic Cyrenaic-style hedonism, which then might manifest as anything from libertine antics to pessimism, depending on individual proclivities.

As far as I know, I'm a virtue ethicist. I try to be kind but also fair and responsible. Fairness is not always kind to everyone. Sometimes I need to take away a toy from a child to give to another, because they should share (or even agreed to share). Or I take away candy because they had enough, being the responsible parent I am. Ahem.

I think I've come to prefer virtue ethicism because it doesn't railroad you into only one possible heuristic approach which ultimately leads to unethical results when we demand complete consistency. We're inconsistent and fallible persons and the difficulty of "virtue ethics to prescribe action" is precisely the point; it makes you think it through when you're confronted with an ethical dillema instead of abandoning thought and emotion by following a "rule".

I was never convinced that utilitarianism could provide a comprehensive basis for moral philosophy, although elements of it are worthy of incorporation into more satisfying and comprehensive conceptions — John

I got depressed because people kept asking me (as a utilitarian) to consider the "best" reasons for killing other people.

Why don't utilitarians spend much time thinking about the best ways to help other people?
And the reality is, there is a correlation between utilitarianism and psychopaths. It was perhaps overblown by the media, but it IS there, nonetheless.

Most of the time, it comes down to intuition/feeling/compassion; conditional on the information given and my personal understanding of the situation on a case to case basis.

and no argument can rule out the possibility that there are other goods which we can affirm that have nothing to do with our lives. — The Great Whatever

Indeed, I have wondered about this myself. What if there is a non-agential good that really ought to be cultivated?

To everyone else who calls themselves a virtue ethicist or any non-consequentialist: I have problems with virtue ethics (or any other non-consequentialist ethics) as it makes it seem as though you need to have a person breathing down your neck for you to help them. As a consequentialist, it doesn't matter to me where or when something good or bad is happening. Whether it's down the street or in the savanna of Africa, there's no difference, it's still happening. In my opinion, if you care about something, and I mean legitimately care about something, then you'll do something about it. I can't understand how people can reasonably say they despise, say, suffering, and yet not do anything about it, as if recognizing that it exists is "good enough". If you don't do anything about suffering, you either don't care, or you don't actually consciously understand how important suffering is. Being a "nice person" in my opinion does not cut it for moral obligations, although perhaps it's the best we have for legal obligations.

Indeed, I have wondered about this myself. What if there is a non-agential good that really ought to be cultivated? — darthbarracuda

That's precisely it, though: 'what if?' The fundamental philosophical question to my mind is not 'why' but 'so what?' If there were such a good, it wouldn't matter to the very process of inquiry asking after it, and so is pragmatically self-defeating. So what if? Nothing, apparently, or nothing that matters to us. And what doesn't matter to us, doesn't matter to us. QED.

Most of the time, it comes down to intuition/feeling/compassion; conditional on the information given and my personal understanding of the situation on a case to case basis. — OglopTo

This. And I tend to think along consequentialist lines, as is common.

I'm not a sufficientarian, though, because this leads right into a repugnant conclusion. — darthbarracuda

What repugnant conclusion would that be? And how does sufficientarianism lead to it? I'm aware of some problems attributed to sufficientarianism, and I'm not sure that they can be internally resolved.

Instead, I see only the perfect as the good. — darthbarracuda

Can you please elaborate?

Can you please elaborate? — Sapientia

See here.

Bona fides.

See here. — darthbarracuda

I was hoping that it wouldn't be as misguided as it sounded, but unfortunately, after following your link, I realise that it is indeed that bad.

I mean, statements like:

If it isn't perfect, it's not worth it. — darthbarracuda

Really?

Really? — Sapientia

Indeed.

Well, all the worse for you and anyone who shares your bizarre view - which is, I think, fortunately a tiny minority.

I know that seems dismissive, but I don't know if it can really be argued against, to be honest. If you can't see how wrong that is, I don't know whether or how I can persuade you. It just strikes me as obviously wrong, given, for example, the massive benefit in doing good for very large numbers of people, despite not achieving perfection.

I'm surprised no one else has objected to this "perfection or nothing" view - either in this discussion or the one linked to.

Isn't this the nirvana fallacy, which involves "comparing actual things with unrealistic, idealized alternatives" and whereby "the choice is not between real world solutions, but is, rather, a choice between one realistic achievable possibility and another unrealistic solution that could in some way be 'better'"?

An example given on Wikipedia:

Posit (fallacious)
Seat belts are a bad idea. People are still going to die in car crashes.
Rebuttal
While seat belts cannot make driving 100% safe, they do reduce one's likelihood of dying in a car crash.

I mean, the prospect of humanity bringing about it's own extinction on a voluntary basis is almost as unrealistic as the prospect of everyone being in a constant state of happiness with no one ever suffering. I'll go with the sensible, realistic option.

The good is not constrained by our abilities or the environment.

The good is not constrained by our abilities or the environment. — darthbarracuda

Mmkay...?

I sort of agree with it in a sense. It has a respect for suffering. I may be giving more naunce than it warrants, but I wouldn't automatically read it as saying: " a life without pain, suffering or less than some arbitrary standard is not with living."

We may use "perfection" to refer to our significance regardless of the disappoints we suffer, mistakes we make or wrongs we commit-- I am perfect as I am, even if I didn't achieve something or get what I desired. Sometimes it used to celebrate a life full of failure and disappointment.

In this sense perfection is certainly required. Without it we are caught thinking ourselves worthless for being stuck in world where we can't do everything we want. Life has to be perfect despite (and with) it's failings or else we are eating ourselves for existing.

I tend to think that the various ethical theories are good for pondering situations and trying to make good decisions, but I don't think any one of them is the best. I would say that the best is somewhat situational-dependent, and even actor-dependent -- so that the best-for-you may be different from the best-for-her, and the best-for-now may differ from the best-for-then, and that even if there are some situations where it may make sense to say that this is the best answer, I wouldn't commit to say that all situations are likewise so straightforward.

In short: We should think with normative theories, but not be ruled by them. At the end of the day you just have to judge what's the right course of action in the moment, and no ethical theory will remove the weight of choice.

Yes, I think you are giving it more nuance than it warrants. He even has graphs to show what he means. There is no middle ground. It's either eudaimonia or nothing. And he has said that eudaimonia, or flourishing, can only occur when someone is not suffering. Yet we all suffer at one time or another, and there are people suffering every moment, so, in terms of humanity and the world we live in, this cannot be perfection.

If it isn't perfect, it's not worth it. How else can that be interpreted? It clearly isn't perfect. Is anything? So, nothing then. Just like arguing against seatbelts, but on a grander scale.

If he thinks I've misinterpreted him or overlooked some nuance, he hasn't exactly put much effort into correcting me.

I'm tempted to say I have none, but will say virtue ethics for now.

I was about to write out something similar. I think you hit the nail on the head.

Right, so pain is not equivalent to suffering.

'Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children.'

The flaw I see in virtue ethics, is that it is, or maybe just is usually selfish. It's amazing that none of the ancient virtue ethicists thought "isn't slavery wrong?"

What's with these replies that consist of just a short sentence? They aren't helpful at all.

Okay, pain is not equivalent to suffering. Not sure I agree, but whatever, that might just be down to semantics. I don't see the supposed significance of raising that in response to my comment. Likewise with your previous comment.

The flaw I see in virtue ethics, is that it is, or maybe just is usually selfish. It's amazing that none of the ancient virtue ethicists thought "isn't slavery wrong?" — anonymous66

That's not a flaw in virtue ethics, it's a flaw with ancient virtue ethicists. And it's easy to point out flaws in some of the views of historical ethicists or how they lived their lives. The first example which comes to mind is John Locke regarding slavery, but there's also controversy regarding Nietzsche and his views on women, and Hume and his views on black people, and I'm sure there are others.

Under virtue ethics, you can ask what kind of person would keep a slave, and you can say that keeping slaves is indicative of vice.

'Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children.' — mcdoodle

"Perfect is the enemy of good", "Better a diamond with a flaw than a pebble without."

Under virtue ethics, you can ask what kind of person would keep a slave, and you can say that keeping slaves is indicative of vice. — Sapientia

What name would you give that vice? Edit: Perhaps justice is the virtue that is at issue? Hard to see one man owning another as being fair or just.